Weingel v. Commissioner of Social Security (SSA)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
MITCHELL BRUCE WEINGEL,
Plaintiff,
v.
FRANK BISIGNANO, Commissioner of
Social Security,
Defendant.
Case No. 24-cv-02111-BAS-DEB
ORDER:
(1) DENYING MOTION TO WAIVE
OVERPAYMENT (ECF No. 14);
AND
(2) AFFIRMING THE
COMMISSIONER’S DECISION
Plaintiff Mitchell Bruce Weingel is self-represented. In 2007, he started receiving
disability benefits from the Social Security Administration (“SSA”). Over the next decade,
Mr. Weingel made several attempts to return to work despite his disabling conditions. He
found some success working for the Department of the Navy in 2016. 	Then, starting in
2017, Mr. Weingel found lasting success working for the Defense Contract Management
Agency.
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Mr. Weingel’s return to work meant he was no longer eligible for disability benefits.
But there was a gap between when he started working and when the SSA realized his
benefits should stop. Ultimately, the agency determined that it overpaid Mr. Weingel by
$53,145.30—approximately twenty months of benefits.
Mr. Weingel asked the SSA to waive the requirement that he repay the extra benefits.
Although he has enough resources to make the repayment, Mr. Weingel submitted that
recovery would be against equity and good conscience. Mr. Weingel showed that he used
the extra benefits to support his elderly father, who was in a skilled nursing facility, and
his two adult sons, who needed help during challenging periods of their lives.
After 	a 	hearing, 	an 	Administrative 	Law 	Judge 	(“ALJ”) 	considered 	all 	the
circumstances of Mr. Weingel’s case and determined that the extra benefits should be
repaid. This ruling became the final decision of the Commissioner of the SSA,1 and Mr.
Weingel now appeals under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
The Court acknowledges that Mr. Weingel faced significant challenges while
navigating 	the 	transition 	from 	receiving 	disability 	benefits 	to 	returning 	to 	the
workforce. And the record does not reflect that he squandered the overpaid benefits or
exploited the disability system. 	Nevertheless, substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s
determination that requiring repayment would not be against equity and good conscience.
Mr. Weingel did not change his position for the worse or relinquish a valuable right in
reliance on the benefits. Further, evidence supports the ALJ’s conclusion that repayment
should not be waived under a broader concept of fairness. Accordingly, for the following
reasons, the Court DENIES Plaintiff’s Motion to Waive Overpayment and AFFIRMS the
Commissioner’s decision.
1 	In May 2025, Frank Bisignano became the Commissioner of Social Security. He is therefore
substituted as Defendant in this suit for Commissioner Martin O’Malley, who occupied the position when
this action commenced. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 25(d); 20 C.F.R. § 422.210(d) (stating where an action for
judicial review of a final decision by the Commissioner is instituted, “the person holding the Office of the
Commissioner shall, in his official capacity, be the proper defendant”).
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I. 	BACKGROUND
A. 	Overpayment of Benefits
In 2007, Mr. Weingel began receiving disability benefits under Title II of the Social
Security Act.2 (Administrative Record (“AR”) 162, ECF No. 7.) In 2008, he attempted to
return to work by testing his ability to work over the course of several months, which is
known as a trial work period under the SSA’s regulations. (AR 174.) See Lingenfelter v.
Astrue, 504 F.3d 1028, 1039 (9th Cir. 2007). 	During this period, a claimant like Mr.
Weingel is still considered disabled and receives benefits. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1592. Further,
the work performed during the trial period is not used as evidence that a disability has
ended until the claimant works for at least nine months, which do not have to be
consecutive. 	See id. 	Thus, “a trial work period is provided as an incentive for personal
rehabilitation efforts for disabled workers.” 	1 Social Security Claims and Procedures §
8:27 (6th ed. 2025).
By December 2008, Mr. Weingel had completed at least nine months of trial work.
(AR 179.) Therefore, the SSA determined that his disability had ended, but notified Mr.
Weingel that he was entitled to receive benefits for December 2008, plus an additional two
months, under the agency’s rules. (AR 178–80.) See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1592a.
In August 2009, however, Mr. Weingel again stopped working due to his disability
and requested that his benefits be reinstated. 	(AR 187, 240.) 	The SSA approved Mr.
Weingel’s request, so he again started receiving benefits from September 2009 onward
under his original entitlement to benefits. (AR 187.) In other words, Mr. Weingel did not
have to go back to square one. 	He quickly started receiving benefits again under his
original disability application. (See id.)
2 Under Title II, the Government provides disability benefits to individuals who have contributed
to the Social Security program and who, because of a medically determinable physical or mental
impairment, are unable to engage in substantial gainful work. 42 U.S.C. § 423(a), (d). Title II provides
benefits only while an individual’s statutory disability persists. Id. §§ 421(a), 423(a)(1).
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In April 2011, the SSA requested information about Mr. Weingel’s work activity.
(AR 194–95.) 	In May 2011, the agency notified Mr. Weingel that his benefits would
continue and requested that he “promptly report any changes which may affect [his]
benefits. Failure to do so could mean [he] may have to repay any benefits not due.” (AR
478.)
In October 2017, the SSA sought information about Mr. Weingel’s work activity
since January 2014. 	(AR 205.) 	A month later, Mr. Weingel submitted a Work Activity
Report with the requested information, which showed earnings for several months between
2013 and 2016. (AR 207–21; see also AR 471–72.)
In January 2018, the SSA notified Mr. Weingel that he may no longer be eligible for
benefits based on his work activity. 	(AR 226–29.) 	The SSA confirmed this outcome in
February 2018, stating that Mr. Weingel had been overpaid by $53,145.30 for the period
from May 2016 to January 2018. (AR 233.)
During the time when he was both working and receiving disability benefits, Mr.
Weingel made payments to support his elderly father and two adult sons. 	(AR 35–41.)
Among these expenses were payments to an assisted care facility for his father (AR 586–
88) and payments to his sons in connection with a divorce, restitution, a drug treatment
program, and other expenses (AR 37–41).
In March 2018, Mr. Weingel filed a request for reconsideration, where he disputed
that he was overpaid and at fault for causing the overpayment. (AR 238–57.) His request
for reconsideration was denied. 	(AR 258.) 	In August 2018, Mr. Weingel requested a
hearing with an ALJ. (AR 259–66.) The hearing was repeatedly delayed due to, among
other things, scheduling conflicts, the COVID-19 pandemic, and requests from Mr.
Weingel for time to seek counsel. (See generally AR 49–59, 60–63, 72–141, 274–77, 291–
359.) Ultimately, almost five years later, ALJ Howard Treblin held a hearing on the merits
on June 26, 2023. (AR 26.)
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B. 	Administrative Decision
On September 29, 2023, the ALJ issued an unfavorable decision, which concluded
that Mr. Weingel is responsible for repaying $53,145.30 in overpaid benefits. (AR 18.) In
reaching this outcome, the ALJ made five determinations.
First, the ALJ found that Mr. Weingel was overpaid. 	(AR 13–14.) 	The ALJ
reasoned that Mr. Weingel engaged in substantial gainful activity while working for the
Department of the Navy from May 2016 through December 2016, and then again while
working for the Defense Contract Management Agency from October 2017 through
January 2018—the end of the period at issue. (Id.) Mr. Weingel’s work during this period
“rendered him ineligible for disability benefits.” (AR 14.) But because his “benefits were
not stopped until February 2018, an overpayment of $53,145.30 was created during the
period from May 2016 through January 2018.” (Id.)
Second, the ALJ found that Mr. Weingel was without fault in causing the
overpayment. (AR 14–15.) Although Mr. Weingel claims that he fulfilled his obligation
to report his work activity to the SSA, the ALJ found this assertion is unsubstantiated. (AR
14.) 	Nevertheless, the ALJ acknowledged that multiple factors contributed to the
overpayment, including accounting errors made by Mr. Weingel’s employer in 2016. (AR
15.) Further, the ALJ addressed Mr. Weingel’s belief that he was entitled to a second trial
work period. (Id.) The ALJ explained that this belief was incorrect because Mr. Weingel’s
payments had been resumed in 2009 under his original entitlement to benefits. 	(Id.; see
also AR 14.) 	In other words, Mr. Weingel had already exhausted the full trial work
incentive for this period of disability. Even so, the ALJ gave Mr. Weingel the benefit of
the doubt and found he was not at fault for the overpayment. (AR 15.)
Third, the ALJ found that recovery of the overpayment would not defeat the
purposes of Title II of the Social Security Act. (AR 15.) The ALJ based this conclusion
on 	Mr. 	Weingel’s 	testimony 	demonstrating 	that 	he 	“has 	the 	means 	to 	repay 	the
overpayment based on his steady income (working for Defense Contract Management
Agency) and his assets and other material resources.” (Id.; see also AR 44–45.)
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Fourth, the ALJ found that recovery of the overpayment would not be against equity
and good conscience. (AR 15–18.) The ALJ found that Mr. Weingel did not change his
financial position for the worse because he did not incur a debt in reliance on the
overpayments and then “do something he would not have done, if he had not been entitled
to benefit payments.” (AR 16.) The ALJ also found that Mr. Weingel did not relinquish a
valuable right under the definition in 20 C.F.R. § 404.509. (Id.) Finally, the ALJ looked
to the Ninth Circuit’s guidance on this issue, which includes the general concept of fairness,
and found a broader inquiry likewise supports repayment of the benefits. 	(AR 16–17
(citing Quinlivan v. Sullivan, 916 F.2d 524 (9th Cir. 1990)).)
Overall, the ALJ concluded that waiving the statutory requirement for Mr. Weingel
to repay the benefits is not appropriate. 	(AR 18.) 	The Appeals Council denied Mr.
Weingel’s 	request 	for 	review, 	making 	the 	ALJ’s 	ruling 	the 	final 	decision 	of 	the
Commissioner. 	(AR 1–3.) 	Mr. Weingel now seeks judicial review, and the Court finds
this matter suitable for determination on the papers submitted and without oral argument.3
See Fed. R. Civ. P. 78(b); Civ. L.R. 7.1(d)(1).
II. 	LEGAL STANDARD
“Any individual, after any final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security
made after a hearing to which he was a party . . . may obtain a review of such decision.”
42 U.S.C. § 405(g). The district court may affirm, modify, or reverse the decision. Id.
“The district court reviews the Commissioner’s final decision for substantial
evidence, and the Commissioner’s decision will be disturbed only if it is not supported by
substantial evidence or is based on legal error.” 	Hill v. Astrue, 698 F.3d 1153, 1158 (9th
Cir. 2012). 	“Substantial evidence is ‘more than a mere scintilla but less than a
preponderance; it is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate
to support a conclusion.’” 	Id. (quoting Sandgathe v. Chater, 108 F.3d 978, 980 (9th Cir.
3 Because Mr. Weingel is proceeding pro se, the Court has held his pleadings to “less stringent
standards” than those drafted by lawyers in resolving this dispute. See, e.g., Stanard v. Dy, 88 F.4th 811,
818 n.4 (9th Cir. 2023) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)).
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1997)). The court must “consider the entire record as a whole, weighing both the evidence
that supports and the evidence that detracts from the Commissioner’s conclusion, and may
not affirm simply by isolating a specific quantum of supporting evidence.” 	Lingenfelter,
504 F.3d at 1035 (citation modified). 	“If the evidence ‘is susceptible to more than one
rational interpretation, it is the ALJ’s conclusion that must be upheld.’” Ford v. Saul, 950
F.3d 1141, 1154 (9th Cir. 2020) (quoting Burch v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 679 (9th Cir.
2005)).
III. 	ANALYSIS
Mr. Weingel challenges the ALJ’s finding that recovery of the overpayment would
not be against equity and good conscience. 	(See generally Mot., ECF No. 14.) 	Mr.
Weingel argues that because he was without fault in causing the overpayment, and because
he used the overpaid benefits to pay for his father’s elder care and expenses for his two
adult sons, recovery would be against equity and good conscience and thus should be
waived. (Id. at 13–15.)
When Title II benefits are overpaid, the law requires the SSA to recover the
overpayment “under regulations prescribed by the Commissioner of Social Security.” 42
U.S.C. § 404. “To recover overpayments, the Commissioner must show that the claimant
actually received benefits beyond the period of disability or in excess of the correct
amount.” 	McCarthy v. Apfel, 221 F.3d 1119, 1124 (9th Cir. 2000) (citing 42 U.S.C.
§ 404(a)).
After the SSA determines that benefits have been overpaid, the claimant may request
waiver of the recovery of the overpayment. 20 C.F.R. § 404.506(b); see also Califano v.
Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682, 686–87 (1979) (describing the general process for obtaining
review of an overpayment determination). 	To obtain a waiver, two conditions must be
satisfied: “(1) [the] claimant is without fault in receiving the payment, and (2) requiring
repayment would either defeat the purposes of Title II or would be against equity and good
conscience.” Quinlivan, 916 F.2d at 526 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 404(b)).
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A. 	Overpayment
The first step in determining whether a claimant is entitled to a waiver of repayment
is to confirm that an overpayment occurred. 	See McCarthy, 221 F.3d at 1124. 	The
Commissioner has the burden on this point. Id.
Here, as summarized above, the ALJ determined that Mr. Weingel was overpaid
$53,145.30 from May 2016 through January 2018 in light of his return to work. (AR 13–
14.) The record reflects these payments (AR 268–269), and Mr. Weingel has never taken
the position that he did not receive the money. 	The Court also agrees with the
Commissioner that, on appeal, “Plaintiff does not challenge the ALJ’s finding that he had
been overpaid, and instead argues that this overpayment should be waived.” (Opp’n 3–4,
ECF No. 15; accord Mot. 13–22.) 	Indeed, “[i]n the usual overpayment case, a claimant
does not contest the fact or amount of the overpayments.” 	McCarthy, 221 F.3d at 1124.
Nevertheless, 	the 	Court 	confirms 	that 	substantial 	evidence 	supports 	the 	ALJ’s
determination that Mr. Weingel was overpaid $53,145.30 in Title II benefits.
B. 	Without Fault
If the ALJ confirms that an overpayment occurred, the next step is to determine if
the claimant was without fault in receiving the payment. 	See 42 U.S.C. § 404(b);
McCarthy, 221 F.3d at 1126. “Fault” for this inquiry “applies only to the individual.” 20
C.F.R. § 404.507 (citation omitted). An individual is at fault for causing an overpayment
if: (1) he made an incorrect statement that he knew or should have known was incorrect;
(2) he failed to furnish material information to the SSA; or (3) he accepted a payment that
he knew or should have known was incorrect. Id.
On this point, the ALJ found in Mr. Weingel’s favor. The ALJ determined he was
without fault in causing the overpayment. (AR 14–15.) Thus, the Court considers whether
repayment should be waived.
C. 	Grounds for Waiver
The last step is to determine whether requiring repayment “would either defeat the
purposes of Title II or would be against equity and good conscience.” Quinlivan, 916 F.2d
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at 526. If either option applies, then the repayment requirement will be waived. 	42 U.S.C.
§ 404(b); 20 C.F.R. § 404.506(a).
1. 	Defeat the Purposes of Title II
The primary purpose of disability benefits under the Act is “to give financial
assistance to disabled persons because they are without the ability to sustain themselves.”
See Gamble v. Chater, 68 F.3d 319, 322 (9th Cir. 1995). 	Thus, the Commissioner’s
regulations provide that “recovery will defeat the purposes of Title II in . . . situations where
the person from whom recovery is sought needs substantially all of his current income
(including Social Security monthly benefits) to meet current ordinary and necessary living
expenses.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.508(b); see also Harrison v. Heckler, 746 F.2d 480, 483 (9th
Cir. 1984) (applying a comparable test for recovering overpaid Title XVI disability
benefits). For example, where a claimant was overpaid $5,282 but had sufficient assets to
make repayment, the Ninth Circuit reasoned that “the Commissioner could properly find
that recovery of the overpayment will not deprive [the claimant] of the means of meeting
his ordinary and necessary living expenses.” 	Newton v. Chater, 103 F.3d 139 (9th Cir.
1996) (memorandum disposition).
The ALJ concluded that requiring Mr. Weingel to repay the overpaid benefits would
not defeat the purposes of Title II. (AR 15.) Mr. Weingel testified that if he is required to
make repayment, doing so would not cause his monthly expenses to exceed his monthly
income:
ALJ: “[M]y concern is does paying back any aspect of that overpayment put
you in a financial disadvantage whereby your monthly income would then
drop below your monthly expenses[?]”
Mr. Weingel: “I can’t honestly say that it would.”
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(AR 44.)4 Therefore, substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s conclusion that repayment
would not defeat the purposes of Title II. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.508(b).
2. 	Against Equity and Good Conscience
Mr. Weingel’s core argument is that recovery of the overpayment would be against
equity and good conscience. (See Mot. 2.) To demonstrate that requiring repayment would
be inequitable, the claimant must show that he “changed his . . . position for the worse” or
“relinquished a valuable right” because he relied upon “a notice that a payment would be
made or because of the overpayment itself.” 	20 C.F.R. § 404.509(a)(1). 	The SSA’s
Program Operations Manual System (“POMS”) further explains: “To establish a change in
position for the worse, the beneficiary would have to show that he or she did something he
or she would not have done, but for the receipt of the overpaid benefits, not simply that he
or she had spent the benefits payments received.” 	Soc. Sec. Admin., POMS, GN
02250.150 pt. (B)(2).5
The circumstances in which individuals change their position for the worse include
moving into more expensive housing, increasing their debt, entering into a long-term
contract, reducing their income by reducing work hours or stopping working entirely, and
enrolling in school or training that requires payment of tuition. Soc. Sec. Admin., POMS,
GN 02250.150 pt. (E). 	Examples of relinquishing a valuable right include missing an
opportunity, turning down or being denied assistance, and changing employment. Id. at pt.
(F). To illustrate:
• 	“A widow, having been awarded benefits for herself and daughter, entered her
daughter in private school because the monthly benefits made this possible. After
4 The ALJ also offered Mr. Weingel the option of completing the SSA’s Request for Waiver form,
which would detail his monthly income, recurring expenses, and assets. (See AR 45.) 	Mr. Weingel
declined to provide this information. (Id.)
5 	POMS contains agency interpretations that “are entitled to respect, but only to the extent that
those interpretations have the power to persuade.” Lockwood v. Comm’r Soc. Sec. Admin., 616 F.3d 1068,
1073 (9th Cir. 2010) (citation modified); see also Kennedy v. Colvin, 738 F.3d 1172, 1177 (9th Cir. 2013)
(noting POMS does not impose judicially enforceable duties on courts or the ALJ). 	Thus, the Court
references the examples in POMS that are persuasive for interpreting 20 C.F.R. § 404.509, but those
examples are not exhaustive or controlling on this Court.
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the widow and her daughter received payments for almost a year, the deceased
worker was found to be not insured and all payments to the widow and child were
incorrect. The widow has no other funds with which to pay the daughter’s private
school expenses. Having entered the daughter in private school and thus incurred
a financial obligation toward which the benefits had been applied, she was in a
worse position financially than if she and her daughter had never been entitled to
benefits.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.509.
• 	“Tom purchased a more expensive home because he could afford the home based
on his benefit payments. Tom relied on the increased funds to meet his financial
commitment 	to 	purchase 	the 	house. 	He 	is 	unable 	to 	withdraw 	from 	the
commitment without incurring significant financial loss.” POMS, GN 02250.150
pt. (B)(2).
• 	“Sara declined a job because she believed the benefit payments would take care
of her monetary needs.” Id. pt. (B)(1).
In addition, the Ninth Circuit has reasoned that whether repayment is against equity
and good conscience under 42 U.S.C. § 404(b) is not strictly limited to the criteria set forth
in the regulations. 	Quinlivan, 916 F.2d at 527. In Quinlivan, the claimant was overpaid
benefits while incarcerated, and he was “unaware that Congress had changed the law to
prohibit payment of disability benefits to incarcerated felons.” 	Id. at 525. 	Upon being
released from custody, the claimant—who was diagnosed with schizophrenia—had “no
material goods, no means of transportation, and no income.” 	Id. 	He “spent his
accumulated savings, including the overpayment, on clothes, a used truck, and daily living
expenses.” 	Id. 	He later again qualified “for disability benefits because of a personality
disorder, a history of schizophrenia, blindness in one eye, and low back pain.” Id. at 526.
The Ninth Circuit held that requiring the claimant to repay the benefits would be
against equity and good conscience. Quinlivan, 916 F.2d at 527. The court reasoned that
“Congress intended a broad concept of fairness to apply to waiver requests, one that reflects
the ordinary meaning of the statutory language and takes into account the facts and
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circumstances of each case.” Id. And applying that broad fairness inquiry to the claimant’s
circumstances led to the conclusion that repayment “would be against equity and good
conscience as that phrase is commonly understood.” Id. at 527. However, the Ninth Circuit
also “emphasize[d] that [its] interpretation of the equity and good conscience standard does
not mean that whenever an individual is found to be without fault, it necessarily follows
that waiver is appropriate.” Id. Instead, “courts must apply cautiously the equity and good
conscience standard to the circumstances of each case.” Id.
In this case, the ALJ concluded: (i) Mr. Weingel did not change his position for the
worse; (ii) he did not relinquish a valuable right; (iii) a broad concept of fairness does not
support waiving recovery of the overpayment; and (iv) Mr. Weingel did not receive or rely
on misinformation from the SSA. 	The Court assesses whether substantial evidence
supports each determination.
i. 	Change in Position for the Worse
Mr. Weingel argues that his position changed for the worse because he took on a
financial burden in reliance on the overpaid benefits. 	(Mot. 13–14.) 	He contends his
decision to send money to his family is analogous to a long-term contract or commitment
described by the regulations and the agency’s guidance. 	(Id. at 14–15.) 	He points to
POMS, GN 02250.150, which provides “[a]n individual may have entered into a long-term
contract or commitment . . . based on the assumption of continued benefits, which could
result in financial difficulty had the benefits been later reduced or stopped.”
The ALJ reasoned that Mr. Weingel “did not ‘change his position for the worse’
because there is no showing that he reasonably relied on receiving benefit payments and
then decided to do something he would not have done, if he had not been entitled to benefit
payments.” (AR 16.) Instead, “as the claimant testified and the record indicates, he simply
would have paid his family members less if he had not been entitled to benefit payments.”
(Id.)
Substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s determination. For example, with respect
to Mr. Weingel’s support for his elderly father, the evidence shows Mr. Weingel
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contributed to his father’s assisted living facility from 2011 to 2021—during and after the
overpayment period. (AR 584–88.) After the extra benefits stopped in 2018, Mr. Weingel
continued making payments to the facility. (Id.) Nor does the record show Mr. Weingel
otherwise did something that he would not have done, but for the additional payments, to
his detriment. These circumstances can be rationally interpreted to show that Mr. Weingel
did not change his position for the worse in reliance on the extra benefits between 2016
and 2018. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.509(a)(1); see also Ford, 950 F.3d at 1154.
Mr. Weingel’s circumstances are also dissimilar from the scenarios found in the
regulations and the agency’s guidance. For instance, unlike the widow who enrolled her
daughter in private school “because the monthly benefits made this possible,” and who had
no other means to pay the tuition, Mr. Weingel has not demonstrated that there were no
other funds available to pay his father’s assisted living expenses during the overpayment
period. 	See 20 C.F.R. § 404.509. 	Mr. Weingel’s support of his two adult sons with
payments during challenging periods of their lives likewise does not fit into the agency’s
guidance. 	Mr. Weingel did not take on a debt, like a mortgage, where he “is unable to
withdraw from the commitment without incurring significant financial loss.” See POMS,
GN 02250.150 pt. (B)(2).
In short, the ALJ’s conclusion that Mr. Weingel did not change his position for the
worse is supported by substantial evidence. 	See Hill, 698 F.3d at 1158 (explaining that
“substantial evidence” requires “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept
as adequate to support a conclusion”).
ii. 	Relinquishment of a Valuable Right
Second, the ALJ concluded that Mr. Weingel did not relinquish a valuable right.
(AR 16.) 	The record supports this conclusion. 	Mr. Weingel did not give up his right to
employment, pass on state assistance, or miss some other opportunity because he relied on
the overpaid benefits. 	See 20 C.F.R. § 404.509(a)(1); POMS, GN 02250.150 pt. (F).
Instead, he chose to make payments to his family using the benefits. These circumstances
do not fit within the regulations. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.509 (providing examples that include
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“an individual [who] resigned from employment on the assumption he would receive
regular monthly benefit payments,” but because of his age, the individual was “unable to
get his job back and could not get any other employment”). Thus, substantial evidence
supports the ALJ’s conclusion that Mr. Weingel did not relinquish a valuable right in
reliance on the overpaid benefits.
iii. 	Broad Concept of Fairness
Third, the ALJ applied a broad principle of fairness to the specific facts of Mr.
Weingel’s case and concluded that requiring repayment would not be inequitable. 	(AR
16–17.) As in Quinlivan, the ALJ considered the nature of Mr. Weingel’s impairment and
found that the impairment did not affect Mr. Weingel’s ability to understand how his return
to work would affect his entitlement to disability benefits. (AR 17.) Cf. Higbee v. Sullivan,
975 F.2d 558, 561–63 (9th Cir. 1992) (reasoning it would be unfair to consider a claimant’s
failure to cooperate with the SSA where he suffered from a severe mental illness, had been
hospitalized six times, and did not understand how his disability benefits worked).
Further, the Court notes that Mr. Weingel’s circumstances are starkly different from
those considered in Quinlivan. There, as mentioned, the claimant had been incarcerated,
needed to spend the overpaid benefits for basic living expenses, and was unable to return
to employment. See Quinlivan, 916 F.2d at 526–27. At the time of the ALJ’s decision, the
claimant’s “sole source of income was $314 a month in state welfare benefits.” Id. at 524.
By contrast, as noted by the ALJ here, Mr. Weingel testified that he has the means to make
the repayment. (AR 17.) Mr. Weingel also declined to provide a complete picture of his
financial resources. 	(AR 45.) Cf. Newton, 103 F.3d at 139 (reasoning where claimant’s
assets exceeded the amount to be recovered, the Commissioner could properly find that
recovery would not be against equity and good conscience).
In short, the ALJ considered the nature of Mr. Weingel’s impairment and the factual
circumstances of his situation. There is enough evidence for a reasonable mind to accept
that requiring Mr. Weingel to repay the benefits is appropriate under a broad concept of
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fairness. 	See Quinlivan, 916 F.2d at 527. The ALJ’s determination therefore withstands
scrutiny under the substantial evidence standard. See Hill, 698 F.3d at 1158.
iv. 	Reliance on Erroneous Information
Last, the Court addresses Mr. Weingel’s argument that he received erroneous
information from the SSA, which led to the overpayment. (See Mot. 12; see also Reply 5.)
If 	an 	individual 	relies 	on 	erroneous 	information 	from 	the 	SSA 	in 	accepting 	the
overpayment, then the regulations deem that recovery would be against equity and good
conscience. 	20 C.F.R. § 404.512(a). 	This situation occurs when “an individual accepts
such overpayment because of reliance on erroneous information from an official source
within the Social Security Administration . . . with respect to the interpretation of a
pertinent provision of the Social Security Act or regulations pertaining thereto.”6 20 C.F.R.
§ 404.510a; see also Anderson v. Sullivan, 905 F.2d 1540 (9th Cir. 1990) (resolving
argument based on 20 C.F.R. § 404.510a).
Given that the erroneous information must relate to an interpretation of the Social
Security Act or its regulations, courts have reasoned that form letters notifying claimants
of 	their 	entitlement 	to 	benefits 	“do 	not 	purport 	to 	make 	any 	explicit 	or 	specific
interpretation” and cannot meet the standard for misinformation. 	See, e.g., Valley v.
Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 427 F.3d 388, 393 (6th Cir. 2005); Feenster v. Colvin, 220 F. Supp.
3d 123, 129 (D.D.C. 2016); see also Stone v. Berryhill, No. 17-cv-1952 (CRC), 2019 WL
1440130, at *1 (D.D.C. Apr. 1, 2019) (finding that two annual notices “informing [the
claimant] of retroactive increases in her monthly benefits” do not qualify as “official
interpretation[s]”). 	Indeed, if form letters or benefits statements “constituted official
interpretation[s] of the statute or regulations sufficient to trigger the good conscience
exception to repayment, virtually every Social Security benefit recipient would be entitled
6 	To be precise, this regulation addresses whether a claimant is “without fault” in causing the
overpayment, as opposed to whether repayment should be waived. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.510a. Here, the
ALJ found Mr. Weingel was without fault, but not on this basis, so Mr. Weingel was not entitled to an
automatic waiver. 	(See AR 14–15.) 	The ALJ nevertheless addressed Mr. Weingel’s misinformation
argument. (See AR 17–18.) The Court does the same here.
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to waiver of repayment assuming they received benefits of any kind and a letter describing
those benefits.” Valley, 427 F.3d at 393. Thus, more is required for 20 C.F.R. § 404.512(a)
to apply. See id.
Here, the ALJ found that Mr. Weingel did not rely on erroneous information from
the SSA in accepting the overpaid benefits. 	(See AR 17–18 (applying POMS guidance
based on C.F.R. § 404.510a).) Although Mr. Weingel claimed that he relied on incorrect
information provided by the SSA, the ALJ noted that there are no records of who Mr.
Weingel spoke to or which office advised him. 	(AR 	17; see also AR 32–33; AR 263.)
The ALJ further reasoned that Mr. Weingel’s reliance on a “May 22, 2011, notice that his
benefits would continue is also not a basis for misinformation.” 	(AR 17.) 	The ALJ
rationalized that Mr. Weingel had multiple work reviews that detailed the “rules and policy
regarding work while collecting disability benefits.” (Id.) Moreover, routine notices are
not enough to support a claim of misinformation. (Id.)
The Court will not overturn the ALJ’s decision. 	A review of the record does not
reveal the ALJ committed legal error, and there is substantial evidence to support the
conclusion that Mr. Weingel did not rely on erroneous information within the meaning of
20 C.F.R. § 404.510a. 	Hence, there is no basis to deem recovery of the overpayment as
against equity or good conscience under the regulations. See id. § 404.512(a).
* * *
Overall, substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s determination that Mr. Weingel did
not change his position for the worse or relinquish a valuable right, as well as the ALJ’s
determination that recovery of the overpayment would not violate a broad concept of
fairness. There is also substantial evidence to support the conclusion that Mr. Weingel did
not rely on erroneous information from the SSA. Hence, it is not appropriate to disturb the
Commissioner’s decision to deny the request to waive the recovery of the overpayment.
See Ford, 950 F.3d at 1153–54.
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D. 	Remaining Challenges
Beyond the core issues resolved above, Mr. Weingel raises several additional
grounds in support of his request that the Court “relinquish the obligation [that he] repay
the amount of the overpayment” or determine that “a substantial reduction” is appropriate.
(Mot. 21–22.) 	The Court has considered these supplementary issues, but they do not
change the outcome of this case for the reasons explained below.
Good Faith Negotiations. Mr. Weingel first argues that the Commissioner refused
to engage in good faith negotiations to settle this dispute. (Mot. 21; see also Reply 2–4.)
The Magistrate Judge’s Order Setting Briefing Schedule required that the “parties must
engage in good faith settlement negotiations to resolve the case.” (ECF No. 9.) The record
reflects that the parties engaged in negotiations, but the negotiations were not successful.
(See ECF Nos. 12, 13.) The Magistrate Judge’s Order did not mandate that a settlement be
reached. 	Cf. Delamater v. Anytime Fitness, Inc., 722 F. Supp. 2d 1168, 1180 (E.D. Cal.
2010) (“Although in a mediation, the parties may reach a settlement agreement, the parties
are not required to resolve their dispute.”). Further, even though this Court has the inherent
power to punish noncompliance with its orders, ruling against the Commissioner on this
basis would be “so harsh a penalty [that] it should be imposed as a sanction only in extreme
circumstances.” See Thompson v. Hous. Auth. of City of L.A., 782 F.2d 829, 831 (9th Cir.
1986). Extreme circumstances are not present here. Thus, this first argument is unavailing.
Bias. Mr. Weingel next argues that the SSA and the ALJ were biased against him
in various ways, which led to the unfavorable outcome. 	(Mot. 21.) 	When reviewing an
ALJ’s decision, there is “a presumption that the ALJ was unbiased.” Bayliss v. Barnhart,
427 F.3d 1211, 1215 (9th Cir. 2005). To rebut this presumption, the claimant must show
a “conflict of interest or some other specific reason for disqualification.” 	Rollins v.
Massanari, 261 F.3d 853, 857–58 (9th Cir. 2001). 	A claimant is “required to show that
the ALJ’s behavior, in the context of the whole case, was ‘so extreme as to display clear
inability to render fair judgment.’” 	Id. at 858 (quoting Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S.
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540, 555–56 (1994)). The claimant bears a “heavy burden” to show bias. Cope v. Colvin,
No. 2:15-CV-01744 JRC, 2016 WL 6439940, at *7 (W.D. Wash. Nov. 1, 2016).
Having 	considered 	Mr. 	Weingel’s 	allegations, 	they 	do 	not 	overcome 	the
presumption that the ALJ was unbiased. He fails to meet the heavy burden of showing that
the ALJ’s behavior displayed a conflict of interest or an inability to render fair judgment.
Rather, the record shows the ALJ asked open-ended questions, permitted Mr. Weingel to
submit additional evidence after the hearing, and invited Mr. Weingel to explain the issues
from his point of view. 	(See, e.g., AR 28 (“[I]n your words, what happened?”), AR 37
(“How is your receipt of the benefits, how does that lend itself to the claim of equity and
good conscience relative to the two sons?”); AR 40 (“If I gave you 30 days, would that be
enough to see if you could try to track that [additional information] down?”).) Mr. Weingel
“has pointed to nothing in the record that rises to th[e] level” of actionable bias. 	See
Rollins, 261 F.3d at 858. Thus, this argument is unpersuasive.
Obfuscating Policies, Failure to Consider Evidence, and Harm to Plaintiff. 	Mr.
Weingel’s remaining arguments are best considered together. 	He contends the SSA’s
policies and procedures “obfuscated and hampered” his ability to receive a favorable
outcome. (Mot. 21.) Further, Mr. Weingel claims the ALJ failed to give “adequate weight”
to Mr. Weingel’s evidence, and the SSA relied on “[i]ncorrect supporting information” in
reaching its decision. 	(Id.) 	Finally, Mr. Weingel argues that requiring repayment of the
overpaid benefits will cause him financial harm and potentially impact his ability to retire.
(Id. 22.)
Mr. Weingel’s contentions about difficult agency policies, the failure to consider
certain evidence, and the use of incorrect supporting information are all encompassed by
the substantial evidence standard described above. Under that standard, the Court cannot
decide this case from scratch or substitute its judgment for that of the ALJ and the SSA.
See, e.g., Hill, 698 F.3d at 1158. 	Rather, the Court’s review is limited to determining
whether there is enough evidence to support the Commissioner’s decision. 	Id. 	Because
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there is substantial evidence in the record to support the Commissioner’s determination
that the repayment obligation should not be waived, these arguments are unavailing.
Finally, the Court recognizes that requiring Mr. Weingel to repay a considerable sum
will negatively impact his financial circumstances. 	However, Congress has determined
that overpaid benefits should be recovered where it would not defeat the purpose of Title
II or be against equity and good conscience. 	42 U.S.C. § 404. 	“It is Congress, not this
Court, that balances those interests.” 	Cf. Rotkiske v. Klemm, 589 U.S. 8, 15 (2019).
Consequently, this final argument is not a basis for reversing the Commissioner’s decision.
See Treichler v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 775 F.3d 1090, 1098 (9th Cir. 2014) (“As
with other agency decisions, federal court review of social security determinations is
limited.”).
IV. 	CONCLUSION
For 	the 	foregoing 	reasons, 	the 	Court 	DENIES 	Plaintiff’s 	Motion 	to 	Waive
Overpayment (ECF No. 14) and AFFIRMS the Commissioner’s decision. The Clerk of
Court shall enter judgment in favor of the Commissioner and close the case.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: February 17, 2026
Hon. Cynthia Bashant, Chief Judge
United States District Court
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