Dalrada Precision Corp. et al v. Cox

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
DALRADA PRECISION CORP.,
Plaintiff,
v.
STUART COX,
Defendant.
Case No.: 24-cv-1122-AJB-DEB
ORDER
(Doc. Nos. 98, 103, 108, 119, 125)
Presently pending before the Court are five motions filed by Defendant Stuart Cox
(“Defendant”), appearing pro se. (Doc. Nos. 98; 103; 108; 119; 125.) Defendant has filed
a motion to vacate the settlement reached at the Early Neutral Evaluation (Doc. No. 98), a
supplemental motion to vacate the settlement (Doc. No. 103), a consolidated motion to
vacate the settlement (Doc. No. 108), a motion for sanctions (Doc. No. 119), and a motion
to reinstate a previously vacated hearing date (Doc. No. 125). The arguments throughout
these motions are substantially similar—Defendant moves to vacate the settlement
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) (see Doc. Nos. 98; 103; 108) and
Defendant seeks dismissal of the Complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction (see Doc. Nos.
103; 108). In Defendant’s fourth motion, he seeks sanctions against Plaintiffs Dalrada
Precision Corporation and Dalrada Financial Corporation (collectively, “Plaintiffs”), and
their counsel Fletcher Robbe and Andrew Jones (collectively, “Counsel”). (Doc. No. 119.)
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The crux of Defendant’s fifth motion is that he is prejudiced because he was denied access
to the Court when motions were submitted without oral argument. (Doc. No. 125.) This
motion also rehashes a number of Defendant’s previous arguments including a request for
sanctions and arguments related to opposing counsel’s pro hac vice status. (See id.)
Plaintiffs opposed each of the five motions. (Doc. Nos. 101; 104; 111; 120; 126.)
Defendant filed replies related to the motion to vacate the settlement (Doc. No. 102) and
the consolidated motion to vacate the settlement (Doc. No. 112). 	Pursuant to Civil Local
Rule 7.1.d.1, the Court finds the matters suitable for determination on the papers and
without oral argument.
I. 	BACKGROUND
Defendant is a citizen of the United Kingdom and currently resides in the
Philippines. (Doc. No. 1 ¶ 5.) Plaintiff Dalrada Precision Corp. is a California Corporation
with its principal place of business in Escondido, California. (Id. ¶ 3.) Plaintiff Dalrada
Financial Corporation is a Wyoming Corporation with its principal place of business also
in Escondido, California. (Id.) Plaintiffs allege that “[a]ll transactions subject to this
Complaint have taken place in the United States, State of California,” and “[u]pon
information and belief, Defendant Cox has had regular, continuous, and ongoing contact
with this jurisdiction.” (Id. ¶¶ 6, 7.)
In June 2019, Defendant was the sole owner/shareholder of Likido Limited
(“Likido”), a United Kingdom company with a physical plant location in Edinburgh,
Scottland. (Id. ¶ 8.) Likido produces and manufactures a commercial heat pump device
designed to conserve energy and lower utility costs. (Id. ¶ 9.)
Plaintiffs and Defendant entered into a Stock Purchase Agreement in December
2019, whereby Defendant effectively transferred ownership of Likido to Plaintiffs. (Id.
¶ 10; see also Doc. No. 1-2, Ex. A.) Defendant represented to Plaintiffs that Plaintiffs
would acquire all of Likido’s assets, including all pending Purchase Agreements from
customers that would not be completed until after the sale of the company. (Doc. No. 1
¶ 16.) Pursuant 	to the Stock 	Purchase Agreement, liabilities 	also transferred 	from
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Defendant to Plaintiffs. (Id. ¶ 24.) Additionally, Plaintiffs and Defendant entered into a
Consultant Agreement whereby Defendant would provide Plaintiffs with consulting
services for thirty-six months. (Id. ¶¶ 12, 26.)
According to Plaintiffs, as part of his “sales pitch,” Defendant relied upon Likido’s
contract with a company known as MAPtech. (Id. ¶ 17.) MAPtech and Likido negotiated
and agreed that MAPtech would purchase industrial chilling systems from Likido. (Id.)
Plaintiffs allege that Defendant misrepresented the MAPtech contract, indicating that the
contract would be profitable for Plaintiffs. (Id. ¶ 20.) But because Defendant was the sole
owner of Likido at the time the MAPtech contract was entered into, all monies paid by
MAPtech were paid into Defendant’s personal bank account. (Id. ¶ 18.) Allegedly,
MAPtech never received the chilling systems and Plaintiffs contend that Defendant had no
ability to perform his part of the agreement. (Id. ¶ 19.) Plaintiffs allege that Defendant
never informed Plaintiffs that he received the payment from MAPtech, nor that he was
unable to manufacture the units for MAPtech. (Id. ¶ 21.)
After Likido failed to produce and deliver the chilling units, MAPtech filed a Notice
of Arbitration in the United Kingdom alleging conversion, fraudulent misrepresentation,
breach of contract, and unjust enrichment. (Id. ¶ 25.) On January 10, 2023, the Arbitrator
issued its award in favor of MAPtech in the amount of $429,987.98, including interest. (Id.
¶ 25.) Because Plaintiffs assumed Likido’s liabilities, this award became Plaintiffs’ debt.
(Id. ¶¶ 24, 25.)
Plaintiffs 	allege 	that 	beginning 	in 	May 	2022, 	Defendant’s 	behavior 	became
“unpredictable and bizarre.” (Id. ¶ 27.) According to the Complaint, Defendant sent
“threatening and, at times, vulgar” emails to a potential customer. (Id. ¶ 28) Plaintiffs then
determined that Defendant’s employment with Plaintiffs needed to end. (Id. ¶ 30.) Plaintiffs
offered Defendant a six-month paid leave with any future relationship to be discusses after
the leave. (Id.) Defendant’s leave and associated payments to him ceased on February 23,
2023. (Id. ¶ 31.)
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Plaintiffs now bring the instant action alleging eight causes of action: (1) fraudulent
misrepresentation, (2) fraudulent concealment, (3) fraudulent inducement, (4) breach of
contract, (5) unjust enrichment, (6) injunctive relief, (7) defamation, and (8) violations of
Business and Professions Code §§ 17200–17207.
II. 	LEGAL STANDARDS
A. 	Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2)
An action is subject to dismissal if the Court lacks personal jurisdiction over
defendant. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2). Where there is no federal statute applicable to
determine personal jurisdiction, a district court should apply the personal jurisdiction law
of the state where the federal court sits. See Schwarzenegger v. Fred Martin Motor Co.,
374 F.3d 797, 800 (9th Cir. 2004). California law requires only that the exercise of personal
jurisdiction comply with federal due process requirements. See id. at 800–01. Personal
jurisdiction over a defendant that does not reside in the forum state may be exercised
consistent with due process if the defendant has either a continuous and systematic
presence in the state (general jurisdiction), or minimum contacts with the forum state such
that the exercise of jurisdiction “does not offend traditional notions of fair play and
substantial justice” (specific jurisdiction). See Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310,
316 (1946) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
III. 	DISCUSSION
A. 	Personal Jurisdiction
For the Court to properly exercise specific personal jurisdiction in accordance with
due 	process, 	the 	defendant 	must 	have “minimum 	contacts” with 	the 	forum 	state.
International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945). To establish minimum
contacts, the court relies on the Dole factors: (1) The non-resident defendant must
purposefully direct his activities or consummate some transaction with the forum or
resident thereof; or perform some act by which he purposefully avails himself of the
privileges of conducting activities in the forum, thereby invoking the benefits and
protections of its laws; (2) the claim must be one which arises out of or relates to the
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defendant’s forum-related activities; and (3) the exercise of jurisdiction must comport with
fair play and substantial justice, i.e. it must be reasonable. Dole Food Co. v. Watts, 303
F.3d 1104, 1111 (9th Cir. 2002). The minimum contacts inquiry “looks to the defendant’s
contacts with the forum State itself, not the defendant’s contacts with persons who reside
there,” emphasizing that “it is the defendant’s conduct that must form the necessary
connection with the forum State.” Walden v. Fiore, 571 U.S. 277, 285 (2014); see also
Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court, 582 U.S. 255, 262 (2017). If the plaintiff
successfully bears the burden of meeting the first two prongs, then the defendant shoulders
the burden of the final prong. Schwarzenegger v. Fred Martin Motor Co., 374 F.3d 797,
802 (9th Cir. 2003).
“[A] contract alone does not automatically establish minimum contacts in the
plaintiff’s home forum.” Boschetto v. Hansing, 539 F.3d 1011, 1017 (9th Cir. 2008); see
also Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 478 (1985). Rather, to determine
whether the defendant “purposefully established minimum contacts within the forum,” the
court considers “prior negotiations and contemplated future consequences, along with the
terms of the contract and the parties’ actual course of dealing.” Burger King, 471 U.S. at
479.
In their opposition, Plaintiffs contend that “this Court has specific personal
jurisdiction over this Defendant based upon his deliberate contacts with California, which
gave rise to Plaintiff’s claims.” (Doc. No. 111 at 1.) Plaintiffs state that Defendant made
numerous trips to California to conduct business as part of his employment contract and
the consulting agreement. (Id. at 4.) And Defendant’s payroll came directly and solely from
Plaintiffs’ California banks. (Id.) However, none of these allegations are in Plaintiffs’
Complaint. (See generally Doc. No. 1.) And even if they were, these conclusory allegations
are insufficient to establish personal jurisdiction over Defendant.
Two Ninth Circuit cases are relevant here. In Picot, the Ninth Circuit affirmed a
California district court’s motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. Picot v.
Weston, 780 F.3d 1206 (9th Cir. 2015). Even though a Wisconsin defendant entered into a
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contract with a California plaintiff, that was not enough to establish specific personal
jurisdiction over the defendant in California for the contract and tort claims. See id. at 1213.
Likewise, in Davis, the Ninth Circuit affirmed an Idaho district court’s motion to dismiss
for lack of personal jurisdiction. Davis v. Cranfield Aerospace Sols., Ltd., 71 F.4th 1154,
1163 (9th Cir. 2023), cert. denied, 144 S. Ct. 826 (2024). There, although an English
corporation entered into a contract with an Idaho corporation, personal jurisdiction in Idaho
was not justified. Upon review, the Ninth Circuit reasoned:
While Tamarack is an Idaho resident, there’s no evidence that Cranfield
sought out Tamarack in Idaho or benefitted from Tamarack’s residence in
Idaho. 	Neither 	the 	contract’s 	negotiations, 	terms, 	nor 	contemplated
consequences establish that Cranfield formed a substantial connection with
Idaho. And while the course of dealings show that Cranfield employees
entered Idaho several times, those transitory trips into the forum state do not
sufficiently reflect purposeful availment.
Davis, 71 F.4th at 1163.
Similar to the facts of Davis, there is no evidence that Defendant sought out Plaintiffs
in California or benefitted Plaintiffs’ California residence. And unlike the facts in Davis,
the Complaint here does not allege that Defendant ever entered California.1 Plaintiffs do
not allege that Defendant reached out to Plaintiffs in California to initiate any contract
negotiations, nor do Plaintiffs allege that any contract negotiations occurred in California.
Moreover, Plaintiffs fail to allege that Defendant harmed them in California. See Morrill
v. Scott Fin. Corp., 873 F.3d 1136, 1144 (“Harm suffered in the forum state is a necessary
element in establishing purposeful direction.”) As alleged, the harm to Plaintiffs occurred
in the United Kingdom, where the arbitration award was entered against Likido. As to any
reputational harm Plaintiffs may have suffered because of Defendant, it is unclear form the
Complaint where these harms were suffered. Purportedly, Defendant told “Anthony
Pagnotti, Brian McGoff, Kyle McCollum and Stephanie Moya” that Plaintiffs and
1 Although Plaintiffs’ opposition alleges Defendant visited California (Doc. No. 111 at 3), those
allegations are not in the Complaint.
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members of their staff were “hangerons” and “wankers.” (Doc. No. 1 ¶ 83.) However, the
Complaint is devoid of any facts relating to where any of these individuals are located, or
what concrete harm was suffered because of these statements. Indeed, the Complaint does
not allege any loss of business in California as a result Defendant’s actions.
Plaintiffs attempt to rely on the forum selection clause in the Consultant Agreement.
(See Doc. No. 1-2, Ex. F at 84.) However, the Complaint does not allege a breach of the
Consultant Agreement. The Complaint only alleges a breach of the Stock Purchase
Agreement. (Doc. No. 1 ¶¶ 57–67.) Notably, the Stock Purchase Agreement—the only
contract which Plaintiffs allege Defendant breached—provides that any dispute arising out
of it “shall be settled by submission to the Scottish Arbitration Center for binding
arbitration to be conducted in the city of Edinburgh.” (Doc. No. 1-2, Ex. F at 19.) And that
the “agreement shall be governed by the laws of the United Kingdom as applicable in
Scottland.”
Accordingly, the Complaint’s threadbare and conclusory allegations are insufficient
to satisfy Plaintiffs’ burden—Plaintiffs do not establish that Defendant purposefully
availed himself of this forum. Given that Plaintiffs cannot satisfy the first Dole factor,
Plaintiffs cannot carry their burden to justify the Court’s exercise of specific personal
jurisdiction.2 Thus, the Court DISMISSES WITHOUT PREJUDICE the claims against
Defendant Cox for lack of personal jurisdiction.
///
///
2 Given that the Court finds no purposeful availment, the Court declines to analyze the remaining Dole
factors. Moreover, to the extent Plaintiff alleges a different analysis for its contract and tort claims, the
Ninth Circuit cautions against drawing a fine distinction between the two tests, stating “there’s no need to
adhere to an iron-clad doctrinal dichotomy to analyze specific jurisdiction.” Davis, 71 F.4th at 1162
(“[W]hen considering specific jurisdiction, courts should comprehensively evaluate the extent of the
defendant’s contacts with the forum state and those contacts’ relationship to the plaintiffs’ claims—which
may mean looking at both purposeful availment and purposeful direction.”). Given the lack of contacts
outside the contractual hook, the Court determines that the jurisdictional analysis for both the contract and
tort claims points to the same result.
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B. 	Settlement Agreement
Turning to Defendant’s request to vacate the settlement reached at the Early Neutral
Evaluation (“ENE”). (Doc. Nos. 98; 103; 108.) On March 27, 2025, the parties participated
in an ENE with the assigned Magistrate Judge. (Doc. No. 81.) On April 9, 2025, the parties
participated in a continued ENE. (Doc. No. 87.) At the April 9 ENE, “the parties settled all
claims.” (Id.) Defendant now seeks to vacate the settlement pursuant to Rule 60(b) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. (Doc. Nos. 98; 103; 108.) Defendant contends that he
entered into the settlement under duress and unfair circumstances. (Doc. No. 98 at 4.)
Defendant argues that his pro se status and residence outside of the United States hindered
his ability to meaningfully participate in the ENE. (Id. at 4–5.)
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) allows the court to relieve a party or a party’s
legal representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding. Under Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 60, “the court may relieve a party . . . from a final judgment, order, or
proceeding for the following reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable
neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence . . .; (3) fraud . . ., misrepresentation, or misconduct
by an opposing party; (4) the judgment is void; (5) the judgment has been satisfied,
released, or discharged; . . . or (6) any other reason that justifies relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
60(b).
Here, no final judgment has been entered, nor has there been an order of dismissal.
Therefore, Rule 60(b) is not applicable. See Lovell v. Union City Police Dep’t, No. 17-
1039-JDT-EGB, 2018 WL 1470262, at *1 n.2 (W.D. Tenn. Mar. 26, 2018) (finding Rule
60(b) not applicable to vacate a settlement agreement because there was no final judgment
or order of dismissal entered). Nevertheless, “Rule 60(b)(1) is not intended to remedy the
effects of a litigation decision that a party later comes to regret . . . .” Latshaw v. Trainer
Wortham & Co., Inc., 452 F.3d 1097, 1101 (9th Cir. 2006). Rather, parties are “bound by
and accountable for the deliberate actions of themselves and their chosen counsel.” Id.;
Engleson v. Burlington Northern R. Co, 972 F.2d 1038, 1043 (9th Cir. 1992) (“Neither
ignorance nor carelessness on the part of the litigant or his attorney provide grounds for
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relief under Rule 60(b)(1).”) Furthermore, a misunderstanding of the legal consequences
of agreeing to a settlement agreement is not a basis for setting aside an accepted settlement.
See id. (rejecting argument that Rule 68 judgment should be vacated because plaintiff “did
not possess sufficient understanding to have ever validly accepted the offer.”); Latshaw v.
Trainer Wortham & Co., 452 F.3d 1097, 1099 (9th Cir. 2006) (“Rule 60(b) is not intended
to remedy the effects of a deliberate and independent litigation decision that a party later
comes to regret through second thoughts or subsequently-gained knowledge . . . .” Under
Rule 	60(b)(3), 	a 	district 	court 	may 	relieve 	a 	party 	from 	an 	order 	for 	fraud,
misrepresentation, or misconduct by an opposing party. Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(3); Hyler v.
Inv. Grade Loans, Inc., No. C 07-03180 WHA, 2008 WL 4279689, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Sept.
12, 2008), aff’d, 362 F. App'x 652 (9th Cir. 2010). “To prevail, the moving party must
prove by clear and convincing evidence that the verdict was obtained through fraud,
misrepresentation, or other misconduct and the conduct complained of prevented the losing
party from fully and fairly presenting the defense.” Casey v. Albertson’s Inc., 362 F.3d
1254, 1260 (9th Cir. 2004) (emphasis added) (quoting De Saracho v. Custom Food Mach.,
Inc., 206 F.3d 874, 880 (9th Cir. 2000)).
Liberally construed, Plaintiff’s motion simply argues that he was disadvantaged
because he had to participate in the ENE while residing out of the country, and that as a
pro se litigant he did not find out about the ENE deadlines until a couple of weeks before
the ENE.3 (Doc. No. 98 at 4–5.) These allegations are not sufficient to set aside the
3 Defendant’s allegation that Plaintiffs’ counsel improperly attempted to “initiate off-record settlement
discussions” is without merit. (Doc. No. 98 at 5.) While an attorney, of course, may not ethically
communicate with a person the attorney knows to be represented by counsel about the subject matter of
the representation without the consent of such person’s counsel, nor may an attorney give legal advice to
an unrepresented person (see Rule 4.2 of the California Rules of Professional Conduct), there is no
prohibition against an attorney communicating with an unrepresented party.
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settlement. That said, Plaintiffs have not moved to enforce the settlement agreement.4 Thus,
the Court will neither set aside nor enforce the settlement agreement at this time.
Defendant’s Motions to Vacate the Settlement are DENIED. (Doc. Nos. 98; 103; 108.)
C. 	Sanctions
Defendant moves for sanctions under Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure alleging that Plaintiffs and their counsel “have made false representations to this
Court.” (Doc. No. 119 at 1.) In opposition, Plaintiffs contend that Defendant’s allegations
“are completely false” (Doc. No. 120 at 3) and his request for sanctions is not supported
by the facts of this case (id. at 5). The Court agrees.
The 	Ninth 	Circuit 	has 	identified 	two 	circumstances 	in 	which 	sanctions 	are
appropriate, “where a litigant makes a ‘frivolous filing,’ that is, where he files a pleading
or other paper which no competent attorney could believe was well grounded in fact and
warranted by law; and where a litigant files a pleading or other paper for an ‘improper
purpose,’ such as personal or economic harassment.” Mir v. Little Co. of Mary Hosp., 844
F.2d 646, 652 (9th Cir. 1990). The Court finds Plaintiffs’ Complaint was neither frivolous,
nor filed for an improper purpose. Accordingly, the Court denies Defendant’s motions for
sanctions. (Doc. Nos. 119; 125.)
D. 	Request to Reinstate Hearing
Defendant seeks to have the December 4, 2025 Hearing reinstated. (Doc. No. 125.)
Plaintiffs opposed the request. (Doc. No. 126.) Defendant’s request is DENIED. (Doc. No.
125.) 	The 	Court, 	in 	its 	discretion, 	may 	decide 	a 	motion 	without 	oral 	argument.
CivLR 7.1.d.1.
IV. 	CONCLUSION
For the forgoing reasons, the Court ORDERS as follows:
4 Plaintiffs filed a motion to enforce the settlement on May 15, 2025, but withdrew the motion the same
day. (Doc. Nos. 96; 97.)
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1. 	The Court GRANTS Defendant’s motions to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(2)
WITH LEAVE TO AMEND. Should Plaintiffs choose to do so, they may file an
Amended Complaint by January 29, 2026. Defendant must file a responsive pleading no
later than February 13, 2026.
2. 	The Court DENIES Defendant’s motion to vacate the settlement.
3. 	The Court DENIES Defendant’s motion for sanctions.
4. 	The Court DENIES Defendant’s request to reinstate the December 4, 2025
hearing date.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: January 16, 2026
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