Pardo et al v. The County of San Diego et al

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
FRANCISCO S. PARDO, M.D.;
RICARDO JOAQUIN; FRANCISCO
PARDO; MARIA-AMELIA PARDO; and
VICTOR PARDO,
Plaintiffs,
v.
THE COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO, et al.,
Defendants.
Case No.: 24-CV-1062 JLS (SBC)
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S
MOTION TO DISMISS
PLAINTIFFS’ THIRD AMENDED
COMPLAINT
(ECF No. 28)
Presently before the Court are Defendant County of San Diego’s (“County”) Motion
to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ Third Amended Complaint (“Mot.,” ECF No. 28). Also before the
Court 	are 	Plaintiffs 	Francisco 	S. 	Pardo’s, 	Ricardo 	Joaquin’s, 	Francisco 	Pardo’s,
Maria-Amelia Pardo’s, and Victor Pardo’s (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) Opposition to the
Motion (“Opp’n,” ECF No. 29) and the County’s Reply (“Reply,” ECF No. 30). Having
considered the Parties’ arguments, Plaintiffs’ Third Amended Complaint (“TAC,” ECF
No. 27), and the law, the Court GRANTS the County’s Motion.
/ / /
/ / /
/ / /
/ / /
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BACKGROUND
I. 	Factual Background
Dr. 	Francisco 	S. 	Pardo 	is 	the 	biological 	father 	of 	triplets 	Francisco 	Pardo,
Maria-Amelia Pardo, and Victor Pardo, all of whom were minors at the time of the events
in question. 	TAC ¶¶ 4–6. 	At that time, the Pardos all resided in the same home as
Dr. Pardo’s husband, Ricardo Joaquin. 	See id. ¶ 19. This case arises out of the County’s
attempted removal of the Pardo triplets from that home on May 12, 2022, a removal that
Plaintiffs contend was animated by homophobic animus. Id. ¶ 34.
Before the County’s involvement with the family, the triplets, “who suffer from
psychological conditions and drug use,” were “being treated by licensed psychiatrists,
psychologists, attending counseling, and were enrolled in behavioral and rehabilitation
programs.” Id. ¶ 21. Francisco Pardo and Ricardo Joaquin (the “Parents”) “routinely met
with the triplets’ treating physicians, counselors, school officials, and other outside
assistance.” Id. ¶ 22. The Parents had a “disagreement” with the then-treating psychiatrist
“about the adequacy of care one of the triplets was receiving” and the “County-contracted
psychiatrist’s office” contacted the County of San Diego Department of Health and Human
Services (“DHHS”) who assigned a Child Welfare Services (“CWS”) to investigate
potential abuse or neglect. Id. ¶ 24.
One of those assigned was Defendant Reina Lopez, a CWS social worker. Id. ¶ 25.
Plaintiffs allege that Lopez was responsible for “unsubstantiated accusations of emotional
abuse being committed by the parents” “born out of Lopez’s animus towards same sex
parents, and her belief that children should be raised by heterosexual parents.” 	Id. ¶ 26.
Plaintiffs allege a laundry list of discriminatory actions committed by Lopez through her
investigation, including attempting to “elicit false information from the then-minor
children by twisting their words and manipulating their recollections to substantiate
grounds of abuse,” repeatedly contacting the triplets despite their refusal to speak with her,
and failing to consider the triplets’ underlying psychological disorders and psychosis. Id.
¶¶ 27–31.
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Plaintiffs allege that Lopez, along with a student of hers, and four police officers,
arrived at the Pardo home on May 12, 2022, attempting to remove the Pardo triplets. 	Id.
¶ 34. 	By Plaintiffs’ account, the removal attempt was unsuccessful due to the lack of a
signed warrant, though it prompted the County to schedule a detention hearing for the
following Monday, May 16, 2022. 	Id. ¶¶ 39–41. 	In preparation for this hearing, the
Parents requested access to their CWS file but allege that Defendants failed to produce the
necessary documents. 	Id. ¶ 40. 	At this hearing, “the court determined that it was in the
best interest of the children to remain in the family home.”1 Id. ¶ 41. The Parents allegedly
again requested a copy of their CWS file, but the Defendants only provided the Child
Family Teen (“CFT”) report created by Defendant Lonnie Lou, Lopez’s supervisor. 	Id.
¶ 42. 	This CFT report “contained derogatory comments regarding their sexuality.” 	Id.
The County reported both Dr. Pardo and his husband to the Child Abuse Central Index
(“CACI”), an electronic database compiling “substantiated cases of physical abuse, sexual
abuse, mental/emotional abuse, and/or severe neglect of a child.”2 Id. ¶ 48. The Parents
were “denied their requests for a grievance hearing” and “denied access to documents
related to the CACI reporting.” Id.
On June 17, 2022, Defendants Lou and Ruff “scheduled a CFT meeting” to
“discuss the allegations against the parents.” Id. ¶ 43. The County facilitator responsible
for the meeting allegedly did not appear, and the meeting was never rescheduled as
promised. Id. The Parents made “multiple follow-up requests” for the CWS file including
through two attorneys representing the Parents. Id. In July or August of 2022, the Parents
were informed by counsel in a related juvenile detention hearing that the planned hearings
“were being impeded from proceeding in a timely fashion because County Counsel was
‘paranoid’ (or words to that effect) and would not produce discovery . . . because of
1 The Court notes that some factual allegations differ between the TAC and the Second Amended
Complaint (“SAC,” ECF No. 19). 	Specifically, that Joaquin, Dr. Pardo’s husband, was ordered at this
hearing to keep his distance from the home and resided at a nearby hotel for about two months. SAC ¶ 29.
2 See Child Abuse Central Index, State of Cal. Dep’t of Just., https://oag.ca.gov/childabuse (last visited
January 6, 2026).
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litigation, or anticipated litigation.” Id. ¶ 45.
The County continued to investigate the allegations of abuse by conversing with
neighbors and school counselors—including discussion of the alleged emotional abuse and
alleged discussion that children should be in the custody of their mother, that men lack
maternal instincts and are inherently abusive, and that the children are at risk if raised by
same-sex fathers. Id. ¶¶ 50–51. Placement in CACI and these discussions with community
members, per Plaintiffs, has caused Dr. Pardo and his husband humiliation and has harmed
their career prospects. Id. ¶¶ 51–53.
They also allege that the Pardo triplets, who have each suffered from mental health
challenges dating back to March 2022, have seen their emotional condition deteriorate in
the aftermath of the attempted removal. 	Id. ¶¶ 53–55. All three triplets, according to the
TAC, have increased their use of controlled substances and experienced heightened anxiety
and depression. 	Id. 	As illustrative examples of the triplets’ emotional state, one of the
sons suffered his first episode of psychosis after the CWS investigation and the other son
stopped attending counseling and school. Id. ¶ 54.
Plaintiffs allege that throughout this investigation and afterwards they “individually
and by and through their legal representatives made numerous requests for a complete copy
of their CWS file, but to no avail”—concluding that the Defendants acted in bad faith. Id.
¶ 56. On June 1, 2023, Plaintiffs “urgently drove to the CWS records administrative offices
to obtain a copy of the CWS records needed to file a lawsuit before the statute of limitations
expired.” Id. ¶ 57. These records were never received. Id. Further, Plaintiffs allege that
they “made multiple requests and visited the County offices to obtain a copy of the CACI
report to defend against the abuse allegations.” 	Id. ¶ 58. 	Plaintiffs conclude that the
Defendants’ failure to respond or act on these requests for information is in bad faith and
retaliatory, causing them extreme emotional distress and impacting their professional
licenses, ability to obtain insurance and make a living, and reputation. Id. ¶ 61.
II. 	Procedural Background
Plaintiffs’ efforts to litigate this case began in San Diego County Superior Court.
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There, on July 3, 2023, Plaintiffs filed suit against the County and the same County
employees that are named as Defendants in this action. 	See ECF No. 22-2, Ex. B.3 That
case asserted a host of violations of state law, including, inter alia, the Unruh Civil Rights
Act, several provisions of the California Welfare and Institutions Code, and the California
Government Code. 	See id. 	Nearly a year later, on June 21, 2024, Plaintiffs voluntarily
dismissed the entire state court action without prejudice following a case management
conference. See ECF No. 22-2, Ex. D.
The instant case began on June 20, 2024, the day before the state court case was
voluntarily dismissed. 	See ECF No. 1. 	The County moved to dismiss that Complaint—
which is, as far as the Court can tell, identical to the state court complaint—but Plaintiffs
failed to oppose the County’s Motion, so the Court granted the Motion under the factors
set forth in Ghazali v. Moran, 46 F.3d 52 (9th Cir. 1995). See ECF No. 7. Plaintiffs were
given fourteen days to file an amended complaint, which they did on September 3, 2024.
ECF No. 8.
The second iteration followed a similar course when Plaintiffs, again, failed to
oppose the County’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint. 	See
generally Docket. Plaintiffs’ counsel represented that he had never received notice of the
Motion—blaming the County for making a typographical error. See ECF Nos. 12, 13. The
Court, like the County, found Plaintiffs’ counsel’s “excuse . . . less than convincing.” ECF
No. 15 at 2. After discussing why the typographical error was unlikely to be the cause of
Plaintiffs’ lack of notice of the Motion, the Court granted Plaintiffs the opportunity to cure
their repeated failures to participate in the action by filing both an opposition to the
County’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint as well as “a more
detailed explanation for [Plaintiffs’] failure to oppose the Motion.” 	Id. 	In so doing, the
Court warned Plaintiffs that their “fail[ure] to oppose the Motion or provide justification
3 The Court took judicial notice of the state court filing in its previous Order. See ECF No. 26 at 4 n.1.
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for their multiple filing failures” would result in dismissal of the case. Id. at 3–4.
Plaintiffs then filed an Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss but failed to file the
explanation that was also ordered by the Court. See ECF No. 16. The County submitted a
Reply highlighting the failure, see ECF No. 17, but again, the Court merely dismissed the
First Amended Complaint without prejudice under the Ghazali factors, see ECF No. 18.
The Court expressed its unmitigated displeasure with Plaintiffs’ incessant failures to abide
by Court orders, but recognizing the strong public policy in favor of disposing of cases on
the merits, the Court granted Plaintiffs one more opportunity. Id. at 7 (citing Citizens Utils.
Co. v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 595 F.2d 1171, 1174 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 931
(1979)). To that end, Plaintiffs were given fourteen days to file another amended complaint
along with the previously ordered explanation that had not been filed. Id. at 8.
Plaintiffs timely filed a Second Amended Complaint (“SAC,” ECF No. 19),
alongside a two-page declaration by Plaintiffs’ counsel regarding his failure to file the prior
oppositions (ECF No. 19-5). The factual allegations in the SAC continued to mirror those
of the state court complaint and the prior Complaints filed in this action, but Plaintiffs
added four claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in addition to an assortment of state law claims.
See SAC ¶¶ 43–71. The County filed a Motion to Dismiss the SAC (ECF No. 22) arguing
that Plaintiffs’ counsel’s explanations concerning his repeated filing failures remain
inadequate and that the newly pled Section 1983 claims are time-barred. Plaintiffs filed a
timely Opposition, and the County filed a timely Reply. See ECF Nos. 23, 25.
On July 10, 2025, the Court granted the County’s Motion to Dismiss the SAC
(“Order,” ECF No. 26) allowing Plaintiffs leave to amend. The Court declined to dismiss
the case under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b) based on Plaintiffs’ “continued refusal
to meaningfully grapple with their mismanagement of this case” “out of deference to the
public policy favoring disposition of cases on their merits.” Order at 8–9 (quoting Citizens
Utils. Co., 595 F.2d at 1174). In considering the statute of limitations argument, the Court
found that Plaintiffs’ SAC related back to the filing date of their original federal Complaint,
June 20, 2024. 	Id. at 11. 	The Court, addressing the County’s argument that the § 1983
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claims were time barred even if the June 2024 date was operative, concluded that the
continuing violation doctrine was inapplicable because Plaintiffs were not asserting hostile
work environment claims or class-wide pattern-or-practice claims. 	Id. at 12. 	The Court
found that “[b]ecause Plaintiffs filed their Complaint on June 20, 2024, they must seek
relief on the basis of a discrete, discriminatory act that occurred on or after June 20, 2022.”
Id. at 13. In the SAC, the only acts that could potentially serve as the basis of the claims
were the “attempted removal of the Pardo triplets on May 12, 2022, and the placement of
the Pardo parents on the CACI on May 17, 2022.” Id. (citing SAC ¶ 27). These two acts
took place outside the limitations period and were found to be time barred. Id.
Plaintiffs attempted to supplement the factual allegations in the SAC with new
allegations in their Opposition. 	Id. at 14. The Court found—even if it accepted the new
allegations—that they still would not support invocation of the continuing violation
doctrine, and that the conduct occurring after June 2022 identified by Plaintiffs in their
Opposition was “best understood as the continuing impact from a past violation,” thus
making those additional facts inactionable. 	Id. (quoting Williams v. Owens-Illinois, Inc.,
665 F.2d 918, 924 (9th Cir. 1982)). 	The Court concluded that Plaintiffs reliance on the
continuing violation doctrine was “an implicit concession that they seek relief based on the
May 12, 2022 attempted removal and May 17, 2022 CACI placement”—which the Court
found to be time-barred. Id. at 15. The Court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction
over the remaining state law claims and thus dismissed the entire action. Id. at 16–17. The
Court “reluctantly” granted Plaintiffs leave to amend, expressing “doubts that Plaintiffs
[would] be able to overcome the statute of limitations bar to their federal claims.” Id. at 17.
The Court noted, however, that Plaintiffs had not raised “all possible objections, like
equitable tolling, to the two-year limitations period.” Id.
On July 24, 2025, Plaintiffs filed the TAC alleging thirteen causes of action, many
of which slightly differ from the SAC. 	Cf. ECF Nos. 27, 19. 	Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,
Plaintiffs now allege violation of the Equal Protection Clause, Substantive Due Process,
Procedural Due Process, and Retaliation in violation of the First Amendment. 	See TAC.
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On August 7, 2025, the County filed the present Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ Third
Amended Complaint arguing that Plaintiffs’ § 1983 causes of action are time-barred and
that Plaintiffs failed to satisfy the equitable tolling doctrine. Mot. at 11–13. The County
further argues that the Court should decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the
remaining state law claims. Id. at 14.
LEGAL STANDARD
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) permits a party to raise by motion the
defense that the complaint “fail[s] to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” To
survive a 12(b)(6) motion, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as
true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,
678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). 	A claim is
facially plausible when the facts pled “allow[] the court to draw the reasonable inference
that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. That is not to say that the claim
must be probable, but there must be “more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has
acted unlawfully.” Id. Facts “‘merely consistent with’ a defendant’s liability” fall short of
a plausible entitlement to relief. Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557).
Though 	this 	plausibility 	standard 	“does 	not 	require 	‘detailed 	factual
allegations,’ . . . it [does] demand[] more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-
harmed-me accusation.” 	Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). 	In other words, a
complaint will not suffice “if it tenders ‘naked assertion[s]’ devoid of ‘further factual
enhancement.’” 	Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557). 	Put
differently, “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.”
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.
Review under Rule 12(b)(6) requires a context-specific analysis involving the
Court’s “judicial experience and common sense.” 	Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. In performing
that analysis, “a district court must accept as true all facts alleged in the complaint, and
draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff.” 	Wi-LAN Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc.,
382 F. Supp. 3d 1012, 1020 (S.D. Cal. 2019). 	“[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not
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permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has
alleged—but it has not ‘show[n]’—‘that the pleader is entitled to relief.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S.
at 679 (second alternation in original). 	If a complaint does not survive Rule 12(b)(6), a
court grants leave to amend unless it determines that no modified contention “consistent
with the challenged pleading could . . . possibly cure the deficiency.” 	Schreiber Distrib.
Co. v. Serv-Well Furniture Co., 806 F.2d 1393, 1401 (9th Cir. 1986).
ANALYSIS
I. 	Statute of Limitations
The Court first addresses the County’s argument that the five 42 U.S.C. § 1983
causes of action asserted against the County for alleged sexual orientation discrimination,
violations of procedural and substantive due process under the Fourteenth Amendment,
and retaliation in violation of the First Amendment are barred by the applicable two-year
statute of limitations. Mot. at 11–12.
In the Court’s Order dismissing the SAC, the Court concluded that the SAC is an
“amendment to a pleading” as required by the relation back doctrine under Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 15, and, therefore, Plaintiffs’ SAC related back to the date of filing of the
original Complaint in federal court, June 20, 2024. Order at 11. Likewise, here, the Court
finds that the TAC is an “amendment to a pleading,” and, for purposes of assessing whether
Plaintiffs can overcome the statute of limitations, the TAC relates back to the date of their
original Complaint, June 20, 2024.
Also in the Court’s Order, the Court concluded that California’s two-year statute of
limitations for personal injury torts applies to the causes of action in this case. Order at 11
(citing Kemp v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., No. C-09-4687 PJH, 2010 WL 2889224, at *3
(N.D. Cal. July 22, 2010)). “For actions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, courts apply the forum
state’s statute of limitations for personal injury actions, along with the forum state’s law
regarding tolling, including equitable tolling, except to the extent any of these laws is
inconsistent with federal law.” 	Jones v. Blanas, 393 F.3d 918, 927 (9th Cir. 2004)
(citations omitted); see also Elliot v. City of Union City, 25 F.3d 800, 802 (9th Cir. 1994).
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“The statute of limitations for personal injury actions under California law is two years.”
Jones v. Cnty. of San Diego, No. 20CV1989-GPC(DEB), 2021 WL 4460788, at *3 (S.D.
Cal. Sept. 21, 2021) (first citing Cal. Code. Civ. P. § 335.1; then citing Blanas, 393 F.3d at
927). Therefore, the Court—and both Parties—agree that California’s two-year statute of
limitations and equitable tolling principles apply to this action.4 See Mot. at 12. 	This
means that the cause of action must have accrued two-years before the June 20, 2024, date
of filing of the original Complaint—June 20, 2022. Federal law determines when a cause
of action accrues for a § 1983 claim. Belanus v. Clark, 796 F.3d 1021, 1025 (9th Cir. 2015)
(citing Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 388 (2007)). A cause of action accrues when “the
plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury which is the basis of the action.”
Maldonado v. Harris, 370 F.3d 945, 955 (9th Cir. 2004) (quoting Knox v. Davis, 260 F.3d
1009, 1013 (9th Cir. 2001)).
Here, the events underlying the causes of action center on the May 12, 2022,
attempted removal of the Pardo triplets and the May 17, 2022, placement of the Parents on
the CACI.5 See SAC ¶¶ 34, 48. 	These two events took place before the June 20, 2022,
cut-off for the statute of limitations and are thus time-barred—subject to an equitable
tolling analysis.
/ / /
/ / /
4 Plaintiffs do not contest that the two-year statute of limitations is applicable. See generally Opp’n.
5 The only mention of the date of the CACI placement is found in Plaintiffs’ Opposition to the County’s
Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaint. 	See ECF No. 23 at 5 (“On May 17, 2022,
Defendants reported the Parents to the Child Abuse Central Index (CACI) without notice and an
opportunity for a hearing in violation of their due process rights.”). Thus, the Court relied on the May 17,
2022, date in its previous Order. 	See Order at 13–15. 	The only discussion of dates surrounding the
Parents’ CACI placement in the TAC is that the Parents were denied requests for a grievance hearing and
access to documents related to the CACI reporting in “July and August of 2022.” TAC ¶ 48. For the sake
of consistency, the Court will assume the May 17, 2022, date is correct and continue to use this date for
the purposes of its analysis. Plaintiffs were on notice that this is the date the Court used in its previous
Order, and they did not provide a separate date in their TAC or Opposition to the County’s Motion to
Dismiss Plaintiffs’ Third Amended Complaint or contest the previous use of this date. See generally TAC;
Opp’n. Therefore, the Court concludes that the Parents’ CACI placement took place on May 17, 2022.
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Plaintiffs include additional information in their TAC regarding the conduct leading
up to the attempted removal of the Pardo triplets (TAC ¶¶ 21–33), the Parents’ challenges
to their CACI placement (TAC ¶¶ 44–45, 48, 58–61), juvenile court hearings and additional
investigation conducted by CWS through the end of 2022 (TAC ¶¶ 43, 45, 49–52), ongoing
emotional trauma suffered by the Pardo triplets (TAC ¶¶ 53–54), and the Parents repeated
attempts to access their CWS and CACI records (TAC ¶¶ 40, 42, 45, 48, 56–58). In the
Court’s Order, the Court concluded that the subsequent conduct occurring after June 2022
identified by Plaintiffs in their Opposition to Motion to Dismiss the Second Amended
Complaint (ECF No. 23) “is best understood as the continuing impact from a past
violation” and thus was inactionable. Order at 14 (quoting Williams, 665 F.2d at 924). As
the County correctly points out, while more detailed, this additional information provided
in Plaintiffs’ prior Opposition (ECF No. 23) is the same information now provided in the
TAC. 	See Mot. at 3. In its Order, the Court also concluded that because Plaintiffs were
relying upon the continuing violation doctrine, they conceded that the relief they sought
was based on conduct occurring outside of the statute of limitations. Order at 15.
The Court makes the same conclusion here. 	The additional allegations made by
Plaintiffs “simply demonstrate ‘injuries resulting from the [May 2022] act[s] of’ attempting
to remove the Pardo triplets and placing the Pardo parents on the CACI.” Id. at 14 (quoting
Bird v. Dep’t of Human Servs., 935 F.3d 738, 748 (9th Cir. 2019)). “As the case law makes
clear, ‘continuing impact from past violations is not actionable.’” 	Id. (quoting Williams,
665 F.2d at 924); see also Del. State Coll. v. Ricks, 449 U.S. 250, 252–54 (1980)
(recognizing that “[t]he proper focus is upon the time of the discriminatory acts, not upon
the time at which the consequences of the acts became most painful” (quoting Abramson
v. Univ. of Haw., 594 F.2d 202, 209 (9th Cir. 1979))). Further, Plaintiffs “allege that any
applicable statute of limitations is subject to equitable tolling.” 	TAC ¶ 63. 	Thus, by
explicitly relying on the equitable tolling doctrine, Plaintiffs again implicitly concede that
any relief sought is based on conduct outside of the previously defined statute of
limitations.
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Therefore, to avoid Plaintiffs’ § 1983 claims from being time-barred, Plaintiffs must
“adequately allege[] facts showing the potential applicability of the equitable tolling
doctrine.” Cervantes v. City of San Diego, 5 F.3d 1273, 1277 (9th Cir. 1993).
A. 	Equitable Tolling Doctrine
As discussed above, for actions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, district courts apply the law
of the forum state regarding tolling. 	Blanas, 393 F.3d at 927. Thus, California equitable
tolling 	law 	applies. 	Equitable 	tolling 	“is 	a 	judge-made 	doctrine 	‘which 	operates
independently of the literal wording of the Code of Civil Procedure’ to suspend or extend
a statute of limitations as necessary to ensure fundamental practicality and fairness.”
Lantzy v. Centex Homes, 31 Cal. 4th 363, 370 (2003) (quoting Addison v. State of
California, 21 Cal. 3d 313, 318–19 (1978)). 	Under California law, Plaintiffs must meet
three conditions to equitably toll the statute of limitations: (1) they must have diligently
pursued their claims; (2) their situation must be the product of forces beyond their control;
and (3) Defendants must not be prejudiced by the application of equitable tolling. 	See
Jasso v. Flores, No. 24-CV-615-JAH-MMP, 2024 WL 4280957, at *3 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 24,
2024) (first citing Hull v. Cent. Pathology Serv. Med. Clinic, 28 Cal. App. 4th 1328, 1335
(1994); then citing Addison, 21 Cal. 3d at 316–17). “The effect of equitable tolling is that
the limitations period stops running during the tolling event, and begins to run again . . .
when the tolling event has concluded.” 	Kraft Americas, L.P. v. Oldcastle Precast, Inc.,
641 F. App’x 718, 720 (9th Cir. 2016) (quoting Lantzy, 31 Cal. 4th at 370–71). 	“The
burden of alleging facts which would give rise to tolling falls upon the plaintiff.” 	Hinton
v. Pacific Enterprises, 5 F.3d 391, 395 (9th Cir. 1993) (citations omitted).
Plaintiffs allege that they “were denied access to the complete [CWS] file necessary
to understand the full scope of Defendants’ misconduct” and “were repeatedly mislead or
stonewalled in their attempts to obtain the evidence needed to evaluate and prepare legal
claims.” TAC ¶ 63. Plaintiffs argue that this delay in access “was caused by the affirmative
actions and omissions of Defendants, who withheld critical records, failed to respond to
multiple requests from Plaintiffs and their representatives, and intentionally concealed
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material facts.” Id. Plaintiffs conclude that “[e]quity therefore requires that the statute of
limitations be tolled until the date Plaintiffs discovered, or with reasonable diligence could
have discovered, the basis for their claims.” Id. Plaintiffs, however, fail to point to a date
to where the statute of limitations should be tolled. Instead, Plaintiffs state that they “have
yet to discover the full extent of Defendants’ discriminatory, retaliatory, and unlawful
conduct[,]” id., and repeatedly discuss how they have yet to receive the CWS file, id. ¶¶
45, 56–57, 61. The Court is unconvinced by Plaintiffs’ apparent solution that the statute
of limitations be tolled to some unspecified date “until Plaintiffs could discover the claims’
bases.” Opp’n at 10.
Further, the County correctly points out that Plaintiffs began litigation in this matter
in San Diego Superior Court on July 3, 2023, against the same Defendants in the present
matter for the same underlying events. 	Mot. at 13. 	Plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed the
state court action, “which unexplainably lingered in the pleading stage for approximately
one year, following a case management conference on June 21, 2024.” 	Id. 	The County
argues that this undercuts Plaintiffs’ “present claim of ignorance of evidence ‘needed to
evaluate and prepare legal claims’ prior to June 20, 2024.” Id. The Court agrees. Plaintiffs
pled nearly twelve pages of factual allegations against the County in their TAC and have
filed two lawsuits regarding the alleged conduct, the present action and the 2023 state court
action—hardly demonstrating that Plaintiffs were kept in the dark regarding information
relevant for their claims. See TAC ¶¶ 17–62.
Additionally, Plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed their state court claim after “lingering”
in the pleading stage for almost a year. Mot. at 13. “California courts have concluded that
absent express statutory language, a plaintiff’s voluntary dismissal will not entitle him to
toll the statute of limitations.” 	Johnson v. Riverside Healthcare Sys., LP, 534 F.3d 1116,
1127 (9th Cir. 2008) (first citing Wood v. Elling Corp., 20 Cal. 3d 353, 359 (1977); then
citing Thomas v. Gilliland, 95 Cal. App. 4th 427, 433 (2002)). Courts have concluded that
failure to litigate a prior state law claim demonstrates that the plaintiff was not “diligently”
pursuing their claim as required for equitable tolling. 	See, e.g., Marano v. Neotti,
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No. 16cv0189-LAB (JLB), 2017 WL 553390, at *3 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 10, 2017) (“Plaintiff’s
allegations supporting equitable [tolling] are insufficient because they are based on his
abandoned effort to litigate his claims in state court before coming to this court . . . .”);
Cooper v. Paramo, No. 20-cv-1342-AJB-NLS, 2021 WL 4501758, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 3,
2021) (“The decision to litigate his claims in state court in the first instance, is a decision
within his control, and is not an extraordinary circumstance calling for equitable tolling.”).
Therefore, Plaintiffs have not met their burden regarding the applicability of the
equitable tolling doctrine, as Plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate how Defendants’ actions
prevented them from litigating this case, nor have they demonstrated that they diligently
pursued their claims. 	The Court need not address the other two requirements of the
equitable tolling doctrine. See Watkins v. Singh, No. 2:12-CV-1343 GEB DAD, 2014 WL
2930536, at *4 (E.D. Cal. June 27, 2014), aff’d sub nom., Watkins v. Spears, 627 F. App'x
631 (9th Cir. 2015) (finding equitable tolling inapplicable because of plaintiff’s lack of
diligence without addressing the other two requirements).
Because Plaintiffs have failed to satisfy their burden alleging sufficient facts to
support equitable tolling, and because they seek relief only from events that occurred in
May 2022, Plaintiffs’ § 1983 claims are barred by the statute of limitations. Accordingly,
the Court GRANTS the County’s Motion to Dismiss as to Claims I–V.
II. 	Remaining State Law Claims
Having successfully achieved dismissal of Plaintiffs’ federal claims, the County
urges that Court should decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining
state law claims. 	Mot. at 14. 	Plaintiffs fail to address the supplemental jurisdiction
argument—instead arguing the federal claims survive based on equitable tolling. 	Opp’n
at 10.
Where a “court dismisses on the merits a federal claim over which it had original
jurisdiction, it may then decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining
state claims, subject to the factors set forth in § 1367(c)(1)–(4).” 	Herman Family
Revocable Tr. v. Teddy Bear, 254 F.3d 802, 806 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing Acri v. Varian
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Assocs., Inc., 114 F.3d 999, 1000 (9th Cir. 1997)). 	Those § 1367(c) factors include
whether: “(1) the claim raises a novel or complex issue of State law, (2) the claim
substantially predominates over the claim or claims over which the district court has
original jurisdiction, (3) the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original
jurisdiction, or (4) in exceptional circumstances, there are other compelling reasons for
declining jurisdiction.” 	Id. 	The ordinary rule favors dismissal of state law claims when
the federal claims are dismissed before trial. 	See United Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs,
383 U.S. 715, 	726 	(1966) 	(“Certainly, 	if 	the 	federal 	claims 	are 	dismissed 	before
trial, . . . the state claims should be dismissed as well.”). And this case, which is still at the
pleading stage, presents a straightforward instance of judicial economy and comity
principles weighing in favor of dismissal. 	See Acri, 114 F.3d at 1001 (identifying
“economy, convenience, fairness, and comity” as essential factors to consider). As courts
have long recognized, “in the usual case in which all federal-law claims are eliminated
before trial, the balance of factors . . . will point toward declining to exercise jurisdiction
over the remaining state-law claims.” 	Id. (quoting Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill,
484 U.S. 343, 350 n.7 (1988)). Accordingly, the Court declines to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction over the state law claims and GRANTS the County’s Motion to Dismiss as to
Claims VI–XIII. See Ove v. Gwinn, 264 F.3d 817, 826 (9th Cir. 2001).
III. 	Leave to Amend
The final consideration is whether Plaintiffs should again be granted leave to amend.
Leave to amend should be freely given “when justice so requires.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2).
But 	while 	the 	rule 	should 	be 	interpreted 	liberally, 	leave 	should 	not 	be 	granted
automatically. 	Jackson v. Bank of Haw., 902 F.2d 1385, 1387 (9th Cir. 1990). 	In
determining whether to grant leave to amend, trial courts should consider various factors,
including bad faith, undue delay, prejudice to the opposing party, futility of amendment,
and whether the party has previously amended. Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962).
Applying the Foman factors here, the Court declines to grant Plaintiffs leave to
amend for a fourth time. 	Plaintiffs were “reluctantly” granted leave to amend after the
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SAC was dismissed and were expressly told to address equitable tolling after the Court
expressed doubt that Plaintiffs would be able to overcome the statute of limitations bar to
their federal claims. 	Order at 17; see also Marano, 2017 WL 553390, at *4 (dismissing
with prejudice after a party was explicitly told they needed to satisfy equitable tolling to
continue, and they failed to do so). The Court finds that “it is clear that granting leave to
amend would [be] futile.” 	Thinket Ink Info. Res., Inc. v. Sun Microsystems, Inc.,
368 F.3d 1053, 1061 (9th Cir. 2004). Thus, Plaintiffs claims are dismissed without leave
to amend.
CONCLUSION
In light of the foregoing, the Court GRANTS the County’s Motion to Dismiss
Plaintiffs’ 	Third 	Amended 	Complaint 	(ECF 	No. 28) 	and 	DISMISSES 	WITH
PREJUDICE Plaintiffs’ Third Amended Complaint (ECF No. 27). As this concludes the
litigation in the matter, the Clerk of Court SHALL CLOSE the file.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: January 13, 2026
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