Mazgaj v. Anthony et al

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
MILDRED MAZGAJ, MARIAN
ANTHONY,
Plaintiffs,
v.
CORINA GALVEZ a/k/a CORINA
ANTHONY et al.,
Defendants.
Case No.: 3:24-cv-00776-JAH-AHG
ORDER:
1) GRANTING DEFENDANT’S
MOTION TO DISMISS;
2) DENYING PLAINTIFFS’
MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE
SUPPLEMENTAL PLEADINGS
[ECF Nos. 16, 18]
INTRODUCTION
Pending before the Court is Defendants Corina Anthony, Issac Galvez, Ceceila
Leon, and Gabriella Galvez-Reyna’s (collectively, “Defendants”) Motion to Dismiss
Plaintiffs Mildred Mazgaj and Marian Anthony’s (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) First Amended
Complaint (ECF No. 10, “FAC”). ECF No. 16 (“Motion”). Plaintiffs, proceeding pro se,
opposed the Motion. ECF No. 17. Defendants, also proceeding pro se, did not reply.
Also pending before the Court is Plaintiffs’ Motion for Leave to File Supplemental
Pleadings Based on Newly Discovered Evidence of Fraud and Conspiracy of the Social
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Security Administration, Including Money Laundering, Bank Fraud, Wire Fraud, Forgery,
and Perjury. ECF No. 18 (“Supp. Motion”). After a thorough review of the record, and
for the reasons described below, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ Motion and DENIES
Plaintiffs’ Supp. Motion.
BACKGROUND
This lawsuit is one of several originating from a family court matter previously
litigated in San Diego Superior Court, Marian Anthony v. Corina Galvez, Case No.
19FL005322N (filed May 2, 2019) (“State Court Matter”). Related cases include, in part:
Anthony v. Segura, Case No. 3:24-cv-00458-BAS-SBC, 2024 WL 3315996 (S.D. Cal. July
3, 2024) (where Plaintiff Anthony unsuccessfully sued Superior Court Judge Daniel
Segura, who presided over the State Court Matter); Mazgaj v. Charles, Case No. 3:24-cv-
00777-JAH-MSB, 2025 WL 605049 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 25, 2025) (where Plaintiffs
unsuccessfully sued an adverse witness from the State Court Matter); Anthony v. Stephen,
Case No. 3:25-cv-01550-DMS-BLM, 2025 WL 2971653 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 21, 2025), appeal
dismissed, No. 25-7249, 2026 WL 442393 (9th Cir. Jan. 27, 2026) (where Plaintiff
Anthony unsuccessfully sued an adverse witness from the State Court Matter); and Anthony
v. Roberts, Case No. 3:25-cv-2486-CAB-AHG, 2025 WL 3456470 (S.D. Cal. Dec. 1,
2025), appeal docketed, No. 25-7928 (9th Cir. Dec. 18, 2025) (where Plaintiff Anthony
unsuccessfully sued two Superior Court judges stemming from the State Court Matter).
On May 1, 2024, Plaintiffs initially filed this lawsuit against Defendants asserting
various causes of action. ECF No. 1. On February 27, 2025, the Court granted without
prejudice Defendants’ motion to dismiss the complaint for Plaintiffs’ failure to comply
with Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (“FRCP”) Rule 8. ECF No. 9 (“Prior Order”). The
Court cautioned Plaintiffs that any amended complaint “must be complete by itself, comply
with the [FRCP],” and “failure to do so will result in the dismissal of this action with
prejudice.” Id. at 10. On March 14, 2025, Plaintiffs filed a FAC. ECF No. 10.
In their FAC, Plaintiffs allege both criminal and civil violations by Defendants.
Plaintiffs allege the following federal criminal violations under 18 U.S.C.: § 1951 (Hobbs
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Act); §§ 1030, 1033, 1341, 1343, 1344, 1546 (criminal fraud); §§ 1001, 1014, 1621 (false
statements and perjury); §§ 875, 876 (interstate communications); § 2261A (stalking); §§
1201(c), 1204 (conspiracy to kidnap and kidnapping); § 1589 (forced labor); § 1038 (false
information and hoaxes); § 1519 (obstruction of justice); §§ 241, 242 (conspiracy against
and deprivation of rights); § 1512 (witness tampering); § 1956 (money laundering); § 2314
(transportation of stolen goods). See FAC at 9, 21-45. Plaintiffs also allege 8 U.S.C. §
1325(c) (illegal immigration marriage fraud), 26 U.S.C. § 7201 (tax evasion), 31 U.S.C. §
3729 (False Claims Act), as well as various California and Arizona state criminal
violations. Id. at 39, 42-45. Lastly, Plaintiffs allege a civil violation under 42 U.S.C. §
1983 for deprivation of constitutional rights. Id. at 35.
In its Prior Order, the Court detailed Plaintiffs’ factual allegations stemming from
the State Court Matter. See ECF No. 9 at 2-6. In the FAC, Plaintiffs additionally allege
that Defendant Anthony is a Mexican-born citizen who “falsified her immigration status to
create a fraudulent marriage contract.” FAC at 7. As a result, Plaintiffs allege that diversity
jurisdiction exists because the parties are from different countries and the amount in
controversy exceeds $75,000. Id. at 9.
LEGAL STANDARD
Federal courts are of limited jurisdiction. Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of
America, 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). Jurisdiction must “be established as a threshold
matter” before reaching the merits of any dispute. Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better
Environ., 523 U.S. 83, 94-95 (1998). FRCP 12(b)(1) allows a party to challenge a pleading
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1).
Plaintiffs in federal court must have standing to satisfy the “case or controversy”
requirement under Article III of the Constitution. LSO, Ltd. v. Stroh, 205 F.3d 1146, 1152
(9th Cir. 2000) (citation omitted); see also Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561
(1992). To have standing, plaintiffs must establish three elements: “(1) that plaintiffs had
suffered an injury in fact that was concrete and particularized, and actual or imminent; (2)
that the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged conduct; and (3) that the injury was likely
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to be redressed by a favorable court decision.” Levine v. Vilsack, 587 F.3d 986, 991-92
(9th Cir. 2009) (citations omitted). Absent standing, a district court lacks subject matter
jurisdiction over the suit. Cetacean Cmty. v. Bush, 386 F.3d 1169, 1174 (9th Cir. 2004)
(citation omitted).
DISCUSSION
Defendants argue that Plaintiffs’ FAC should be dismissed for several reasons,
including FRCP Rule 12(b)(1) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and lack of standing,
Rule 8 for improper pleading, and Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim. Mot. at 5-8.
As discussed below, because Plaintiffs cannot establish standing, the Court need not
conduct a Rule 12(b)(6) analysis to address the factual sufficiency of the FAC claims.
I. Subject Matter Jurisdiction
Plaintiffs primarily allege federal and state criminal violations against Defendants
throughout the FAC. “These criminal provisions, however, provide no basis for civil
liability.” Aldabe v. Aldabe, 616 F.2d 1089, 1092 (9th Cir. 1980) (citations omitted); see
also Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 619 (1973) (“a private citizen lacks a judicially
cognizable interest in the prosecution or nonprosecution of another”); Retanan v. Cal.
Dep’t of Corr. & Rehab., 2012 WL 1833888, at *5 (E.D. Cal. May 18, 2012) (“it is well-
established that a private individual has no constitutional right and standing to bring a
criminal complaint against another individual”); Anthony, 2025 WL 2971653 at *2 (“[18
U.S.C.] statutes do not provide a private right of action”). Therefore, Plaintiffs lack
standing to assert claims under any of the criminal codes mentioned in the FAC.
Accordingly, to the extent Plaintiffs attempt to use criminal statutes as causes of action,
Plaintiffs’ FAC is DISMISSED.
Plaintiffs allege one civil cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for deprivation of
constitutional rights. FAC at 35. To state a § 1983 claim, Plaintiffs must show that “a
person acting under the color of State Law” deprived them of a constitutional or federal
statutory right. Long v. County of Los Angeles, 442 F.3d 1178, 1185 (9th Cir. 2006).
Plaintiffs fail to show that they suffered an “injury in fact” that is “fairly traceable” to
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Defendants’ conduct because none of the Defendants are acting on behalf of the state. See
Levine, 587 F.3d at 991-92. To drive the point further, Plaintiffs cannot allege a § 1983
claim while simultaneously asserting that Defendants “are not U.S. [c]itizens and are
believed to be illegal aliens.” FAC at 7. Therefore, Plaintiffs lack standing to assert a §
1983 claim against Defendants. Accordingly, Plaintiffs civil cause of action asserted in the
FAC is DISMISSED.
In addition, Plaintiffs filed a Supp. Motion “to incorporate newly discovered
evidence of fraud and conspiracy by the Galvez family, collectively, against the United
States government.” Supp. Motion at 6. The alleged newly discovered evidence is in
support of Plaintiffs’ allegations under 18 U.S.C. §§ 1343, 1344, 1956, and 1962. Id. at 6-
8. Plaintiffs do not have standing to sue under these criminal provisions. Aldabe, 616 F.2d
at 1092. Therefore, Plaintiffs’ Supp. Motion is DENIED.
II. Improper Pleading
Although Plaintiffs’ causes of action are dismissed for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction, the Court chooses to address Defendants’ alternative argument that the FAC
did not comply with FRCP Rule 8 “for failure to make a short and plain statement that
informs all defendants of the claims against them.” Mot. at 2; See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8; see
also McHenry v. Renne, 84 F.3d 1172, 1177 (9th Cir. 1996) (Rule 8 requires “each
averment of a pleading [to] be simple, concise, and direct”). The pleadings of plaintiffs
who proceed pro se are “to be liberally construed” and “must be held to less stringent
standards . . . .” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted).
In its Prior Order, the Court noted that “Plaintiffs present their claims in a lengthy
and fractured narrative” and “Plaintiffs fail to make it clear which claims are asserted
against which Defendants.” Prior Order at 8-9. Stated differently, “the narrative,
interruptive, and repetitive structure does not simply, concisely, and directly put defendants
on notice of Plaintiffs’ claims. Id. at 9.
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The FAC fails in similar ways. The most glaring example of Plaintiffs’ failure to
comply with Rule 8 occurs in “Cause of Action Ten.” See FAC at 34-37. Over the course
of four pages, Plaintiffs tell a lengthy and confusing tale regarding a series of events that
alleges excessive force by police, attempted murder, and multiple thefts of Plaintiff
Anthony’s property. Id. Within “Cause of Action Ten,” Plaintiffs allege four criminal
violations under 18 U.S.C. and one civil violation under 42 U.S.C., all without specifying
which Defendants are responsible for which allegations. Id. Further, it appears that
Plaintiffs attempts to levy criminal allegations against unnamed defendants. Id.
The FAC, like the original complaint, is not “simple, concise, and direct.” McHenry,
84 F.3d at 1177. Therefore, the Court finds that the FAC fails to comply with Rule 8 and
violates the Court’s Prior Order. ECF No. 9 at 10 (cautioning Plaintiffs that any amended
complaint must comply with the FRCP and “fail[ing] to do so will result in the dismissal
of this action with prejudice”).
III. Dismissal With Prejudice
Finally, the Court must determine whether this action should be dismissed with or
without prejudice. Rule 41(b) allows district courts to dismiss an action “[i]f the plaintiff
fails to prosecute or to comply with [the FRCP] or a court order,” and the dismissal
“operates as an adjudication on the merits.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b). “Dismissal with
prejudice of a complaint under Rule 41(b) is a harsh remedy . . . .” McHenry, 84 F.3d at
1178. “The district judge should first consider less drastic alternatives, but ‘need not
exhaust them all before finally dismissing a case.’” Id. (quoting Von Poppenheim v.
Portland Boxing and Wrestling Comm’n, 442 F.2d 1047, 1054 (9th Cir. 1971). Of note,
“[a] district court should not dismiss a pro se complaint without leave to amend unless it is
absolutely clear that the deficiencies of the complaint could not be cured by amendment.”
Rosati v. Igbinoso, 791 F.3d 1037, 1039 (9th Cir. 2015) (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted).
Three factors, considered together, inform the Court’s decision. First, as discussed
supra § II, Plaintiffs violated the Court’s Prior Order when the FAC failed to comply with
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Rule 8 pleading standards. This is despite the Court warning Plaintiffs as to consequences
for failure to comply. Prior Order at 10.
Next, as discussed supra § I, Plaintiffs lack standing to sue Defendants on the alleged
causes of action. Courts have found dismissal with prejudice appropriate where “it is
plainly unlikely that the plaintiff will be able to cure the standing problem.” Fieldturf, Inc.
v. Sw. Recreational Industries, Inc., 357 F.3d 1266, 1269 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted). Private citizens do not have standing to bring
criminal charges, Retanan, 2012 WL 1833888, at *5, and criminal provisions provide no
basis for civil liability. Aldabe, 616 F.2d at 1092. Further, individuals cannot pursue §
1983 civil liability against a person not acting under the color of state law. See Long, 442
F.3d at 1185. Therefore, it is “plainly unlikely” that Plaintiffs can cure their standing
problem as related to Defendants. Fieldturf, Inc., 357 F.3d at 1269.
Lastly, the Court’s view remains unchanged that “this is a case of disappointed state
court litigant[s] who ha[ve] brought multiple lawsuits in federal court ‘as an expression of
hurt feelings and dissatisfaction with the results in the state tribunals.’” Prior Order at 9-
10 (quoting Shakespeare v. Wilson, 40 F.R.D. 500, 504 (S.D. Cal. 1966). The State Court
Matter from which this case originates has now been fully litigated in California state court.
Marian Anthony v. Corina Galvez, Case No. 19FL005322N, was filed on May 2, 2019.
The Superior Court issued its Findings and Order After Hearing (FOAH) on May 21, 2024.
The Cal. 4th Appellate District Division I affirmed the FOAH on August 11, 2025 (Case
No. D083483). The Cal. Supreme Court denied the petition for review on November 12,
2025 (Case No. S292952). The case was closed on December 2, 2025.
In sum, this case originates from the State Court Matter that has since been fully
resolved. Plaintiffs have failed multiple times to abide by Rule 8 pleading standards, and
even if the FAC was properly pled according to the FRCP, Plaintiffs lack standing to sue
Defendants based on the causes of action alleged. Therefore, the Court finds dismissal
under Rule 41(b) appropriate, and Plaintiffs’ FAC is DISMISSED with prejudice.
//
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CONCLUSION
Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:
1) Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED with prejudice;
2) Plaintiffs’ Motion for Leave to File Supplemental Pleadings is DENIED; and
3) The Clerk of Court is instructed to close the case.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: March 23, 2026
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