Tidwell v. Center for Medicare & Medicaid Services et al et al

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United States District Court
Northern District of California
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
EDWARD C TIDWELL,
Plaintiff,
v.
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND
HUMAN SERVICES, et al.,
Defendants.
Case No. 25-cv-04777-DMR
ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO
DISMISS CLAIMS AGAINST
TRIDENT WITHOUT PREJUDICE
Re: Dkt. No. 45
Plaintiff Edward C. Tidwell, a self-represented litigant, brings this complaint against
Defendants U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (“HHS”); Centers for Medicare &
Medicaid Services (“CMS”); Kaiser Foundation Health Plan, Inc.; Kaiser Foundation Hospitals;1
Trident Society, Inc. (“Trident”); Livanta LLC (“Livanta”); Ellen R. Evans M.D.; and Matthew
Stofferahn M.D. Plaintiff alleges the wrongful death of his daughter on June 8, 2022 due to
negligence and medical malpractice. [Docket No. 1 (Compl.).]
This order relates solely to the motion to dismiss filed by Trident. [Docket Nos. 45 (Mot.);
78 (Reply).] Trident moves to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and failure to state a
claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and (6). Plaintiff filed an opposition2 and
request for judicial notice. [Docket Nos. 68 (Opp’n); 69 (Plf. RJN).]
This matter is suitable for determination without oral argument. Civ. L.R. 7-1(b). For the
following reasons, Trident’s motion is granted.
1 The complaint names Defendant Kaiser Permanente, which has since been voluntarily dismissed
by Plaintiff. [Docket No. 58.]
2 Plaintiff’s brief is styled as an “Opposition to Dismiss the Motion to Dismiss of Defendant
Trident Society, Inc.; and Plaintiff's Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment.” For the reasons
stated in Docket No. 96, the court construes the brief only as Plaintiff’s opposition to this motion.
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I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff makes the following allegations in the complaint, which the court takes as true for
purposes of this motion.3 Plaintiff’s daughter Tanesha Tidwell (“Decedent”) was a patient at
Kaiser Permanente from 2013 to 2022. Compl. ¶ 1. After she died in June 2022, Plaintiff alleges
that Kaiser Permanente “failed to obtain Plaintiff authorization in June 2022 prior to the release of
Decedent’s body over to Defendant Trident for Decedent to be burned up in July 2022 solely for
Defendant Trident to aid Defendant Kaiser Permanente's spoliation and destruction of evidence to
camouflage Defendant Kaiser Permanente's personal injuries, negligence/medical malpractices
and other causes that directly resulted in the wrongful death of Decedent.” Id. ¶ 2. Plaintiff
alleges that, without his “prior knowledge, consent or written approval,” Kaiser Permanente
contracted with Trident “to handle, possess, take control and transport Decedent's body (not
embalmed) from Defendant Kaiser Permanente to Defendant Trident for Decedent to be
gruesomely and barbarically burned up in late July 2022.” Id. ¶ 3.
Plaintiff also alleges that Trident “accumulated massive ill-gotten gain and unjust
enrichment from the theft of Decedent and Plaintiff's personal information and identification.” Id.
¶ 29.
Plaintiff brings the following claims against Trident:
• Personal injury under California Code of Civil Procedure §§ 338, 340.5;
• Wrongful death under California Code of Civil Procedure§ 377.60;
• Fraud and deceit;
• Health care fraud;
• Conspiracy to commit health care fraud;
• Fraudulent misrepresentations;
• Unjust enrichment;
• Breach of fiduciary duty.
II. LEGAL STANDARDS
Pleadings by a self-represented litigant must be liberally construed and “held to less
3 When reviewing a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, the court must “accept as true all
of the factual allegations contained in the complaint.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007)
(per curiam) (citation omitted).
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stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Erickson, 551 U.S. at 94. The
Ninth Circuit has held that “where the petitioner is pro se,” courts have an obligation “to construe
the pleadings liberally and to afford the petitioner the benefit of any doubt.” Bretz v. Kelman, 773
F.2d 1026, 1027 n.1 (9th Cir. 1985) (en banc). “This rule relieves pro se litigants from the strict
application of procedural rules and demands that courts not hold missing or inaccurate legal
terminology or muddled draftsmanship against them.” Blaisdell v. Frappiea, 729 F.3d 1237, 1241
(9th Cir. 2013). However, “a liberal interpretation of a pro se . . . complaint may not supply
essential elements of the claim that were not initially pled.” Byrd v. Maricopa Cty. Sheriff’s
Dep’t, 629 F.3d 1135, 1140 (9th Cir. 2011) (en banc) (quoting Pena v. Gardner, 976 F.2d 469,
471 (9th Cir. 1992)).
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a), leave to amend should be granted as a matter
of course, at least until the defendant files a responsive pleading. Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(1). After
that point, Rule 15(a) provides generally that leave to amend the pleadings before trial should be
given “freely . . . when justice so requires.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). “This policy is to be applied
with extreme liberality.” Eminence Capital, LLC v. Aspeon, Inc., 316 F.3d 1048, 1051 (9th Cir.
2003) (quotation omitted). However, leave to amend may be denied where the complaint “could
not be saved by any amendment,” i.e., “where the amendment would be futile.” Thinket Ink Info.
Res., Inc. v. Sun Microsystems, Inc., 368 F.3d 1053, 1061 (9th Cir. 2004).
A. FRCP 12(b)(1)
A motion to dismiss filed pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) is a
challenge to the court’s subject matter jurisdiction. A court will dismiss a party’s claim for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction “only when the claim is so insubstantial, implausible, foreclosed by
prior decisions of th[e Supreme] Court, or otherwise completely devoid of merit as not to involve
a federal controversy.” Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 89 (1998) (citation
and quotation marks omitted). When reviewing a 12(b)(1) motion, the court sculpts its approach
according to whether the motion is “facial or factual.” White v. Lee, 227 F.3d 1214, 1242 (9th Cir.
2000). A facial challenge asserts that “the allegations contained in a complaint are insufficient on
their face to invoke federal jurisdiction.” Safe Air for Everyone v. Meyer, 373 F.3d 1035, 1039
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(9th Cir. 2004). A factual challenge asserts that subject-matter jurisdiction does not exist,
independent of what is stated in the complaint. White, 227 F.3d at 1242. In contrast with a facial
challenge, a factual challenge permits the court to look beyond the complaint, without
“presum[ing] the truthfulness of the plaintiff’s allegations.” Id. (citation omitted). Even the
presence of disputed material facts “will not preclude the trial court from evaluating for itself the
merits of jurisdictional claims.” Roberts v. Corrothers, 812 F.2d 1173, 1177 (9th Cir. 1987)
(citations omitted).
B. FRCP 12(b)(6)
A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) tests the legal sufficiency of the claims alleged in
the complaint. See Parks Sch. of Bus., Inc. v. Symington, 51 F.3d 1480, 1484 (9th Cir. 1995).
When reviewing a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, the court must “accept as true all
of the factual allegations contained in the complaint,” Erickson, 551 U.S. at 94, and may dismiss a
claim “only where there is no cognizable legal theory” or there is an absence of “sufficient factual
matter to state a facially plausible claim to relief,” Shroyer v. New Cingular Wireless Servs., Inc.,
622 F.3d 1035, 1041 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677-78 (2009);
Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001)) (quotation marks omitted). A claim has
facial plausibility when a plaintiff “pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at
678 (citation omitted). In other words, the facts alleged must demonstrate “more than labels and
conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Bell Atl.
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 554, 555 (2007).
III. REQUESTS FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE
A district court generally may not consider any material beyond the pleadings in ruling on
a Rule 12(b)(6) motion unless the motion is converted to a Rule 56 motion for summary judgment.
United States v. Ritchie, 342 F.3d 903, 908 (9th Cir. 2003). “A court may, however, consider
certain materials—documents attached to the complaint, documents incorporated by reference in
the complaint, or matters of judicial notice—without converting the motion to dismiss into a
motion for summary judgment.” Id. Under Federal Rule of Evidence 201, a court may take
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judicial notice of “an adjudicative fact if it is ‘not subject to reasonable dispute.’” Khoja v.
Orexigen Therapeutics, Inc., 899 F.3d 988, 999 (9th Cir. 2018) (quoting Fed. R. Evid. 201(b)). A
fact is “not subject to reasonable dispute” if it is “generally known,” or “can be accurately and
readily determined from sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.” Fed. R. Evid.
201(b). While a court may take judicial notice of matters of public record without converting a
motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment, it may not take judicial notice of disputed
facts stated in public records. Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 690 (9th Cir. 2001). “Just
because [a] document itself is susceptible to judicial notice does not mean that every assertion of
fact within that document is judicially noticeable for its truth.” Khoja, 899 F.3d at 999. If a court
takes judicial notice of a document, it must identify the specific fact or facts it is noticing from the
document. Id.
Plaintiff requests judicial notice of eleven exhibits:
• Exhibit 1: the Authorization for Cremation and Disposition for Trident to cremate
Decedent’s remains, which includes a signature from Phyllis Venson4 dated June
21, 2022 and an e-signature from Plaintiff dated July 14, 2022;
• Exhibit 2: Plaintiff’s California Driver’s License, which also includes a signature
from Plaintiff;
• Exhibit 3: an email exchange dated June 30, 2022 between Plaintiff and Alexandra
Day, a funeral arranger for Trident, in which Day wrote to Plaintiff that, “due to
the circumstances of [Decedent’s] passing,” Trident’s legal team required that all
individuals who wished to attend Decedent’s viewing must sign a certain
document5;
• Exhibit 4: a DocuSign email dated July 1, 2022 stating that a “TIDWELL
VIEWING CONTRACT” had been deleted and voided by Alexandra Day;
• Exhibit 5: an email exchange dated August 6 to August 7, 2025 between Plaintiff
4 The document indicates that Venson is Decedent’s mother and was the only person listed as
having the legal right to control the disposition of Decedent’s remains.
5 It is unclear what document the email refers to.
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and Trident’s legal counsel, in which Plaintiff apparently attached a letter dated
February 21, 2023 from the California Department of Consumer Affairs finding
that Trident had violated Health and Safety Code section 102775 when it failed to
register the death of a decedent with the local registrar within eight calendar days
after death;
• Exhibit 6: Trident’s Statement of Information filed with the California Office of
the Secretary of State (listing “CSC – Lawyers Incorporating Service” as its agent
for service of process);
• Exhibit 7: Trident’s Articles of Incorporation;
• Exhibit 8: the Registered Corporate Agent for Service of Process Certificate and
Statement of Information for CSC – Lawyers Incorporating Service;
• Exhibit 9: a “Search History dated October 15, 2025 of the CASOS,” which
includes a line stating “System Amendment – FTB Suspended – 2/1/2022” and
then a line stating “System Amendment – FTB Restore – 2/1/2022”;
• Exhibit 10: a Certification of License Status for Tiffany A. Gadison which expired
on December 31, 2008;
• Exhibit 11: a Certification of License Status for Stephanie Davies which expired
on July 31, 2011.
Plaintiff also requests judicial notice of his letters and emails submitted in another case filed in the
Northern District of California (Tidwell v. Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, et al., No.
24-cv-09067-RFL), documents in a case filed in the Southern District of California (Trident
Society, Inc., et al. v. Illinois Nat’l Ins. Co., No. 19-cv-01608-DMS/BLM), and documents in a
California Court of Appeal case (Trident Society, Inc. v. Cemetery and Funeral Bureau, No.
C098017). Plf. RJN 5.
The court takes judicial notice of Exhibits 6, 7, and 8 as matters of public record not
subject to reasonable dispute.
The court denies judicial notice of Exhibits 1, 3, 4, and 5 because these are private
documents, not matters of public record, and they are subject to reasonable dispute. The court
cannot consider these documents as part of Plaintiff’s opposition to the motion to dismiss. See
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Ritchie, 342 F.3d at 908.
Plaintiff offers Exhibit 2 (Plaintiff’s driver’s license) to compare his handwritten signature
with the e-signature in Exhibit 1. This is irrelevant because an e-signature does not use an
individual’s handwriting, and because the court cannot consider Exhibit 1 as previously explained.
The court denies judicial notice of Exhibit 2 as moot.
The court denies judicial notice of Exhibit 9. It is unclear what Plaintiff means by “Search
History”—for example, he does not specify which corporation he was searching or what type of
history was sought. Furthermore, Plaintiff seeks to have the court conclude that Trident “was in
violation for operating from November 2015 to February 2022 without a designated Agent for
Service of Process, which resulted in Defendant Trident being suspended by the FTB.” Plf. RJN
4. Even if the court could consider the contents of Exhibit 9, Plaintiff’s conclusion is subject to
reasonable dispute. The court cannot take judicial notice of Plaintiff’s conclusion that Trident was
suspended by the FTB for operating without a designated Agent for Service of Process.
The court denies judicial notice of Exhibits 10 and 11 and the documents from Case Nos.
19-cv-01608-DMS/BLM and C098017. Plaintiff does not explain their relevance. Neither
Tiffany A. Gadison nor Stephanie Davies appeared at all in Plaintiff’s complaint and were not
involved in any of Plaintiff’s allegations. Plaintiff also does not explain the subject matter of Case
Nos. 19-cv-01608-DMS/BLM and C098017, and they appear wholly unrelated to this case.
The court denies judicial notice of Plaintiff’s correspondence filed in Case No. 24-cv-
09067-RFL. The court cannot consider these documents as part of Plaintiff’s opposition because
they are private documents, not matters of public record, and they are subject to reasonable
dispute. See Ritchie, 342 F.3d at 908. The court also instructs Plaintiff that any exhibits in this
case must be filed in this case, and not merely referenced from Case No. 24-cv-09067-RFL.6
IV. DISCUSSION
A. Subject Matter Jurisdiction
A court will dismiss a party’s claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction “only when the
6 For example, Plaintiff requests judicial notice of “Plaintiff’s correspondence dated September 25,
2024.” Plf. RJN 5. Instead of attaching this correspondence to the request for judicial notice,
however, Plaintiff directs the court to Exhibit 13 of Plaintiff’s Complaint in Case No. 24-cv-
09067-RFL. This is improper.
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claim is so insubstantial, implausible, foreclosed by prior decisions of th[e Supreme] Court, or
otherwise completely devoid of merit as not to involve a federal controversy.” Steel Co., 523 U.S.
at 89. The court has federal question jurisdiction over all civil actions arising under the
Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States. See 28 U.S.C. §1331. The court also has
supplemental jurisdiction over claims that form part of the same case or controversy as the federal
claims. See 28 U.S. Code § 1367.
Trident argues that the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the case. Mot. 10-11.
Trident fails to address that Plaintiff’s complaint brings three claims under the Freedom of
Information Act (“FOIA”), 5 U.S.C § 552 against CMS and Livanta.7 Compl. ¶¶ 115-133. The
court has federal question jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s FOIA claims. Trident does not dispute that
the FOIA claims form part of the same case or controversy as Plaintiff’s state law claims against
Trident. The court exercises supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s claims against Trident.
The court finds that it has subject matter jurisdiction.
B. Failure to State a Claim
To state a claim, the plaintiff must plead “factual content that allows the court to draw the
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at
678. In addition, “Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b) requires a pleader of fraud to detail with
particularity the time, place, and manner of each act of fraud, plus the role of each defendant in
each scheme.” Lancaster Cmty. Hosp. v. Antelope Valley Hosp. Dist., 940 F.2d 397, 405 (9th Cir.
1991) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b)).
Plaintiff’s complaint does not plead enough facts for the court to reasonably infer that
Trident engaged in actionable conduct. For example, Plaintiff alleges in a conclusory manner that
Kaiser Permanente “failed to obtain Plaintiff authorization in June 2022 prior to the release of
Decedent’s body over to Defendant Trident.” Compl. ¶ 2. Plaintiff does not plead facts to support
that either Kaiser Permanente or Trident was required to obtain his authorization prior to Trident
7 CMS and Livanta filed motions to dismiss [Docket Nos. 41, 121], which will be addressed
separately from this order. CMS did not move to dismiss Plaintiff’s FOIA claims to the extent
they are premised on Plaintiff’s second FOIA request, #111420247047. [Docket No. 121 at 2.]
As a result, there is at least one federal claim that is not subject to a pleadings challenge.
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taking possession of Decedent’s remains. As another example, Plaintiff makes a conclusory
allegation that Trident “accumulated massive ill-gotten gain and unjust enrichment from the theft
of Decedent and Plaintiff's personal information and identification.” Id. ¶ 29. Plaintiff provides
no facts to support this statement. It is entirely unclear what actions Trident took to allegedly steal
Decedent and Plaintiff’s personal information and identification. To the extent Plaintiff’s claims
are based in fraud, Plaintiff does not state the time, place, or manner of each act of fraud, or the
role of each defendant in the fraud. See Lancaster Cmty. Hosp., 940 F.2d at 405.
In his opposition brief, Plaintiff simply reiterates his conclusory statements. He argues that
Trident “burning up Plaintiff’s dear daughter’s body under the faulty contract was more than
wrongful, it was gruesome and barbaric.” Reply 7. Plaintiff has not pleaded sufficient facts for
the court to reasonably infer that there was a flawed contract or that Trident cremated Decedent’s
remains without appropriate authorization. Plaintiff also argues that Trident “stole and used
Plaintiff’s identification and personal information,” and that Trident “falsified and made
fraudulent misrepresentations to Plaintiff from July 1, 2022 to July 14, 2022.” Id. As previously
explained, Plaintiff has not pleaded what Trident did to steal his identification and personal
information, nor has he pleaded what false or fraudulent statements Trident made to him, in what
time, place, or manner.
Plaintiff’s opposition cites various sections of the California Business and Professions
Code regarding funeral establishments and directors. Reply 8-10. These citations are unavailing
because they do not appear to have anything to do with the claims or allegations in Plaintiff’s
complaint.8
Plaintiff’s allegations do not meet the pleading standards of Rule 12(b)(6), let alone the
heightened pleading standards of Rule 9(b). Because Plaintiff’s complaint is unclear and fails to
plead any wrongful conduct on the part of Trident, the court does not analyze the elements of each
of Plaintiff’s eight claims against Trident. Plaintiff’s claims are dismissed.
8 For example, Plaintiff cites Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 7616.2, which states: “A licensed funeral
establishment shall at all times employ a licensed funeral director to manage, direct, or control its
business or profession.” Opp’n 8-9. Plaintiff has not pleaded that Trident failed to employ a
licensed funeral director.
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V. CONCLUSION
The court has subject matter jurisdiction over the case. The court dismisses the claims
against Trident because Plaintiff has failed to plead facts that state a claim.
Given Plaintiff’s self-represented status, and in light of the policy in favor of allowing
amendment that must be “applied with extreme liberality,” Eminence Capital, 316 F.3d at 1051,
the court cannot say with certainty that amendment is futile. Therefore, Plaintiff’s claims against
Trident are dismissed with leave to amend.
Plaintiffs’ amended complaint is due March 2, 2026.9 Plaintiff must plead his best case
and is forewarned that a further pleading failure may result in dismissal of claims against Trident
without leave to amend.
The court refers Plaintiff to the link entitled “Representing Yourself” on the Court’s
website, located at https://cand.uscourts.gov/pro-se-litigants/, as well as the Court’s Legal Help
Centers for unrepresented parties. Parties may schedule an appointment by calling 415-782-8982
or emailing FedPro@sfbar.org.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: December 30, 2025
______________________________________
Donna M. Ryu
Chief Magistrate Judge
9 In the interest of efficiency and judicial economy, this due date has been set to occur after the
scheduled hearings on the remaining motions brought by the Kaiser Defendants and the Federal
Defendants. [Docket Nos. 82, 91, 121.]
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