Lanier v. City of Lakeport

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United States District Court
Northern District of California
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
EUREKA DIVISION
PATRICIA LANIER,
Plaintiff,
v.
CITY OF LAKEPORT,
Defendant.
Case No. 26-cv-04502-RMI
ORDER ON MOTION TO DISMISS
PLAINTIFF'S FIRST AMENDED
COMPLAINT
Re: Dkt. No. 15
This matter is before the court on Defendant City of Lakeport’s Motion to Dismiss
Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint (“FAC”). Dkt. 15. Plaintiff Patricia Lanier has filed this civil
rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging violations of her constitutional rights under
the Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments, in addition to state law tort claims. Dkt. 13. Both
parties have consented to the jurisdiction of a magistrate judge, dkts. 5, 7, and both parties have
filed briefs, dkts. 15, 19, 20, 22.1 For the reasons stated below, the Motion to Dismiss is
1 Defendants filed the motion to dismiss on July 20, 2026, dkt. 15, and Defendants filed a Notice
of Non-Opposition on August 5, 2026, dkt. 19. In the Notice of Non-Opposition, Defendants argue
that Lanier’s opposition to the motion to dismiss needed to be filed by August 3, 2026, within the
fourteen (14) day timeframe provided by Civil Local Rule 7-3(a). Lanier did not file her
opposition until August 8, 2026. This is not her first delay. She similarly failed to timely file an
opposition to Defendant’s motion to dismiss the original complaint. Dkt. 10.
Additionally, every case cited in Plaintiff’s Opposition brief lacks a pinpoint citation. Civil Local
Rule 7-4 requires that parties’ briefs cite pertinent authorities. This includes pinpoint citations to
case law, as appropriate. Failure to provide pinpoint citations muddies the claims. These
deficiencies are unacceptable, particularly where a cited authority is central to an argument.
All future filings must comply with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Civil Local
Rules. Plaintiff is hereby on notice that future untimeliness and deficiencies will result in
sanctions, which may include striking the late filing, dismissal of some or all Plaintiff’s claims, or
monetary sanctions.
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GRANTED. Plaintiff is granted leave to amend her Complaint as described herein.
I. BACKGROUND
Lanier alleges the following facts: On December 21, 2023, Lanier visited the Lake County
Courthouse in Lakeport, California, seeking emergency custody of her son from her ex-husband.
FAC ¶¶ 11–12. While crossing the street to the courthouse, Lanier’s ex-husband appeared and
accelerated his car towards her, and she jumped to avoid being hit. FAC ¶¶ 12–14. She called 911,
rushed back to her vehicle, and followed her ex-husband until he stopped in a parking lot. FAC ¶¶
15–16. Plaintiff approached her ex-husband’s vehicle to grab her son, but her ex-husband exited
the vehicle and struck her. FAC ¶¶ 17–18. She then bit her ex-husband’s arm. FAC ¶ 20.
Then, Doe Defendants, Lakeport police officers, arrived. FAC ¶ 21. The officers
handcuffed Lanier and placed her in the back of a patrol car. Id. She told them that she sustained
neck, chest, and shoulder injuries in the altercation and was experiencing pain and difficulty
breathing. FAC ¶ 22. She requested to be handcuffed in the front—rather than in the back—to
ease the pain, but the officers did not do so. Id. Nor did the officers offer medical treatment. FAC
¶ 23. The officers arrested and questioned her, but they did not provide Miranda warnings. FAC
¶¶ 24–25. Based on her un-Mirandized statements, she was taken to jail. FAC ¶ 25.
On December 18, 2025, Lanier filed her lawsuit in Lake County Superior Court, and
Defendant City of Lakeport removed the case to federal court on May 14, 2026. See Notice of
Removal, Dkt. 1. On July 6, 2026, Lanier filed the FAC against the City of Lakeport and Doe
Defendants, adding Doe Defendants, along with more facts and claims than the initial complaint.
Dkt. 13.
II. LEGAL STANDARD
A complaint must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the
pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(6), dismissal is proper when an operative complaint either fails to advance “a cognizable
legal theory” or fails to allege “sufficient facts alleged under a cognizable legal theory.” Balistreri
v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990). In evaluating 12(b)(6) motions to
dismiss, courts must (1) construe the operative complaint in the light most favorable to the
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plaintiff; (2) accept all well-pleaded factual allegations as true; and (3) determine whether the
plaintiff can prove any set of facts to support a claim that would merit relief. See Cahill v. Liberty
Mut. Ins. Co., 80 F.3d 336, 337–38 (9th Cir. 1996). However, courts are not required “to accept as
true allegations that are merely conclusory, unwarranted deductions of fact, or unreasonable
inferences.” In re Gilead Scis. Sec. Litig., 536 F.3d 1049, 1055 (9th Cir. 2008) (citation omitted).
To survive dismissal under these standards, a complaint must contain sufficient factual
allegations to establish a plausible claim for relief. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678–79 (2009).
This task “requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of
a cause of action . . . .” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (internal citations
omitted). “Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders ‘naked assertion[s]’ devoid of ‘further factual
enhancement.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Bell Atl. Corp., 550 U.S. at 557). Plausibility is
established where the well-pleaded facts permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of
misconduct and show that the pleader is entitled to relief. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678–79.
Pursuant to Rule 15(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, leave to amend “should be
freely granted when justice so requires.”
III. DISCUSSION
The FAC includes both federal and state law claims. Defendants filed a motion to dismiss
on July 20, 2026. Dkt. 15.
A. Federal Law Claims
Defendants move to dismiss all of Plaintiff’s federal claims for failure to state a claim.
1. Fourth Amendment
Lanier’s First Claim alleges excessive force during her arrest in violation of the Fourth
Amendment. FAC ¶¶ 28–31.
Claims of excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment are analyzed under the
“objective reasonableness” standard. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 388 (1989). “In assessing
the objective reasonableness of a particular use of force, [courts] consider: (1) the severity of the
intrusion on the individual’s Fourth Amendment rights by evaluating the type and amount of force
inflicted, (2) the government’s interest in the use of force, and (3) the balance between the gravity
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of the intrusion on the individual and the government’s need for that intrusion.” Lowry v. City of
San Diego, 858 F.3d 1248, 1256 (9th Cir. 2017) (citation modified).
Here, Lanier does not state a plausible claim for relief under the Fourth Amendment’s
prohibition on the use of excessive force during arrests. The FAC alleges: (1) that Lanier told the
Lakeport police officers that she was experiencing significant pain and difficulty breathing from
the altercation with her ex-husband, FAC ¶ 22; (2) that Lanier requested to be handcuffed in the
front—rather than in the back—to ease the pain, but the officers did not do so, id.; and (3) that the
officers did not offer her medical treatment. FAC ¶ 23. These facts are insufficient to show that the
officers applied force during the arrest, let alone unreasonable force. Notably, Lanier does not
allege that she suffered any harm from the handcuffs. See Wall v. Cnty. of Orange, 364 F.3d 1107,
1112 (9th Cir. 2004) (recognizing that allegations of “overly tight handcuffing can constitute
excessive force”); Palmer v. Sanderson, 9 F.3d 1433, 1436 (9th Cir. 1993) (finding that the
“abusive application of handcuffs” and the officer’s refusing to loosen handcuffs, which plaintiff
alleged caused pain and bruises, could constitute use of excessive force). Lanier’s Opposition
recognizes as much and offers to “particularize the nature, duration, and tightness of the
handcuffing, the officers’ identities, and contemporaneous complaints.” Opp’n 4. Accordingly, the
First Claim is DISMISSED with leave to amend.
2. Fourteenth Amendment
Lanier’s Second Claim alleges two violations of the Fourteenth Amendment: malicious
prosecution and substantive due process. First, Lanier concedes that her malicious prosecution
claim must be pled under the Fourth Amendment. Opp’n 5.
Second, the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits the government
from depriving individuals of their life, liberty, or property, without due process of law. U.S.
Const. amend. XIV, § 1. “The substantive component of the Due Process Clause is violated by
executive action only when it ‘can properly be characterized as arbitrary, or conscience shocking,
in a constitutional sense.’” Cnty. of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 847 (1998) (citation
omitted).
Here, Lanier does not state a plausible claim for relief under the Fourteenth Amendment’s
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substantive due process guarantees. Lanier alleges that her custodial interrogation without
Miranda warnings, which Defendants concede was error, see Mot. 5, violated her substantive due
process rights. FAC ¶¶ 24–25, 32–36. She claims that the officers’ conduct was “shocking to the
conscious, beyond the bounds of acts tolerable in a civilized society, and so egregious and
outrageous that they may fairly be said to shock the contemporary conscious.” FAC ¶ 35. This
allegation is a mere recitation of the legal standard, and the sole fact that Lanier was questioned
without the Miranda warnings does not state a plausible claim for relief arising from the
substantive due process right to be free from coercive questioning or other unlawful police
techniques. See Stoot v. City of Everett, 582 F.3d 910, 928–29 (9th Cir. 2009). Again, Lanier’s
Opposition recognizes as much and offers to provide “more detail regarding the manner, duration,
and coerciveness of interrogation.” Opp’n 5. Accordingly, the Second Claim is DISMISSED with
leave to amend.
3. Fifth Amendment
Lanier’s Third Claim alleges a Fifth Amendment violation for questioning her without
Miranda warnings and for using her un-Mirandized statements against her. FAC ¶¶ 37–39.
The Fifth Amendment requires that “[n]o person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal
case to be a witness against himself.” U.S. Const. amend. V. “[C]oercive police questioning does
not violate the Fifth Amendment, absent use of the statements in a criminal case.” Stoot, 582 F.3d
at 923 (citing Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 760, 766 (2003)).
Here, to begin with, the mere allegation of a Miranda violation alone does not give rise to
a Section 1983 claim. See Vega v. Tekoh, 597 U.S. 134, 150 (2022) (“[A] violation of Miranda
does not necessarily constitute a violation of the [Fifth Amendment], and therefore such a
violation does not constitute ‘the deprivation of [a] right . . . secured by the Constitution.’ 42
U.S.C. § 1983.”). Lanier has alleged that the un-Mirandized statements were “used against [her] in
a manner that violated due process protections guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment.” FAC ¶ 39.
But this is conclusory and fails to plead coercion or the use of the statements in a criminal case, let
alone with any specificity. Once again, Lanier’s Opposition offers to provide the alleged uses in an
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amended pleading. Opp’n 6.2 Accordingly, the Third Claim is DISMISSED with leave to amend.
4. Conspiracy
Lanier’s Fourth Claim alleges a conspiracy to violate civil rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
FAC ¶¶ 40–43.
Proving a conspiracy under Section 1983 requires plaintiffs to “show ‘an agreement or
meeting of the minds to violate constitutional rights.’” Franklin v. Fox, 312 F.3d 423, 441 (9th
Cir. 2002) (quoting United Steelworkers of Am. v. Phelps Dodge Corp., 865 F.2d 1539, 1540–41
(9th Cir.1989)). “Such an agreement need not be overt, and may be inferred on the basis of
circumstantial evidence such as the actions of the defendants.” Mendocino Env’t Ctr. v.
Mendocino Cnty., 192 F.3d 1283, 1301 (9th Cir. 1999).
Here, Lanier does not state a plausible conspiracy claim. Lanier alleges that:
Doe Defendants acted in conspiracy and with agreement, permission,
ratification, and approval of their joint conduct to (1) unlawfully
detain Ms. Lanier with an unreasonable use of force; (2) jointly act to
use excessive force during Ms. Lanier’s detention; and (3) collaborate
to interrogate Ms. Lanier while she was detained and using this
unlawfully gained statement to arrest Ms. Lanier, place her in custody
and file a report with said statement to the District Attorney’s Office
where it was used against Ms. Lanier is coercing her to make a plea
deal.
FAC ¶ 43.3 Stripped of conclusory statements, the fact that Lakeport police officers—working in
the same department—“detained” and “interrogated” Lanier is not sufficient to state a conspiracy
claim. Burns v. Cnty. of King, 883 F.2d 819, 821 (9th Cir. 1989) (“To state a claim for a
conspiracy to violate one's constitutional rights under section 1983, the plaintiff must state specific
2 Lanier alternatively offers to reassert the Fifth Amendment theory “under the Fourteenth
Amendment coercive-interrogation/substantive due process framework” “if the Court determines
no criminal case occurred.” Opp’n 6. First, it would be improper for the court to determine a
factual issue at the motion to dismiss stage. Second, the court could not make this determination
because the FAC fails to allege any use in a criminal case.
3 The cases cited by the parties on this issue concern conspiracies between state and private actors.
However, this claim only alleges a conspiracy amongst the Doe Defendants. The court need not
address this legal issue at this point, but if the next amended complaint keeps the conspiracy
claim, then briefing for any subsequent motion to dismiss shall address this question.
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facts to support the existence of the claimed conspiracy.”). Once again, Lanier’s Opposition offers
to provide more factual allegations, such as “communications, joint decision-making, and role
assignments.” Opp’n 7. Accordingly, the Fourth Claim is DISMISSED with leave to amend.
5. Monell
Lanier’s Fifth and Sixth Claims allege, respectively, that Defendant City of Lakeport
violated her constitutional rights (1) pursuant to unconstitutional customs and practices and (2) by
failing to train and supervise. FAC ¶¶ 44–56.
“[A] municipality can be found liable under § 1983 only where the municipality itself
causes the constitutional violation at issue. Respondeat superior or vicarious liability will not
attach under § 1983.” City of Canton, Ohio v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 385 (1989) (citing Monell v.
Dep't of Soc. Servs. of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 694–95 (1978)). “[M]unicipalities may be
liable under § 1983 for constitutional injuries pursuant to (1) an official policy; (2) a pervasive
practice or custom; (3) a failure to train, supervise, or discipline; or (4) a decision or act by a final
policymaker.” Horton by Horton v. City of Santa Maria, 915 F.3d 592, 602–03 (9th Cir. 2019).
Furthermore, “it is not enough for a § 1983 plaintiff merely to identify conduct properly
attributable to the municipality.” Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs of Bryan Cnty., Okl. v. Brown, 520 U.S.
397, 404 (1997). Deliberate conduct or indifference is required. See id.; City of Canton, 489 U.S.
at 388–89. Therefore, plaintiffs “must show that the municipal action was taken with the requisite
degree of culpability and must demonstrate a direct causal link between the municipal action and
the deprivation of federal rights.” Brown, 520 U.S. at 404. For this reason, only in rare
circumstances will “a single instance of unlawful conduct [be] []sufficient to state a claim for
municipal liability . . . .” Benavidez v. Cnty. of San Diego, 993 F.3d 1134, 1154 (9th Cir. 2021).
Here, both of Lanier’s Monell claims fall short because they are premised on a single
incident, and this single incident as alleged does not meet the high bar for single incident liability.
Lanier’s fifth claim alleges that the City of Lakeport has (1) “a de facto policy, custom, or practice
of not providing medical attention to citizens for the simple reason that the arresting persons do
not believe the citizen”; and (2) “a de facto policy, custom, or practice to not provide citizens who
are detained, their Miranda warnings prior to interrogation.” FAC ¶ 46. Lanier alleges that these
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policies or customs “caused . . . all of the violations of Ms. Lanier’s constitutional rights” and are
“the result of deliberate indifference.” FAC ¶¶ 47–48. Similarly, Lanier’s sixth claim alleges that
the City of Lakeport and Doe Defendants “have failed to properly train, supervise, and/or
discipline employees, officers, managers, and supervisors within the City of Lakeport Police
Department as to the legal requirements and protections applicable to persons as set forth in the
United States and California Constitutions, and other laws” and that these failures “are intentional
and/or the result of deliberate indifference.” FAC ¶ 53.
As alleged, both claims are premised solely on Lanier’s arrest and interrogation, and
bolstering the claims by repeating legal elements and conclusions cannot substitute for factual
allegations of a policy or custom. “[T]o be entitled to the presumption of truth, allegations in a
complaint or counterclaim may not simply recite the elements of a cause of action, but must
contain sufficient allegations of underlying facts to give fair notice and to enable the opposing
party to defend itself effectively.” AE ex rel. Hernandez v. Cnty. of Tulare, 666 F.3d 631, 637 (9th
Cir. 2012) (quoting Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1216 (9th Cir. 2011)). Nor do the alleged facts
state a claim for the rare circumstance of single incident Monell liability. See Benavidez, 993 F.3d
at 1154 (“life-threatening decisions”); see also Est. of Chivrell v. City of Arcata, 623 F. Supp. 3d
1032, 1041 (N.D. Cal. 2022) (quoting Brown, 520 U.S. at 398) (holding that “municipal liability
may be ‘triggered by evidence of a single violation of federal rights’ when accompanied by a
showing of the municipality's failure to train ‘its employees to handle recurring situations
presenting an obvious potential for such a violation’”). And once again, Lanier’s Opposition offers
to provide more factual allegations, such as “prior similar complaints against [the Lakeport Police
Department]; policy titles and training bulletins; known omissions in custodial care/Miranda
training; and final policymaker ratification of the conduct.” Opp’n 8. Accordingly, the Fifth and
Sixth Claims are DISMISSED with leave to amend.
B. State Law Claims
Lanier’s Seventh and Eighth Claims are state tort law claims for negligence and intentional
infliction of emotional distress. FAC ¶¶ 57–66. Defendant moves to dismiss based on the
California Tort Claims Act (“CTCA”). Mot. 9–10.
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Under the CTCA, “[b]efore a plaintiff can seek money damages from a government entity
or its employees on a tort claim, . . . the plaintiff [must] file an administrative claim form with the
relevant government entity no more than six months after the cause of action accrues.” Johnson v.
Cty. of Santa Clara, No. 5:18-CV-06264-EJD, 2020 WL 870933, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 21, 2020)
(citing Cal. Gov't. Code §§ 905, 911.2, 945.4, 950). “In federal court, the failure to allege facts
that either demonstrate or excuse compliance with the [CTCA] will subject a state law claim to
dismissal.” Young v. City of Visalia, 687 F. Supp. 2d 1141, 1152 (E.D. Cal. 2009). Simply put, “a
plaintiff must allege facts demonstrating or excusing compliance with the claim presentation
requirement.” State v. Superior Ct., 13 Cal. Rptr. 3d 534, 541 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004).
Here, the FAC lacks any facts demonstrating compliance with the CTCA. Lanier merely
states that she “has attempted to comply with the [CTCA].” FAC ¶¶ 59, 64. Lanier’s Opposition
offers to “supply claim dates and attach or incorporate the claim and rejection notices.” Opp’n 8.
Accordingly, the Seventh and Eighth Claims are DISMISSED with leave to amend.
IV. CONCLUSION
Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss all eight claims in the First Amended Complaint is
GRANTED. The Complaint is dismissed with leave to amend as described herein. Plaintiff shall
have 45 days from the date of this order to file an amended complaint.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: October 13, 2026
ROBERT M. ILLMAN
United States Magistrate Judge
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