Ron McNiel, Sr.

OCR transcription for search; preserved printed pages are authoritative

UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT

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Entered on Docket

“ October 06, 2005

GLORIA L. FRANKLIN, CLERK
U.S BANKRUPTCY COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

In re Case No. 97-56350-ASW

Ron McNiel, Sr. Chapter 7

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Debtor. J
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MEMORANDUM DECISION ON
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Before the Court is an objection by three creditors in this
Chapter 7' case to a claim filed by another creditor in the case.
The objection (“Objection”) is by Maria Teresa DeSaracho; Eureka
Canners Group, S.A.; and Eureka Mexicana, S.A. (collectively,
“Objectors”). The claim (“Claim”) was filed by Behram DeSai
(“DeSai”), as trustee of several trusts. Susan L. Uecker is the
trustee of the Chapter 7 case (“Chapter 7 Trustee”), and has joined
in the Objection. This Memorandum Decision resolves the motion for
summary judgment filed by Objectors seeking to subordinate the
Claim because it was filed after the claims bar date.

The Objectors are represented by William J. Keegan, Esq. of The

Keegan Law Firm. DeSai is represented by Samuel E. Goldstein, Esq.

INFORMATION
GPO

' Unless otherwise noted, all statutory references are to Title 11, United States Code
("Bankruptcy Code"), as applicable to cases commenced on July 30, 1997.

MEMORANDUM DECISION ON

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of Samuel E. Goldstein & Associates. The Chapter 7 Trustee is
represented by Randy Michelson, Esq. of Bingham McCutchen LLP. The
matter was briefed and argued, and the Court stated its findings of
fact and conclusions of law on the record. Post-hearing, the Court
requested additional briefing from the parties. This Memorandum
Decision supersedes the findings and conclusions stated on the
record by this Court at the hearing and shall constitute the
Court’s findings of fact and conclusions of law, pursuant to Rule

7052 of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure.

FACTS

The relevant facts are undisputed.

On July 30, 1997, Ron McNiel, Sr. (“Debtor”) commenced this
bankruptcy case by filing a petition under Chapter 11. On
August 4, 1997, the Court issued a notice announcing that
December 16, 1997 was the last day for filing claims in the
Chapter 11 case.

On October 27, 2000, the bankruptcy case was converted to
Chapter 7. The Chapter 7 Trustee was appointed on November 9,
2000. On February 2, 2001, the Chapter 7 Trustee issued a notice
announcing that March 7, 2001 was the last day for filing claims in
the Chapter 7 case (“Claims Notice”). The Claims Notice was served
by mail on Debtor, and on DeSai at his correct address. The Claims
Notice also was served on counsel representing Ron McNiel, Jr.
(“Ron”) in an adversary proceeding pending during the Chapter 7

claim filing period.

MEMORANDUM DECISION ON
MOTION_FOR SUMMARY JUDG

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Pre-petition, Debtor created three trusts for the benefit of
Aln J. McNiel (“Aln”): the Aln J. McNiel Education Trust-1982
(“1982 Trust”), created by the Debtor on February 16, 1982; the
Aln J. McNiel Trust-1988 (“1988 Trust”), created by Diane Barbara
McNiel (“Diane”) on November 30, 1988; and the Aln J. McNiel Trust-
1989 (“1989 Trust”), created by the Debtor and Diane on
December 22, 1989. On June 1, 2000, Dale Dawson resigned as
trustee of the three trusts and Ron subsequently became trustee of
the trusts. Ron resigned his trusteeships on October 23, 2000.
Debtor appointed himself trustee of the 1982 Trust on October 23,
2000. On October 30, 2000, Aln petitioned the Superior Court of
California, County of Santa Cruz (“State Court”), inter alia, to
appoint DeSai as trustee of the three trusts.

On March 1, 2001, the State Court conducted a hearing on Aln’s
petition. On or about that date, a minute order (“Minute Order”)
was issued in the State Court case,* reciting that Aln and DeSai
were among those who appeared at the hearing, and stating as
follows:

The Parties address [sic] the issue(s) now before the
Court.

The Court grants the Petition to Remove Trustees, Appoint
Successor Trustee, Impose Equitable Lien on Trust Property.

The Court appoints Mr. DeSai as temporary trustee.

Mr. DeSai is directed to prepare the order pursuant to
California Rule of Court 391.

> It is the Court’s understanding that (1) the State Court records the oral rulings of the court
in minute orders created by the courtroom clerk and placed in the file; and (2) the State Court does
not create permanent minutes of its proceedings. The courtroom clerk is advised to place a minute
order in the file as soon after the hearing as feasible. See Declaration of Samuel E. Goldstein in
Response to Court Order re Motion for Summary Judgment filed on May 6, 2005, ff 6-8, and
uncontested on these points.

MEMORANDUM DECISION ON

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On March 15, 2001, the Minute Order was amended to delete the
second paragraph. DeSai acknowledges being present at the hearing
on March 1, and hearing the State Court’s ruling as reflected in
the Minute Order.

Following the March 1, 2001 hearing and before a written order
was signed, DeSai wrote and sent several letters asserting his role
as trustee of the 1982 Trust, 1988 Trust and 1989 Trust and seeking
to take possession of all the records and assets of the trusts and
to have certain accountings performed for those trusts.

On April 11, 2001, the State Court issued a written order
(“Written Appointment Order”) appointing DeSai as “sole temporary
trustee” of the 1982 Trust, 1988 Trust, and 1989 Trust.

On April 20, 2001, DeSai filed the Claim in the Bankruptcy
Court, identifying the claimant as himself in the role of “Trustee
for: Aln J. McNiel Education Trust - 1982 / Aln J. McNiel Trusts:
1988 & 1989” and annotating the claim form to state “THIS ISA
COURT APPOINTED TRUSTEE CLAIM****”, The basis for the Claim is
stated as “IRREVOCABLE TRUSTS HAVE ASSETS IN PARTNERSHIPS FOR
BENEFICIARY Aln J. McNiel / (SEE EXHIBIT - 1) /For Partnerships
(registered & recorded) SEE EXHIBITS 2, 3 & 4. / PROBATE LITIGATION
IN PROGRESS AT: SUPERIOR COURT, COUNTY OF SANTA CRUZ”. The amount
claimed is stated to be “$5 MILLION”. The Claim is described as
being secured by real property and rental income; the description
also refers to an “EXHIBIT 1”, which is a copy of the Written
Appointment Order. The value of the secured claimant’s collateral
is shown as “$15.5 MILLION + Contingent non-liquidated debt. Trust

income to beneficiary Aln J. McNiel”.

MEMORANDUM DECISION ON

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The Objectors first filed an objection to the Claim in 2002,
asserting that the Claim had been filed late and should therefore
be allowed only as provided by §726(a) (3), which subordinates late
claims to timely claims and those filed late by claimants who
lacked either notice or actual knowledge of the bankruptcy case in
time to meet the bar date. The Objectors received summary
judgment, which was appealed by DeSai. On June 13, 2003, the
Unites States District Court for the Northern District of
California issued an order (“District Court Order”) reversing this
Court’s decision, and remanding the matter “for further findings
consistent with this order”. The District Court Order states the

following findings and conclusions:

Based on its review of the entire record in this case,
as well as on the briefs filed in this appeal, the Court
concludes that there are genuine issues of material fact as
to whether DeSai was Trustee of any of the Aln McNiel
Trusts during the claim filing period of December 7, 2000
to March 7, 2001. The Court finds that it cannot conclude
from the record that Appellees satisfied their burden to
show that DeSai was the legally appointed Trustee during
the claim filing time since the record is devoid of any
trust documents for either the 1982 or 1989 Aln McNiel
Trusts.[?] Rather, the record contains only the Aln McNiel
1988 Trust. The 1988 Trust documents clearly state that,
upon resignation of the Trustee, certain named individuals
may succeed as Trustee. Neither Ron McNiel, Sr. nor
Michael Leath are listed as permissible successor trustees
under the 1988 Trust. Although Ron McNiel, Jr. is listed
aS a permissible successor trustee, the record relied upon
by Appellees to support their argument indicates that Ron
McNiel, Jr. resigned as Trustee on October 23, 2000. This
resignation was prior to the new claims period. Further,
the record does not show that Ron McNiel, Jr. was served
with notice of the new claims period, even assuming he had
not resigned as Trustee of the 1988 Trust.

In addition, the Court agrees with DeSai that it
cannot rely on the letter allegedly filed by DeSai in June
of 2000 for several reasons. First, the letter is not
properly authenticated. However, even assuming for

* A copy of the trust document for the 1982 Trust is included in the moving papers for this
summary judgment motion. DeSai has withdrawn his claim based on the 1989 Trust.

MEMORANDUM DECISION ON
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGM

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purposes of this motion that DeSai was the author of the
letter, the 1988 Trust documents do not permit DeSai to
succeed as successor trustee without court approval.
Therefore, even if DeSai purported to act on behalf of the
1988 Trust, the only trust for which the Court has
documentation, such representation was invalid without
court approval.

In addition, the record is devoid of any proof that
DeSai made court appearances on behalf of the Trusts.
Again, however, assuming the truth of this argument for
purposes of this motion, DeSai was without legal and proper
authority to make such court appearances without court
approval and appointment as the legal trustee.

Appellees next argue that, even assuming that DeSai
was not the proper trustee for the Aln McNiel Trusts, his
predecessor trustees had notice of the claims filing period
and failed to file timely claims. A review of the trust
documents in the record before the Court reveals, however,
that Dale Dawson resigned as trustee for the 1988 Trust on
June 1, 2000. The Debtor did not convert the bankruptcy
from a Chapter 11 to a Chapter 7 bankruptcy until
October 27, 2000, after the date that Dale Dawson resigned.

As noted above, DeSai, even if he misrepresented
himself as the trustee of the Aln McNeil Trusts after
October 27, 2000, was not the properly appointed trustee
and could not, therefore, have legally filed a claim on
behalf of the trusts. Dale Dawson has resigned as trustee
and could not, therefore, file a legal claim on behalf of
the trusts. Based on the 1988 Trust documents, neither Ron
McNiel, Sr. nor Michael Leath could serve as successor
trustees. Finally, although Ron McNiel, Jr. could have
served as a successor trustee, the record indicates that
Ron McNiel, Jr. resigned as Trustee on October 23, 2000.
This resignation was prior to the new claims period.
Further, the record does not show that Ron McNiel, Jr. was
served with notice of the new claims period, even assuming
he had not resigned as Trustee of the 1988 Trust. For all
of these reasons, the Court grants DeSai’s appeal.

On March 24, 2004, Objectors deposed DeSai. In his deposition,
DeSai authenticated the letter he sent to the bankruptcy court in
June 2000. DeSai also acknowledged that he had actual knowledge of
Debtor’s bankruptcy case before the claims bar date. DeSai also
acknowledged that on March 19, 2001, he wrote letters to his
predecessor trustee (the Debtor) and to Aln’s step-mother’s lawyer

where DeSai states that “as of March 1, 2001 I am the sole court

MEMORANDUM DECISION ON

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appointed successor trustee” for the 1982 Trust, 1988 Trust and
1989 Trust.*

On May 11, 2004, DeSai purported to amend the Claim by filing a
new claim identifying the claimant as himself “as Trustee of the
1982 and 1988 Lynedt McNiel Trusts and the 1982 and 1988 Mickey
McNiel Trusts -- See Attached” and checking the box for “amends”

and annotating the claim form to state “See Attached.”° The basis

* In his deposition, Desai testified:

Q. Right. I am going to hand you Exhibit 22.
A. Okay.

(Whereupon, Exhibit 22 [March 19, 2001 letter from DeSai to Debtor]

was marked for identification.)
R. KEEGAN: Q. Exhibit 22, I think this might have been the letter you were fishing for.
. Iam sorry?
I think this might have been the letter you were fishing for for Ron McNiel?
Oh, that’s right. That’s the one. Credibility guaranteed here, isn’t it?
How so?
That’s the one, sir.
. Okay. So as of March 19th -- well, as of March 19th putting this together with your
former testimony, is it correct then that as of March 19th, 2001 you were still under the impression
that you could operate as a sole trustee based upon the oral order that you heard in Court on March
1st?

QOPOPO>

A. That is a correct statement.

Q. So then we can deduce that sometime after March 19th, 2001 is when Union Bank
rebuffed your request because you did not have a formal order yet?

A. That’s true.

Q. And [ll hand you Exhibit 23.

(Whereupon, Exhibit 23 [March 19, 2001 letter from DeSai to Michael
Gurev, Aln’s step-mother’s lawyer] was marked for identification.)

MR. KEEGAN: Q. Exhibit 23 is a letter to Michael Gurev Dated [sic] also the same date,
March 19th, 2001, where you say the same thing that you did to Mr. McNiel; namely, that on March
Ist, 2001 -- I am looking at the third paragraph, “I became the sole appointed temporary trustee for
the referenced Aln McNiel Trusts,” right?

A. Right, right.

Q. And on the top of the next page you say on the second line, “I am quite right -- I am quite
in my right as a court appointed sole trustee to make sure to protect the trust property, to see it
remains productive,” right?

A. Thank you, Counsel. That is a correct statement.

DeSai Deposition at 116:20-118:11 (Exhibit B to the Keegan Declaration in Support of
Motion for Summary Judgment or Partial Summary Judgment on Claim Re-Classification)

° The Objection objects only to the Claim and does not object to the Amended Claim. At the
hearing, DeSai asked how the Court’s ruling applied to the Lynedt McNiel Trusts and the Mickey
MeNiel Trusts. The Lynedt McNiel Trusts and Mickey McNiel Trusts were not part of Objectors’
motion for summary judgment and the Court makes no express ruling regarding those trusts.

MEMORANDUM DECISION ON
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

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for the claim is stated as “claimant incorporates his claim of
4/20/2001.” The date the claimed debt was incurred states “prior
to the date of conversion to Chapter 7 on October 27, 2000.” The
amount claimed is stated to be “SAME AS PRIOR CLAIM - $5 MILLION -
See Attached” and “THIS CLAIM IS NOT INTENDED TO ADD TO THE
ORIGINAL CLAIM OF $5 MILLION FILED 4/20/2001 - See Attached.” The
Claim is marked as an “UNSECURED NONPRIORITY CLAIM” and “See
Attached” is entered. The attachment states:

The following explanation and information is provided
in connection with the Amended Proof Of Claim of Behram
DeSai, Trustee and is part of the Amended Proof of Claim.

DESAI’S APPOINTMENT AS TRUSTEE

Subsequent to the passage of the claims deadline of
March 7, 2001, Claimant, Behram DeSai became trustee of the
1982, 1988, and 1989 Aln McNiel Trusts by the Order of the
Santa Cruz County Probate Court entered on April 11, 2001,
in Case No. PR-41902. Claimant DeSai filed his Proof of
Claim on or about April 20, 2001, as trustee of the 1982,
1988, and 1989 Aln McNiel Trusts.

On December 5, 2001, in Case No. PR-42293, the Santa
Cruz County Probate Court entered its order appointing
Claimant DeSai as Trustee of the 1982, 1988, and 1989
Lynedt McNiel Trusts.

On January 15, 2002, the parties to Santa Cruz Probate
Court Case No. PR-42361 stipulated on the record to
Claimant DeSai’s appointment as trustee of the 1982, 1988,
and 1989 Mickey McNiel Trusts. The court entered its order
to that effect on or about January 15, 2002.

Following entry of the three orders, Claimant DeSai
was the trustee of nine trusts: the 1982, 1988, and 1989
Aln McNiel Trusts; the 1982, 1988, and 1989 Lynedt McNiel
Trusts; and the 1982, 1988, and 1989 Mickey McNiel Trusts.

EFFECT OF THIS AMENDMENT OF PROOF OF CLAIM

This Amendment to Proof of Claim is intended to make
the following changes and modifications of Claimant Behram
DeSai’s initial claim filed with this court on or about
April 20, 2001:

Withdrawal of Claim as Trustee of the 1989
Aln McNiel Trust - The claim of Claimant DeSai in
his capacity as trustee of the 1989 Aln McNiel

MEMORANDUM DECISION ON
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

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Trust is withdrawn. No other withdrawals of
claims are intended by this Amendment to Proof of

Claim.

Claim as Trustee of the 1982 and 1988 Lynedt
McNiel Trusts - The claims of Behram DeSai in his
capacity as trustee of the 1982, 1988, and 1989
Aln McNiel Trusts asserted in the Original Proof
of Claim are reasserted by as [sic] claims of
Behram DeSai in his capacity as trustee of the
1982 and the 1988 Lynedt McNiel Trusts.

Claim as Trustee of the 1982 and 1988 Mickey
McNiel Trusts - The claims of Behram DeSai in his
capacity as trustee of the 1982, 1988, and 1989
Alin McNiel Trusts asserted in the Original Proof
of Claim are reasserted by as [sic] claims of
Behram DeSai in his capacity as trustee of the
1982 and the 1988 Mickey McNiel Trusts.

Original Amount Of Claim Unchanged - The
original claim amount of $5 million shall not be
changed by this Amended Proof of Claim.

On May 18, 2004, Objectors filed a motion for summary judgment
seeking to re-classify the Claim as subordinate to the timely-filed

claims of other unsecured creditors.

Il.
ANALYSIS

A. LAW OF THE CASE DOCTRINE

DeSai asserts that the District Court’s denial of the prior
summary judgment motion is the law of the case. Denial of a prior
motion for summary judgment establishes law of the case only when
the court in the prior motion “clearly intended to decide the

issues at hand.” Fed. Ins. Co. v. Scarsella Bros., Inc., 931 F.2d

599, 601 n.4 (1991) .®

° At oral argument, DeSai cited cases asserting that the mandate rule, related to the law of
the case doctrine, requires this Court to adhere to certain conclusions rendered by Judge Ware in the
District Court Order. The Court finds it inappropriate to raise new issues for the first time at oral
argument. Even if the Court were to consider DeSai’s arguments, the Court finds that none of the
cases cited by DeSai involve a situation where an appellate court reversed an order granting a motion

MEMORANDUM DECISION ON

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Here the District Court held that the record before it was
insufficient to carry the Objectors’ burden for summary judgment
because it left material factual issues in dispute and remanded the
matter to this Court. That appears to this Court to be all the
District Court decided. The District Court did not decide the
legal issues of whether an oral appointment of a trustee is
sufficient to empower him to file a claim in a bankruptcy case for
the trust and did not decide the factual issues of what notice
and/or knowledge DeSai actually had regarding the bankruptcy case.
Thus, the law of the case doctrine does not limit this Court’s

analysis on Objectors’ current motion for summary judgment.

B. MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Objectors move for summary judgment on three grounds. First,
DeSai’s appointment as trustee was effective as of the March 1,
2001 hearing in State Court -- and by that time he knew of the
Claims bar date. Alternatively, Debtor was appointed trustee of

the 1982 Trust as of October 23, 2000, so if DeSai was not the

for summary judgment (because it found that factual issues precluded summary judgment on the
record then before the trial court) and remanded the matter for further proceedings. U.S. v. Bell, 988
F.2d 247 (Ist Cir. 1993), involved the remand of a criminal sentence where the defendant sought to
readdress issues not raised in the original appeal. Magnesystems, Inc. v. Nikken, Inc., 933 F.Supp.
944 (C.D. Cal. 1996), involved applying determinations made in granting a prior motion for
summary judgment to a motion for leave to file an amended answer and counterclaim. In re
Fraschilla, 235 B.R. 449 (9th Cir. BAP 1999), involved a change of law between the remand from
the bankruptcy appellate panel and trial in the bankruptcy court.

Those cases are distinguishable from the present situation where an appellate court has
reversed a motion granting summary judgment based on finding “genuine issues of material fact as
to whether DeSai was Trustee of any of the Aln McNiel Trusts during the claim filing period of
December 7, 2000 to March 7, 2001.” District Court Order at 5:24-6:2. The District Court found
that the summary judgment order that was on appeal was erroneous because, on the record as it then
existed, there were genuine issues of material fact precluding summary judgment. The record now
has been augmented by depositions and document authentication, and is now different than it was
when the prior order was appealed. This summary judgment decision is based on the new expanded
record.

MEMORANDUM DECISION ON
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

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trustee, Debtor was between October 23, 2000 and April 9, 2001 and
had knowledge of the claims bar date. Alternatively, Ron did not
receive permission from Aln to resign his trusteeships over the
1982 Trust and 1988 Trust, so his resignation was ineffective and

Ron had knowledge of the claims bar date.

1. Appointment of DeSai

It is undisputed that DeSai was appointed trustee of the
1982 Trust, 1988 Trust, and 1989 Trust at a State Court hearing on
March 1, 2001, that he was present in court, and knew of the
appointment at that time. The parties dispute the legal effect of
the State Court orally appointing DeSai as temporary trustee of the
three trusts. Determining the legal effect of the State Court oral
ruling requires this Court to interpret California law and is not
an exercise of this Court’s discretion.

Objectors contend that DeSai’s appointment was effective upon

the oral ruling of the State Court, citing Cauhape v. Barnes, 135
Cal. 107 (1901) (“Cauhape”). DeSai contends that because the
Minute Order directed DeSai “to prepare the [written] order
pursuant to California Rule of Court 391,” DeSai’s appointment was
not effective until the written order was entered, citing Cuenllas

v. VRL Int’l, Ltd., 92 Cal.App.4th 1050 (2001) (“Cuenllas”), where

the court addressed the impact of a minute order on the timeliness
of an appeal under California Rule of Court 2 (“Rule 2").

In Cauhape, a trustee was appointed in 1884 under a will to
operate a butchering business. That trustee retired, another was
appointed, and, on April 13, 1887, the third trustee, defendant
Barnes, was appointed trustee according to the minutes of the

court. Barnes was present in court at the time he was appointed

MEMORANDUM DECISION ON
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

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and commenced acting as trustee at that time. The validity of
Barnes’ appointment was not contested until October 1895. The
California Supreme Court held that Barnes had authority to act
the date of a minute order even without a signed written order:

There was therefore no legal impediment against Barnes
entering upon the duties as trustee at the date of the
minute order, which, as a matter of fact, he did, and from
that time he performed the duties as trustee; and his acts
as such were not even questioned by any one until a short
time before the trial of this cause in the court below.

Cauhape, at 110.
Rule 2 and California Rule of Court 391 (“Rule 391"), as

at

argued by DeSai, are inapplicable and do not contradict Cauhape.

Rule 2 addresses when an order is effective for the purposes of

determining the period in which to file an appeal.’ Rule 391

7 Rule 2, as of March 1, 2001, provided in relevant part:

(a) Except as otherwise provided by Code of Civil Procedure section 870 or other
statute or rule 3, a notice of appeal from a judgment shall be filed on or before the
earliest of the following dates:

(1) 60 days after the date of mailing by the clerk of the court of a
document entitled “notice of entry” of judgment;

(2) 60 days after the date of service of a document entitled “notice of
entry” of judgment by any party upon the party filing the notice of
appeal, or by the party filing the notice of appeal; or

(3) 180 days after entry of judgment.

For the purposes of this subdivision, a file-stamped copy of the judgment may be used
in place of the document entitled “notice of entry”.

(b) For purposes of this rule:

(1) The date of entry of a judgment shall be the date of its entry in the
judgment book or, in a county following the procedure specified in
Code of Civil Procedure section 668.5 in lieu of maintaining a
judgment book, the date of filing the judgment with the clerk pursuant
to that section.

(2) The date of entry of an appealable order which is entered in the
minutes shall be the date of its entry in the permanent minutes, unless
the minute order entered expressly directs that a written order be

MEMORANDUM DECISION ON
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

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addresses the procedure for preparing and serving proposed written
orders.*® DeSai asserts that the Minute Order that expressly
directed DeSai to prepare a written order pursuant to Rule 391
means that the Written Appointment Order is the only order
appointing Desai as trustee, citing Cuenllas:?

As recognized in Hughey v. City of Hayward (1994) 24

Cal.App.4th 206, 209 [30 Cal.Rptr.2d 687], the plain
language of rule 2(b) “requires us to conclude that even

prepared, signed, and filed, in which case the date of entry shall be the
date of filing of the signed order.

(3) The date of entry of an appealable order which is not entered in the
minutes shall be the date of filing of the order signed by the court.

(4) The date of entry of a decree of distribution in a probate proceeding
shall be the date of its entry at length in the judgment book or other
permanent record of the court.

The fact that a written order is to be prepared under the provisions of rule 391 ora
similar local rule does not constitute an express direction in the minute order that a
written order be “prepared, signed, and filed” within the meaning of (2) above.

® Rule 391 provides:

(a) Unless the parties waive notice or the court orders otherwise, the party prevailing
on any motion shall, within five days of the ruling, mail or deliver a proposed order to
the other party for approval as conforming to the court’s order. Within five days after
the mailing or delivery, the other party shall notify the prevailing party as to whether
or not the proposed order is so approved. The opposing party shall state any reasons
for disapproval. Failure to notify the prevailing party within the time required shall
be deemed an approval. Code of Civil Procedure section 1013, relating to service of
papers by mail, does not apply to this rule.

(b) The prevailing party shall, upon expiration of the five-day period provided for
approval, promptly transmit the proposed order to the court together with a summary
of any responses of the other parties or a statement that no responses were received.

(c) If the prevailing party fails to prepare and submit a proposed order as required by
(a) and (b) above, any other party may do so.

(d) This rule shall not apply if the motion was unopposed and a proposed order was
submitted with the moving papers, unless otherwise ordered by the court.

» DeSai also cites County of Nevada v. Superior Court, 183 Cal.App.3d 806 (1986) (“County
of Nevada”), but that case does not deal with Rule 391 or Rule 2. In County of Nevada, the court
held that a complaint filed within 30 days of the entry of a written order granting relief from the
claim requirement, but more than 30 days after the minute order, was timely filed under Cal. Govt.
Code §946.6.

MEMORANDUM DECISION ON

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though preparation of a written order is now contemplated

in the ordinary course of events, the date of entry remains

the date the order is entered in the permanent minutes

unless the minute order expressly directs the preparation

of a written order.

Cuenllas, at 1052. The Court disagrees with DeSai’s analysis.

In Cuenllas, the trial court took a motion to quash under
submission on October 13, 1999 and granted the motion pursuant to a
minute order sent to the parties on October 20, 1999. The minute
order did not require that a formal order be prepared and presented
to the court for signature. A proposed judgment of dismissal was
circulated on October 29, 1999. The parties disputed the form of
order and a formal order was signed and entered on November 23,
1999. A notice of appeal was filed on January 20, 2000. An
objection to the timeliness of the appeal was made, based on the
fact that the appeal was noticed more than 60 days after the entry
date of the minute order. The California Court of Appeal applied
Rule 2 and determined that, because the minute order was not titled
“notice of entry,” the time period for appeal fell under Rule
2(a) (3) and the notice of appeal had to be filed within 180 days of
the minute order, which it was.

DeSai would have this Court determine that the Minute Order
directing DeSai to prepare a written order pursuant to Rule 391
precludes the State Court’s oral ruling appointing DeSai as
temporary trustee on March 1, 2001 and the subsequent Minute Order
from taking immediate effect. However, the complete language of
Rule 2 does not support such an interpretation. The language of
Rule 2(b) specifically provides that a minute order that is entered
in the permanent minutes of the court is the appealable order

irrespective of a subsequent written order later filed pursuant to

MEMORANDUM DECISION ON
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGM

Case: 97-56350 Doc# 1876 Filed: 09/30/05 * Entered: 10/06/05 09:02:30 Page 14

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For The Northern District Of California

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Rule 391. Rule 2 means that a state court minute order can be the
effective order of the court -- irrespective of a subsequent
written order -- and such an interpretation is consistent with
Cauhape. Moreover, there is no indication either Rule 2
(addressing deadlines for appealing an order) or Rule 391
(addressing procedures for preparing and submitting proposed
written orders to the court) were intended to displace the
authority and effect of oral rulings issued by the State Court and
this Court declines to rewrite state law in this fashion.

Thus, DeSai occupied the capacity of trustee of the 1982 Trust,
1988 Trust and 1989 Trust as of March 1, 2001, and he knew that he
did, and he had the power to act for them as of that date. DeSai
was authorized to assume the duties of the Trustee prior to entry
of the Written Appointment Order, and in fact did so. DeSai stated
in his deposition that he understood that he was sole temporary
trustee of all three trusts as of the March 1, 2001 hearing and
believed that it was in his power to safeguard the assets of the
trusts to the maximum limit based on the oral order. DeSai even
took actions consistent with this understanding including writing
letters to the predecessor trustee and to Aln’s step-mother’s
lawyer based on the March 1, 2001 Minute Order. Thus, the March 1,
2001 Minute Order was all the authority DeSai needed to file a

claim and there was no need to wait for a written order.?°®

'° There is no requirement in California trust law that a trustee must first have a written
signed order before he can undertake any action to protect a trust’s interest; nor is there any
requirement that a person claiming to be a trustee of a private trust have a formal signed order
evidencing such authority prior to filing a claim in a Chapter 7 case. Moreover, the filing of a claim
in a Chapter 7 bankruptcy case can be very informal. A letter written to the Chapter 7 trustee prior to
the claims bar date may well have sufficed. See In re Holm, 931 F.2d 620, 622 (9th Cir. 1991).

MEMORANDUM DECISION ON
MOTION FOR_SUMMARY JUDGMEN

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DeSai specifically acknowledges having actual knowledge of the
bankruptcy case before his appointment. He said at his deposition
that he may not have received the Chapter 7 Trustee Claims Notice
regarding a claims bar date of March 7, 2001, set in the converted
Chapter 7 case, but he also testified that the proof of service

showed his correct address. Under In re Bucknum, 951 F.2d 204 (9th

Cir. 1991), DeSai is presumed to have received the notice and has
not attempted to rebut that presumption, so, at a minimum, he had
constructive notice of the bankruptcy case.

Section 726(a) (2) (C) provides:

(a) Except as provided in section 510 of this title,
property of the estate shall be distributed -

(2) second, in payment of any allowed unsecured
claim, other than a claim of a kind specified in
paragraph (1), (3), or (4) of this subsection,
proof of which is -

(C) tardily filed under section 501(a) of
this title, if --
(i) the creditor that holds such claim
did not have notice or actual knowledge
of the case in time for timely filing
of a proof of such claim under section
501(a) of this title; and

(ii)proof of such claim is filed in
time to permit payment of such claim.

DeSai had both actual knowledge and constructive notice of the
bankruptcy case, and either one is sufficient to subordinate the
late claim pursuant to §726(a)(2)(C). DeSai argues that the notice
occurred before he became trustee, but cites no authority for the
proposition that the knowledge he possessed when he was appointed

trustee should not be imputed to him after his appointment.

MEMORANDUM DECISION ON
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMEN

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The Claim was not filed until after the bar date, despite DeSai
having had both actual knowledge of the bankruptcy case and notice
of the bar date in time to file a timely claim. The Claim must be
subordinated to claims that were filed timely and to claims that
were filed late by those who lacked either notice or actual
knowledge in time to meet the bar date because there are no
exceptions and equitable considerations do not apply under Ninth

Circuit authority. In re Edelman, 237 B.R. 146, 152-53 (9th Cir.

BAP 1999); In re Coastal Alaska Lines, Inc, 920 F.2d 1428, 1432-33

(9th Cir. 1990).

Accordingly, this is not a matter for this Court’s exercise of
its discretion. As a matter of binding law, the Objection must be
sustained and the Claim allowed only to the extent provided by
§726(a) (3),11 as a late claim filed by a creditor with notice or
knowledge of the case in time to meet the bar date. Such claims
are subordinate to timely claims and to late claims that are filed
by creditors without notice or knowledge of the case in time to
meet the bar date.

2. Self-desigqnation of Debtor as Trustee of 1982 Trust

Objectors argue that even if DeSai was not appointed as trustee
effective March 1, 2001, Debtor became trustee of the 1982 Trust
when Ron resigned on October 23, 2000 and was trustee when the
proof of claim needed to be filed. The record reflects that Debtor
was listed on the proof of service of the Claims Notice and knew of

the claims bar date in sufficient time to file a proof of claim.

a Section 726(a)(3) provides: “third, in payment of any allowed unsecured claim proof of
which is tardily filed under section 501(a) of this title other than a claim of the kind specified in
paragraph (2)(C) of this subsection.”

MEMORANDUM DECISION ON
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

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DeSai asserts that Debtor was legally precluded from acting as
trustee of any trust under California Probate Code §15643(f)
because Debtor was a debtor in a bankruptcy case at the time he was
allegedly appointed trustee.’* Objectors assert that because Debtor
did not file his bankruptcy petition while he was trustee,
California Probate Code §15643(f) does not apply.

The Court agrees with DeSai that a fair reading of the
California Probate Code §15643(f) would preclude a debtor ina
pending bankruptcy case from assuming a trusteeship. While on its
face the statute states that a trustee vacates his trusteeship only
upon the filing of a bankruptcy petition, the Court finds that it
would be inconsistent with the legislative intent to allow a debtor
in an active bankruptcy case to become a trustee when that person

would have to resign from the trusteeship if he filed a bankruptcy

" California Probate Code §15643 provides:

There is a vacancy in the office of trustee in any of the following circumstances:
(a) The person named as trustee rejects the trust.
(b) The person named as trustee cannot be identified or does not exist.
(c) The trustee resigns or is removed.
(d) The trustee dies.

(e) A conservator or guardian of the person or estate of an individual
trustee is appointed.

(f) The trustee files a petition for adjudication of bankruptcy or for
approval of an arrangement, composition, or other extension under the
federal Bankruptcy Code, or a petition filed against the trustee for any
of these purposes is approved.

(g) A trust company’s charter is revoked or powers are suspended, if
the revocation or suspension is to be in effect for a period of 30 days or
more.

(h) A receiver is appointed for a trust company if the appointment is
not vacated within a period of 30 days.

MEMORANDUM DECISION ON

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UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT

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petition after becoming a trustee. Objectors argue that DeSai’s
interpretation would mean that any person who had ever filed a
bankruptcy petition could never again be appointed a trustee.
However, the Court does not construe the statutory language to be a
permanent bar. If an individual is a debtor in a pending
bankruptcy case, permitting that individual to accept a trusteeship
would violate the intent of California Probate Code §15643(f).
Thus, the Court accepts DeSai’s argument that Debtor could not have
replaced Ron as trustee of the 1982 Trust when Ron resigned.

3. Resignation of Ron as Trustee of 1988 Trust

Objectors assert that Ron’s signing a piece of paper saying
that Ron was resigning as trustee did not effectuate Ron’s
resignation. California Probate Code §15640'% provides that when a

trust agreement fails to set forth a method for resignation, the

> California Probate Code §15640 provides:
A trustee who has accepted the trust may resign only by one of the following methods:
(a) As provided in the trust instrument.

(b) In the case of a revocable trust, with the consent of the person
holding the power to revoke the trust.

(c) In the case of a trust that is not revocable, with the consent of all
adult beneficiaries who are receiving or are entitled to receive income
under the trust or to receive a distribution of principal if the trust were
terminated at the time the consent is sought. Ifa beneficiary has a
conservator, the conservator may consent to the trustee’s resignation
on behalf of the conservatee without obtaining court approval.
Without limiting the power of the beneficiary to consent to the
trustee’s resignation, if the beneficiary has designated an attorney in
fact who has the power under the power of attorney to consent to the
trustee’s resignation, the attorney in fact may consent to the
resignation.

(d) Pursuant to a court order obtained on petition by the trustee under
Section 17200. The court shall accept the trustee’s resignation and
may make any orders necessary for the preservation of the trust
property, including the appointment of a receiver or a temporary
trustee.

MEMORANDUM DECISION ON
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

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Case: 97-56350

trustee of an irrevocable trust can only resign with the consent of
all beneficiaries or by petitioning the court for permission to
resign. DeSai submitted copies of Ron’s resignation letter for the
1982 Trust and 1989 Trust after the hearing. Neither party
submitted a copy of Ron’s resignation letter for the 1988 Trust.

Objectors argue that because the 1982 Trust and 1988 Trust’
provide only that the trustee can resign and do not set forth a
manner in which that resignation must occur, the trust documents do
not provide a method for the resignation of a trustee and Ron’s
attempt to resign did not comply with the statute.*® DeSai argues
that the language in the 1982 Trust and 1988 Trust provide that the
trustee could resign and that is sufficient to permit Ron to resign
pursuant to his letters.

Assuming arguendo that DeSai was not appointed until the filing

of the Written Appointment Order, this Court finds that Ron was the

'* DeSai is asserting the Claim only on behalf of the 1982 Trust and 1988 Trust -- he has
withdrawn his Claim against Debtor’s estate on behalf of the 1989 Trust, so the Court will not
address that trust.

'® Section 7.01 of the 1982 Trust provides:

The Trustee shall have the right to resign at any time and on such
resignation or in the event of the Trustee’s death or other inability to
serve as Trustee, the Trustor shall appoint a successor Trustee. In the
event of the failure, refusal, or inability of the Trustor to appoint a
successor Trustee, the Trustee or any beneficiary of the Trust may
secure, at the expense of the Trust, the appointment of a successor
Trustee by a court of competent jurisdiction.

Section 7.01 of the 1988 Trust provides:

The Trustee shall have the right to resign at any time. In the event
the Trustee is unable to act or ceases to act, then RONALD McNIEL
JR., MICKEY McNIEL, LYNEDT McNIEL, MICHAEL JOHN
CROMAN, BENJAMIN JAMES CROMAN, or such as are willing
and able, shall act as successor trustees. In the event none of the above
qualify or is willing to act, the Superior Court of the State of California
shall appoint a successor trustee.

MEMORANDUM DECISION ON

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trustee of the 1982 Trust and 1988 Trust during the time that a
proof of claim in Debtor’s Chapter 7 case needed to be filed on
behalf of the 1982 Trust and 1988 Trust. Section 7.01 of both
trusts provides that the trustee can resign, but does not set forth
any manner in which that resignation is to take place. Since the
1982 Trust document and 1988 Trust document are silent as to how a
trustee can resign, the Court finds that Ron could not resign
unilaterally pursuant to California Probate Code §15640(a) and,
thus, his purported resignation on October 23, 2000 was
ineffective.

The parties do not dispute that Ron received the Claims Notice
via service of that notice on his attorneys of record, and thus had
notice of the claims bar date. Accordingly, arguendo, if DeSai was
not appointed trustee of the 1982 Trust and 1989 Trust until
April 11, 2001 when the Written Appointment Order was filed, notice
of the Chapter 7 claims bar date was still properly given to the
1982 Trust and 1988 Trust via the notice mailed to Ron who remained
the trustee of those trusts. Under those circumstances, as
explained above, the Objection must be sustained and the Claim
allowed only to the extent provided by §726(a) (3), as a late claim
filed by a creditor with notice or knowledge of the case in time to

meet the bar date.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, Objectors’ motion for summary
judgment is granted. The Claim is allowed only to the extent
provided by §726(a) (3), as a late claim filed by a creditor with

notice or knowledge of the case in time to meet the bar date.

MEMORANDUM DECISION ONG
MOTION FOR_SUMMARY JUD!

Case: 97-56350 Doc# 1876 Filed: 09/30/05 * Entered: 10/06/05 09:02:30 Page 21

of 36

UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT

For The Northern District Of California

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Counsel for Objectors shall submit a form of order in

accordance with this Memorandum Decision after review as to form by

counsel for DeSai.

Dated:

g 30) a7

Cp beech, y) side!

RTHUR S. WEISSBRODT
UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY JUDGE

MEMORANDUM DECISION ON
MOTION FOR SUMMARY

JUDGME . 22
Case: 97-56350 Doc# 1876 Filed: 09/30/05 © Entered: 10/06/05 09:02:30 Page 22

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Case No. 97-56350-ASW
Court Service List

Amy W. Baghdadi, Esq. Kim Elizabeth Baskett, Esq.
Pillsbury Winthrop Office of the County Counsel
50 Fremont St. 5% Fl, 701 Ocean Street #505

P.O. Box 7800 Santa Cruz, CA 95060-4068
San Francisco, CA 94120-7880

Peter J. Benvenutti, Esq. Ron McNiel, Sr.

Heller, Ehrman, White & 4719 Quail Lakes Dr. #G-253
McAuliffe Stockton, CA 95207

333 Bush Street
San Francisco, CA 94014-2878

Bruce Cornelius, Esq. Kevin M. Epstein, Esq.
Graves, Allen, Cornelius & Office of the U.S. Trustee
Celestre 280 S. 1% St. #268

3650 Mt. Diablo Blvd. #180 San Jose, CA 95113-0002
Lafayette, CA 94549

David H. Fallek, Esq. Steven H. Felderstein, Esq.
Bingham McCutchen Felderstein, Fitzgerald et al.
3 Embarcadero Center #1800 400 Capitol Mall #1450

San Francisco, CA 94111-4066 Sacramento, CA 95814-4434
David H. Freedman, Esq. Maxwell M. Freeman, Esq.
Erhman, Teicher, Miller, Freeman, D’Aiuto, Pierce,
Zucker et al. Gurev et al.

100 Galleria Officentre #333 1818 Grand Canal Blvd. #4
Southfield, MI 48034 Stockton, Ca 95207-8109
Samuel E. Goldstein, Esq. Charles B. Greene, Esq.
Law Offices of Samuel E. Law Offices of Charles B.
Goldstein Greene

1220 Oakland Blvd. #200 84 W. Santa Clara St. #770
Walnut Creek, CA 94596 San Jose, CA 95113

Anthony S. Guerriero, Esq. Michael L. Gurev, Esq.
Bray, Geiger, Rudquist and Freeman, D’Aiuto, Pierce,
Nuss Gurev et al.

311 E. Main Street #400 1818 Grand Canal Blvd. #4
Stockton, CA 95202 Stockton, CA 95207-8109
Charles L. Hastings, Esq. Patric J. Kelly, Esq.

Law Offices of Rishwain and Adleson, Hess and Kelly
Hastings 577 Salmar Ave. 2" £1.
4568 Feather River Dr. #A Campbell, CA 95008

P.O. Box 70391
Stockton, CA 95267-8791

Case: 97-56350 Doc#1876 Filed: 09/30/05 Entered: 10/06/05 09:02:30 Page 23
of 36

Elizabeth M. Khachigian, Esq.
Brobeck, Phleger and Harrison
spear St. Tower

1 Market Plaza

San Francisco, CA 94105

Chris D. Kuhner, Esq.
Kornfield, Paul and Nyberg
1999 Harrison St. #2675
Oakland, CA 94612

Maureen McQuaid, Esq.

Law Offices of Maureen McQuaid
1408 Chapin Ave. #5
Burlingame, CA 94010

Douglas B. Provencher, Esq.
law Offices of Provencher and
Flatt

823 Sonoma Ave.

Santa Rosa, CA 95404

Elaine M. Seid, Esq.

McPhalin, Sprinkles and Thomas
10 Almaden Blvd. #1460

San Jose, CA 95113

John M. Sorich, Esq.
Alvarado, Shapiro and Wilson
4 Park Plaza #1230

Irvine, CA 92614

Janet R. Walworth, Esq.
law Offices of Rehon and
Roberts

10 Almaden Blvd. #550
San Jose, CA 95113

Annette Causey

Vice President

Comerica Bank-California
55 Almaden Blvd, 2nd Fl
San Jose, CA 95113

Case: 97-56350 Doc#1876 Filed: 09/30/05 Entered: 10/06/05 09:02:30 Page 24
of 36

James C. Krieg, Esq.

Kreig, keller, Sloan, Reilley
and Roman

114 Sansome St. 7° £1.

San Francisco, CA 94104

Harvey L. Leiderman, Esq.
Steefel, Levitt and Weiss

1 Embarcadero Center 30° fl.
San Francisco, CA 94111

Randy Michelson, Esq.
Bingham McCutchen

3 Embarcadero Center #1800
San Francisco, CA 94111-4066

Reid P. Schantz, Esq.
133 Mission St., #230
Santa Cruz, CA 95060

Edward W. Smithers, Esq.

Law Offices of Edward W.
Smithers

160 W. Santa Clara St. #1025
San Jose, CA 95113-1700

Nikolai Tehin, Esq.

Law Offices of Tehin and
Assoc.

Bank of America Center

555 California St. 33" fl.
San Francisco, CA 94104-1609

Aln J. McNiel
29374 Chance St
Hayward CA 94544

Bachecki, Crom and Co.,
Bachecki, Crom and Co., CPA's
Jay D. Crom, CPA

180 Montgomery St. #2340

San Francisco, CA 94104-4203

Bank of America

c/o Harvey L. Leiderman
Steefel, Levitt and Weiss

1 Embarcadero Center, 30th Fl.
San Francisco, CA 94111

Bank of America
6485 N Palm Ave #101
Attn: Ray Bravo
Fresno, CA 93704

Bank of America
P O Box 6179
Fresno CA 93703

Bank of America

c/o Harvey L. Leiderman
Steefel, Levitt and Weiss

1 Embarcadero Center, 30th Fl.
San Francisco, CA 94111

Barry Milgrom
955 Montgomery Street,15th Floor
San Francisco, CA 94111

Behram Desai

Samuel E. Goldstein and Assoc.
1646 N California Blvd Suite 550
Walnut Creek, CA 94596

Behram J. K. DeSai, Trustee
P.O. Box 28
Vill Valley, CA 94942

Case: 97-56350 Doc#1876 Filed: 09/30/05 Entered: 10/06/05 09:02:30 Page 25
of 36

CA Employment Development Dept.
Bankruptcy Group MIC 92E

P.O. Box 826880

Sacramento, CA 94280-0001

CA Franchise Tax Board
Attn: Special Procedures
P.O. Box 2952

Sacramento, CA 95812-2952

CFM 3
445 West Weber Avenue
Suite 137

Stockton CA 95203

CFM 43 Partnership
445 West Weber Avenue
Suite 137

Stockton CA 95203

CFM Partnership

445 West Weber Avenue
Suite 137

Stockton CA 95203

Cal Osha
POB 420603
San Francisco, CA 94142

California Regional
Walter Quality Board
3443 Routier Rd Ste A
Sacramento, CA 95287

Case: 97-56350 Doc#1876 Filed: 09/30/05 Entered: 10/06/05 09:02:30 Page 26
of 36

Coamerica Bank
P O Box 55000
Detroit MI 48255-0005

Comerica Bank
P O Box 55000
Detroit MI 48255-0005

Comerica Bank

Mail Code 7154

PO Box 75000

Detroit, MI 48275-7154

Comerica Bank
POB 49032

San Jose, CA 95161

Comerica Bank
c/o Janet Walworth Esq
10 Almaden Blvd #550

Comerica Bank-California
Janet R. Walworth, Esq

Mahl Rehon Walworth & Roberts
Ten Almaden Blvd. Suite 550
San Jose, CA 95113

Comerica Bank-California
Janet R. Walworth, Esq

Mahl Rehon Walworth & Roberts
Ten Almaden Blvd. Suite 550
San Jose, CA 95113

Case: 97-56350 Doc#1876 Filed: 09/30/05
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Entered: 10/06/05 09:02:30 Page 27

Comerica Mortgage
P O Box 55000
Detroit MI 48255-0005

Comerica Mortgage Corporation
c/o Marcy J. Ford

30150 Telegraph Rd #100
Bingham Farms, MI 48025

Comerica Mortgage Corporation
c/o Marcy J. Ford

30150 Telegraph Rd #100
Bingham Farms, MI 48025

Conagra Inc
107 S Kilroy
Turlock, CA

County Office of Emergency Svc
222 E. Weber Ave
Stockton, CA 95202

County of Santa Cruz
Office of The Treasurer
Tax Collector

POB 801

Santa Cruz, CA 95061

County of Santa Cruz
Office of The Treasurer
Tax Collector

POB 801

Santa Cruz, CA 95061

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Craig Dunn
9377 E. Summers Court
Stockton, CA 95215

Craig Needam

Liccardo Rossi et al
1960 The Alameda 2nd Fl
San Jose CA 95126

Craig Needham

c/o Charles B. Greene, Esq.
84 W Santa Clara St. #770
San Jose, CA 95113

Custom Food Machinery, Inc.
Diepenbrock, Wulff, Plant and Hannegan
300 Capitol Mall #1700

P.O. Box 3034

Sacramento, CA 95812-3034

DFEH State of CA
30 Van Ness Ave #3000
San Francisco, CA 94102

Dawson Passafuim
4664 Scotts Vly Drive
scotts Vly CA 95066

B.J. DeSai
P.O. Box 28
Mill Valley, CA 94942

Debra Lee Delgado

c/o Lanahan and Reilley
980 9th St 16th Fl
Sacramento, CA 95814

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Dept of Fish and Game
POB 47
Yountville, CA 94599

EEOC

US Dept of Justice
Civil Rights Division
Washington, DC 20530

EPA
555 Capital Mall, #525
Sacramento, CA 95814

Eureka Canners Group SA
c o William J Keegan
The Keegan Law Firm
160 W Santa Clara 1400
San Jose CA 95113

Eureka Canners Group, S.A.
c/o Tom Linderman

2752 W Fir Ave.

Fresno, CA 93711

FG1l Environmental Labs
2500 Stagecoach Rd
Stockton, CA 95215

Franchise Tax Board
P.O. Box 2952
Sacramento CA 95812-2952

Guaranty Federal Bank

c/o Anthony S. Guerriero, Esq.
Bray, Griger, Rudquist and Nuss
Stockton, CA 95202

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Guaranty Federal Bank
c/o Zeba Ansari

8333 Douglas Ave.
Dallas, TX 75225

Guaranty Federal Bank
8333 Douglas Ave.
Dallas, TX 75225
Attn: Zeba Ansari

Guaranty Federal Bank

c/o Anthony S. Guerriero, Esq.
Bray, Griger, Rudquist and Nuss
Stockton, CA 95202

Guaranty Federal Bank
c/o Zeba Ansari

8333 Douglas Ave.
Dallas, TX 75225

Anthony S. Guerriero

Bray, Geiger, Rudquist and Nuss
311 E Main St. #400

stockton, CA 95202

Hoge Fenton Jones
60 South Market 1400
San Jose CA 95113-2396

Home Savings
2900 Standiford Avenue
Modesto, CA 95350

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Home Savings Bank
Dept LA 0001
pasadena CA 91187-0001

Home Savings of America

Home Servicing of America

POB 60029

City of Industry, CA 91716-0029

Home Savings of America
P O Box 7180
Pasadena CA 91109

Internal Revenue Service
PO Box 99

Stop HQ 5430

San Jose, CA 95103

Irene Bianconi
445 W Weber #137
Stockton, CA 95203

Michael S. Janin
2222 W Grandview Bivd
Erie, PA 16506-4508

Jeff Swedlund
8030 Soquel Ave. #201
Santa Cruz, CA 95062

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Lanahan and Reilley
980 9th St, 16th Fl.
Sacramento, CA 95814

Lee Delgado

c/o Canon T Young
980 Ninth St 16th Fl
Sacramento, CA 95814

Maria Teresa De Saracho
c o William J Keegan
The Keegan Law Firm
160 W Santa Clara 1400
San Jose CA 95113

Diane McNiel

Charles L. Hastings

Law Offices of Charles L. Hastings
4568 Feather River Dr. #A
Stockton, CA 95219

Ron McNiel Sr.
4719 Quail Lakes Dr. #G-253
Stockton, CA 95207

Michael S. Janin
2222 W Grandview Blvd
Erie, PA 16506-4508

Barry Milgrom
555 Montgomery Street,15th Floor
San Francisco, CA 94111

Craig Needham

c/o Charles B. Greene, Esq.
84 W Santa Clara St. #770
San Jose, CA 95113

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North Bay Ford Lincoln
1999 Soquel Avenue
Santa Cruz CA 95062

Office of the U.S. Trustee / SJ
U.S. Federal Bldg.

280 S lst St. #268

San Jose, CA 95113-3004

Parc Asbestos Removal
2706 S Railroad Ave
Fresno, CA 93725

Patrick Riddle
7574 Shoreline Dr.
Stockton, CA 95219

Public Health Services
Env Health Div

304 E Weber Ave 3d Fl
Stockton, CA 95201-0388

Quinn Buseck Leem
2222 W Grandview Blvd
Erie PA 16506-4508

Regional Water Quality
Cntrl Brd

SF Bay Region

2101 Webster St #500
Oakland, CA 94612

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Riddle Isola
2291 W March Lane
Stockton CA 95207

Safeway Kleen Env
5050 Salida Blvd
Salida, CA 95368

Reid P. Schantz
133 Mission St., #230
Santa Cruz, CA 95060

Secretary of The Treasury
15th and Pennsylvania Ave. NW
Washington, DC 20220-0001

Sharon L. Hightower
152 N Third St. #700
San Jose, CA 95112

State Board of Equalization

Attn: Special Procedures Section, MIC:55
P.O. Box 942879

Sacramento, CA 94279

State of CA

Franchise Tax Board

POB 2952

Sacramento, CA 95812-2952

Jeff Swedlund
8030 Soquel Ave. #201
Santa Cruz, CA 95062

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The Hoffman Co.
3217 Sheridan Way
Stockton CA 95219

Tokai Bank
505 Montgomery Street
San Francisco CA 94111

U.S. Attorney

Civil Division

450 Golden Gate Ave.

San Francisco, CA 94102-3400

Susan L. Uecker

Uecker & Associates

100 Pine St. #475

San Francisco, CA 94111-3657

Uprite Construction
4055 N Wilson Way
Stockton CA 95205

Janet R. Walworth

Law Offices of Rehon and Roberts
10 Almaden Blvd. #550

San Jose, CA 95113

Washington Mutual Bank, F.A.

c/o Alvarado, Shapiro, and Wilson LLP
2677 N. Main St., Ste. 550

Santa Ana, CA 92705

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