Casey Young and Barbara Faye Young

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UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT

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For The Northern District Of California

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GPO

Entered on Docket
April 17, 2007

GLORIA L. FRANKLIN, CLERK
U.S BANKRUPTCY COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

FILED
APR a7 2001

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UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
In re Case No. 04-54764-ASW
Casey & Barbara Young, Chapter 13

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MEMORANDUM DECISION
REGARDING STANDARD FOR VALUATION OF CREDITOR’S CLAIM
Before the Court is the Debtors’ Motion to Modify Chapter 13
Plan (“Motion”). The Debtors, Casey and Barbara Young (“Debtors”),
filed their original Chapter 13 plan (“Plan”) on July 30, 2004.

The Plan was confirmed without objection on September 24, 2004.
Debtors filed the instant Motion on October 5, 2005. Having
received no objection, Debtors filed a request for entry of default
on October 26, 2005. On October 27, 2005, Creditor CIT Group/Sales
Financing, Inc. (“Creditor”) filed an objection to the Motion on

the basis that the valuation of the collateral for its secured
claim, Debtors’ mobile home, was too low. Neither counsel for
Debtor nor counsel for Creditor scheduled a hearing on the Motion,
so on May 3, 2006, the Chapter 13 Trustee set the matter on the

Court’s calendar. An initial hearing was held on June 5, 2006.

MEMORANDUM DECISION REGARDING STANDARD
FOR VALUATION OF CREDITOR’S CLAIM

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UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT

For The Northern District Of California

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The hearing was continued to permit, inter alia, the parties to
obtain appraisals and submit additional briefing. The Court held a
final argument on the Motion on January 26, 2007, and took the
matter under submission.

Debtors in this case are represented by James J. Gold, Esq. of
Gold and Hammes. Craig C. Chiang, Esq. of Buchalter Nemer
represents Creditor.

The Court now makes the following findings of fact and
conclusions of law, pursuant to Rule 7052 of the Federal Rules of

Bankruptcy Procedure.

I.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

Debtors purchased a 1998 Silvercrest W-69 mobile home on
November 12, 1998, financing the purchase through Advantage Mobile
Homes (“Advantage”) with a loan in the sum of $109,502.00. When
Debtors purchased the mobile home, it was already in its current
location in a mobile home park in San Jose, California. Debtors
make separate monthly payments to the owner of the mobile home park
for rental of the space on which the mobile home sits.

The loan agreement (“Agreement”) between Debtors and Advantage
granted Advantage a security interest in the mobile home.

Advantage assigned its interest in the Agreement to Creditor on the
same day, November 12, 1998. The Agreement grants Creditor “a
security interest under the Uniform Commercial Code in the
commodity and all proceeds thereof and accessions thereto until
[the Debtors] have paid the balance in full and completely

satisfied all other requirements of this contract and any

MEMORANDUM DECISION REGARDING STANDARD
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modifications to it.” The Agreement contains a section entitled
“Itemization of Amount Financed”, which contains a list of items
and states that, “[{i]f checked, the Total Cash Price includes the
following:”. The list of items includes skirting and awnings.
However, none of the individual boxes is checked, and the entire
section is marked “N/A” to indicate that it does not apply. The
awnings and skirting are physically attached to the mobile home.
Also located on Debtors’ space in the mobile home park are a
carport, shed and a patio. While the Agreement does not grant
Creditor a security interest therein, the awnings and skirting were
included in the mobile home purchase, according to Debtors. The
carport, shed and patio were not included in the purchase of the
mobile home, are not physically attached to the mobile home, and
are property of the park, not Debtors.? Creditor did not submit
any evidence to the contrary.

Debtors filed a chapter 13 petition, along with the Plan, on
July 30, 2004. The contract balance on the petition date was
$107,365.79. The Plan provided for monthly payments of $900 anda
dividend of 15% to general unsecured creditors. It did not list
Creditor’s claim, and was confirmed on September 24, 2004. At the
time of confirmation, Debtors intended to make ongoing monthly
payments to Creditor at the contract rate of $1,003.90.

Debtors soon realized that they could not afford the monthly
outlays required by both the $900 monthly Plan payment and the
$1003.90 monthly payments to Creditor. Accordingly, Debtors filed
the instant Motion on October 5, 2005. Under the proposed

modification, Debtors sought to decrease Plan payments

"See October 26, 2006 Declaration of Casey Young.

MEMORANDUM DECISION REGARDING STANDARD

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retroactively to $366 per month for July through September 2005,
which would then increase to $1,500 in October 2005 and continue at
that level for the balance of the Plan term. The Motion also
sought to pay Creditor’s claim through the Plan, proposing to value
the collateral at $40,000, with monthly payments of $400 and
interest at 9.5% (which equals the contract interest rate).
Debtors’ proposed valuation is based on the NADA Manufactured
Housing Appraisal Guide for the relevant period. The Motion also
sought to decrease the dividend to general unsecured creditors

to 1%.

Creditor opposed the Motion on the ground that the valuation of
its collateral was too low. Creditor proposes to value the mcbile
home at $103,586, based on an appraisal of its “in-place” value by
California licensed real estate appraiser Jim Moore.” In addition
to the mobile home itself, the $103,586 appraisal includes and
attributes separate value to the carport ($2,778), awnings
($2,045), patio ($2,919), shed ($903) and skirting ($2,240), based
on the square footage of each. The appraisal also includes $26,800
based on the value of the park space.

The matter has now been fully briefed and argued, and was taken

under submission by the Court on January 26, 2007.

Il.
ANALYSIS

There are three possible methods for treatment of an allowed

* Creditor’s appraisal asserts an “in-place” value for the

mobile home, as of the petition date, of $103,586.00 and a value on
a dealer lot of $76,786.00. See August 18, 2006 Declaration of Jim
Moore.

MEMORANDUM DECISION REGARDING STANDARD

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secured claim such as the one held by Creditor under a chapter 13
plan: (1) the holder of the claim may accept the plan, (2) the
debtor may surrender the collateral, or (3) the plan must comply
with the chapter 13 cram down provisions. 11 U.S.C. § 1325 (a) (5) .3
In this case, Debtors propose to retain the collateral and Creditor
has objected to the proposed plan modification. Accordingly, the
Plan, as modified, must satisfy the elements of cram down.

Creditor retains the lien securing its claim, and the Plan must
provide Creditor with payments, over the life of the Plan, that
will total the present value of the allowed secured claim, i.e.

———

the present value of the collateral. Associates Commercial Corp.

v. Rash, 520 U.S. 953, 957 (1997). In this case, the Court must
determine the proper method for valuing the collateral, i.e., the
1998 Silvercrest mobile home.

Section 506(a) provides:

An allowed claim of a creditor secured by a lien on
property in which the estate has an interest...is a secured
claim to the extent of the value of such creditor’s
interest in the estate’s interest in such property...and is
an unsecured claim to the extent that the value of such
creditor’s interest...is less than the amount of such
allowed claim. Such value shall be determined in light of
the purpose of the valuation and of the proposed
distribution or use of such property, and in conjunction
with any hearing on such disposition or use or on a plan
affecting such creditor’s interest.

11 U.S.C. § 506(a).

It is undisputed that Creditor’s interest in the estate’s
interest in the mobile home is defined by the Agreement. According
to the Agreement, Creditor’s security interest extends only to the

mobile home itself. In addition, Debtors concede that the awnings

3 Unless otherwise noted, all statutory references are to

Title 11, United States Code (the Bankruptcy Code), as it existed
when Debtors filed this bankruptcy petition on July 30, 2004.

MEMORANDUM DECISION REGARDING STANDARD
FOR VALUATION OF_CREDIT

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and skirting were included in the purchase of the mobile home.’

The terms of the Agreement do not grant Creditor a security
interest in the carport, shed, or patio. Moreover, Debtors
submitted a declaration stating that those items are property of
the mobile home park and are not physically attached to the mobile
home. Creditor did not submit any contrary evidence. In addition,
the form of the Agreement specifically permits Creditor to claim a
security interest in such items if appropriate, and it was not done
in this case. Having determined the property that comprises
Creditor’s interest -- the 1998 Silvercrest mobile home -- the
question in this case is how to value that interest for purposes of
cram down.

Debtors contend that Rash supplies the standard for valuing
Creditor’s secured claim: “under § 506(a), the value of property
retained because the debtor has exercised the § 1325(a)(5)(B) ‘cram
down’ option is the cost the debtor would incur to obtain a like
asset for the same ‘proposed...use.’” Rash, 520 U.S. at 965. The
standard set by Rash is the replacement value of the property, as
distinguished from foreclosure value. Debtors contend that the
replacement value of the mobile home can be found in the relevant
NADA Manufactured Housing Appraisal Guide (which Debtors submitted
into evidence), and is $40,000.

Creditor contends that the appropriate valuation of the mobile
home is not the replacement value asserted by Debtors, but is

instead the “in-place” value. In re Valdez, 338 B.R. 97 (Bankr.

N.D. Cal. 2006). In Valdez, the bankruptcy court determined that

“Since Debtors do not contest this issue, the Court will treat
the awnings and skirting as part of Creditor’s collateral.

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the value of the collateral for purposes of fixing the amount of
the secured creditor’s claim under § 506 was the mobile home’s in-
place value. The bankruptcy court arrived at this conclusion by
looking to the California state law rights of the legal owner of
the mobile home, i.e., the secured creditor. Reasoning that,

because state statutory law governing mobile home foreclosure gave

the legal owner the right, in a foreclosure, to sell the mobile
home in its present location within the mobile home park and to
retain all proceeds from such a sale, the Valdez court held that
the appropriate value of the secured creditor’s claim under § 506
was the in-place value of the mobile home. The bankruptcy court
stated that “[b]ecause this right arises by statute, it does rot
depend upon [secured creditor's] having a perfected security
interest in any leasehold.” 338 B.R. at 99. The court’s decision
did not address the Supreme Court’s decision in Rash.

Citing the bankruptcy court’s decision in Valdez, Creditor
asserts that $103,586.00 is the value of its claim. Creditor
contends that the in-place value of the collateral in this case, as
of the petition date, was $103,586.00, which is set forth in
Creditor’s appraisal, conducted on July 10, 2006, and the
accompanying declaration of appraiser Jim Moore.

The Court concludes that Rash controls the situation at bar.
Rash mandates application of a replacement value standard for
purposes of valuing a partially secured claim under § 506(a) where
the debtor has exercised the cram down option under § 1325(a) (5).

In Rash, the secured creditor held a loan and lien on a tractor
truck purchased by the debtors for use in a freight hauling

business. The contract balance was $41,171. The debtors proposed

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to retain the collateral and invoked the cram down provision. The
secured creditor objected to confirmation, sought to repossess the
truck, and disputed the value assigned to the truck by the debtors.
The secured creditor argued that the proper measure of valuation
was the replacement value of the truck, estimated at $41,000. The
debtors advocated application of the foreclosure value standard,
estimated at $31,875. The bankruptcy court adopted the debtors’
position and confirmed the plan. The district court and the Fifth
Circuit affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed. Justice Ginsburg,
writing for the majority, held that § 506(a) “directs application
of the replacement-value standard.” 520 U.S. at 956.

In a footnote, the Supreme Court explained the meaning of the
term replacement value: “by replacement value, we mean the price a
willing buyer in the debtor’s trade, business or situation would
pay a willing seller to obtain property of like age and condition.”
520 U.S. at 959, n.2.

In deciding whether to apply foreclosure or replacement velue,
the Supreme Court stated that, under § 506(a), “the ‘proposed
disposition or use’ of the collateral is of paramount importance to
the valuation question.” 520 U.S. at 962. Where a creditor
objects to confirmation, the debtor has only two options for
dealing with allowed secured claims: (1) surrender the collateral
under § 1325(a)(5)(C) or (2) retain the collateral and exercise the
cram down option under § 1325(a)(5)(B).

The “disposition or use” of the collateral thus turns on

the alternative the debtor chooses - in one case, the

collateral will be surrendered to the creditor, and in the

other, the collateral will be retained and used by the

debtor. Applying a foreclosure-value standard when the

cram down option is invoked gives no significance to the
different consequences of the debtor's choice to surrender

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the property or retain it. Employing a replacement value
standard when the debtor retains the property, on the other
hand, distinguishes retention from surrender and renders
meaningful the key words “disposition or use.”

520 U.S. at 962.

The Rash majority explicitly rejected the Fifth Circuit’s
reasoning that the replacement value standard was disrespectful of
state law, under which the secured creditor could sell the
collateral and obtain its net foreclosure value “and nothing more.”
520 U.S. at 964, quoting 90 F.3d 1036, 1044 (1996).

In allowing Chapter 13 debtors to retain and use collateral

over the objection of secured creditors, however, the Code

has reshaped debtor and creditor rights in marked departure

from state law. The Code’s cram down option displaces a

secured creditor’s state-law right to obtain immediate

foreclosure upon a debtor’s default. That change, ordered
by federal law, is attended by a direction that courts look
to the “proposed disposition or use” of the collateral in
determining its value. It no more disrupts state law to
make “disposition or use” the guide for valuation than to
authorize the rearrangement of rights the cram down power
entails.

520 U.S. at 964 (citations omitted).

Creditor attempts to distinguish Rash on the ground that the
case involved a truck, rather than a mobile home. There is no
support for such a position, other than Valdez, which, as noted
above, does not discuss Rash. It is well established that the

holding of Rash applies to all manner of personal property,

including mobile homes. See, for example, In re Stratton, 248 B.R.

177 (Bankr. D. Mont. 2000) (mobile home); In re Mitchell, 320 B.R.

687 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 2005) (car); In re Nice, 355 B.R. 554 (Bankr.

N.D. W.Va. 2006) (SUV), In re Bivens, 317 B.R. 755 (Bankr. N.D. Ill.

2004) (van); In re Spraggins, 316 B.R. 317 (Bankr. E.D. Wis.

2004) (computer and television); In re Nguyen, 2006 WL 2846822

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(Bankr. W.D. La. Mar. 21, 2006) (shrimp boat).

It is not possible to discern whether or not Valdez implicitly
takes account of the Supreme Court’s holding. It is, however,
difficult to apprehend how Valdez can be construed consistently
with the replacement value standard set by Rash. Extension of
Valdez’s logic to other personal property is illustrative. Take,
for instance, a partially secured automobile loan. Where the
debtor elects the cram down option and the creditor objects, under
Valdez, the creditor’s rights would be defined by state law. Under
California law, a creditor holding a security interest in an
automobile may repossess the collateral and sell it at auction --
just as the legal owner of a mobile home may do. The fundamental
difference between the two situations is that, with respect toa
automobiles, the replacement value, often defined by the Kelley
Blue Book, is substantially higher than what the creditor would
obtain at a hypothetical foreclosure sale. Unlike a mobile home,
an automobile that is sold at auction receives no premium based on
its location. If Valdez is applied to a partially-secured
automobile loan, where the debtor elects to retain the collateral,
the creditor would only be entitled to be paid the amount it would
be able to obtain if it exercised its state law foreclosure rights,
which is, generally speaking, significantly lower than the
replacement value. Not only would such a situation be highly
objectionable from the perspective of secured auto lenders, it is
not the law. Where a debtor elects the cram down option with
respect to an automobile, the debtor must pay the secured creditor
the replacement value of the vehicle. Rash, 520 U.S. at 963; in re

Schwalb, 347 B.R. 726, 758 (Bankr. D. Nev. 2006). In this Court’s

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opinion, the same is true when the collateral involved is a mobile

home. See Stratton, 248 B.R. at 182. This conclusion ig not

altered by the fact that, in this particular case, the foreclosure
value of the mobile home happens to be greater than the replacement
value.

Creditor argues that, when determining Creditor’s interest in
the collateral, che Court must evaluate the “in-place” interest.
This appears to be an attempt by Creditor to divorce the issue from
the question of the appropriate method for valuation -- which,
according to Rash, is replacement value. Instead, Creditor
attempts to frame the issue as requiring a determination of
(1) Creditor’s interest that is being valued; and (2) how to value
that interest. Creditor contends that the answer to the first
question, pursuant to Valdez, is that the interest to be valued is
the mobile home in-place in the mobile home park, and it therefore
follows that, under state law, a creditor could foreclose and sell
the property in its present location. The logic of this position
is circular. The reason why Creditor believes its interest is the
“in-place” interest relates to state foreclosure law, to which the
Valdez court looked to determine the appropriate method of
valuation. Logically, under Creditor’s analysis, there would be no
need to analyze separately the value of Creditor’s interest,
because Creditor’s answer to the first part of the inquiry supplies
the same answer to the second valuation question in every instance
-- i.e., if the proposition that Creditor’s interest is the “in-
place” interest is accepted, then the value, by definition, is the
foreclosure value under state law. In this Court’s opinion, this

analysis is purely obfuscatory, and is incorrect for a number of

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reasons, the most significant being that it is directly contrary to
the replacement value standard set by the Supreme Court in Rash.

In reality, there is no dispute over the answer to the first

question posed by Creditor -- Creditor’s interest is defined by the
Agreement and state law. The answer to the second question -- the
valuation question -- however, is not defined solely by state law.

If it were, the appropriate standard may be foreclosure value, as
stated in Valdez. The Supreme Court has, however, explicitly
rejected this position (which was, in fact, urged by the debtors in
the Rash case) by defining the valuation question not in terms of
state law, but rather in terms of bankruptcy law under § 506 and in
light of the proposed use or disposition of the collateral. As the
Supreme Court held, application of the replacement value standard,
rather than foreclosure value, properly accounts for the debter’s
continued use of the collateral. Rash, 520 U.S. at 962. The
replacement value standard values “the creditor’s interest in the
collateral in light of the proposed [repayment plan] reality: no
foreclosure sale and economic benefit for the debtor derived from
the collateral equal to ... its [replacement] value.” Id., quoting

In re Winthrop O..d Farm Nurseries, Inc., 50 F.3d 72, 75 (lst Cir.

1995). In this case, Debtors propose to retain and use the
collateral in the same manner as was contemplated when it was
originally purchased and as such property is customarily used -- as
a place of residence.

Creditor argues that Debtors misinterpret Rash and its
replacement value mandate and suggests that, because Debtors have
elected to continue using the collateral they must pay Creditor

$103,586. Creditor has no explanation for its contention that,

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because Debtors propose to retain the collateral, they must pay the
foreclosure value ascribed to it by Creditor. Creditor has been
unable to explain how its proposed valuation represents anything
but foreclosure value -- the standard that was explicitly rejected
by Rash. Creditor has not made an argument that its $103,586
valuation represents an estimate of replacement value, and any such
argument would be incorrect in any event.

Despite its attempts to distinguish Rash, Creditor asserts that
Rash actually supports its position because “if Debtors choose not
to surrender the Mobilehome to [Creditor], they must pay [Creditor]
more than the foreclosure value of the Mobilehome. To take into
account the additional risk that Debtors may default, [Creditor] is
allowed a secured claim for the higher, fair market value of the
Mobilehome.” Creditor’s Supplemental Brief at 7:26 - 8:2.
Creditor’s position is that, where Debtors propose to retain the
collateral over Creditor’s objection, Creditor must be paid more
than the foreclosure value. But Rash merely mandates application
of replacement value without any reference to whether that value is
higher or lower than the foreclosure value.’ It is true that under
the facts of Rash, the replacement value was higher than the
foreclosure value. But it is not true that where the situation is
reversed -- as it is in this case ~- that the creditor is entitled
to select the higher of the two. Replacement value is the standard
set by the Supreme Court and this Court is bound to follow it,

whether or not, in a particular case, it is higher or lower than

>In this case, Debtors’ proposed modified plan also proposes
to pay Creditor the contract rate of interest, and Creditor does

not argue that it is entitled to a higher rate.

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the foreclosure value.

State foreclosure law has a specific purpose, which is to allow
the creditor to sell the collateral in a very short period of time
and recover as much money as possible. State law with respect to
mobile homes, cited in Valdez and urged by Creditor, makes a great
deal of sense in that context. In a foreclosure, the debtor loses
the property. In that situation, allowing the foreclosing creditor
to reap the benefit of the mobile home’s in-place value has no
negative effect on the debtor and provides a potentially enormous
benefit to the creditor. That policy is, however, substantially at
odds with the Bankruptcy Code, where, as here, Debtors’ intention
is to keep the property. The purpose of the cram down provision is
to permit Debtors to retain the property by paying Creditor its

value. Till v. SCS Credit Corp., 541 U.S. 465, 476 (2004). Under

such circumstances, it makes no sense to include in the valuation
of the collateral items that the creditor did not provide and in
which it has no security interest. The Bankruptcy Code alters
debtor and creditor rights “in marked departure from state law,” by
“displac[ing] a secured creditor’s state-law right to obtain
immediate foreclosure upon a debtor’s default.” Rash, 520 U.S. at
964. This reshaping of parties’ rights by the Bankruptcy Code will
benefit debtors in some instances (specifically where, as here, the
foreclosure value of the collateral is higher than the replacement
value), and creditors in others (where the situation is reversed).
Even application of the law is essential.

The fact that foreclosure value in this case is Significantly
higher than replacement value is largely a reflection of the

current state of the California real estate market. Mobile home

MEMORANDUM DECISION REGARDING STANDARD
FOR VALUATION OF CREDITOR’S CLAIM

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UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT

For The Northern District Of California

+ oS) No

~ nN eal

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spaces are scarce in this area. That scarcity, and the particulars
of the location (neighborhood safety, quality of schools, etc.),
contribute significantly to the foreclosure value. See October 26,
2005 Declaration of Patty Lambert, 47; see also July 28, 2006
appraisal report, attributing a value of $26,800 to the park space.
In this case, Creditor is not secured to any extent by Debtors’
leasehold interest in the mobile home space, yet Creditor insists
that, in order to retain the mobile home, Debtors must pay Creditor
an additional $26,800 for the value of the park space. Review of
the Agreement shows that the form is drafted to permit Creditor to
take a security interest in the mobile home park tenancy, if
desired. This was not done in the instant case. Debtors already
possess a mobile home space inside the park, which is provided by
the park owner and for which they make separate payments. Those
separate payments to the park landlord presumably reflect the full
value of the location. It would be inequitable, therefore, to
require Debtors -- as a condition of retaining their home -- also
to pay Creditor for the portion of value that the mobile home park
tenancy contributes to the value asserted by Creditor. The same is
true of the carport, shed and patio. In a foreclosure situation,
Creditor could reap the benefit of the value added to the mobile
home by these items. The evidence is clear, however, that Creditor
has no security interest in these items. They are property of the
mobile home park, and presumably some portion of the monthly space
rent is also attributable to their value. To the extent that
Creditor now contends under Valdez that it should be paid for these
items because it would receive value for them under state

foreclosure law, despite its lack of a security interest therein,

MEMORANDUM DECISION REGARDING STANDARD
FOR VALUATION OF CREDITOR’S CLAIM

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1 |} the Court rejects this argument as both unfair and contrary to the

2 || Bankruptcy Code, for the same reasons set forth above.

3

4 TIL.

5 CONCLUSION

6 The Court concludes that the appropriate standard for valuing

7 | Creditor’s claim in this case is replacement value as set forth in

8 || Rash. The parties agree that the proper date for valuation is the

9} petition date, July 30, 2004. The Court finds that Creditor’s

10} security interest includes the skirting and awnings, which were

11 | acquired as part of Debtors’ purchase of the mobile home. The

12} Court finds that Creditor’s interest does not extend to the

13 | carport, shed or patio, which are not property of Debtors, and

14 |} belong to the mobile home park. The calculation of the replacement

15 || value does not include the mobile home’s in-place value and may not

16 |} attribute any value to the carport, shed or patio, in which

17 || Creditor has no interest.

18 In order to determine whether the Plan can be modified as

19 | Debtors propose, the actual value of Creditor’s claim must be set.

20 |] The parties have submitted different estimates of the replacement

21) value of Debtors’ mobile home. This may be resolved by

22) stipulation, or the parties may contact the Court to schedule an

23 | evidentiary hearing to determine the replacement value.

24

25 || Dated: A pr |7 2007

26 OD f MW oo

37 i, ZT, ‘Sha Load?

ARTHUR S. WEISSBRODT

28 UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY JUDGE

mNFOR VALUATION OF CREDITOR'S CLAIM 1

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UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT

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1} Court Service List

2 | Casey Young
5450 Monterey Rd. #1A
3 |} San Jose, CA 95111

4!}Norma L. Hammes, Esq.

Law Offices of Gold and Hammes
5 || 1570 The Alameda #223

San Jose, CA 95126

Barbara Faye Young
715450 Monterey Rd. #1A
San Jose, CA 95111

Mark M. Scott, Esq.

9] Craig C. Chiang, Esq.

Buchalter Nemer

10} 18400 Von Karman Avenue, Suite 800
Irvine, CA 92612-0514

1]
Devin Derham-Burk

12 || P.O. Box 50013

San Jose, CA 95150-0013
13
Eva Alexandra Delateur

14 |} Office of the Chapter 13 Trustee
P.O. Box 50013

15} San Jose, CA 95150

16}}U.S. Trustee

Office of the U.S. Trustee
17}}U.S. Federal Bldg.

280 S lst St. #268

18 |} San Jose, CA 95113-3004

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MEMORANDUM DECISION REGARDING STANDARD
FOR VALUATTON OF CREDI'TOR’S CLAIM

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