Marks v. Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC

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UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
In re 	No. 09-46608 TG
Chapter 13
LESLIE PATRICE BARNES MARKS,
Debtor.
___________________________/
LESLIE PATRICE BARNES MARKS, 	A.P. No. 09-4307 AT
Plaintiff,
vs.
OCWEN LOAN SERVICING, LLC,
Defendant.
___________________________/
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
Defendant Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC (“Ocwen”) moved to dismiss
the first amended complaint (the “Complaint”) in the above-captioned
adversary proceeding pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure, made applicable to this proceeding by Rule 7012
of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure. 	The motion was opposed
by 	the 	plaintiff 	Leslie 	Patrice 	Barnes 	Marks 	(the 	“Debtor”). 	The
Debtor 	filed 	a 	motion 	for 	leave 	to 	file 	a 	second 	amended 	complaint
Signed: November 03, 2009
________________________________________
LESLIE TCHAIKOVSKY
U.S. Bankruptcy Judge
________________________________________
Entered on Docket
November 05, 2009
GLORIA L. FRANKLIN, CLERK
U.S BANKRUPTCY COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
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and a proposed second amended complaint. 	Ocwen filed an opposition
to the Debtor’s motion. 	The motions came on for hearing on October
8, 2009. 	Appearances were stated on the record. 	At the conclusion
of the hearing, the Court took the motions under submission. 	Having
considered the evidence presented and argument made, for the reasons
stated 	below, 	the 	Court 	concludes 	that 	Ocwen’s 	motion 	should 	be
granted and that the Debtor’s motion should be denied.
SUMMARY OF FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On 	July 	23, 	2009, 	the 	Debtor 	filed 	a 	petition 	seeking 	relief
under 	chapter 	13 	of 	the 	Bankruptcy 	Code, 	thereby 	commencing 	the
above-captioned case. 	On the same day, she filed a complaint against
Ocwen, thereby commencing this adversary proceeding. 	She filed an
amended complaint (i.e., the Complaint) on July 28, 2009. 	On August
19, 2009, Ocwen filed a timely motion to dismiss the Complaint on the
ground that the claims asserted therein were barred by res judicata.
On September 2, 2009, the Debtor filed a motion for leave to file a
second 	amended 	complaint 	and 	a 	proposed 	second 	amended 	complaint.
Both motions were opposed.
The 	Complaint 	concerns 	a 	secured 	claim 	(the 	“Secured 	Claim”)
encumbering 	the 	Debtor’s 	real 	property 	(the 	“Property”). 	The
Complaint 	begins 	with 	a 	series 	of 	factual 	allegations, 	i.e., 	that
Ocwen 	acquired 	the 	Secured 	Claim 	fraudulently, 	that 	it 	unlawfully
charged 	the 	Debtor 	late 	fees, 	that 	it 	never 	serviced 	the 	Secured
Claim, 	that 	it 	threatened 	to 	foreclose 	on 	the 	Property 	without 	any
right 	to 	do 	so, 	that 	it 	harassed 	the 	Debtor 	and 	made 	false
representations to her in an attempt to acquire the Property, that it
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has 	failed 	to 	provide 	the 	original 	note 	to 	prove 	it 	is 	the 	holder,
that it has made false reports to credit bureaus that the loan is in
“good 	standing,” 	that 	it 	has 	failed 	to 	place 	insurance 	on 	the
Property, and that it has refused to provide the Debtor with monthly
statements.
The Complaint asserts three claims for relief, which incorporate
the 	above 	factual 	allegations 	by 	reference: 	(1) 	fraud 	and
misrepresentation, (2) fraudulent transfer, and (3) quiet title. 	The
claim for fraud and misrepresentation alleges that Ocwen engaged in
actions and made representations that were false and fraudulent and
were intended to induce the Debtor to convey title to the Property to
Ocwen 	and 	upon 	which 	she 	relied. 	The 	nature 	of 	the 	actions 	and
representations is not specified except by reference to the factual
allegations described above.
The 	claim 	for 	fraudulent 	transfer 	alleges 	that 	Ocwen 	has
unlawfully attempted to convert the Property to its own use based on
false 	and 	fraudulent 	representations, 	despite 	the 	fact 	that 	the
Debtor 	has 	rescinded 	the 	loan. 	As 	a 	result 	of 	the 	rescission, 	the
Debtor alleges, Ocwen’s claim has become wholly unsecured. 	The claim
for 	quiet 	title 	alleges 	that 	the 	Debtor 	owns 	fee 	title 	to 	the
Property. 	The prayer asks the Court to determine that Ocwen has no
claim 	against 	the 	Property, 	to 	strip 	off 	the 	unsecured 	portion 	of
Ocwen’s 	lien, 	to 	ensure 	that 	the 	Debtor 	suffers 	no 	liability 	as 	a
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1The Debtor’s motion for leave to file a second amended
complaint in the bankruptcy court seeks to add DB Structured
Products (“DB”) as an additional defendant. 	DB was also a
defendant in the District Court Action. 	The proposed second
amended complaint (the “Second Amended Bankruptcy Court Complaint”)
lists five claims: (1) violation of RESPA, (2) conversion, 	(3)
unjust enrichment, (4) negligence, and (5) intentional infliction
of emotional distress.
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result 	of 	the 	lien 	stripping, 	and 	to 	order 	Ocwen 	to 	remove 	all
derogatory credit references from the three credit bureaus. 1
Ocwen’s motion to dismiss asserts that these claims are barred
by 	res 	judicata. 	Ocwen 	asserts 	that, 	in 	2007, 	the 	Debtor 	filed 	a
complaint against Ocwen in the United States District Court for the
Northern District of California (the “District Court Action”). 	The
complaint 	in 	the 	District 	Court 	Action 	involved 	the 	same 	facts 	and
asserted 	similar 	legal 	claims 	based 	on 	those 	facts. 	The 	District
Court gave the Debtor several opportunities to amend the complaint to
state 	a 	viable 	claim 	against 	Ocwen 	before 	dismissing 	the 	District
Court 	Action 	with 	prejudice 	on 	April 	10, 	2009. 	The 	Debtor 	did 	not
appeal the dismissal order.
Ocwen’s 	motion 	is 	supported 	by 	a 	Request 	for 	Judicial 	Notice
(the “RJN”) to which are attached copies of the following documents
filed in the District Court Action: (1) the Debtor’s Second Amended
Complaint in the District Court Action (the “Second Amended District
Court 	Complaint”), 	(2) 	the 	District 	Court’s 	Order 	granting 	Ocwen’s
motion 	for 	judgment 	on 	the 	pleadings, 	and 	(3) 	the 	District 	Court’s
Judgment dismissing the Second Amended District Court Complaint with
prejudice. 	The Second Amended District Court Complaint asserted six
claims 	as 	follows: 	(1) 	Fraud/Intentional 	Misrepresentation, 	(2)
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Negligent Misrepresentation, (3) Negligence/Professional Malpractice,
(4) Violation of Truth in Lending Act, (5) Violation of Real Estate
Settlement 	Procedures 	Act, 	and 	(6) 	Violation 	of 	Business 	and
Professions Code § 17200 et seq.
The 	key 	factual 	recitals 	in 	the 	Second 	Amended 	District 	Court
Complaint alleged that, in December 2005, the Debtor was induced by
a 	brokerage 	subsidiary 	of 	New 	Century 	Mortgage 	Corporation 	(“New
Century”) to replace the existing mortgage on the Property with a new
mortgage in favor of New Century-–i.e., the Secured Claim--by false
representations 	as 	to 	the 	interest 	rate 	and 	monthly 	payments. 	In
2006, the Debtor filed a lawsuit against New Century based on these
misrepresentations. 	However, the lawsuit was stayed when New Century
filed for bankruptcy in April 2007.
The Second Amended District Court Complaint further alleged that
New Century unlawfully transferred the Secured Claim in March 2007,
on 	the 	eve 	of 	its 	bankruptcy 	filing. 	It 	alleged 	that 	Ocwen 	was
either 	the 	original 	assignee 	of 	the 	Secured 	Claim 	or 	was 	the 	loan
servicer for the assignee. 	As such, it alleged, Ocwen was liable for
the misconduct by New Century and its brokerage subsidiary.
The Order granting Ocwen’s motion for judgment on the pleadings
and 	denying 	the 	Debtor’s 	request 	for 	leave 	to 	file 	a 	third 	amended
complaint 	found 	that, 	shortly 	before 	New 	Century’s 	bankruptcy, 	the
Secured Claim was transferred to a third party other than Ocwen and
that Ocwen acquired the servicing rights for the Secured Claim. 	It
recited that the Debtor’s original complaint asserted four claims for
relief: 	(1) 	Fraudulent 	Misrepresenation, 	(2) 	Truth 	in 	Lending 	Act
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(“TILA”), 	(3) 	Federal 	Real 	Estate 	Settlement 	Procedures 	Act
(“RESPA”), 	and 	(4) 	Section 	17200 	of 	the 	California 	Business 	and
Professions Code (“B & P Code”). 	It recited that the District Court
granted the defendants’ first motion to dismiss with leave to amend.
The 	Order 	further 	stated 	that 	the 	prior 	complaint 	(the 	“First
Amended District Court Complaint”) realleged the original four causes
of 	action 	and 	added 	claims 	for 	Negligence 	and 	Professional
Malpractice, 	and 	Negligent 	Misrepresentation. 	The 	District 	Court
granted the defendants’ second motion to dismiss in part, dismissing
the 	claims 	under 	TILA, 	RESPA, 	and 	for 	negligence 	and 	professional
malpractice, 	again 	with 	leave 	to 	amend. 	The 	B 	& 	P 	Code 	claim 	was
dismissed 	on 	the 	ground 	that 	it 	sought 	an 	improper 	remedy. 	The
District Court declined to dismiss the Debtor’s fraud claim at that
time.
The 	Second 	Amended 	District 	Court 	Complaint 	alleged 	the 	same
claims as the First Amended District Court Complaint. 	The defendants
again moved to dismiss and the Debtor responded by filing a request
for 	leave 	to 	file 	a 	third 	amended 	complaint 	(the 	“Third 	Amended
District Court Complaint”). 	The Order addressed each of the claims
asserted in the Second Amended District Court Complaint separately.
With respect to the TILA claim, the Order noted that, as Ocwen
argued 	in 	support 	of 	its 	motion 	to 	dismiss, 	TILA 	exempts 	loan
servicers. 	While 	the 	District 	Court 	granted 	leave 	to 	amend 	this
claim with respect to the other defendant, the leave to amend did not
apply to the claim against Ocwen.
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With respect to the RESPA claims, which alleged the failure of
New Century to give proper notice of the assignment, the Order noted
that the District Court previously held that defendants could not be
held liable for New Century’s failure to give proper notice. 	Since
RESPA 	also 	requires 	the 	assignee 	to 	give 	notice 	of 	the 	assignment,
the District Court gave the Debtor leave to amend the claim to allege
that 	defendants 	had 	not 	given 	the 	notice 	they 	were 	required 	to
provide. 	The 	Order 	noted 	that 	neither 	the 	Second 	Amended 	District
Court 	Complaint 	nor 	the 	proposed 	Third 	Amended 	District 	Court
Complaint 	contained 	such 	an 	allegation. 	In 	addition, 	defendants
alleged 	that 	they 	had 	given 	the 	required 	notice 	and 	provided 	the
District Court with a copy of the notice.
With 	respect 	to 	the 	claims 	for 	intentional 	and 	negligent
misrepresentation, 	the 	Order 	noted 	that, 	in 	dismissing 	the 	First
Amended 	District 	Court 	Complaint 	with 	leave 	to 	amend 	these 	claims,
the Court had found that all of the alleged misrepresentations were
made 	before 	the 	assignment 	of 	the 	loan. 	In 	order 	to 	hold 	the
defendants 	liable 	for 	the 	misrepresentations, 	the 	complaint 	would
have 	had 	to 	allege 	that 	defendants 	were 	closely 	connected 	to 	New
Century 	and 	its 	brokerage 	subsidiary. 	The 	Second 	Amended 	District
Court 	Complaint 	failed 	to 	make 	any 	such 	allegations. 	The 	District
Court 	noted 	in 	a 	footnote 	that 	the 	proposed 	Third 	Amended 	District
Court 	Complaint 	also 	failed 	to 	contain 	any 	such 	allegations.
Moreover, the Order noted that the allegations of misrepresentations
were insufficiently specific.
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With 	respect 	to 	the 	claims 	for 	Negligence 	and 	Professional
Malpractice, 	the 	Order 	noted 	that, 	in 	dismissing 	the 	First 	Amended
District 	Court 	Complaint, 	the 	District 	Court 	had 	observed 	that 	no
relationship between the Debtor and the defendants was alleged that
would give rise to a duty, the breach of which would give rise to a
claim for negligence or professional malpractice. 	The Second Amended
District Court Complaint did not remedy this deficiency. 	Again, in
a footnote, the District Court noted that the proposed Third Amended
District Court Complaint abandonned this claim.
With respect to the B & P Code claim, the Order noted that the
District Court previously dismissed this claim based on the Debtor’s
prayer for an improper remedy, but permitted the claim to be amended
to permit a prayer for a proper remedy. 	However, the success of the
claim 	depended 	on 	the 	Debtor 	asserting 	viable 	claims 	against 	Ocwen
under 	RESPA 	and 	for 	intentional 	and 	negligent 	representation. 	The
Second 	Amended 	District 	Court 	Complaint 	failed 	to 	assert 	such 	a
claim. 	Thus, the B & P Code claim was also insufficient regardless
of the remedy sought.
Addressing 	the 	Debtor’s 	request 	for 	leave 	to 	file 	a 	Third
Amended District Court Complaint, the District Court noted that the
Third 	Amended 	District 	Court 	Complaint 	proposed 	to 	add 	claims 	for
fraudulent conveyance, civil conspiracy, violation of the Fair Credit
Reporting 	Act 	(“FCRA”), 	violation 	of 	the 	Lenders 	and 	Servicers
Licensing 	Act 	(“LSLA”), 	breach 	of 	fiduciary 	duty 	in 	servicing 	the
Secured 	Claim, 	and 	quiet 	title. 	The 	District 	Court 	denied 	the
Debtor’s request for leave to file the Third Amended District Court
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Complaint, concluding that permitting the Debtor to allege these new
causes of action would be futile.
With 	respect 	to 	the 	claim 	for 	fraudulent 	conveyance, 	the
District Court found that the proposed Third Amended District Court
Complaint failed to state a viable claim. 	The District Court noted
that 	a 	claim 	to 	avoid 	a 	fraudulent 	conveyance 	seeks 	to 	undo 	a
transfer 	by 	a 	debtor 	to 	shield 	property 	from 	creditors. 	The
fraudulent conveyance alleged by the proposed Third Amended District
Court Complaint was the transfer of the Secured Claim by New Century
to defendants. 	Among other reasons stated, the District Court found
that 	the 	claim 	alleged 	was 	not 	viable 	because 	the 	Debtor 	was 	not 	a
creditor with standing to bring such a claim.
With respect to the claim for civil conspiracy, the Order noted
that the proposed Third Amended District Court Complaint alleged that
the defendants conspired to deprive the Debtor of her right to equal
protection in that subprime lenders have routinely preyed on minority
borrowers. 	The Order recited the statutory provision upon which such
a claim is necessarily based: 	i.e., 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3). 	It noted
that 	the 	allegations 	underlying 	the 	Debtor’s 	claim 	for 	civil
conspiracy 	in 	the 	proposed 	Third 	Amended 	District 	Court 	Complaint
were 	conclusory, 	containing 	no 	specific 	facts 	demonstrating 	that
subprime 	lenders 	have 	preyed 	on 	minorities 	in 	general 	or 	on 	her 	in
particular. 	Additionally, 	the 	claim 	did 	not 	allege 	that 	the
defendants 	conspired 	with 	New 	Century 	or 	its 	subsidiary 	brokerage
when the loan was made.
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With 	respect 	to 	the 	claim 	for 	the 	FCRA 	violation, 	the 	Order
notes that, in the proposed Third Amended District Court Complaint,
the 	Debtor 	alleged 	that 	the 	defendants 	violated 	FCRA 	by 	making
negative 	credit 	reports 	within 	60 	days 	of 	acquiring 	her 	loan. 	The
District Court concluded that the allegations of the proposed Third
Amended 	District 	Court 	Complaint 	were 	insufficiently 	specific 	to
state 	a 	claim 	under 	FCRA 	and 	that, 	given 	the 	Debtor’s 	litigation
history, it would be futile to allow her to amend this claim further.
With respect to the claim for violation of LSLA, the Order noted
that the proposed Third Amended District Court Complaint alleged that
defendants violated the LSLA because she never received copies of the
closing documents on her loan as well as other documents required to
be provided when a loan secured by a mortgage is made. 	The District
Court noted that this type of claim applies to the loan originator–-
i.e., 	New 	Century–-not 	to 	an 	entity 	that 	subsequently 	acquired 	the
Secured Claim or its servicer.
With 	respect 	to 	the 	third 	party 	claim 	for 	breach 	of 	fiduciary
duty, the Order noted that the proposed Third Amended District Court
Complaint 	alleged 	that 	defendants 	breached 	their 	fiduciary 	duty 	to
her by seeking to benefit from loan servicing without providing any
loan servicing. 	The District Court noted that the Debtor previously
made 	similar 	allegations, 	although 	she 	styled 	them 	as 	claims 	for
negligence 	and 	professional 	malpractice. 	The 	District 	Court
dismissed the claims when previously alleged on the ground that the
allegations did not establish that the defendants owed the Debtor a
duty 	of 	care. 	The 	Order 	stated 	that 	the 	same 	rationale 	applies 	to
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the claim asserted as a breach of fiduciary duty. 	The District Court
concluded 	that 	it 	would 	be 	futile 	to 	allow 	the 	Debtor 	to 	amend 	the
Second Amended District Court Complaint to add this claim.
Finally, 	with 	respect 	to 	the 	quiet 	title 	claim, 	the 	Order
recited the elements of such a claim. 	The District Court found that
the 	claim 	as 	alleged 	in 	the 	proposed 	Third 	Amended 	District 	Court
Complaint was deficient in two respects. 	First, it failed to allege
any adverse claim to ownership of the Property. 	Second, the proposed
Third Amended District Court Complaint stated, in conclusory fashion,
that 	defendants 	wrongfully 	claimed 	an 	interest 	in 	the 	Property,
without specifying what interest was claimed or how it was adverse to
her 	ownership 	claim. 	For 	the 	reasons 	stated 	earlier, 	the 	District
Court found that it would be futile to allow the Debtor to amend the
Second Amended District Court Complaint by adding this claim.
In conclusion, the Order indicated that the Debtor’s request for
leave 	to 	file 	the 	proposed 	Third 	Amended 	District 	Court 	Complaint
would 	be 	denied. 	On 	the 	same 	date 	the 	Order 	was 	signed, 	the 	Court
signed a judgment, granting the motion for judgment on the pleadings
in favor of Ocwen and the other defendant and dismissing the District
Court Action with prejudice.
DISCUSSION
Ocwen moves to dismiss the claims asserted in the Complaint on
the 	ground 	that, 	based 	on 	the 	rulings 	made 	in 	the 	District 	Court
Action, 	they 	are 	barred 	by 	the 	doctrine 	of 	res 	judicata. 	Such 	a
dismissal 	would 	necessarily 	be 	with 	prejudice. 	Ocwen 	opposes 	the
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Debtor’s motion for leave to file the Second Amended Bankruptcy Court
Complaint on the same ground.
Res 	judicata 	is 	a 	phrase 	used 	to 	refer 	to 	two 	distinct
doctrines: 	i.e., 	claim 	preclusion 	and 	issue 	preclusion. 	Taylor 	v.
Sturgell, 	128 	S. 	Ct. 	2161, 	2171 	(2008). 	The 	doctrine 	upon 	which
Ocwen 	relies 	is 	claim 	preclusion. 	Under 	the 	doctrine 	of 	claim
preclusion, 	“a 	final 	judgment 	on 	the 	merits 	of 	an 	action 	precludes
parties or their privies from religitating issues that were or could
have been raised in that action.” 	Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 94
(1980). 	There are three elements to a successful claim preclusion
defense: (1) an identity of claims, (2) an identity of parties, and
(3) 	a 	final 	judgment 	on 	the 	merits. 	Tahoe 	Sierra 	Preservation
Council, Inc. V. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 322 F.3d 1064, 1077
(9th 	Cir. 	2003). 	Each 	of 	these 	elements 	is 	satisfied 	here. 	Thus,
Ocwen’s motion to dismiss should be granted.
For purposes of claim preclusion, claims are identical when the
claims asserted in the two actions arise from the “same transactional
nucleus of facts.” 	Id., at 1078. 	Two actions arise from the “same
transactional 	nucleus 	of 	fcts” 	if 	they 	are 	related 	in 	time, 	space,
and 	origin. 	A 	party 	may 	not 	avoid 	the 	preclusive 	effect 	of 	claim
preclusion 	“by 	attaching 	a 	different 	legal 	label 	to 	an 	issue 	that
has, or could have, been litigated” in the previous action. 	Id. at
1077-78.
In this proceeding, as summarized above, the Complaint clearly
asserts 	claims 	that 	arose 	from 	the 	same 	transactional 	nucleus 	of
facts as those asserted in the District Court Action. 	Both actions
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assert claims arising from alleged misconduct by New Century and its
brokerage subsidiary, for which Ocwen is asserted to be liable, and
claims arising from alleged misconduct by Ocwen itself in connection
with the Secured Claim. 	It is of no consequence that the Debtor may
be 	asserting 	new 	theories 	of 	recovery 	in 	the 	proceeding 	herein.
Moreover, she is not. 	Each of the three claims for relief included
in the Complaint were at one time or another asserted, or proposed to
be asserted, in the District Court Action. 	Therefore, the identity
of claims element of claim preclusion is satisfied.
The 	other 	two 	elements 	are 	even 	more 	clearly 	satisfied. 	The
Debtor 	and 	Ocwen 	were 	parties 	to 	the 	District 	Court 	Action.
Moreover, 	the 	judgment 	entered 	in 	the 	District 	Court 	Action,
dismissing 	the 	Second 	Amended 	Complaint 	with 	prejudice, 	is 	final.
The Debtor did not appeal it.
The Debtor’s opposition to Ocwen’s motion to dismiss raises no
serious issues. 	She attaches rulings from a separate district court
action 	that 	she 	filed 	against 	a 	different 	defendant 	in 	which 	she
obtained a default judgment. 	She also attaches one of the orders in
the District Court Action, granting in part and denying in part one
of defendants’ prior motions to dismiss.
The 	Debtor 	blames 	her 	lack 	of 	success 	in 	the 	District 	Court
Action 	on 	the 	attorney 	representing 	her 	at 	the 	time. 	The 	time 	for
challenging the ruling by the District Court is past, and this is the
wrong court in which to do so. 	The Debtor does not dispute that the
claims asserted in this proceeding were, or could have been, asserted
in 	the 	District 	Court 	Action 	and 	arise 	from 	the 	same 	transactional
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nucleus 	of 	facts. 	Neither 	does 	she 	dispute 	that 	the 	same 	parties
were 	involved 	or 	that 	judgment 	entered 	therein 	is 	final. 	As 	a
result, 	the 	doctrine 	of 	res 	judicata 	or 	claim 	preclusion 	bars 	the
assertion of the claims in the Complaint.
The same rationale applies to the Debtor’s motion for leave to
file 	the 	Second 	Amended 	Bankruptcy 	Court 	Complaint. 	Some 	of 	the
claims 	asserted 	in 	the 	proposed 	Second 	Amended 	Bankruptcy 	Court
Complaint were asserted in the District Court Action; some were not.
However, 	all 	are 	based 	on 	the 	same 	transactional 	nucleus 	of 	facts.
Therefore, the doctrine of claim preclusion bars their being asserted
now in this court. 	The Debtor’s attempt to distinguish the factual
nature 	of 	the 	claims 	alleged 	in 	the 	proposed 	Second 	Amended
Bankruptcy 	Court 	Complaint 	is 	of 	no 	avail. 	Claim 	preclusion 	bars
relitigation of claims that were or could have been asserted in the
prior action.
CONCLUSION
The claims asserted in the Complaint are barred by res judicata
based 	on 	the 	final 	judgment 	in 	the 	District 	Court 	Action.
Consequently, 	Ocwen’s 	motion 	to 	dismiss 	will 	be 	granted 	with
prejudice. 	For 	the 	same 	reason, 	the 	Debtor’s 	motion 	for 	leave 	to
file 	the 	Second 	Amended 	Bankruptcy 	Court 	Complaint 	will 	be 	denied.
Counsel for Ocwen is directed to submit a proposed form of order in
accordance with this decision.
END OF DOCUMENT
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COURT SERVICE LIST
Leslie Patrice Barnes Marks
3099 Sutter Street
Oakland, CA 94602-2840
Eric D. Houser
Law Offices of Houser and Allison
9970 Research Dr.
Irvine, CA 92618
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