Felicia Laura Collier

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UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
In re 	No. 08-43740 TG
Chapter 13
FELICIA LAURA COLLIER,
Debtor.
_____________________________/
In re 	No. 08-44842 TG
Chapter 13
WILLIE JACKSON,
Debtor.
______________________________/
NOTICE TO CALIFORNIA ATTORNEY GENERAL
Section 2403(b) of Title 28 of the United States Code provides
that, 	when 	the 	constitutionality 	of 	a 	state 	statute 	is 	called 	into
question 	in 	a 	proceeding 	in 	federal 	court, 	the 	court 	shall 	certify
such fact to the attorney general of the State and shall permit the
state 	to 	intervene. 	The 	Court 	has 	tentatively 	concluded 	that 	Cal.
Rev. 	& 	Tax. 	Code 	§ 	4103(b) 	is 	unconstitutional 	as 	applied 	to
bankruptcy 	debtors. 	Therefore, 	it 	hereby 	gives 	notice 	to 	the
California Attorney General of this opinion and gives the California
Attorney General 60 days from the date of this tentative decision to
Signed: December 15, 2008
________________________________________
LESLIE TCHAIKOVSKY
U.S. Bankruptcy Judge
________________________________________
Entered on Docket
December 16, 2008
GLORIA L. FRANKLIN, CLERK
U.S BANKRUPTCY COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
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indicate 	its 	desire 	to 	intervene. 	If 	not 	such 	indication 	has 	been
received within 60 days, the decision will become final.
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
In 	each 	of 	the 	above-captioned 	chapter 	13 	cases, 	Donald 	R.
White, 	the 	Treasurer-Tax 	Collector 	of 	Alameda 	County, 	(“Alameda
County”) objected to confirmation of the debtor’s plan on the ground
that 	it 	failed 	to 	provide 	for 	payment 	of 	interest 	on 	its 	secured
property tax claim at the rate of 18% per annum pursuant to 11 U.S.C.
§ 511(a) and Cal. Rev. & Tax. Code § 4103(b). 	The debtors contended,
among 	other 	things, 	that 	§ 	4103(b) 	is 	unconstitutional 	because 	it
violates 	the 	Supremacy 	Clause 	of 	the 	United 	States 	Constitution.
U.S. 	Const. 	Art. 	VI, 	§ 	8. 	The 	Court 	agrees. 	The 	reasons 	for 	the
Court’s decision are set forth below. 	The memorandum also sets forth
the Court’s conclusions with respect to Alameda County’s alternative
arguments.
SUMMARY OF FACTS
Felicia 	Laura 	Collier 	(“Collier”) 	filed 	a 	petition 	seeking
relief under chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code on July 17, 2008. 	On
August 28, 2008, she filed a first amended chapter 13 plan. 	The plan
sets 	forth 	a 	secured 	property 	tax 	claim 	owing 	to 	Alameda 	County 	in
the amount of $15,000 and provides for an interest rate on the claim
of zero percent. 	Alameda County filed an objection to confirmation
on 	September 	8, 	2008. 	Alameda 	County 	filed 	a 	proof 	of 	claim 	on
October 31, 2008, listing the following amounts due:
(1) taxes and assessments totaling $15,349.69;
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(2) delinquent penalties totaling $1,534.94 (calculated as 10%
of the taxes);
(3) costs totaling $30; and
(4) 	pre-petition 	redemption 	penalties 	through 	July 	31, 	2008
totaling $2,379.29.
The proof of claim also asserted a claim for post-petition redemption
penalties at the rate of 18% per annum.
Willie Jackson (“Jackson”) filed a petition seeking relief under
chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code on September 2, 2008. 	On November
8, 	2008, 	he 	filed 	a 	third 	amended 	chapter 	13 	plan. 	The 	plan 	sets
forth two secured property tax claims owing to Alameda County: i.e.,
one 	with 	respect 	to 	real 	property 	located 	on 	Martin 	Luther 	King
Boulevard (the “MLK Boulevard Property”) and one with respect to real
property 	located 	on 	38 th 	Avenue 	(the 	“38 th 	Avenue 	Property”). 	The
Jackson Plan provides for an interest rate on both claims of 10% per
annum.
Alameda County filed an objection to confirmation of the Jackson
Plan 	on 	November 	12, 	2008. 	On 	November 	4, 	2008, 	it 	filed 	three
proofs of claim in the Jackson case, one of which reflected property
tax due for a third piece of real property located on Penniman Avenue
(the “Penniman Avenue Property”) not listed in the debtor’s plan.
The proofs of claim listed the following amounts due:
MLK Boulevard Property
(1) taxes and assessments totaling $9,447.20;
(2) delinquent penalties totaling $944.70 (calculated as 10% of
the taxes);
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1Although § 4103(b) states that the 18% per annum charged
should be considered interest when the taxpayer is a bankruptcy
debtor, Alameda County’s proofs of claim continue to refer to the
charge as a penalty.
4
(3) costs totaling $20; and
(4) pre-petition redemption penalties through September 30, 2008
totaling $1,272.81. 1
38 th Avenue Property
(1) taxes and assessments totaling $48,016.52;
(2) delinquent penalties totaling $4,801.30 (calculated as 10%
of the taxes);
(3) costs totaling $70; and
(4) pre-petition redemption penalties through September 30, 2008
totaling $15,622.06.
Penniman Avenue Property
(1) taxes and assessments totaling $3,218.60;
(2) delinquent penalties totaling $321.86 (calculated as 10% of
the taxes);
(3) costs totaling $20; and
(4) pre-petition redemption penalties through September 30, 2008
totaling $96.26.
The proof of claim also asserted a claim for post-petition redemption
penalties at the rate of 18% per annum.
DISCUSSION
A. 	SUMMARY OF THE ISSUES AND ARGUMENTS
When a chapter 13 plan proposes to pay the delinquent amount of
a secured claim over time, 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(B)(ii) requires the
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2Section 511(a) of the Bankruptcy Code states as follows: “If
any provision of this title requires the payment of interest on a
tax claim or on an administrative expense tax, or the payment of
interest to enable a creditor to receive the present value of the
allowed amount of a tax claim, the rate of interest shall be the
rate determined under applicable nonbankruptcy law.” 	11 U.S.C. §
511(a).
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amount 	paid 	to 	equal 	the 	present 	value 	of 	the 	claim 	as 	of 	the
effective 	date 	of 	the 	plan. 	See 	11 	U.S.C. 	§ 	1325(a)(5)(B)(ii).
Normally, 	this 	requires 	that 	interest 	be 	paid 	on 	the 	claim 	at 	the
market 	rate. 	However, 	11 	U.S.C. 	§ 	511(a) 	provides 	that, 	when 	a
secured tax claim is involved, the rate of interest is determined by
applicable nonbankruptcy law. 2
Section 	4103(a) 	of 	the 	California 	Revenue 	and 	Taxation 	Code
(“Cal. Rev. & Tax. Code”) provides that, when a real property owner
fails to pay its real property taxes when due, a redemption penalty
of 18% per annum accrues. 	However, Section 4103(b) provides that:
For purposes of an administrative hearing or any
claim 	in 	a 	bankruptcy 	proceeding 	pertaining 	to
the 	property 	being 	redeemed, 	the 	assessment 	of
penalties determined pursuant to subdivision (a)
with respect to the redemption of that property
constitutes the assessment of interest.
Cal. Rev. & Tax. Code § 4103(b).
Alameda County objected to the Collier and Jackson plans on the
ground 	that 	they 	fail 	to 	provide 	for 	payment 	of 	interest 	on 	its
claims at the rate of 18% per annum as required by 11 U.S.C. § 511.
Alternatively, 	Alameda 	County 	argued 	that, 	if 	the 	Court 	concludes
that the 18% per annum charge is not interest, the charge should be
considered 	part 	of 	the 	tax 	claim 	like 	the 	10% 	delinquency 	penalty
that accrues when the tax is not paid when due. 	See Cal. Rev. & Tax
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Code §§ 2617 & 2618; Rickley v. County of Los Angeles, 114 Cal. App.
4th 	1002, 	1011 	(2004). 	Finally, 	Alameda 	County 	asserted 	that 	the
post-petition penalties may be recovered as part of its secured claim
based on 11 U.S.C. § 506(b).
The debtors’ only meaningful argument challenging the County’s
position is that Cal. Rev. & Tax. Code § 4103(b) is unconstitutional
as 	in 	violation 	of 	the 	United 	States 	Constitution 	and 	that 	it 	is
preempted 	by 	the 	Bankruptcy 	Code. 	They 	do 	not 	address 	Alameda
County’s two alternative contentions.
All three issues are addressed below.
B. 	DECISION
1. 	Is 	Cal. 	Rev. 	& 	Tax 	Code 	§ 	4103(b) 	Preempted 	by 	the
Supremacy Clause?
The first issue to be addressed is whether Cal. Rev. & Tax. Code
§ 4103(b), as applied to a debtor in a bankruptcy case, is preempted
by 	the 	Bankruptcy 	Code. 	The 	Court 	concludes 	that 	it 	is. 	Thus, 	§
4103(b) 	is 	a 	nullity 	as 	applied 	to 	Collier 	and 	Jackson. 	The 	basis
for the Court’s decision is set forth below.
Section 	511(a) 	of 	the 	Bankruptcy 	Code 	provides 	that, 	in 	a
chapter 13 case, when a tax claim is to be paid over the life of the
plan, 	the 	tax 	claim 	must 	receive 	interest 	at 	the 	rate 	provided 	by
state 	law. 	Section 	4103(b) 	of 	the 	California 	Revenue 	and 	Taxation
Code 	states 	that, 	when 	the 	taxpayer 	is 	in 	bankruptcy, 	the 	18% 	per
annum 	charge 	assessed 	on 	delinquent 	property 	taxes 	shall 	be 	deemed
interest.
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3Section 4103(b) also applies to taxpayers not in bankruptcy
who are the subjects of an administrative proceeding. 	The Court
does not view the inclusion of these nondebtors in this subsection
as sufficient to render the provision constitutional as applied to
bankruptcy debtors.
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The question is whether Congress’s intent in enacting § 511(a)
was to permit states to enact a bankruptcy specific interest rate or
merely 	to 	subject 	bankruptcy 	debtors 	to 	the 	same 	interest 	rate
imposed 	on 	nonbankruptcy 	debtors 	under 	state 	law. 	The 	Court
concludes 	that 	Congress 	intended 	the 	latter, 	not 	the 	former. 	As 	a
result, it concludes that § 4103(b) violates the Supremacy Clause of
the 	United 	States 	Constitution 	and 	is 	a 	nullity 	as 	applied 	to
bankruptcy debtors. 3
The 	Supreme 	Court 	has 	described 	the 	doctrine 	of 	federal
preemption as follows:
The pre-emption doctrine, which has its roots in
the Supremacy Clause, U.S. Const., art. VI. cl.
2, requires us to examine congressional intent.
Pre-emption 	may 	be 	either 	express 	or 	implied,
and 	“is 	compelled 	whether 	Congress’ 	command 	is
explicitly 	stated 	in 	the 	statute’s 	language 	or
implicitly 	contained 	in 	its 	structure 	and
purpose.” 	Absent explicit pre-emptive language,
Congress’ 	intent 	to 	supersede 	state 	law
altogether may be inferred because “[t]he scheme
of federal regulation may be so pervasive as to
make reasonable the inference that Congress left
no 	room 	for 	the 	States 	to 	supplement 	it,”
because 	“the 	Act 	of 	Congress 	may 	touch 	a 	field
in 	which 	the 	federal 	interest 	is 	so 	dominant
that 	the 	federal 	system 	will 	be 	assumed 	to
preclude 	enforcement 	of 	state 	laws 	on 	the 	same
subject,” 	or 	because 	“the 	object 	sought 	to 	be
obtained by federal law and the character of the
obligations 	imposed 	by 	it 	may 	reveal 	the 	same
purpose.”
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MSR 	Exploration, 	Ltd. 	v. 	Meridian 	Oil, 	Inc., 	74 	F.3d 	910, 	913 	(9th
Cir. 	1996), 	quoting 	from 	Fidelity 	Fed. 	Sav. 	& 	Loan 	Ass’n 	v. 	de 	la
Cuesta, 	458 	U.S. 	141, 	152-53 	(1982). 	The 	MSR 	Exploration 	court
stated that:
...a 	mere 	browse 	through 	the 	complex,
detailed, 	and 	comprehensive 	provisions 	of 	the
lengthy 	Bankruptcy 	Code...demonstrates
Congress’s intent to create a whole system under
federal 	control 	which 	is 	designed 	to 	bring
together and adjust all of the rights and duties
of creditors and embarrassed debtors alike.
Id. at 914.
However, as stated in Sherwood Partners, Inc. V. Lycos, Inc.:
At the same time, federal law coexists peaceably
with, 	and 	often 	expressly 	incorporates, 	state
laws 	regulating 	the 	rights 	and 	obligations 	of
debtors...and 	creditors. 	In 	determining
whether...[a 	specific 	state 	statute] 	is
preempted, we must consider whether it is merely
another 	creditor 	rights 	provision 	of 	the 	kind
that 	is 	tolerated 	by 	the 	Bankruptcy 	Code, 	or
whether 	it 	gives 	the 	state...powers 	that 	are
within 	the 	heartland 	of 	bankruptcy
administration.”
394 F.3d 1198, 1201 (9th Cir. 2005).
In Sherwood Partners, the Ninth Circuit concluded that Cal. Civ.
Proc. 	Code 	§ 	1800, 	which 	gives 	an 	assignee 	for 	the 	benefit 	of
creditors the power to recover a preferential transfer, was preempted
by the Bankruptcy Code. 	Sherwood Partners, the assignee, contended
that 	§ 	1800 	was 	not 	only 	tolerated 	by 	the 	Bankruptcy 	Code 	but
specifically incorporated through 11 U.S.C. § 544(b). 	Section 544(b)
permits 	a 	trustee 	to 	avoid 	a 	transfer 	that 	could 	be 	avoided 	by
unsecured 	creditors 	under 	state 	law. 	The 	Sherwood 	Partners 	court
found this argument unpersuasive, noting that § 1800 did not give the
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power 	to 	recover 	preferences 	to 	creditors 	in 	general, 	only 	to 	an
assignee for the benefit of creditors. 	Thus, it did not come within
the provisions of 11 U.S.C. § 544(b). 	Id. at 1201-02.
The 	Sherwood 	Partners 	court 	then 	addressed 	the 	question 	of
whether, although not expressly incorporated by the Bankruptcy Code,
§ 	1800 	could 	peaceably 	coexist 	with 	it. 	Id. 	at 	1202. 	The 	court
concluded that it could not. 	It observed that one of the major goals
of 	bankruptcy 	was 	the 	equitable 	distribution 	of 	the 	debtor’s
nonexempt assets and that the power to avoid preferences was one of
the major powers in accomplishing that goal. 	If an assignee for the
benefit of creditors could recover a preference, it would prevent a
bankruptcy 	trustee 	from 	doing 	so 	since 	a 	preference 	may 	only 	be
recovered once. 	Id.
Similarly, in a case decided under the Bankruptcy Act, the Ninth
Circuit 	found 	unconstitutional 	a 	California 	statute 	purporting 	to
exempt 	a 	personal 	injury 	action 	from 	the 	claimant’s 	bankruptcy
estate. See In re Kanter, 505 F.2d 228, 230-31 (9th Cir. 1974). 	At
that 	time, 	a 	debtor’s 	bankruptcy 	exemptions 	were 	those 	exemptions
provided 	to 	judgment 	debtors 	in 	general 	under 	state 	law. 	However,
the 	California 	statute 	in 	question 	purported 	to 	render 	a 	personal
injury action exempt from a bankruptcy trustee but not with respect
to 	judgment 	creditors 	outside 	a 	bankruptcy 	case. 	The 	Kanter 	court
concluded 	that, 	by 	giving 	states 	the 	power 	to 	define 	a 	debtor’s
exempt property, Congress did not intend to give states “a free hand
to circumscribe the powers of the bankruptcy trustee.” 	Id. at 230.
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4See In re Lennen, 71 B.R. 80, 81-82 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 1987)
for an accurate description of the reason for the enactment of
these state law exemptions schemes.
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Finally, a number of cases, many in recent years, have addressed
the 	constitutionality 	of 	exemption 	schemes 	enacted 	by 	states 	which
are applicable only to bankruptcy debtors. 4 	The decisions on whether
such 	schemes 	are 	constitutional 	are 	split. 	See 	In 	re 	Morrell, 	394
B.R. 405, 414, n. 5 (Bankr. N.D. W.Va. 2008)(citing cases on issue).
Having considered the issue and the authorities cited above, in
particular, Kanter, the Court concludes that Cal. Rev. & Tax. Code §
4103(b) is preempted by the Bankruptcy Code and may not be applied to
a bankruptcy debtor. 	Congress’ intent in enacting 11 U.S.C. § 511(a)
was 	clearly 	to 	prevent 	any 	distinction 	made 	between 	bankruptcy 	and
nonbankruptcy 	debtors 	with 	respect 	to 	the 	interest 	rate 	imposed 	on
delinquent tax claims. 	The thrust of § 4103(b) is directly opposed
to that intent: i.e., it creates a distinction between the two types
of taxpayers.
2. 	Is Delinquent Penalty Part of the Tax?
Alameda 	County’s 	second 	contention 	was 	that, 	even 	if 	the 	18%
annum 	charge 	(i.e., 	the 	redemption 	penalty) 	is 	a 	penalty, 	not
interest, it is part of the tax as is the 10% delinquent penalty. 	As
noted 	above, 	in 	support 	of 	this 	contention, 	Alameda 	County 	cited
Rickley and the cases cited therein.
In 	Rickley, 	a 	real 	property 	owner 	wished 	to 	contest 	the
legitimacy of the property tax. 	Applicable law required the “tax” to
be 	paid 	in 	order 	to 	challenge 	the 	legitimacy 	of 	the 	tax. 	114 	Cal.
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App. 4 th at 1010; see Cal. Const. Art. XIII, § 32. 	The property owner
had 	paid 	the 	principal 	amount 	of 	the 	tax 	but 	not 	the 	delinquent 	or
redemption penalties. 	The issue was whether the penalties were part
of the “tax” that had to be paid to challenge the legitimacy of the
tax. 	Id. at 1009-10.
The 	Rickley 	court 	held 	that 	both 	types 	of 	penalties 	had 	to 	be
paid. 	It 	noted 	that 	§§ 	2617 	and 	2618 	state 	that, 	if 	the 	two
installments 	of 	property 	tax 	are 	not 	paid 	by 	the 	deadline, 	the
delinquent 	penalty 	“attaches” 	to 	the 	tax. 	Id. 	at 	1011. 	Section
4103(a) 	also 	uses 	the 	word 	“attach” 	with 	respect 	to 	redemption
penalties. 	See Cal. Rev. & Tax. Code §§ 2618 & 4103. 	However, the
debtors do not dispute that the delinquent penalties or pre-petition
redemption 	penalties 	are 	part 	of 	the 	tax 	that 	they 	owe 	to 	Alameda
County. 	They merely dispute that the redemption penalties continue
to accrue post-petition.
The 	debtors 	cite 	no 	authority 	for 	their 	contention 	that
redemption penalties on unpaid real property tax do not accrue post-
petition. 	The 	Court 	is 	unaware 	of 	any 	such 	authority. 	Section
502(b)(2) 	of 	the 	Bankruptcy 	Code 	provides 	that 	claims 	for 	post-
petition 	interest 	may 	be 	disallowed. 	There 	is 	no 	comparable
provision 	for 	post-petition 	penalties. 	Thus, 	the 	Court 	concludes
that the redemption penalties provided for by § 4103(a) do continue
to accrue post-petition until the plan has been fully performed and
the debtor has received a discharge.
The more significant question is what payment on the claim must
be 	made 	by 	the 	debtors. 	The 	answer 	to 	this 	question 	depends 	on
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whether or not the redemption penalties are part of Alameda County’s
secured claim. 	This issue is addressed in the next section.
3. 	Are 	Redemption 	Penalties 	Allowable 	as 	Part of Alameda
County’s 	Secured 	Claim 	Allowable 	Pursuant 	to 	11 	U.S.C. 	§
506(b)?
Alameda 	County 	contended 	that 	the 	post-petition 	redemption
penalties may be recovered as part of its secured claim pursuant to
11 U.S.C. § 506(b). 	Section 506(b) states as follows:
To 	the 	extent 	that 	an 	allowed 	secured 	claim 	is
secured 	by 	property 	the 	value 	of 	which, 	after
any 	recovery 	under 	subsection 	(c) 	of 	this
section, 	is 	greater 	than 	the 	amount 	of 	such
claim, 	there 	shall 	be 	allowed 	to 	the 	holder 	of
such 	claim, 	interest 	on 	such 	claim, 	and 	any
reasonable 	fees, 	costs 	or 	charges 	provided 	for
under the agreement or State statute under which
such claim arose.
11 U.S.C. § 506(b). 	The Court finds this contention without merit.
The Court bases this conclusion on In re County of Orange, 262 F.3d
1014 (9th Cir. 2001)(“Orange County”).
In Orange County, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (the
“FDIC”), as receiver for various failed financial institutions, filed
proofs of claim for delinquent real property tax penalties paid under
protest. 	It 	contended 	that 	12 	U.S.C. 	§ 	1852(b) 	shielded 	it 	from
liability 	for 	the 	delinquent 	penalties, 	both 	those 	that 	accrued
before 	it 	took 	over 	as 	receiver 	and 	those 	that 	accrued 	thereafter.
Section 1852(b)(2) and (3) state that:
When acting as a receiver...
(2) No property of the...[FDIC] shall be subject to
levy, 	attachment, 	garnishment, 	foreclosure, 	or 	sale
without 	the 	consent 	of 	the 	...[FDIC], 	nor 	shall 	any
involuntary 	lien 	attach 	to 	the 	property 	of
the...[FDIC].
(3) The...[FDIC] shall not be liable for any amounts
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in the nature of penalties or fines, including those
arising from the failure of any person to pay any real
property, personal property, probate, or recording tax
or any recording or filing fees when due.”
12 U.S.C. § 1852(b)(2),(3).
The Ninth Circuit held that the FDIC took the real property in
question 	subject 	to 	the 	encumbrances 	for 	the 	delinquent 	penalties
that 	had 	accrued 	before 	it 	became 	receiver 	for 	the 	institution 	in
question. 	However, 	it 	held 	that 	the 	FDIC 	was 	entitled 	to
reimbursement 	for 	the 	redemption 	penalties 	paid, 	both 	those 	that
accrued 	before 	and 	those 	that 	accrued 	after 	it 	became 	receiver
because 	these 	redemption 	penalties 	did 	not 	constitute 	part 	of 	the
lien 	on 	the 	real 	property. 	Orange 	County, 	262 	F.3d 	at 	1018. 	It
based this holding on Weston Inv. Co. v. California, 31 Cal. 2d 390
(1948), 	in 	which 	the 	California 	Supreme 	Court 	held 	that 	redemption
penalties do not become “part of the tax obligation to be secured by
the 	lien.” 	Id. 	at 	1021-22; 	see 	also 	Ferreira 	v. 	El 	Dorado 	County,
222 Cal. App. 3d 788 (1990).
As a result, although the Court concludes that Alameda County’s
redemption penalties continue to accrue post-petition, it concludes
that they constitute a general, unsecured claim as do the redemption
penalties 	that 	accrued 	pre-petition. 	As 	such, 	Alameda 	County 	is
entitled 	to 	receive 	its 	pro 	rata 	share 	of 	any 	payments 	made 	by 	the
debtors 	to 	general, 	unsecured 	creditors 	on 	account 	of 	these
redemption 	penalties. 	Since 	there 	is 	no 	exception 	to 	discharge 	in
chapter 13 with respect to such claims, see 11 U.S.C. § 1328, if the
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plans are fully performed, the debtors will receive a discharge with
respect to any remaining balance of these penalties.
CONCLUSION
Section 4103(b) of the California Revenue and Taxation Code is
preempted 	by 	the 	Bankruptcy 	Code 	and 	is 	a 	nullity 	as 	applied 	to 	a
debtor in a bankruptcy case. 	Although Alameda County is entitled to
interest 	on 	its 	secured 	claim, 	including 	both 	the 	underlying 	tax
itself, plus costs and the delinquent penalty, it is not entitled to
interest at 18% per annum absent evidence. 	The statutory rate should
apply.
The 	debtor 	is 	thus 	subject 	to 	§ 	4103(a) 	which 	provides 	for 	a
delinquent penalty on any unpaid property tax at the rate of 18% per
annum. 	The penalty continues to accrue post-petition. 	However, it
is 	not 	part 	of 	Alameda 	County’s 	secured 	claim 	and 	is 	entitled 	to
receive only its pro rata share of any amounts paid to the general,
unsecured creditors.
END OF DOCUMENT
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COURT SERVICE LIST
Office of the Attorney General
1300 “I” St.
P.O. Box 944255
Sacramento, CA 94244-2550
Claude F. Kolm
Deputy County Counsel
Office of County Counsel, County of Alameda
1221 Oak St., Ste. 450
Oakland, CA 94612
Max Cline
Law Offices of Max Cline
1300 Clay St.
Oakland, CA 94612
David Ashley Smyth
Smyth Law Offices
1990 N California Blvd. #830
Walnut Creek, CA 94596
Martha G. Bronitsky
P.O. Box 5004
Hayward, CA 94540-5004
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