David Kimmel

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UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
In re
DAVID KIMMEL,
Debtor.
Case No. 05-35269
Chapter 7
MEMORANDUM DECISION REGARDING CREDITOR’S
POST-DISCHARGE ATTEMPTS TO COLLECT JUDGMENT
A debtor’s discharge in bankruptcy would not do her much good
if her pre-petition creditors could still garnish her wages to pay
their claims. The creditor in this case has a creative theory for
doing just that: he argues that her discharge did not affect his
claim against her husband, that her husband had an interest in her
wages as community property, and that her husband fraudulently
transferred that interest to her by entering into a postnuptial
agreement. The creditor’s fraudulent transfer claim, besides
/ / /
Signed and Filed: April 11, 2007
________________________________________
DENNIS MONTALI
U.S. Bankruptcy Judge
________________________________________
Entered on Docket
April 12, 2007
GLORIA L. FRANKLIN, CLERK
U.S BANKRUPTCY COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
Case: 05-35269 Doc# 21 Filed: 04/11/07 Entered: 04/12/07 09:11:38 Page 1 of
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The following discussion constitutes the court’s	1
findings of fact and conclusions of law. Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7052
(incorporating by reference Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a)).
Unless otherwise indicated, all chapter, section and rule
references are to the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1330, and
to the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure, Rules 1001-9036, as
enacted and promulgated prior to the effective date of The
Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005,
Pub. L. 109-8, 119 Stat. 23, because the bankruptcy cases at issue
were filed before its effective date (generally October 17, 2005).
This memorandum decision is being filed concurrently in the
bankruptcy cases of both Roberta Kimmel (93-33089) and David
Kimmel (05-35269).
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being untimely, is barred by Section 524(a)(3), which enjoins	1
holders of pre-petition community claims from collecting or
recovering from community property acquired post-petition.
I. Facts
In 1991 creditor William Rooz (“Rooz”) filed an action
against Roberta Kimmel (“Roberta”) and David Kimmel (“David”) (San
Mateo Superior Ct., Case No. 368482) (the “Original Action”).
Roberta filed a voluntary Chapter 7 petition in 1993 (Case No. 99-
33089) and thereafter received her discharge. Rooz continued to
prosecute the Original Action against David. In May of 1995 Rooz
obtained a judgment against David (the “Judgment”). Rooz alleges
that the total Judgment debt with interest and attorneys’ fees is
now over $1 million.
Around July of 1995 David entered into a Postnuptial
Agreement with Roberta. No party has provided the court with a
copy of that agreement. Rooz does not dispute that the agreement
complies with the California Family Code but he asserts that it
transfers to Roberta community property that would otherwise be
available to satisfy the Judgment.
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The Complaint alleges (¶ 16) that Roberta’s salary and	2
funds deposited into her account “at least four years last past,
and up to October 15, 2005, are subject to an accounting and an
award to Mr. Rooz as the creditor of Mr. David Kimmel under the
[J]udgment.”
The Complaint does not actually claim that the Postnuptial	3
Agreement was a fraudulent transfer, but the court treats Rooz’s
arguments on that issue as a proposed amendment to the Complaint.
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In October of 2006 Rooz filed a complaint against Roberta and
Doe defendants in state court (the “Complaint”) asserting claims
under the California version of the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer
Act, Cal. Civ. Code §§ 3439 et seq. (“UFTA”) and for “a continuing
conspiracy to deprive [Rooz] of payments they were obligated to
pay under the [J]udgment” (San Francisco Superior Court, Case No.
CGC-06-456731). The conspiracy claim is somewhat vague but Rooz
has clarified that it relies on his UFTA theories.
The purported community property described in the Complaint
is Roberta’s salary earned after the Postnuptial Agreement became
effective, alleged to be approximately $60,000 per year. Rooz
argues that Roberta’s salary is community property but that the
Postnuptial Agreement transmutes the salary into her separate
property either when it is received, or when it is deposited into
her account, or both. Rooz argues in the alternative that he can	2
avoid the Postnuptial Agreement itself.3
In response to the Complaint Roberta filed a motion to reopen
her bankruptcy case, which was granted, and she removed the action
to this court. Roberta also filed an answer and a motion for
judgment on the pleadings in this removed action.
Meanwhile David filed his own voluntary Chapter 7 petition on
October 16, 2005 (Case No. 05-35269). Rooz contested the
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dischargeability of the Judgment (A.P. No. 06-3047) but the court
eventually dismissed that adversary proceeding with prejudice.
Rooz appealed the dismissal to the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel of
the Ninth Circuit which affirmed in an unpublished Memorandum (BAP
No. NC-06-1252-PaDB). In January of 2007 Rooz appealed that
decision to the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit (C.A. No.
07-15155).
David’s bankruptcy case was closed after he received his
discharge. He filed a motion to reopen his bankruptcy case (which
had already been reopened by Rooz, but under conditions that might
cause it to be closed again). David combined this motion to
reopen with a motion to enforce the discharge injunction of
Section 524, which he asserts is being violated by this removed
action against Roberta. He and Roberta are represented by the
same bankruptcy counsel.
Rooz filed opposition papers to these motions, Roberta and
David filed replies, and these matters came on for hearing on
March 9, 2007. Rooz did not file a written motion to remand this
removed action but at oral argument, after the court noted the
lack of any such motion, his counsel made an oral motion to
remand.
II. Jurisdiction, and oral remand motion
The court is satisfied that it has jurisdiction, that this is
a core proceeding, and that remand is inappropriate. Roberta and
David argue that Rooz’s action is barred by the discharge
injunction. See 11 U.S.C. § 524. Determining what is and is not
covered by the discharge injunction is a core proceeding that is
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The court also notes that Rooz’s statement pursuant to	4
Rule 9027(e)(3) includes the following: “Plaintiff asserts that
the action is a non core proceeding but will consent to the entry
of final orders or judgment by the bankruptcy judge.”
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properly decided by this court. The associated issues of
California law are not complex and deciding them in this forum
will not prejudice Rooz. His oral motion for remand is untimely
and is not persuasive on the merits. It will be denied. See 28
U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(I) and (O); 28 U.S.C. §§ 1334, 1441, and 1452.4
III. Discussion
There is no dispute that California permits postnuptial
agreements to transmute community property into separate property,
but such transmutation can amount to a fraudulent transfer. For
example, when a husband transferred his interest in a community
property house to his wife, that was held to be a fraudulent
transfer in Reddy v. Gonzalez, 8 Cal.App.4th 118, 10 Cal.Rptr.2d
55 (1992), disapproved on other grounds by Annod Corp. v. Hamilton
& Samuels, 100 Cal.App.4th 1286, 1293; 123 Cal.Rptr.2d 924, 928
(2002).
More recently, a California Court of Appeal has held that a
marital agreement transmuting future wages into separate property
was a fraudulent transfer. State Board of Equalization v. Woo, 82
Cal.App.4th 481, 483-84; 98 Cal.Rptr.2d 206, 208 (2000) (rejecting
argument that wife’s future earnings were a mere expectancy rather
than community property in which husband had an interest).
Therefore the court assumes without deciding that Rooz states
a claim for relief under the UFTA. The issues presented are
whether that claim is time-barred under California law or else
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Roberta alleges that the California claims are barred	5
because David’s bankruptcy trustee has exclusive standing bring a
UFTA action. The court disagrees.
The right to maintain a UFTA action belongs to individual
creditors prior to bankruptcy. Once the bankruptcy case is
commenced the automatic stay prevents those creditors from
interfering with the right that has passed to the trustee as the
representative of all creditors. See, e.g., In re MortgageAmerica
Corp., 714 F.2d 1266, 1275-78 (5th Cir. 1983) (fraudulent transfer
action vested in trustee, and automatic stay prohibited creditor
from bringing such action). Once the case is closed, however, the
automatic stay terminates (11 U.S.C. § 362(c)) and the right
reverts to creditors.
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barred by Section 524 of the Bankruptcy Code.5
A. Rooz’s UFTA claim is barred by the applicable California
statute of repose
Rooz alleges that he did not learn of the Postnuptial
Agreement until recently, but provisions of the UFTA impose not
only a four year statute of limitations but also a seven year
statute of repose: “Notwithstanding any other provision of law, a
cause of action with respect to a fraudulent transfer or
obligation is extinguished if no action is brought or levy made
within seven years after the transfer was made or the obligation
was incurred.” See Cal. Civ. Code § 3439.09(c) (emphasis added).
The Posnuptial Agreement was entered into over seven years ago.
Therefore, any attempt by Rooz to avoid it under the UFTA is time-
barred. See Roach v. Lee, 369 F.Supp.2d 1194, 1197-1200 & n.3
(C.D. Cal. 2005) (fraudulent transfer claim barred, even though
fraud was allegedly concealed and “[e]ven though [plaintiff] filed
his complaint less than one year after discovering the fraud,”
because “he filed his complaint more than seven years after the
fraudulent transfer.”).
The Complaint anticipates this obstacle by treating each
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Section 524(a)(1) and (2) provide, in full:	6
(a) A discharge in a case under this title --
(1) voids any judgment at any time obtained, to the
extent that such judgment is a determination of the
personal liability of the debtor with respect to
any debt discharged under section 727, 944, 1141,
1228, or 1328 of this title, whether or not
discharge of such debt is waived;
(2) operates as an injunction against the
commencement or continuation of an action, the
employment of process, or an act, to collect,
recover or offset any such debt as a personal
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occasion when Roberta receives or deposits her paycheck as a
separate transmutation of community property into separate
property. The problem with this argument is that if the
Postnuptial Agreement is not avoided then, by definition,
Roberta’s wages are already her separate property even before she
receives or deposits them. Therefore there is no transmutation
that could be the basis for any fraudulent transfer claim.
For all of these reasons, Rooz’s UFTA claim is time-barred.
Alternatively, even if there were no time bar, Rooz’s claim would
be barred by the Bankruptcy Code.
B. Rooz’s claims are barred by Section 524
Rooz’s Original Action against Roberta and David was filed in
1991, well before Roberta filed her Chapter 7 case in 1993.
Therefore any personal liability that Roberta had to Rooz,
including any liability that she might have had as David’s wife,
was a pre-petition claim that was discharged in her bankruptcy
case. Rooz cannot collect the Judgment from Roberta as a personal
liability. See 11 U.S.C. § 524(a)(1) and (2).6
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liability of the debtor, whether or not discharge
of such debt is waived[.]
11 U.S.C. § 524(a)(1) and (2) (emphasis added).
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David has also received a discharge, and the court has
dismissed Rooz’s nondischargeability action against David. Unless
that dismissal is reversed on appeal and Rooz ultimately prevails
in his nondischargeability action, he cannot collect the Judgment
as a personal liability of David either.
Rooz argues in effect that he is not seeking to impose
personal liability on either Roberta or David on account of his
claims in the Original Action, but instead he is attempting to
recover community property (Roberta’s salary) that was
fraudulently transferred to frustrate collection of his Judgment
against David. The court assumes without deciding that recovering
Roberta’s wages and applying them to pay the Judgment would be
something different from imposing personal liability on Roberta
for the Judgment, because in this community property state she was
not the sole owner of her wages prior to the Prenuptial Agreement.
But cf. Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 243-45 (1934)
(rejecting creditor’s argument that enforcing assignment of future
wages would be something other than imposing personal liability);
In re Miranda Soto, 667 F.2d 235 (1st Cir. 1981) (continuing
vitality of Hunt); In re Chetto, 282 B.R. 215, 216-18 (Bankr. N.D.
Ill. 2002) (same).
Even applying that assumption, Rooz’s claims are barred by
the Bankruptcy Code’s treatment of community claims, which are
defined in Section 101(7) to mean claims “that arose before the
commencement of the case concerning the debtor [Roberta] for which
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Section 541(a)(2) provides:	7
(a) The commencement of a case under section 301, 302, or 303
of this title creates an estate. Such estate is comprised of
all the following property, wherever located and by whomever
held:
* * *
(2) All interests of the debtor and the debtor’s spouse
in community property as of the commencement of the case
that is --
(A) under the sole, equal, or joint management and
control of the debtor [i.e., Roberta]; or
(B) liable for an allowable claim against the
debtor, or for both an allowable claim against the
debtor and an allowable claim against the debtor’s
spouse [i.e., David], to the extent that such
interest is so liable.
11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(2) (emphasis added).
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property of the kind specified in section 541(a)(2) [i.e., most
community property ] is liable, whether or not there is any such	7
property at the time of the commencement of the case.” 11 U.S.C.
§ 101(7). Rooz is asserting a community claim because he asserts
that Roberta’s wages are community property and that such property
is liable for the Judgment against David. See also In re
Soderling, 998 F.2d 730, 733 (9th Cir. 1993) (explaining
definition of community claim). Section 524(a)(3) provides:
(a) A discharge in a case under this title --
* * *
(3) operates as an injunction against the
commencement or continuation of an action, the
employment of process, or an act, to collect
or recover from, or offset against, property
of the debtor of the kind specified in section
541(a)(2) of this title [i.e., Roberta’s
wages] that is acquired after the commencement
of the case, on account of any allowable
community claim, except a community claim that
is excepted from discharge under section 523,
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1228(a)(1), or 1328(a)(1) of this title, or
that would be so excepted, determined in
accordance with the provisions of sections
523(c) and 523(d) of this title, in a case
concerning the debtor’s spouse commenced on
the date of the filing of the petition in the
case concerning the debtor, whether or not
discharge of the debt based on such community
claim is waived.
11 U.S.C. § 524(a)(3) (emphasis added).
Regardless whether David ever received a discharge, Section
524(a)(3) protects Roberta from any action, process, or act “to
collect or recover from, or offset against” her wages “on account
of” the Judgment against David. 11 U.S.C. § 524(a)(3). As
summarized by a leading treatise, “after-acquired community
property will be free from prebankruptcy creditor claims against
either spouse even when only one spouse [Roberta] has filed a
bankruptcy case.” 5 L. King et al., Collier on Bankruptcy (15th
ed. Rev.) (“Collier on Bankruptcy”) ¶ 524.02[3][a], at pp. 524-27
to -28, text accompanying n. 80 (emphasis added).
The policy of Section 523(a)(3) is succinctly explained in In
re Costanza, 151 B.R. 588, 589-90 (Bankr. D.N.M. 1993):
The discharge received by [wife] provides her
a fresh start. It shields all her after acquired
property from the claim[s] of her creditors,
including community claims based upon her husband’s
wrongdoing. It provides the marital community, of
which she is an equal member, a fresh start.[]
Such is the clearly stated policy of Congress.
. . . For those who wish to pursue the
matter, there may be no better source than the
article written by Alan Pedlar, Community Property
and the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, 11 St.
Mary’s L.J. 349 (1979) [“Pedlar, Community
Property”]. The article suggests the possibility
that “the Devil himself could effectively receive a
discharge in bankruptcy if he were married to Snow
White.” Id. at 382. To this I would add: if he
does not treat her better than his creditors, she
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A footnote omitted from the above quote states: “Section	8
524(a)(3) is only available to the marital community. Upon
dissolution of the marriage its protection no longer exists.
Collier, 3 Collier on Bankruptcy, ¶ 524.01[2] at n.16 (15th ed.
1992); Pedlar, Community Property and the Bankruptcy Reform Act of
1978, 11 St. Mary’s L.J. 349 (1979) at n. 134.” Costanza, 151
B.R. at 589 n. 5.
Section 524(b) provides in relevant part, “Subsection	9
(a)(3) of this section does not apply if -- * * * (2)(A) the court
would not grant the debtor’s spouse [David] a discharge in a case
under chapter 7 of this title concerning such spouse commenced on
[Roberta’s petition date]; and (B) a determination that the court
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will, by divorcing him, deny his discharge.[ ]	8
The cases are uniform in recognizing this effect of
Section 524(a)(3). See, e.g., Soderling, 998 F.2d at 733 (“[a]ll
claims against a marital community are discharged,” except for
nondischargeable community claims); In re Homan, 112 B.R. 356, 360
(9th Cir. BAP 1989) (stating in dicta that after-acquired
community property is immune from collection efforts, even if
creditor’s claim is only against nondebtor spouse); In re Hull,
251 B.R. 726, 732 (9th Cir. BAP 2000) (recognizing effect of
Section 524(a)(3)); In re Rollinson, 322 B.R. 879, 883 (Bankr. D.
Ariz. 2005) (creditor’s claim barred by Section 524(a)(3)); In re
Strickland, 153 B.R. 909 (Bankr. D.N.M. 1993) (same); In re
Schmiedel, 236 B.R. 393 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 1999) (same).
Rooz was not without a remedy. Once Roberta filed her
voluntary Chapter 7 petition Rooz had the opportunity to prove
(a) that his claim was nondischargeable by Roberta, or (b) that
his claim would be nondischargeable by David in what was then a
hypothetical case by David, or (c) that David would be denied a
discharge in his hypothetical case. See 11 U.S.C. § 524(a)(3)
(nondischargeability) and § 524(b) (denial of discharge). If	9
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would not so grant such a discharge is made by the bankruptcy
court within the time and in the manner provided for a
determination under section 727 of this title of whether a debtor
is granted a discharge.” 11 U.S.C. § 524(b)(2).
There are no due process concerns because Rooz had notice	10
of Roberta’s bankruptcy case and knew that Roberta was then (and
is now) David’s spouse, so he could have filed a timely complaint
in Roberta’s case. See Schmiedel, 236 B.R. at 397-98 (creditor
who had actual knowledge that nondebtor spouse was married to
debtor had sufficient notice that Section 524(a)(3) would apply)
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Rooz had proved any one of these things then Section 524(a)(3)
would not protect after-acquired community property. See
Rollinson, 322 B.R. at 883 (“the economic sins of either spouse
shall be visited upon the community property when a discharge is
denied as to a community debt”).
Rooz had only a limited time in Roberta’s case in which to
establish one of these things and the deadline for doing so has
long since passed:
As a result of the statutory scheme of
subsections 524(a)(3) and (b), the bankruptcy court
will often be called upon to determine the
hypothetical discharge of a nondebtor spouse or to
rule upon the hypothetical nondischargeability of
one or more of the nondebtor’s debts.
Procedurally, section 524(b) requires a creditor to
file an objection to the hypothetical discharge of
the nondebtor spouse within the same time limits as
an objection to the debtor’s discharge as
prescribed by Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure
4004(a). Similarly, complaints to determine the
nondischargeability of an obligation of the debtor
or of an obligation of the nondebtor spouse in a
hypothetical case commenced by such spouse must be
filed within the time period set forth in Federal
Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 4007(c).
Consequently, creditors must act diligently with
respect to both the debtor and the nondebtor spouse
to preserve their rights as to the discharge or
dischargeability of their claims.
5 Collier on Bankruptcy ¶ 524.02[3][b] and [c], at pp. 524-29 to
-32 (footnotes omitted).10
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(distinguishing In re Sweitzer, 111 B.R. 792, 797-99 (Bankr. W.D.
Wis. 1990) (dicta discussing potential due process concerns)).
Nor is Rooz saved by In re Maready, 122 B.R. 378 (9th Cir.
BAP 1991). In Maready the creditor had missed the deadlines to
object to the discharge or dischargeability but the BAP held that
the creditor could still contest whether or not a claim was a
community claim -- the creditor could argue that Section 524(a)(3)
did not apply because she held a separate claim against the non-
debtor spouse, not a community claim. That does not help Rooz
because his only theory for reaching Roberta’s wages is that he
holds a community claim -- that he can collect the Judgment
against David from Roberta’s wages as community property.
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To summarize, the holder of a community claim must take
action in an innocent spouse’s bankruptcy case, even if his real
quarrel is with the nonfiling, wrongdoing spouse. Once the
deadlines in the first spouse’s case have passed, it is too late
to collect a pre-petition community claim from after-acquired
community property.
This is not to say that Roberta’s discharge protected David’s
separate property or protected him from personal liability (which
is the subject of Rooz’s pending appeal to the Ninth Circuit).
See, e.g., In re Moore, 318 B.R. 679 (Bankr. W.D. Wis. 2004)
(Section 524(a)(3) did not bar creditor from pursuing non-debtor’s
separate property). Her discharge does not extend that far, but
Congress decided to protect after-acquired community property as a
way of protecting the fresh start of the debtor (Roberta) even
thought non-debtor spouses (David) are thereby somewhat protected.
5 Collier on Bankruptcy ¶ 524.02[3][a] at pp. 524-28 to -29, text
accompanying nn. 83-84. See generally Alan Pedlar, Community
Property and the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, 11 St. Mary’s L.J.
349, 380-86 (1979) (discussing Section 524(a)(3) and (b)).
Rooz cites Brenelli Amedeo, S.P.A. v. Bakara Furniture, Inc.,
29 Cal.App.4th 1828, 35 Cal.Rptr.2d 348 (1994), in which a
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creditor was permitted to maintain a UFTA action against a
corporation and its shareholders after the corporation’s voluntary
Chapter 7 bankruptcy. That case is entirely inapposite.
Corporations do not have community property nor are they eligible
to receive a discharge in Chapter 7. See 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(1).
Rooz also cites Sanwa Bank California v. Chang, 87
Cal.App.4th 1314, 105 Cal.Rptr.2d 330 (2001), which held that a
husband’s discharge injunction did not protect his wife from a
fraudulent transfer action to recover the family residence that he
had conveyed to her before filing his bankruptcy petition. As
that decision specifically notes, the house “was pre-bankruptcy
property, not after-acquired property . . . .” Id., 87
Cal.App.4th at 1319, 105 Cal.Rptr.2d at 333 (distinguishing
Strickland, 153 B.R. 909). Therefore Section 524(a)(3) was
inapplicable by its own terms. It only protects after-acquired
community property.
At least one case has specifically applied Section 524(a)(3)
to bar an action to garnish a non-debtor spouse’s wages:
Norwest [the creditor] seeks to execute
against community property belonging to [Nellie and
William] Lawver[] in the form of Nellie’s wages.
The language of 11 U.S.C. 524(a)(3) prohibits a
creditor from seeking satisfaction of a community
debt by resorting to the debtor’s property through
an action against the non-bankrupt spouse commenced
after the filing of the petition in bankruptcy.
Norwest Financial v. Lawver, 109 Nev. 242, 246-47; 849 P.2d 324,
327 (1993) (emphasis added).
Bankruptcy courts have also recognized in dicta that the
discharge injunction in Section 524(a)(3) protects community
property wages. See In re Passmore, 156 B.R. 595, 598 (Bankr.
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E.D. Wis. 1993) (“After Mr. Passmore’s [the debtor’s] discharge is
issued, the discharge injunction will prevent creditors holding
community claims from recovering either spouse’s interest in funds
classified as marital property, such as Mrs. Passmore’s wages,
even though she will not receive a discharge.”) (italics in
original, underlining added); In re Nelson, 308 B.R. 343 (Bankr.
E.D. Wis. 2004) (if wife had filed her Chapter 7 case prior to
husband’s Chapter 13 case, then her discharge injunction under
Section 524(a)(3) would render community claims unenforceable
against husband’s subsequent wages).
For all of these reasons Rooz’s claims are barred by the
discharge injunction of Section 524(a)(3).
C. David’s motion
The court assumes without deciding that David would also have
standing to protect Roberta’s alleged community property wages,
earned prior to his own bankruptcy case, by seeking enforcement of
Section 524(a)(3). But as the court observed at oral argument,
David’s motion to enforce that section appears to seek what the
statute already provides automatically: an injunction. See 5
Collier on Bankruptcy ¶ 524.02[2] at p. 524-14.10 (“Like the
automatic stay of section 362(a), the discharge injunction is the
equivalent of a court order.”) (footnote omitted). An injunction
or declaratory relief regarding the scope of the discharge
injunction would also require an adversary proceeding. See Fed.
R. Bankr. P. 7001(9); In re Munoz, 287 B.R. 546, 551 (9th Cir. BAP
2002). For these reasons, David’s combined motion to reopen and
to enforce the discharge injunction will be denied without
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Any further proceedings by Rooz against either David or	11
Roberta, however, will likely violate Section 524 and expose him
to sanctions. In re Zilog, Inc., 450 F.3d 996, 1007-10 (9th Cir.
2006) (“A party who knowingly violates the discharge injunction
[of Section 524] can be held in contempt under section 105(a) of
the bankruptcy code.”) (citations omitted).
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prejudice.
IV. Conclusion
Roberta is entitled to judgment on the pleadings. Rooz’s
UFTA claim against her is barred by the seven year statute of
repose in California Civil Code section 3439.09(c). Rooz’s UFTA
claim is also barred by the discharge injunction of Section
524(a)(3). Rooz has suggested no amendment to his Complaint that
would state a claim on which relief could be granted.
By separate orders the court will deny Rooz’s oral motion for
remand, grant Roberta’s motion for judgment on the pleadings,
dismiss this removed action with prejudice, and deny without
prejudice David’s combined motion to reopen his case and enforce
the discharge injunction.11
* END OF MEMORANDUM DECISION *
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