(PS)Singh v. Lipworth

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
RAJ SINGH,
Plaintiff,
v.
STEPHEN LIPWORTH,
Defendant.
No. 2:25-cv-01610-DJC-SCR
FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Plaintiff is proceeding pro se in this matter, which is referred to the undersigned pursuant
to Local Rule 302(c)(21) and 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). The Court previously granted Plaintiff leave
to proceed in forma pauperis and screened the complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915. Plaintiff
has now filed a First Amended Complaint (“FAC”). The Court now recommends the FAC be
dismissed without further leave to amend.
I. Prior Screening Order
In the prior screening order (ECF No. 3), the Court observed that the complaint alleged
that the sole defendant, Lipworth, obtained a state court judgment against Plaintiff in 2010.
Plaintiff alleged that judgment allowed Lipworth to take his family house, and alleged Lipworth
took his properties, destroyed his family, and left him homeless. ECF No. 1 at 4.
The screening order informed Plaintiff that his complaint did not comply with Rule 8, and
that to the extent he was alleging fraud it was not pled with particularity. ECF No. 3 at 3.
Case 2:25-cv-01610-DJC-SCR Document 5 Filed 01/05/26 Page 1 of 6

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Plaintiff was also advised that to the extent he was complaining of the state court judgment his
claims may be barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Id. at 4. The screening order also noted
the claims appeared time-barred because Plaintiff complains of actions in 2010, fifteen years prior
to the filing of this action. Id. at 4-5.
Plaintiff was instructed that if he filed an amended complaint, it must address the
deficiencies set forth in the screening order. Specifically, the order stated: “Plaintiff must plead
his allegations of fraud with particularity. Plaintiff must identify the who, what, when, where,
and how of the conduct by Defendant that is alleged to be fraudulent. Plaintiff should also
include any factual allegations demonstrating that this action is timely, or in support of an
argument that the statute of limitations was tolled.” ECF No. 3 at 6.
II. The First Amended Complaint (FAC)
Plaintiff’s FAC names one defendant, Stephen Lipworth. ECF No. 4 at 2. Plaintiff
alleges federal jurisdiction based on diversity of citizenship. Id. at 3. Plaintiff asserts he is a
citizen of California and Lipworth is a citizen of Texas. Id. Plaintiff does not allege a specific
amount in controversy, but instead states: “Lipworth took Singh’s Properties, destroyed Singh’s
family and made Singh homeless.” Id. at 4.
In the “Statement of Claim” portion of the form complaint, Plaintiff appears to argue why
the Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not apply, rather than setting forth specific facts supporting his
claim of fraud. Id. at 5. Plaintiff also alleges that “[i]n 2008 or so, Lipworth took this property
by imposing illegal attorney fees and illegal assessments.” Id. Plaintiff further contends that
“[i]n 2010 Lipworth took on this property illegally.” Id.
In the “Relief” portion of the FAC, Plaintiff states that “[a]nything based on Extrinsic
Fraud can be set aside anytime.” ECF No. 4 at 5. It thus appears Plaintiff is seeking to have this
Court set aside the state court judgment. It also appears from the additional factual allegations
that Plaintiff was not the owner of the property that he alleges was wrongfully taken. Instead, he
alleges: “Lipworth fraudulently took 2 properties owned by Relatives of Raj Singh and illegally
evicted Raj Singh and his family based on frauds …” ECF No. 4 at 7.
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III. 	Analysis
Plaintiff’s FAC continues to fail to comply with the pleading requirements of Rules 8 and
9. It does not comply with Rule 8 in that it does not contain a short and plain statement showing
that plaintiff is entitled to relief. Plaintiff’s complaint does not set forth clearly delineated claims
or causes of action. There are mentions of “fraud.” However, claims of fraud must be pled with
particularity pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b). Rule 9(b)’s particularity
requirement applies to state law causes of action. Vess v. Ciba-Geigy Corp., 307 F.3d 1097, 1103
(9th Cir. 2003). This is true even where the Court’s jurisdiction is based on diversity. Id. (“We
therefore reject [plaintiff’s] argument that we should refuse to apply Rule 9(b) to his state-law
causes of action in this diversity case.”). Even where fraud is not a necessary element of a claim,
if the claim is “grounded in fraud” or “sound[s] in fraud,” the “pleading of the claim as a whole
must satisfy the particularity requirement of Rule 9(b).” Id. at 1103-04.
Plaintiff’s pleading of fraud is largely conclusory. In order to meet the heightened
pleading standard, “a party must state the particularity of the circumstances constituting fraud,”
meaning that the “pleading must identify the who, what, when, where, and how of the misconduct
charged.” United States ex rel. Cafasso v. Gen. Dynamics, 637 F.3d 1047, 1055 (9th Cir. 2011)
(internal citations and quotation omitted). Plaintiff’s FAC fails to meet this standard.
Plaintiff also complains that Lipworth “took a judgment” against him. To the extent
Plaintiff seeks to challenge the state court judgment, the action would be barred by the Rooker-
Feldman doctrine. Under the doctrine, “federal district courts lack subject matter jurisdiction
over cases brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments
rendered before the district court proceedings commenced and inviting district court review and
rejection of those judgments.” Miroth v. County of Trinity, 136 F.4th 1141, 1144 (9th Cir. 2025)
(internal citation and quotation omitted). Plaintiff does appear to seek to set aside the state court
judgment, contending that “[a]nything based on Extrinsic Fraud can be set aside anytime.” ECF
No. 4 at 5. The Rooker-Feldman doctrine “does not bar subject matter jurisdiction when a federal
plaintiff alleges a cause of action for extrinsic fraud on a state court and seeks to set aside a state
court judgment obtained by that fraud.” Kougasian v. TMSL, Inc., 359 F.3d 1136, 1141 (9th Cir.
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2004). However, Plaintiff’s allegations of extrinsic fraud are conclusory. Plaintiff does not
explain how Lipworth committed a fraud on the state court. Conclusory allegations of extrinsic
fraud are insufficient to invoke the exception to application of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. See
Beck v. Catanzarite Law Corp., 2023 WL 1999485, *7 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 14, 2023); Williams v. City
of Los Angeles, 2023 WL 2899292, *9 (C.D. Cal. March 14, 2023).
Additionally, the Court takes notice that Plaintiff has previously challenged this judgment
in state court. See Singh v. Lipworth, 227 Cal.App.4th 813 (2014). As described by the
California Court of Appeal, in that case Singh “sued Lipworth alleging he used fraudulent
representations to persuade the trial court in the prior case that Singh was hiding some properties
from creditors and using different names.” Id. at 816 (quotation omitted). “The trial court found
Singh to be a vexatious litigant with no reasonable probability of prevailing in the litigation
because the lawsuit amounted to an impermissible collateral attack on a prior final judgment and
postjudgment orders.” Id. The California Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment and awarded
sanctions for bringing a frivolous appeal. Id. at 830.
Thus, Plaintiff has already unsuccessfully argued in state court that the judgment was
obtained by fraud. An attack on a judgment cannot be sustained on the argument it was procured
by fraudulent representations “when the charge of fraud has been rejected in previous litigations
by the parties to the suit in which the judgment was rendered.” Heiser v. Woodruff, 327 U.S. 726,
736 (1946); see also Reusser v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., 525 F.3d 855, 859 (9th Cir. 2008) (holding
that Rooker-Feldman barred plaintiff’s claims even though plaintiff alleged extrinsic fraud where
the fraud claim had itself already been litigated in state court).
Plaintiff’s FAC also does not address the timeliness issue identified in the prior screening
order. Plaintiff complains of actions taken in 2008 and 2010. ECF No. 4 at 5. Plaintiff did not
file this action until fifteen years later. The statute of limitations for fraud in California is
generally three years. See Britton v. Girardi, 235 Cal.App.4th 721, 733-34 (Cal. Ct. App. 2015),
citing Cal. Code Civ. Pro. § 338. Section 338(d) “effectively codifies the delayed discovery rule
in connection with actions for fraud, providing that a cause of action for fraud ‘is not to be
deemed to have accrued until the discovery, by the aggrieved party, of the facts constituting the
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fraud or mistake.’” Britton, 235 Cal.App.4th at 734. Plaintiff alleges that Lipworth imposed
illegal attorney fees, illegal assessments, and obtained a judgment. ECF No. 4 at 5. All of these
actions should have been ascertainable near the time they occurred, and Plaintiff was aware of the
judgment as he alleges he was evicted based on the judgment. Additionally, as discussed above,
he previously challenged the judgment in state court more than a decade ago.
For all these reasons, Plaintiff fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
Plaintiff’s FAC suffers from the same defects as the original complaint. Given that the Court
previously allowed leave to amend, and the FAC contains the same pleading deficiencies and
allegations of conduct more than 15 years ago, the Court concludes further leave to amend would
be futile. See Chodos v. West Publishing Co., 292 F.3d 992, 1003 (9th Cir. 2002) (“when a
district court has already granted a plaintiff leave to amend, its discretion in deciding subsequent
motions to amend is particularly broad”). In exercising its discretion to recommend denial of
leave to amend, the Court has also considered that Plaintiff has been determined to be a vexatious
litigant in both state court (as discussed above) and in federal bankruptcy court. See In re Singh,
551 B.R. 54, 56 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 2016) (upholding vexatious litigant pre-filing review order and
stating Singh has filed “multiple meritless actions” and “repeatedly commenced actions” in both
state and federal court “to use, and abuse, those courts against his adversaries”). The Court
recommends the action be dismissed without further leave to amend.
IV. Conclusion
Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that:
1. 	Plaintiff’s FAC be dismissed without further leave to amend; and
2. 	The Clerk be directed to enter judgment and close this case.
These findings and recommendations will be submitted to the United States District Judge
assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within fourteen days
after being served with these findings and recommendations, either party may file written
objections with the court. The document should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge's
Findings and Recommendations.” The parties are advised that failure to file objections within the
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specified time may result in waiver of the right to appeal the district court’s order. Martinez v.
Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).
DATED: January 5, 2026
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