(HC) Z. v. Chestnut et al

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
MUSSIE B.Z.,
Petitioner,
v.
CHRISTOPHER CHESTNUT, et al.,
Respondents.
No. 1:26-cv-00003-TLN-DMC
ORDER
This matter is before the Court on an order to show cause why a preliminary injunction
should not issue (ECF No. 4) after granting Petitioner Mussie B.Z.’s (“Petitioner”) underlying ex-
parte Motion for Temporary Restraining Order (“TRO”) (ECF No. 2). Respondents filed a
response and waived a hearing. (ECF No. 7.) For the reasons set forth below, the Court issues a
preliminary injunction.
///
///

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I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND1
Petitioner is a 32-year-old citizen of Eritrea and asylum applicant in the United States.
(ECF No. 2 at 4.) Petitioner fled Eritrea and came to the United States to seek protection from
persecution on May 10, 2023. (Id.) Immigration authorities determined that Petitioner’s fear of
persecution was credible and released him into the United States to pursue his asylum application
in July 2023. (Id.)
Since his release over two years ago, Petitioner has established a life in California. (Id.)
He maintains a stable residence, has obtained employment authorization and gainful employment,
and is a contributing member of his community. (Id.) Petitioner has consistently complied with
all reporting and supervision requirements imposed by immigration authorities and has attended
every scheduled check-in with U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”). (Id.)
Petitioner also has no criminal history. (Id.)
Nevertheless, at a routine ICE check-in, Petitioner was detained by ICE, without notice,
explanation, or an opportunity to be heard. (Id.) Petitioner’s detention occurred without any
allegation of criminal conduct, violation of release conditions, or individualized finding that
detention was necessary. (Id.) During Petitioner’s detention, he was not afforded a custody
hearing. (Id.)
Petitioner challenged the lawfulness of his civil detention through a petition for writ of
habeas corpus and a motion for TRO. (ECF Nos. 1, 2). On January 2, 2026, the Court granted a
TRO ordering Petitioner’s immediate release from detention.2 (ECF No. 4.) Now the Court
determines whether the relief granted in the TRO should continue as a preliminary injunction.
II. STANDARD OF LAW
For a preliminary injunction, courts consider whether a petitioner has established “[1] that
he is likely to succeed on the merits, [2] that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence
of preliminary relief, [3] that the balance of equities tips in his favor, and [4] that an injunction is
1 The facts are not disputed by the parties. (ECF Nos. 2, 7.)
2 Respondents did not affirm in their response that they have released Petitioner. Thus, the
Court now seeks a notice certifying compliance with the January 2, 2026 TRO.

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in the public interest.” Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008). Petitioner
must “make a showing on all four prongs” of the Winter test. Alliance for the Wild Rockies v.
Cottrell, 632 F.3d 1127, 1135 (9th Cir. 2011).
In evaluating a petitioner’s motion, a district court may weigh petitioner’s showings on
the Winter elements using a sliding-scale approach. Id. A stronger showing on the balance of the
hardships may support issuing a preliminary injunction even where the petitioner shows that there
are “serious questions on the merits . . . so long as the [petitioner] also shows that there is a
likelihood of irreparable injury and that the injunction is in the public interest.” Id. Simply put, a
petitioner must demonstrate, “that [if] serious questions going to the merits were raised [then] the
balance of hardships [must] tip[ ] sharply” in petitioner’s favor to issue the requested preliminary
injunction. Id. at 1134–35.
III. ANALYSIS
This Court has already found that Petitioner established each of the Winter elements
sufficient to warrant relief, as set forth in the TRO, including likely violations of the Immigration
and Nationality Act and the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause. (ECF No. 4.) Because the
standard for issuing a TRO is “substantially identical” to the standard for issuing a preliminary
injunction, Stuhlbarg Int’l Sales Co. v. John D. Brush & Co., 240 F.3d 832, 839 n.7 (9th Cir.
2001), the Court incorporates its reasoning from the TRO and need not duplicate its analysis here.
Respondents now oppose a preliminary injunction, and the Court discusses each of Respondents’
arguments in turn.3
First, Respondents argue that detention is mandatory under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1). (ECF
No. 7 at 2.) However, this Court has already found that statutory provision does not apply to
Petitioner. (ECF No. 4 at 4.) Rather, 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) governs Petitioner’s detention. Thus,
Petitioner is entitled to the process available to him under § 1226(a).
Second, Respondents argue that Petitioner has not been subject to a due process violation
3 In addition to the arguments set forth here, Respondents also argue that violations of the
Administrative Procedure Act are not a basis for the relief requested. (ECF No. 7 at 3–4.)
Because this Court declined to address the issue in its TRO (and did not need to reach the issue to
find relief warranted), the Court likewise declines to address the claim here.

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because detention is authorized by statute and because due process (in the immigration context)
should not be analyzed under a multi-factor balancing test, like the Mathews factors applied by
this Court. (ECF No. 7 at 3.) As an initial matter, this Court did not broadly find detention
unlawful under the INA. Rather, it found that Respondents applied the wrong statutory provision
to Petitioner (one that does not require mandatory detention) as well as a due process violation.
(ECF No. 4.) Moreover, the Ninth Circuit has repeatedly applied the Mathews factors when
assessing immigration due process challenges. See Rodriguez Diaz v. Garland, 53 F.4th 1189,
1206 (9th Cir. 2022); Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976). The Ninth Circuit instructs
that the Mathews factors are flexible and can account for the heightened governmental interest in
the immigration detention context. Id. Therefore, the Court declines to reconsider its due process
analysis set out in the TRO and maintains that Petitioner has shown he is likely to succeed on the
merits of his Fifth Amendment procedural due process claim.
Finally, Respondents note this case may be held in abeyance until the Ninth Circuit rules
on Rodriguez Vasquez v. Bostock, 779 F.Supp.3d 1239 (W.D. Wash. 2025), which may be
dispositive of one of the issues in case. (ECF No. 7 at 5.) The Court declines to hold this case in
abeyance. As this Court has said previously, it will not delay issuing relief on the prospective
chance a pending appeal could change the outcome of one claim.
IV. CONCLUSION
Therefore, to prevent further irreparable harm, the Court issues a preliminary injunction as
set forth below. IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:
1. By January 27, 2026, Respondents must file a notice certifying compliance with this
Court’s Temporary Restraining Order and identifying the date Petitioner was released.
2. Respondents are ENJOINED AND RESTRAINED from imposing additional restrictions
on Petitioner’s terms of release, unless such restrictions are determined to be necessary at
a pre-deprivation/custody hearing.
3. Respondents are ENJOINED and RESTRAINED from re-arresting or re-detaining
Petitioner absent compliance with constitutional protections, including seven-days’ notice
and a pre-deprivation hearing before a neutral fact-finder where: (a) Respondents show

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material changed circumstances demonstrate a significant likelihood of Petitioner’s
removal in the reasonably foreseeable future, or (b) Respondents demonstrate by clear and
convincing evidence that Petitioner poses a danger to the community or a flight risk. At
any such hearing, Petitioner shall be allowed to have counsel present.
4. This matter is referred to the United States Magistrate Judge for further proceedings.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Date: January 26, 2026
___________________________________
TROY L. NUNLEY
CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE