(HC) L.C. v. Wofford et al

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
D.L.C.,
Petitioner,
v.
MINGA WOFFORD, et al.,
Respondents.
No. 1:25-cv-01996-DC-JDP (HC)
ORDER GRANTING TEMPORARY
RESTRAINING ORDER AND
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION
(Doc. Nos. 2, 12)
This matter is before the court on Respondents’ response to the court’s order to show
cause as to why the court should not issue a preliminary injunction on the same terms as the
temporary restraining order issued on January 5, 2026. (Doc. No. 12.) For the reasons explained
below, the court will issue a preliminary injunction on the same terms as the January 5, 2026
temporary restraining order.
A. Factual Background
On May 12, 2022, Petitioner D.L.C., a native and citizen of Peru, entered the United
States without inspection. (Doc. Nos. 1 at ¶ 14; 1-2 at ¶ 2.) Petitioner was apprehended by United
States Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) shortly after entering the country. (Doc. Nos. 1
at ¶ 25; 1-2 at ¶ 2.) Petitioner was initially placed in expedited removal proceedings, but he was
placed in removal proceedings under 8 U.S.C. § 1229a after he expressed a fear of being removed
to Peru due to threats and harassment by his fiancée’s ex-husband. (Doc. Nos. 10 at 1; 10-2 at 2;

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2-2 at 3.) DHS detained Petitioner for approximately one week before releasing him on parole.1
(Doc. Nos. 1 at ¶ 25; 2-6 at 3, 5–6.) Following his release, Petitioner lived in Bakersfield,
California, with his partner and her daughter. (Doc. No. 1 at ¶ 26.) Since his release, Petitioner
has complied with all terms of his Intensive Supervision Appearance Program. (Doc. Nos. 1 at
¶ 27; 1-1 at ¶ 6.) Petitioner has applied for asylum and withholding of removal and intends to
pursue these applications for immigration relief. (Doc. No. 2 at 14.)
On September 12, 2025, Petitioner appeared for a credible fear interview relating to his
asylum claim. (Doc. Nos. 1-2 at ¶ 12; 1-4 at 2.) That same day, he was issued a Notice to Appear
for a removal hearing on December 10, 2025. (Doc. Nos. 1 at ¶ 30; 2-2 at 2.) The Notice to
Appear indicates that removal proceedings would be held “under section 240 of the Immigration
and Nationality Act.” (Doc. No. 2-2 at 2.) Petitioner’s next removal hearing was scheduled for
January 15, 2026. (Doc. Nos. 1 at ¶ 30; 2-3 at 2.)
On September 17, 2025, officers from United States Immigration and Customs
Enforcement (“ICE”) appeared unannounced outside of Petitioner’s home in Bakersfield. (Doc.
Nos. 1 at ¶ 28; 1-2 at ¶ 8.) The ICE officers detained Petitioner and brought him to an ICE office
in Bakersfield. (Id.) He was later transferred to the Mesa Verde Detention Facility, where he
remains detained. (Id.)
B. Procedural Background
On December 23, 2025, Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus. (Doc. No. 1.)
Petitioner raises the following claims against Respondents Minga Wofford, Sergio Albarran,
Todd M. Lyons, Kristi Noem, and Pam Bondi: (1) violation of Petitioner’s due process rights
under the U.S. Constitution relating to his re-detainment without the opportunity to appear before
a neutral adjudicator; and (2) violation of Petitioner’s due process rights under the U.S.
1 As discussed further below, Petitioner submitted two documents from DHS purportedly
authorizing his parole. The first, titled “Notice of Custody Determination” and dated May 12,
2022, states that Petitioner was being released “[p]ursuant to the authority contained in section
236 of the Immigration and Nationality Act and part 238 of title 8, Code of Federal Regulations.”
(Doc. No. 2-6 at 3.) The second, titled “Interim Notice Authorizing Parole” and dated May 13,
2022, states that Petitioner was being released “pursuant to . . . section 212(d)(5)(A) of the
Immigration and Nationality Act.” (Id. at 5.)

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Constitution relating to his continued detainment by ICE. (Id. at 22–24.)
That same day, Petitioner filed a motion for a temporary restraining order requiring that
Respondents immediately release him from detainment, enjoining Respondents from re-arresting
Petitioner unless and until he is afforded a hearing before a neutral adjudicator, and enjoining
Respondents from removing Petitioner to another country. (Doc. No. 2 at 27.)
On January 5, 2026, the court granted Petitioner’s motion for temporary restraining order,
holding that “Petitioner is likely to demonstrate that he has a protected liberty interest in his
continued release following his parole” and ordering Petitioner’s immediate release from
Respondents’ custody on the same conditions he was subject to immediately prior to his detention
on September 17, 2025. (Doc. No. 12 at 7, 11.) The court also ordered that Respondents show
cause “as to why this court should not issue a Preliminary Injunction on the same terms” as the
January 5, 2026 order. (Id. at 12.)
On January 9, 2026, Respondents timely filed their response to the court’s order to show
cause asserting that the temporary restraining order “contains several material errors of law and
fact,” requesting that the preliminary injunction not issue, and requesting that the temporary
restraining order be vacated. (Doc. No. 13 at 2, 4.)
On January 12, 2026, Petitioner timely filed a reply to Respondents’ response requesting
that the court issue a preliminary injunction on the same terms as the temporary restraining order.
(Doc. No. 14.)
LEGAL STANDARD
Injunctive relief is “an extraordinary remedy that may only be awarded upon a clear
showing that the plaintiff is entitled to such relief.” Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555
U.S. 7, 22 (2008) (citation omitted). The standard governing the issuing of a temporary
restraining order is “substantially identical” to the standard for issuing a preliminary injunction.
Stuhlbarg Int’l Sales Co. v. John D. Brush & Co., 240 F.3d 832, 839 n.7 (9th Cir. 2001). To
obtain either form of injunctive relief, the moving party must show: (1) a likelihood of success on
the merits; (2) a likelihood of irreparable harm to the moving party in the absence of preliminary
relief; (3) that the balance of equities tips in favor of the moving party; and (4) that an injunction

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is in the public interest. Winter, 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008). The likelihood of success on the merits is
the most important Winter factor. Disney Enters., Inc. v. VidAngel, Inc., 869 F.3d 848, 856 (9th
Cir. 2017).
A party seeking injunctive relief must make a showing on all four prongs of the Winter
factors to obtain injunctive relief. All. for the Wild Rockies v. Cottrell, 632 F.3d 1127, 1135 (9th
Cir. 2011); see Lopez v. Brewer, 680 F.3d 1068, 1072 (9th Cir. 2012) (“A preliminary injunction
is ‘an extraordinary and drastic remedy, one that should not be granted unless the movant, by a
clear showing, carries the burden of persuasion.’”) (quoting Mazurek v. Armstrong, 520 U.S. 968,
972 (1997)). A district court may consider “the parties’ pleadings, declarations, affidavits, and
exhibits submitted in support of and in opposition to the [motion for injunctive relief].” Cal. Rifle
& Pistol Ass’n, Inc. v. L.A. Cnty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 745 F. Supp. 3d 1037, 1048 (C.D. Cal. 2024);
see also Johnson v. Couturier, 572 F.3d 1067, 1083 (9th Cir. 2009). Any evidentiary issues
“properly go to weight rather than admissibility.” Am. Hotel & Lodging Ass’n v. City of Los
Angeles, 119 F. Supp. 3d 1177, 1185 (C.D. Cal. 2015).
DISCUSSION
In the court’s order granting Petitioner’s motion for a temporary restraining order, the
court found that “Petitioner is likely to demonstrate that he has a protected liberty interest in his
continued release following his parole,” therefore his “immediate release is warranted to return to
the status quo ante and remedy [the] constitutional violation.” (Doc. No. 12 at 7, 10.)
Respondents assert a preliminary injunction should not issue because (1) Petitioner does
not have a liberty interest in his continued release because his parole under 8 U.S.C. §
1182(d)(5)(A) had expired at the time of his re-detainment; and (2) pursuant to Demore v. Kim,
538 U.S. 510 (2003), Petitioner is not entitled to an individualized determination as to flight risk
and dangerousness unless his continued detention becomes indefinite and potentially permanent.2
(Doc. No. 4 at 2–3.) The court will address each argument in turn.
2 Respondents also argue that Petitioner’s motion is not timely (Doc. No. 13 at 2), but that
argument was already considered and rejected by the court in the temporary restraining order.
(See Doc. No. 12 at 3 n.2.)

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A. Expiration of Petitioner’s Parole
Respondents contend that, because Petitioner was initially released on parole pursuant to 8
U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A), and because his parole under that section was time-limited from May
2022 to May 2023 (Doc. No. 2-6 at 4), there is no “implicit promise upon which [Petitioner] may
rely, that [his] liberty will be revoked only if [he] fail[s] to live up to the conditions of release.”
(Doc. No. 13 at 1–2) (quoting Pinchi v. Noem, 792 F. Supp. 3d 1025, 1032 (N.D. Cal. 2025)).
Respondents further contend Petitioner did not have a liberty interest in his continued release
because Petitioner’s parole was not indefinite under § 1182. (Id.) However, neither of
Respondents’ contentions are persuasive or warrant the court reconsidering the analysis set forth
in the temporary restraining order.
First, as addressed in the temporary restraining order, it is unclear whether Petitioner was
released on parole in May 2022 pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5) or 8 U.S.C. § 1226 because
ICE issued separate documents to Petitioner stating that he was being released pursuant to each
statute. (Doc. No. 12 at 5–6.) The first document Respondents issued Petitioner authorizes his
release pursuant to § 1226, under which Petitioner would be statutorily entitled to “an initial bond
hearing before a neutral decisionmaker, the opportunity to be represented by counsel and to
present evidence, the right to appeal, and the right to seek a new hearing when circumstances
materially change” before he could be re-detained. Rodriguez Diaz v. Garland, 53 F.4th 1189,
1202 (9th Cir. 2022). Respondents, however, contend this first document is “erroneous,” while
the second document, which was issued the following day and indicates Petitioner was released
under § 1182(d)(5)(A), provides the correct basis for Petitioner’s release. (Doc. No. 10 at 9.) But
Respondents do not provide any competent evidence to support this assertion. Even if the first
document was issued in error, Respondents do not provide any authority to support the
proposition that the government can unilaterally alter a person’s statutory and constitutional rights
without explanation merely by asserting a determination made years earlier was “erroneous.”
Parole under § 1226 does not have an automatic expiration date, and the document providing
Petitioner’s release under that section does not include any such expiration. (Doc. No. 2-6 at 3.)
Thus, Petitioner has demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits of his claim that he was

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released on parole under § 1226, and that he is both statutorily and constitutionally entitled to a
pre-deprivation bond hearing before his re-detainment.
Second, while Petitioner correctly notes that Petitioner’s parole release under § 1182
expired in May 2023, numerous courts in the Ninth Circuit have found that when a noncitizen is
paroled under that section, his “liberty interest [does] not expire along with his parole.” Omer
G.G. v. Kaiser, No. 1:25-cv-01471-KES-SAB, 2025 WL 3254999, at *5 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 22,
2025); Ramirez Tesara v. Wamsley, 800 F. Supp. 3d 1130, 1136 (W.D. Wash. 2025) (“Once
established, Petitioner’s interest in liberty is a constitutional right which may only be revoked
through methods that comport with due process, such as a hearing in front of a neutral party to
determine whether Petitioner’s re-detainment is warranted. . . . That the express terms of the
[§ 1182] parole notice allowed for discretionary termination or expiration does not somehow
obviate the need for the Government to provide a [sic] individualized bond hearing prior to re-
detaining the parolee.”); Mody v. Warden, No. 25-cv-03400-FMO, 2026 WL 51976, at *6 (C.D.
Cal. Jan. 5, 2026) (issuing temporary restraining order where petitioner had been re-detained
following expiration of his § 1182 parole); Quiroga-Chaparro v. Warden of the Golden State
Annex Detention Fac., No. 25-cv-01731-AC, 2025 WL 3771473, at *4–5 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 31,
2025) (same). Indeed, the applicable regulations state that if a non-citizen is re-detained after
§ 1182 parole expires, they “shall again be released on parole” if their “exclusion, deportation, or
removal order cannot be executed within a reasonable time.” 8 C.F.R. § 212.5(e)(1), (e)(2)(i).
Here, Petitioner is not subject to a removal order. Petitioner was detained before he was
scheduled to appear at his initial removal proceeding. (Doc. No. 2-4.) Petitioner has now been
detained for four months, yet Respondents provide neither an indication that his removal will be
executed within a reasonable time, nor an alternative for how Petitioner may challenge his
continued detention while removal proceedings are pending other than through the pending
habeas petition. The requirement that a noncitizen “shall again be released on parole” is illusory if
the noncitizen is entitled to neither a bond hearing in front of a neutral adjudicator, nor the ability
to pursue habeas relief in court.
Further, while the document authorizing Petitioner’s parole under § 1182 does indicate

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that his parole is valid for only one year, it also states that his parole may be extended at ICE’s
discretion, and that Petitioner was to be “released from service custody pending a final decision in
[his] exclusion/deportation hearing.” (Doc. No. 2-6 at 5–6.) In the four years since his initial
release, Petitioner has established a life in the United States with his fiancée and her daughter, for
whom he is the primary financial provider. (Doc. No. 2-2 at ¶ 6.) He has enrolled in adult school
to study English and has otherwise built strong community ties in Bakersfield, California. (Id. at
7.) Petitioner undoubtedly has a strong liberty interest in his continued freedom.
Moreover, Respondents have given Petitioner every “implicit promise” of his continued
liberty in the three years between the expiration of Petitioner’s § 1182 parole and his re-
detainment. Respondents issued Petitioner an employment authorization document in late 2024,
after the nominal termination of his parole. (Doc. No. 2-2 at ¶ 7.) During the post-expiration
period, Petitioner continued to abide by the terms of his parole, including by appearing for his
credible fear interview a week before his detention. (Doc. No. 2-2 at ¶¶ 4, 12.) Respondents do
not indicate why Petitioner was not detained at that interview, or at any of his other scheduled
ICE check-ins following the expiration of his parole. Thus, Respondents did implicitly promise
Petitioner’s continued release, and Petitioner reasonably relied on that implicit promise in
growing his life in the United States. See Omer, 2025 WL 3254999, at *6 (“Under the
circumstances of this case, where immigration officials provided to petitioner a document stating
that he was released ‘pending a final decision’ in his removal proceedings, petitioner had not even
had his initial hearing in those removal proceedings, and petitioner was granted a five-year work
authorization permit during his year on parole status, petitioner reasonably maintained a liberty
interest in his release pending a final removal decision in his immigration case.”); Rodriguez
Cabrera v. Mattos, No. 25-cv-01551-RFB-EJY, --- F. Supp. 3d ---, 2025 WL 3072687, at *11 (D.
Nev. Nov. 3, 2025) (“Petitioner has a fundamental interest in freedom from physical confinement,
and that liberty interest is particularly strong given his initial release from detention [pursuant to §
1182] in 2022, and the fact that Respondents did not seek his return to custody upon the
expiration of his parole in December 2022, or in the three years since.”)
Accordingly, as the court found in granting Petitioner’s motion for a temporary restraining

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order, whether Petitioner was initially released pursuant to § 1226 or § 1182, Petitioner is likely
to succeed on the merits of his claim that his re-detainment without a bond hearing violated his
constitutional right to due process.
B. Detention Under Demore
Respondents contend the “Due Process Clause does not require individualized
determinations of dangerousness or flight risk to detain a noncitizen as his or her removal
proceedings move forward,” therefore Petitioner is not entitled to a bond hearing. (Doc. No. 13 at
3) (citing Demore, 538 U.S. at 510, 514, 531). But in Demore, the petitioner did not dispute that
he had been convicted of multiple crimes, or that he was subject to “mandatory detention under
§ 1226(c),” which applies to “a limited class of deportable aliens—including those convicted of
an aggravated felony.” (Id. at 513–514, 518.) Thus, the Court concluded the “INS detention of
respondent, a criminal alien who has conceded that he is deportable, for the limited purpose of his
removal proceedings,” was constitutionally permissible. (Id. at 1722.)
Here, unlike in Demore, Petitioner has been neither arrested nor convicted of a crime
(Doc. No. 2-1 at ¶ 7.) Rather, Petitioner is actively pursuing his asylum claim to prevent his
removal and does not concede that he is subject to mandatory detention. (Doc. No. 2-3.) Further,
whereas DHS had not made a determination as to the flight risk or danger to the community of
the petitioner in Demore, here, DHS has already found that Petitioner is neither a flight risk nor a
danger to the community. See 8 C.F.R. § 212.5(b) (stating that immigrants may only be paroled
under § 1182 “provided the aliens present neither a security risk nor a risk of absconding”);
Hernandez v. Sessions, 872 F.3d 976, 982 (9th Cir. 2017) (stating that at an initial bond
determination hearing, noncitizens detained under § 1226(a) bear “the burden to establish to the
satisfaction of the Immigration Judge . . . that he or she does not present a danger to persons or
property, is not a threat to the national security, and does not pose a risk of flight”). Thus,
Respondents’ reliance on Demore is unavailing, and Petitioner is entitled to a bond hearing before
he may be re-detained.
/////
/////

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CONCLUSION
For the reasons explained above, and in the court’s order granting Petitioner’s motion for
a temporary restraining order (Doc. No. 12):
1. The court hereby ISSUES a preliminary injunction on the same terms as the
temporary restraining order (Doc. No. 12); and
2. The court REFERS this matter to the assigned Magistrate Judge for further
proceedings.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: January 20, 2026	___________________________
Dena Coggins
United States District Judge