Jeffrey Kane Reich

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POSTED ON WEBSITE
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
1
UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
FRESNO DIVISION
In re
JEFFREY REICH,
Debtor.
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Case No. 25-10499-B-7
Docket Control No. SR-5
MEMORANDUM RULING ON OBJECTION TO DEBTOR’S CLAIM OF EXEMPTIONS
AND MOTION TO CLAIM EXEMPTIONS BY NON-DEBTOR SPOUSE
—————————————————————————————
Peter B. Bunting, ATTORNEY AT LAW, for Jeffrey Reich, Debtor.
Richard Ryan McMath, MCMATH LAW OFFICE, for Pamela Reich,
Creditor.
—————————————————————————————
RENÉ LASTRETO II, Bankruptcy Judge:
This matter comes before the court on the Objection of
Pamela Reich (“Pamela”), the non-debtor spouse in the above-
styled Chapter 7 case filed by debtor Jeffrey Reich (“Debtor” or
“Jeffrey”), to Debtor’s Claim of Exemptions and Pamela’s Motion
to Claim Exemptions. Doc. #164.
The following facts gleaned from the record are undisputed.
Jeffrey is a Chapter 7 debtor in the main case and the Defendant
in an Adversary Proceeding in which Pamela is the Plaintiff
challenging the dischargeability of certain debts. Pamela is
Jeffrey’s estranged wife with whom Jeffrey is undergoing
extremely protracted divorce proceedings lasting about ten years
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so far. The dissolution proceedings are pending in the Fresno
County Superior Court.
On September 23, 2025, after hearing oral arguments, the
took this matter under submission. Doc. #186. After review of the
arguments, declarations and exhibits, the court is prepared to
rule.
JURISDICTION
This court has jurisdiction of this matter by reference from
the District Court under 28 U.S.C. § 157 (a). 	The District Court
has jurisdiction under 20 U.S.C. § 1334(b). 	This is a matter the
Bankruptcy Court may hear and finally determine. 	28 U.S.C. § 157
(b)(2) (A)[administration of the estate] and (B)[exemptions].
BACKGROUND
1. 	Procedural History.
Jeffrey filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy on February 21, 2025,
and filed his first Schedule C on March 7, 2025. Docs. #1, #17.
On March 14, 2025, Jeffrey filed his First Amended Schedule C.
Doc. #25. On April 7, 2025, Pamela filed her First Objection to
Debtor’s Claim of Exemptions (“the First Objection” DCN SR-1).
Doc. #38. Jeffrey filed a Second Amended Schedule C on May 1,
2025, and the court later overruled the First Objection as moot.
Docs. #55, #59.
Pamela filed her Second Objection to Debtor’s Claim of
Exemptions (“the Second Objection” DCN SR-3) on June 2, 2025.
Doc. #82 et seq. 	On that same day, Pamela filed an Amended
Objection, still under DCN SR-3, to add a request that Jeffrey
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exempt an appropriate amount in Pamela’s IRA account (which
Pamela claims Jeffrey undervalued) and to add an additional
exhibit. Doc. #87.
On June 10, 2025, before the Objection to the Second Amended
Schedule C could be heard, Jeffrey filed a Third Amended Schedule
C. Doc. #91. On July 10, 2025, Pamela duly filed an Objection
(“the Third Objection” DCN SR-4) to that one as well. Doc. #133.
On July 15, 2025, Jeffrey filed his Fourth Amended Schedule
C as well as an Opposition to the Second Objection. Docs. #139-
140. On August 13, 2025, Pamela again objected (“the Fourth
Objection” DCN SR-5). Doc. #164. Notably for purposes of this
matter, the Fourth Objection incorporated by reference all the
arguments made in the Second and Third Objections. Id.
The court overruled the Second and Third Objections as moot
on September 23, 2025. Docs. #188-189. That same day, the court
heard oral arguments on the Fourth Objection and took that matter
under submission. Doc. #186.
The filings in this case are somewhat extensive because
Pamela’s Fourth Objection specifically incorporated by reference
her arguments presented in her Second and Third Objections.
Consequently, in deciding the Fourth Objection, the court must
also consider Pamela’s previous two Objections and also any
counterarguments thereto in Jeffrey’s responses. Thus, the
documents considered in ruling on the Fourth Objection include
the following:
1. 	Pamela’s Second Objection (SR-3) and the attached
supporting documents, which include:
///
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a. 	Pamela’s Declaration (Doc. #84)
b. 	The Declaration of Shane Reich (“Shane”), the son of
Pamela and Jeffrey who represented Pamela in this
matter until his recent disqualification. (Doc. #85).
See also Doc. #175 (Order granting motion to
disqualify Shane).
c. 	The Amended Objection (Doc. #87).
d. 	Shane’s Second Declaration in support of the Amended
Objection (Doc. #88).
e. 	Exhibits consisting of excerpts from Jeffrey’s Second
Amended Schedules dated 5/1/25 (Doc. #89).
2. 	Jeffrey’s Opposition to Pamela’s Second Objection and the
attached supporting documents:
a. 	Jeffrey’s Declaration (Doc. #141).
b. 	A Memorandum of Points and Authorities (Doc. #142).
c. 	Exhibits (Doc. #143) consisting of:
i. 	A status statement filed in the state court
divorce proceedings between Jeffrey and Pamela;
ii. 	An email from Attorney Laura Boyd to Jeffrey’s
counsel Peter Bunting;
iii. 	A copy of the Complaint to Determine
Dischargeability of Debt filed by Pamela against
Jeffrey (Case No. 25-01022 or “the AP,” which is
still ongoing before this court); and
iv. 	A copy of Jeffrey’s Fourth Amended Schedule C
filed July 15, 2025.
3. 	Pamela’s Reply to Jeffrey’s Opposition to the Second
Objection (Doc. #153).
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4. 	Pamela’s Third Objection (Doc. #133 DNC SR-4), which is
accompanied by:
a. 	Pamela’s Second Declaration (Doc. #135).
b. 	Shane’s Second Declaration (Doc. #136).
c. 	Exhibits consisting entirely of Jeffrey’s Third
Amended Schedule C (Doc. #137).
5. 	Pamela’s Fourth Objection (Doc. #164), which incorporates
by reference the Second and Third Objection and which is
accompanied by:
a. 	Shane’s Third Declaration (Doc #166).
b. 	Pamela’s Third Declaration (Doc. #167).
c. 	Exhibits consisting entirely of Jeffrey’s Fourth
Amended Schedule C dated July 15, 2025 (Doc. #168).
2. 	The Relevant Facts.
The basis for the instant Objection and its predecessors
lies in Jeffrey’s Fourth Amended Schedule C, dated July 15, 2025
(hereinafter “the July 15 Schedule C”), in which Jeffrey asserts
to specific exemptions to which Pamela objects:
1. 	The Campagna Property: Jeffrey claims an exemption in real
property at 11520 N. Via Campagna Drive, Fresno, California
(“the Campagna Property”). In the entry, Jeffrey states:
“Separated Spouse claims Debtor has ownership interest in
this property. Debtor at one time paid $2,000 rent and now
provides free housesitting services for Sona Vartanian.”
Jeffrey claims that the value of the portion he owns is
$0.00 and the amount of exemption he claims is $189,050.00.
Jeffrey claims this exemption under C.C.P. § 704.730 and
adds “This exemption is claimed in the event the court
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determines the debtor owns an interest in the property
which serves as his residence.”
2. 	The Toyota: Jeffrey claims an exemption in a 2017 Toyota
Camry (“the Toyota”) and states “Vehicle is owned by ‘JS
Paradise Investments or Sona Vartanian’ but driven by
Debtor.” Jeffrey claims that the value of portion he owns
is $0.00 and the amount of exemption he claims is
$7,500.00. Jeffrey claims this exemption under C.C.P.
§ 704.710 and adds “This exemption is claimed in the event
the court determines the debtor owns an interest in the
vehicle.”
Doc. #139.
Debtor did not list either the Campagna Property or the
Toyota as exempt assets until the filing of Debtor’s Second
Amended Schedule C, dated May 1, 2025, with Debtor claiming
exemptions of $348,000.00 and $7,500.00, respectively. Doc. #55.
In Debtor’s Third Amended Schedule C, dated June 6, 2025, Jeffrey
reduced the exemption for the Campagna Property to $189,050.00,
but the amended schedule was otherwise unchanged. Doc. #91. The
July 15 Schedule C does not make any changes to the entries for
the Campagna Property or the Toyota. Doc. #139.
LEGAL ANALYSIS
1. 	Exemptions.
The court begins with an overview of the relevant law
governing exemptions in bankruptcy.
Congress authorized states to opt out of the federal
bankruptcy exemptions created by Bankruptcy Code
§ 522(d). 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(2). California exercised
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the § 522(b)(2) option to opt out by making the federal
bankruptcy exemptions inapplicable in the state. Cal.
Code Civ. P. § 703.130. Since the federal exemptions
created by § 522(d) do not apply in California, basic
exemption questions in California bankruptcies entail
the application only of California law. When California
opted out of the federal bankruptcy exemptions
prescribed at § 522(d), it simultaneously enacted as
state law a veritable clone of § 522(d) that could, in
lieu of the basic judgment enforcement exemptions, be
utilized in bankruptcy cases. Cal. Code Civ. Pro.
§ 703.140; In re Petruzzelli, 139 B.R. 241, 244 (1992).
In re Tallerico, 532 B.R. 774, 779 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 2015).
In the July 15 Schedule C, Debtor claimed exemptions under
11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(3) and exempted both the Campagna Property and
the Toyota pursuant to California’s state exemptions. Doc. #139.
Specifically, the Campagna Property was exempted under C.C.P.
§ 704.730, and the Toyota was exempted under C.C.P. § 704.010.
Id. In both cases, Debtor stated that the relevant exemption was
claimed “in the event the court determines the debtor owns an
interest” in the Campagna Property and/or the Toyota. Id.
In her Objection(s), Pamela seeks to have Debtor’s claimed
exemptions in the Campagna Property and the Toyota disallowed.
Doc. #164. She also moves that Debtor be compelled to claim
exemptions in certain community property, either through the
court ordering that these exemptions be deemed filed or by the
court ordering Debtor to file amended exemptions claiming them.
Id. Pamela argues that Jeffrey owes her a fiduciary duty pursuant
to Cal. Fam. Code §§ 721(b) and 1100(e) that requires him to
exempt this community property. Id. The assets relevant to
Pamela’s motion are:
///
///
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1. 	The property located at 1731 Robinwood, Clovis, CA (“the
Robinwood Property”). This is the community property home
of Jeffrey and Pamela. Pamela asks that the Robinwood
Property be exempted pursuant to C.C.P. 704.730 in the
amount of $361,110.00.
2. 	A 2010 Mazda driven by Pamela (“the Mazda”) to be exempted
pursuant to C.C.P. § 704.010 in the amount of $7,500.00.
3. 	An exemption of $30,000.00 in Pamela’s IRA.
Id.
The court begins with an examination of whether Jeffrey’s
claimed exemptions in the Campagna Property and the Toyota should
be disallowed, as a finding in favor of Jeffrey on this point may
moot some or all of Pamela’s remaining objections.
2. 	Should Jeffrey’s Exemptions Be Disallowed?
The gravamen of Pamela’s arguments for striking Debtor’s
exemptions in the Campagna Property and the Toyota lie in the
fact that Jeffrey affirmatively claims that he does not own
either asset and holds no ownership interest in them. Therefore,
he cannot claim an exemption in either asset. Docs. #133, #164.
The court agrees with this argument. A debtor may not claim
an § 522 exemption on assets which he does not own and which are
not property of the estate. “[W]hat debtor could exempt property
that he or she does not own or have an interest in?” In re
Guevarra, Nos. 18-25306-B-7, BHS-4, 2021 Bankr. LEXIS 1543, at
*11 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. June 7, 2021), rev’d on other grounds by
Guevarra v. Whatley (In re Guevarra), 638 B.R. 120 (B.A.P. 9th
Cir. 2022); see also See In re Scotti, 456 B.R. 760, 763 (Bankr.
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D.S.C. 2011) ("[I]n order to exempt property, not only must the
property be part of the bankruptcy estate under § 541, the debtor
claiming the exemption must own the property, or have an interest
in the property.")
Jeffrey states unambiguously that he “housesits” the
Campagna Property, which is owned by Sona Vartanian, and that he
drives the Toyota which is owned by “JS Paradise Investments or
Sona Vartanian.” Doc. #139. “[S]omething held in trust by a
debtor for another is neither property of the estate under
section 541(d), nor property of the debtor for purposes of
section 547(b).” In re Guevarra, 638 B.R. at 132 (quoting Mitsui
Mfrs. Bank v. Unicom Comput. Corp. (In re Unicom Comput. Corp.),
13 F.3d 321 (9th Cir. 1994)).
Debtor seems to concede this in the July 15 Schedule C,
stating that the two assets are exempted “in the event the court
determines” that he has an interest in them that could make them
subject to exemptions. Doc. #139. This is entirely speculative
and unnecessary. Debtors in bankruptcy have a general right to
amend their schedules, including their exemptions, at any time
before the case is closed. Fed. R. of Bankr. P. 1009(a). Indeed,
under appropriate circumstances, a debtor can amend his
exemptions after the case has been closed and later reopened.
Goswami v. MTC Distrib. (In re Goswami), 304 B.R. 386, 392-93
(B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2003); see also In re Boyd, 243 B.R. 756, 766
(N.D. Cal. 2000)("For the purposes of filing amendments, there is
no difference between an open case and a reopened case”).
Thus, if either the Campagna Property or the Toyota are
shown in the future to be assets in which Jeffrey has an
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ownership interest, Debtor is free to amend his Schedule C once
again to exempt them. Granted, Pamela herself has argued in other
forums that Jeffrey does hold an interest in both assets, and, in
fact, he purchased them on behalf of Sona Vartanian and concealed
that fact in his bankruptcy filings. Doc. #164. If circumstances
change to give Jeffrey an exemptible interest in the two assets,
he will have the opportunity to further amend his schedules to
claim any applicable exemptions at that time, and Pamela will
have her chance to respond.
The objection will be SUSTAINED to the extent of disallowing
the exemptions claimed by Debtor for the Campagna Property and
the Toyota.
3. 	Should Jeffrey Be Forced to Claim Pamela’s Proposed
Exemptions?
Having determined that Jeffrey cannot claim exemptions in
the Campagna Property or the Toyota, the court moves on to
Pamela’s novel theory regarding Jeffrey’s alleged fiduciary
duties owed to her which compel him to claim those exemptions
against his wishes.
Pamela argues the court should order that “the exemptions
she has requested be deemed filed or, alternatively, that Debtor
be ordered to file amended exemptions” to claim the Robinwood
Property and the Mazda as exempt. Doc. #164. Specifically, Pamela
asks the court to effectively impose the following exemptions
without Jeffrey’s consent: a $361,110.00 exemption in the
Robinwood Property pursuant to CCP 704.730, a $7,500.00 exemption
///
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in the Mazda pursuant to CC 704.010, and an exemption of $30,000
in Pamela’s own IRA. Id.
The court notes that Pamela does not present arguments that
she has the power to file the requested exemptions herself
pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 522(l) and/or Fed. R. Bankr. P. 4003(a),
both of which permit a “dependent” of the debtor to file a list
of property claimed as exempt if the debtor fails to file a
Schedule C. Both § 522(l) and Rule 4003(a) are silent as to the
mechanism by which any such dependent may file such a list, and
Pamela does not address those two provisions.
In any event, while precedent interpreting § 522(l)’s
language regarding the right of a dependent to file a Schedule C
on behalf of a debtor is quite sparse, the court is persuaded
that a dependent can only do so when the debtor has filed no
Schedule C at all rather than simply one with which the dependent
disagrees. See e.g. In re Taylor, No. 15-10689, 2015 Bankr. LEXIS
3562, at *4-5 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. Oct. 20, 2015)(“The court rejects
as contrary to the language of the statute [dependent’s]
unsupported argument that a defective or objectionable list of
exemptions is the same thing as no list at all, as the debtor
always has the ability to amend the list.”)
According to Pamela, Jeffrey is obligated to exempt the
aforementioned community property because of fiduciary duties
placed upon him by the California Family Code (C.F.C.). Id.
Pamela cites numerous C.F.C. provisions to support the existence
of a fiduciary duty owed by Jeffrey to his estranged wife while
their divorce proceedings are ongoing. Id. Strikingly absent from
her filings, however, is citation to any provisions of the
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Bankruptcy Code providing a basis for the court to grant the
relief she seeks, or at least through the medium she has
requested it.
"Actions for breach of fiduciary duty, historically
speaking, are almost uniformly actions in equity --
carrying with them no right to trial by jury." The
characterization of actions for breach of fiduciary
duties as primarily equitable has been upheld in a
number of contexts, including the bankruptcy context.
McGranahan v. Christian (In re Cent. Valley Processing), No. CV F
05-1153 AWI LJO, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 41783, at *9 (E.D. Cal.
June 8, 2006)(citations omitted); see also Dunoco Corp. v. Dunoco
Dev. Corp., 56 B.R. 137, 140 (C.D. Cal. 1985)(bankruptcy
trustee's action for breach of fiduciary duty was equitable in
nature).
McGranahan and Dunoco focused on the question of whether
breach of fiduciary duty represented an equitable claim because
the adversary proceedings in those cases raised questions about
the Seventh Amendment guarantee of a jury trial in the context of
an equitable claim, as implicated by Granfinanciera, S.A. v.
Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33, 109 S. Ct. 2782, 106 L. Ed. 2d 26 (1989).
But the question is relevant here because, if Pamela wants
the court compel Jeffrey to comply with his fiduciary duties to
her, her request necessarily becomes a demand for equitable
relief which cannot be heard through a contested matter.
"Contested matter" in the bankruptcy context is a term
of art. There is a distinction among "contested
matters," "adversary proceedings," and "administrative
matters." See 10 Collier on Bankruptcy ¶ 9014.01 (Alan
N. Resnick & Henry J. Sommer eds., 15th ed. rev. 2007).
Administrative matters are those issues that are not
contested, such as unopposed motions. Id. Adversary
proceedings are a species of contested matters governed
by Part VII of the Bankruptcy Rules. Id. A matter
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qualifies as an "adversary proceeding," as opposed to a
"contested matter," if it is included in the list given
in Bankruptcy Rule 7001. Id.; see Fed. R. Bankr. P.
7001. Otherwise, it is a "contested matter." See Fed.
R. Bankr. P. 9014(a).
Barrientos v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 633 F.3d 1186, 1189-90 (9th
Cir. 2011).
11 U.S.C. 7001(g) lists “a proceeding to obtain an
injunction or other equitable relief—except when the relief is
provided in a Chapter 9, 11, 12, or 13 plan” among the matters
which qualify for an adversary proceeding. Consequently, it was
improper for Pamela to incorporate into this Objection what is
essentially a demand for equitable relief in the form of the
court either directing Jeffrey to amend his exemptions according
to her preferences or to simply deem her preferred exemptions as
having been filed. Accordingly, to the extent that the Objection
seeks such equitable relief, it will be OVERRULED.
CONCLUSION
For the forgoing reasons, the Objection is SUSTAINED IN PART
AND OVERRULED IN PART. The Objection is SUSTAINED to the extent
of striking the Debtor’s claimed exemptions in the Campagna
Property and the Toyota. The Objection is OVERRULED regarding
Pamela’s request that the court direct Debtor to amend his
filings in order to claim an exemption in the Robinwood Property,
the Mazda, and Pamela’s IRA on the grounds that the requested
///
///
///
///
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relief represents equitable relief which must be raised in an
adversary proceeding rather than in a contested matter.
A separate order shall issue.
Dated: 	By the Court
René Lastreto II, Judge
United States Bankruptcy Court
Nov 25, 2025
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Instructions to Clerk of Court
Service List - Not Part of Order/Judgment
The Clerk of Court is instructed to send the Order/Judgment
or other court generated document transmitted herewith to the
parties below. 	The Clerk of Court will send the Order via the
BNC or, if checked 	, via the U.S. mail.
Jeffrey Kane Reich
11520 N. Via Campagna Dr.
Fresno, CA 93730
Irma Edmonds
2501 West Shaw Avenue, Ste. 124
Fresno, CA 93711
Anthony D. Johnston
1600 G Street, Ste. 103
Modesto, CA 95354
Megan Zavieh
12460 Crabapple Road
Ste 202-272
Alpharetta, GA 30004
Peter B. Bunting
2304 W. Shaw Ave. Ste. 103
Fresno, CA 93711
Richard Ryan McMath
2100 Garden Road
Bldg. B, Suite J
Monterey, CA 93940
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