Alameda Investments, LLC

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NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
LOS ANGELES DIVISION
In re: ) Case No. 6:09-bk-10348-PC
)
ALAMEDA INVESTMENTS, LLC, ) Chapter 11
)
) MEMORANDUM DECISION
)
) Date: June 12, 2013
) Time: 9:30 a.m.
) Place: United States Bankruptcy Court
) Courtroom # 1468
Debtor. ) 255 East Temple Street
____________________________________) Los Angeles, CA 90012
Before the court is the Motion by Alameda Liquidating Trust for Order Determining that
Membership Interest in West Lakeside LLC was Uneffected by Plan (“Motion”), together with
the written opposition of Phoenix, LLC (“Phoenix”) and AKT Investments, Inc. (“AKT”).
Having considered the Motion and opposition thereto, the evidentiary record, and arguments of
FILED & ENTERED
JUN 25 2013
CLERK U.S. BANKRUPTCY COURT
Central District of California
BY DEPUTY CLERK	egarcia
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counsel, the court makes the following findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to
F.R.Civ.P. 52(a),1 as incorporated into FRBP 7052 and applied to contested matters by FRBP
9014(c).
I. STATEMENT OF FACTS
On January 9, 2009, Alameda Investments, Inc. (“Alameda”) filed a voluntary petition
under chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code in the above referenced case. Alameda’s case was
jointly administered with the bankruptcy case of Woodside Group, LLC and its affiliated entities
(collectively, “Woodside”). On November 24, 2009, Woodside filed its Second Amended Joint
Plan of Reorganization of Woodside Group, LLC and Affiliated Debtors, as Modified on
November 24, 2009 (the “Plan”). Woodside’s Plan was confirmed by order entered on
November 24, 2009 (the “Confirmation Order”) and became effective at the close of business on
December 31, 2009 (the “Effective Date”).
On the Effective Date, the Alameda Liquidating Trust was “established for the primary
purpose of liquidating and distributing Alameda’s assets” pursuant to the Plan and terms of the
trust;2 and except as specifically set forth in the Plan, all of Alameda’s right, title and interest in
and to Alameda’s assets was “irrevocably transferred, absolutely assigned, conveyed, set over
and delivered to the Alameda Liquidating Trust” for the benefit of the Alameda Trust
Beneficiaries.3
1 Unless otherwise indicated, all “Code,” “chapter” and “section” references are to the
Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1330 after its amendment by the Bankruptcy Abuse
Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, Pub. L. 109-8, 119 Stat. 23 (2005). “Rule”
references are to the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure (“FRBP”), which make applicable
certain Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (“F.R.Civ.P.”). “LBR” references are to the Local
Bankruptcy Rules of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Central District of California
(“LBR”).
2 Request for Judicial Notice in Support of Motion by Alameda Liquidating Trust for
Order Determining that Membership Interest in West Lakeside LLC was Uneffected by Plan
(“Trust RJN”), Ex. A, 77:3-4
3 Id. Ex. A, 79:16-25; Ex. D, 249.
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On or about May 7, 2003, Alameda, Phoenix and AKT executed a document entitled
“Operating Agreement West Lakeside, LLC, a California Limited Liability Company” for the
development of a 133-acre tract of land in Sacramento County, California.4 In 2004, Alameda,
Phoenix and AKT executed an Amended and Restated Operating Agreement West Lakeside,
LLC, a California Limited Liability Company (the “Operating Agreement”).5 Paragraph 16.1 of
the Operating Agreement for West Lakeside, LLC (“West Lakeside”) entitled “Prohibition
Against Transfer” states, in part:
16.1.1. Basic Prohibitions. Alameda has entered into this Agreement because of
the trust and confidence it places in Angelo K. Tsakopoulos, the sole owner of
AKT, and AKT and Phoenix have entered into this Agreement because of the
trust and confidence they place in Alameda and its affiliates (collectively, the
“Alameda Group”). The Alameda Group includes Alameda, Woodside Group,
Inc., a Nevada corporation, Danville Land Investments, LLC, a Nevada limited
liability company, Pleasant Valley Investments, LC, Woodside Homes, and other
related entities. In light of the parties’ reliance on the continuing interests of the
other Members, except as provided in this Section 16.1 and in Article XV, none
of the following sales, transfers, assignments or hypothecations (individually and
jointly, a “Transfer”) shall be permitted without the prior written approval of a
Majority of the Members, and any such attempted Transfer shall be void and
ineffectual: (i) a Transfer, directly or indirectly, for consideration or gratuitously,
by a Member or its successors or assigns, of all or any portion of its Member
Interest or Economic Interest; (ii) a Transfer of any of beneficial interest of a
Member to any other individual or entity other than its constituent owners as of
the date of execution of this Agreement; or (iii) a Transfer which results in a
change in the “Principal Owner” of the Member or Member Group, as
applicable. Each Member shall inform the other as of the execution of the
Agreement of its constituent owners.6
The parties essentially concede that at the time of confirmation of Woodside’s Plan, Alameda
and Phoenix each owned a 50% membership interest in West Lakeside and AKT was the
Managing Member of West Lakeside under the Operating Agreement.7
4 Motion (Scheffy Decl.) Ex. 1, 22.
5 Id. Ex. 2, 80.
6 Id. Ex. 2, 108.
7 Prior to January 8, 2008, Alameda’s interest “was putatively transferred” to Liberty
Holdings Group, LLC, but that purported transfer was reversed pursuant to the confirmed Plan
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After the Effective Date, a dispute arose between Alameda, Phoenix and AKT as to the
nature and extent of the interest in West Lakeside received by the Alameda Liquidating Trust
(the “Trust”) under the Plan. The Trust asserts that because the Operating Agreement is not an
executory contract, the Trust “is entitled to the same membership interest and benefits in West
Lakeside to which Alameda was entitled prior to the filing of the bankruptcy case or the
confirmation of the Plan.”8 AKT and Phoenix disagree, arguing that the Trust received at best
only an “economic interest”9 in West Lakeside on the Effective Date and that the membership
interest in West Lakeside “was never assigned to the Trust[,] nor could it have been without a
majority vote of the non-transferring Members.”10 After a hearing on June 12, 2013, the court
took the matter under submission.
II. DISCUSSION
This court has jurisdiction over these contested matters pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 157(b)
and 1334(b). This matter is a core proceeding under 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(A) and (O). Venue
is appropriate in this court. 28 U.S.C. § 1409(a). “A bankruptcy court retains post-confirmation
jurisdiction to interpret and enforce its own orders, particularly when disputes arise over a
bankruptcy plan of reorganization.” Luan Inv., S.E. v. Franklin 145 Corp. (In re Petrie Retail,
and the Alameda Liquidating Trust was vested with all of Alameda’s right, title and interest in
West Lakeside on the Effective Date. See Id. 15:23 – 16:1.
8 Motion 1:19-22.
9 “Economic Interest,” as used in the Operating Agreement, means “the right to receive
distributions of the Company’s assets and allocations of income, gain, loss, deduction, credit and
similar items from the Company pursuant to this Agreement and the Act, but shall not include
any other rights of a Member, including, without limitation, the right to vote or participate in the
management, or, except as provided in Section 17106 of the Corporations Code, any right to
information concerning the business and affairs of the Company.” Id. (Scheffy Decl.) Ex. 2,
123.
10 AKT Investments, Inc.’s Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Opposition to
Motion by Alameda Liquidating Trust for Order Determining that Membership Interest in West
Lakeside LLC was Uneffected by Plan (“AKT Opposition”) 2:4-5; 6:21-23; Opposition to
Motion by Alameda Liquidating Trust for Order Determining that Membership Interest in West
Lakeside LLC was Uneffected by Plan (“Phoenix Opposition”) 8:16-9:18.
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Inc.), 304 F.3d 223, 230 (2nd Cir. 2002) (citations omitted); see Sea Hawk Seafoods, Inc. v.
State of Alaska (In re Valdez Fisheries Dev. Ass’n, Inc.), 439 F.3d 545, 549 (9th Cir. 2006)
(stating that a court has ancillary jurisdiction “to vindicate its authority and effectuate its
decrees”).
A. The West Lakeside Operating Agreement is Not an Executory Contract
“An executory contract is one ‘on which performance remains due to some extent on both
sides.’” Unsecured Creditors’ Comm. v. Southmark Corp. (In re Robert L. Helms Const. & Dev.
Co., Inc.), 139 F.3d 702, 705 (9th Cir. 1998) (citation omitted); see also Everex Sys., Inc. v.
Cadtrak Corp. (In re CFLC, Inc.), 89 F.3d 673, 677 (9th Cir. 1996) (stating that an executory
contract is “‘a contract . . . on which performance is due to some extent on both sides’ and in
which ‘the obligations of both parties are so far unperformed that the failure of either party to
complete performance would constitute a material breach and thus excuse the performance of the
other.’” (citation omitted)). Whether a contract is executory within the meaning of the
Bankruptcy Code is determined under federal law. Otto Preminger Films, Ltd. v. Qintex Enters.,
Inc. (In re Qintex Enters., Inc.), 950 F.2d 1492, 1495 (9th Cir. 1991).
Alameda asserts that the Operating Agreement is not an executory contract. Phoenix
does not disagree. AKT responds that it “has never been AKT’s position” that the Operating
Agreement is an executory contract11 because “the Trust is not entitled to a Membership Interest
in West Lakeside regardless of whether the Operating Agreement is or isn’t executory.”12
However, AKT then proceeds to make “[a] more than colorable argument” that the Operating
Agreement is, in fact, an executory contract “based on the numerous provisions that require a
vote of the majority of the Members.”13
11 AKT Opposition 9:5.
12 Id. 9:13-13.
13 Id. 9: n.26.
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The issue of whether or not an operating agreement is an executory contract is
determined on a case by case basis. See Meiburger v. Endeka Enters., L.L.C. (In re Tsiaoushis),
383 B.R. 616, 618 (Bankr E.D. Va. 2007) (“Courts considering whether an operating agreement
is an executory contract [must look] . . . at the facts and circumstances of each case to determine
the status of a particular operating agreement.”), aff’d, 2007 WL 2156162 (E.D. Va. July 19,
2007).
Each operating agreement is separately analyzed. The courts . . . examine the
operating agreement to determine whether there are unperformed obligations on
the part of the parties. If not, the operating agreement is not an executory
contract. If there are unperformed obligations of both the debtor and the other
party or parties, the court must determine whether, if not performed, non-
performance would constitute a material breach excusing the other party from
further performance. If so, the operating agreement is an executory contract.
Id. at 620 (citations omitted).
The Operating Agreement is not an executory contract. Alameda had no outstanding
performance due under the Operating Agreement on the date of bankruptcy. Alameda had no
role in the management of West Lakeside, and no obligation to provide any personal expertise or
service to the company. Alameda had made all required capital contributions prior to the petition
date. There is no evidence that Alameda had any continuing fiduciary obligations under the
agreement. AKT argues that an operating agreement can be executory if “material events
requiring the debtor to vote [are] imminent[,] and the debtor [has] an obligation to participate in
good faith,” citing In re Strata Title, LLC, 2013 WL 1773619, *2 (Bankr. D. Ariz. April 25,
2013).14 The court in Strata Title determined that the operating agreement at issue in that case
was an executory contract based on (a) certain “supermajority” voting requirements contained in
the agreement, and (b) the fact that current circumstances, including the marketing of property
held by the LLC and the impeding removal of the manager, would soon require the debtor to
perform such voting duties. Id. But even the court in Strata Title acknowledged that “remote
possibilities of future obligations do not make a contract executory.” Id. citing In re Capital
14 Id.
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Acquisitions & Management Corp., 341 B.R. 632, 636 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2006). See Movitz v.
Fiesta Inv., LLC (In re Ehmann), 319 B.R. 200, 204 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 2005) (holding that an
operating agreement for a limited liability company was not an executory contract despite a
provision granting members “the right to approve by majority vote the sale, exchange or other
disposition of all or substantially all of the company’s assets”).
West Lakeside members have a right to vote under Article 9 of the Operating Agreement.
However, the matters on which members are entitled to vote are specifically limited by § 9.1.2
and the existence of such a limited voting right does not, of and by itself, make the Operating
Agreement executory. There is no evidence of facts demonstrating that an upcoming vote within
the scope of § 9.1.2 of the Operating Agreement is imminent or likely nor that the failure of a
member to vote would constitute a material breach of the Operating Agreement excusing other
parties thereto from performance. Indeed, West Lakeside’s only asset is the 133-acre tract of
land that may be years away from development.15 West Lakeside has no income. It has made no
distributions and is not scheduled to make a distribution in the foreseeable future.16
B. Alameda’s Membership Interest in West Lakeside was Transferred to the Trust
During oral argument, AKT’s counsel stated that the executory contract issue is a “red
herring.” The question of whether or not the Operating Agreement is an executory contract,
according to AKT, is a distinction without a difference.
Section 16.1.1 of the Operating Agreement expressly states that a transfer by a member
of the member’s interest in West Lakeside (Member Interest or Economic Interest) without the
prior written approval of a majority of the members is void.17 Section 17301(a)(1) of the
California Corporations Code also provides that “[e]xcept as provided in the articles of
organization or the operating agreement . . . [a] membership interest or an economic interest is
15 Omnibus Reply by Alameda Liquidating Trust to Oppositions of AKT Investments,
Inc. and Phoenix, LLC to Motion for Order Determining that Membership Interest in West
Lakeside LLC was Unaffected by Plan (“Reply”) (Scheffy Decl.) ¶ 20.
16 Id.
17 See note 6 supra.
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assignable in whole or in part, provided, however, that no membership interest may be assigned
without the consent of a majority in interest of the members not transferring their interests . . . . “
Cal. Corp. Code § 17301(a)(1).
AKT and Phoenix concede that Alameda’s entire interest (membership, economic or
otherwise) in West Lakeside became property of the estate under § 541(a) upon the filing of
Alameda’s bankruptcy petition.18 However, AKT and Phoenix argue that Alameda’s authority to
transfer its entire interest in West Lakeside out of the estate to the Trust under the Plan was
limited by the terms of the Plan and Confirmation Order, the Operating Agreement, and state
law, and that the Trust received no more than an economic interest in West Lakeside on the
Effective Date.
With respect to the Plan, AKT and Phoenix maintain that the following language in
section 8.4 of the Plan discussing the effect of the Confirmation Order expressly limits the
Trust’s interest, if any, in West Lakeside to an economic interest:
8.4 Effect of Confirmation Order. The Confirmation Order shall constitute an
order of the Bankruptcy Court: (i) approving, as of the Effective Date, the
assumption or rejection by the Reorganized Debtors, Liberty or Alameda, as the
case may be, pursuant to Sections 365(a) and 1123(b)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code,
all of executory contracts and unexpired leases identified under this Article 8 of
the Plan; and (ii) that any provisions of a limited liability company agreement or
operating agreement of a limited liability company or similar entity which
purports to restrict the transfer of the economic interest in such entity to one of
its members which is one of the Debtors herein, or its assignee, is invalidated as
an ‘ipso facto” clause under Section 365(e) of the Bankruptcy Code, to the extent
that Section 365 applies. The contracts and leases identified in this Plan will be
assumed or rejected, respectively, only to the extent that such contracts or leases
constitute pre-petition executory contracts or unexpired leases of the Debtors, and
18 Section 541(c)(1)(A) preempts the anti-assignment provisions of the Operating
Agreement and the impact of Cal. Corp. Code § 17301(a)(1). Property of the debtor enters the
estate upon the filing of the petition “notwithstanding any provision in an agreement, transfer
instrument, or applicable nonbankruptcy law…that restricts or conditions transfer of such interest
by debtor.” 11 USC § 541(c)(1)(A). “Section 541(c)(1)(A) overrides both contract and state law
restrictions on the transfers or assignment of Debtors' interest in [property] in order to sweep all
their interests into their estate.” Fursman v. Ulrich (In re First Protection, Inc.), 440 B.R. 821,
830 (9th Cir. BAP 2010).
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the identification of such agreements under this Plan does not constitute an
admission with respect to the characterization of such agreements or the existence
of any unperformed obligations, defaults, or damages thereunder. This Plan does
not affect any executory contracts or unexpired leases that: (a) have been
assumed, rejected or terminated prior to the Confirmation Date, or (b) are the
subject of a pending motion to assume, reject or terminate as of the Confirmation
Date.19
Identical language regarding the effect of the Confirmation Order on the assumption, rejection or
termination of executory contracts and unexpired leases is contained in paragraph (F)(3) of the
Confirmation Order.20
By their respective terms, section 8.4 of the Plan and paragraph (F)(3) of the
Confirmation Order deal specifically and exclusively with executory contracts and unexpired
leases. Having determined that the Operating Agreement is not an executory contract, the court
finds section 8.4 of the Plan and paragraph (F)(3) of the Confirmation Order inapplicable to the
Operating Agreement. Neither provision limited the interest in West Lakeside transferred by
Alameda to the Trust on the Effective Date. Because the Operating Agreement is not an
executory contract, § 365 is inapplicable and the court must analyze under § 541 whether
Alameda’s transfer to the Trust of its entire interest in West Lakeside failed by virtue of § 16.1.1
of the Operating Agreement and applicable state law. See, e.g., Sheehan v. Warner (In re
Warner), 480 B.R. 641, 652 (Bankr. N.D. W.Va. 2012) (“Because § 365 does not apply . . . [t]he
court must now examine what property rights of the Debtor entered his estate under § 541(a),
and whether § 541(c) acts to bring those rights into his bankruptcy estate notwithstanding the
Operating Agreement . . . .”); Ehmann, 319 B.R. at 206 (“Because there are no obligations
imposed on members that bear on the rights the Trustee seeks to assert here, the Trustee’s rights
are not controlled by the law of executory contracts and Bankruptcy Code § 365 . . . [but] are
controlled by the more general provision governing property of the estate, which is Bankruptcy
Code § 541.”).
19 Trust RJN Ex. A, 97:10-25 (emphasis added).
20 Id. Ex. D, 254.
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With respect to § 16.1.1 of the Operating Agreement and Cal. Corp. Code § 17301(a)(1),
AKT argues that “[t]he Trust is operated by an independent trustee, unbeholden to Alameda and
subject only to the oversight of a supervisory board whose members represent the creditors, not
Alameda.”21 According to AKT, “[i]t is beyond peradventure that Alameda and the Trust are
distinctly different and separate entities, and as such the Trust is unquestionably subject to the
prohibition on transfers contained in the Operating Agreement.”22 The court disagrees.
“‘[N]onbankruptcy law defines the nature, scope, and extent of the property rights that
come into the hands of the bankruptcy estate. Gumport v. Sterling Press (In re Transcon Lines),
58 F.3d 1432, 1438 (9th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1146 (1996); see State of Cal. v.
Farmers Markets, Inc. (In re Farmers Markets, Inc.), 792 F.2d 1400, 1402 (9th Cir. 1986)
(holding that § 541(c)(1) did not preclude the enforcement of Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 24049
against a debtor in bankruptcy to prevent a sale of a liquor license to a third party without paying
the relevant tax). “‘[T]he estate succeeds to no more interest than the debtor had, and the estate
takes its interest subject to the conditions under which the debtor held the interest.’” In re South
Side House, LLC, 474 B.R. 391, 402 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2012), citing Kipp v. Depoy (In re
Depoy), 29 B.R. 466, 469 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1983).
Even if the court were to find that either the Operating Agreement or § 17301(a)(1) of the
California Corporations Code restricted the transfer of Alameda’s interest in West Lakeside to a
third party, the Alameda Liquidating Trust is not a third party. See Motor Vehicle Cas. Co. v.
Thorp Insulation Co. (In re Thorpe Insulation Co.), 677 F.3d 869, 890 (9th Cir. 2012) (holding
that the creation of a trust under a confirmed plan for the purpose of resolving certain asbestos-
related claims was not a transfer to a third party in violation of a contractual anti-assignment
clause). As previously stated, the Alameda Liquidating Trust was established for the purpose of
liquidating and distributing Alameda’s assets pursuant to the Plan and terms of the trust. The
Plan states specifically:
21 AKT Opposition 12:8-10.
22 Id. 12:11-14.
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On the Effective Date, the Alameda Liquidating Trustee shall be the
representative of the Alameda Estate within the meaning of Section 1123(b)(3)(B)
of the Bankruptcy Code23 and shall have the rights and powers provided for in the
Bankruptcy Code in addition to any rights and powers granted in the Alameda
Liquidating Trust and herein. The Alameda Liquidating Trustee shall be a party
in interest as to all matters over which the Bankruptcy Court has jurisdiction.
In his or her capacity as the Estate representative of the Alameda Estate, . . . the
Alameda Liquidating Trustee shall be the successor-in-interest to Alameda with
respect to any Claim, right or Cause of Action and Defense that was or could have
been commenced by Alameda prior to the Effective Date, or thereafter arising in
conjunction with any Alameda Trust Assets until the Alameda Liquidating
Trustee disposes of them.24
Thorpe is dispositive. Under the Plan and Confirmation Order, the Alameda Liquidating Trustee
is the estate representative of the Alameda Estate. As such, the Alameda Liquidating Trust holds
Alameda’s entire interest (membership, economic, and otherwise) in West Lakeside under the
Operating Agreement as the estate representative, and that interest was not diluted on the
Effective Date by either the anti-assignment provisions of § 16.1.1 of the Operating Agreement
or § 17301(a)(1) of the California Corporations Code.
CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing, the court concludes that (1) the Operating Agreement is not an
executory contract nor was it rejected as an executory contract under the Plan and Confirmation
Order; (2) the Alameda Liquidating Trust succeeded to Alameda’s entire interest in West
Lakeside under the Operating Agreement as the estate representative under the Plan and
Confirmation Order; and (3) the Alameda Liquidating Trust enjoys the same Alameda
Membership Interest in West Lakeside which Alameda had prior to bankruptcy.
23 Section 1123(b)(3)(B) states: “Subject to subsection (a) of this section, a plan may . . .
provide for . . . the retention and enforcement by the debtor, by the trustee, or by a representative
of the estate appointed for such purpose, of any such claim or interest.” 11 U.S.C. §
1123(b)(3)(B) (emphasis added).
24 Trust RJN Ex. A, 78 (emphasis added).
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The Trust shall lodge a proposed order granting the relief requested in the Motion
consistent with this Memorandum Decision.25
###
25 The Trust seeks an order prohibiting AKT or Phoenix from interfering in the
liquidation of its interest in West Lakeside under the Operating Agreement. Motion 13:14-15.
The requested relief is in the nature of an injunction which the court declines to grant absent an
adversary proceeding. See FRBP 7001(7); LBR 7065-1.
Date: June 25, 2013
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NOTICE OF ENTERED ORDER AND SERVICE LIST
Notice is given by the court that a judgment or order entitled (specify): Memorandum Decision was
entered on the date indicated as Entered on the first page of this judgment or order and will be served in
the manner stated below:
1. SERVED BY THE COURT VIA NOTICE OF ELECTRONIC FILING (NEF) B Pursuant to controlling
General Orders and LBRs, the foregoing document was served on the following persons by the court via
NEF and hyperlink to the judgment or order. As of (date) 06-25-2013 , the following persons are currently
on the Electronic Mail Notice List for this bankruptcy case or adversary proceeding to receive NEF
transmission at the email addresses stated below.
Linda F Cantor lcantor@pszjlaw.com, lcantor@pszjlaw.com
Brian L Davidoff bdavidoff@greenbergglusker.com,
jreinglass@greenbergglusker.com;kwoodson@greenbergglusker.com;calendar@greenberggluske
r.com;sgaeta@greenbergglusker.com
Irving M Gross img@lnbrb.com, angela@lnbrb.com
Matthew B Holbrook mholbrook@sheppardmullin.com, mmanns@sheppardmullin.com
John J Immordino john.immordino@wilsonelser.com, raquel.burgess@wilsonelser.com
Ivan L Kallick ikallick@manatt.com, ihernandez@manatt.com
Jeffrey A Krieger jkrieger@ggfirm.com,
kwoodson@greenbergglusker.com;calendar@greenbergglusker.com;pporooshani@greenbergglus
ker.com
Robert S Marticello Rmarticello@wgllp.com, msciesinski@wgllp.com
C John M Melissinos jmelissinos@greenbergglusker.com,
jreinglass@greenbergglusker.com;kwoodson@greenbergglusker.com;calendar@greenberggluske
r.com;sgaeta@greenbergglusker.com
Mark Minuti mminuti@saul.com
Eric A Nyberg e.nyberg@kornfieldlaw.com
Eric S Pezold epezold@swlaw.com, dwlewis@swlaw.com
Jeremy V Richards jrichards@pszjlaw.com, bdassa@pszjlaw.com;imorris@pszjlaw.com
Chad L Schexnayder cls@jhc-law.com, sh@jhc-law.com
Jason K Schrader jason.K.Schrader@usdoj.gov
Mark A Serlin mserlin@globelaw.com
Kenneth J Shaffer jshaffer@stutman.com
United States Trustee (RS) ustpregion16.rs.ecf@usdoj.gov
Michael A Wallin mwallin@sheppardmullin.com
Michael R Williams mwilliams@fwtrl.com, wmills@fwtrl.com
Service information
continued on attached page
2. SERVED BY THE COURT VIA UNITED STATES MAIL: A copy of this notice and a true copy of this
judgment or order was sent by United States mail, first class, postage prepaid, to the following persons
and/or entities at the addresses indicated below:
Case 6:09-bk-10348-PC Doc 328 Filed 06/25/13 Entered 06/25/13 15:33:57 Desc
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