Cesareo Gutierrez

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UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
LOS ANGELES DIVISION
In re:
CESAREO GUTIERREZ,
Debtor(s).
Case No.: 2:12-bk-49133-NB
CHAPTER 13
TENTATIVE RULING THAT PETITION DATE
IS THE APPROPRIATE DATE TO
DETERMINE IF JUNIOR LIENS ARE
SUBJECT TO MODIFICATION
Continued hearing
Date: February 18, 2014
Time: 2:00 p.m.
Courtroom: 1545
The debtor has filed a motion to avoid two junior liens on property that he claims
as his principal residence (the “Motion”). A hearing was held on July 31, 2013 and
continued several times. Appearances were as noted on the record.
A separate written memorandum (dkt. 34) (the “Valuation Memorandum”)
addresses the value of the subject property as of two alternative dates. As of October
of 2013, the tentative value is $405,000, which apparently is not low enough to avoid
either junior lien. Alternatively, if the governing date is roughly a year ago on November
27, 2012, when the debtor filed his bankruptcy petition (the “Petition Date”), then the
Valuation Memorandum tentatively values the property at $370,000, which apparently is
FILED & ENTERED
NOV 27 2013
CLERK U.S. BANKRUPTCY COURT
Central District of California
BY DEPUTY CLERK	ghaltchi
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low enough to avoid the most junior lien. The appropriate valuation date is a difficult
question, but the Valuation Memorandum presumes that the appropriate date for
valuation is the more current date: October of 2013.
Based on further research and reflection, and subject to briefing as set forth
below and argument at the time and date set forth in the caption, the present tentative
ruling is that the Petition Date is the governing date for purposes of determining whether
the junior liens are entirely underwater and can be treated as unsecured claims. See In
re Zimmer, 313 F.3d 1220 (9th Cir. 2002); In re Lam, 211 B.R. 36 (9th Cir. BAP 1997),
appeal dismissed, 192 F.3d 1309, 1311 (9th Cir. 1999). See generally In re White
Crane Trading Co., 170 B.R. 694, 700-01 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 1994) (at any time - prior to
appeal - bankruptcy court could change its mind based on new information or argument
or “just fresh thoughts”).
I. DISCUSSION
Bankruptcy generally modifies the rights that creditors would have under
nonbankruptcy law. Claims secured by a lien on property of the bankruptcy estate
ordinarily can be bifurcated into a secured claim up to the value of that lien and an
unsecured claim for the deficiency. 11 U.S.C. 506(a)&(d). See also Dewsnup v. Tim,
502 U.S. 410 (1992); Nobleman v. Am. Sav. Bank, 508 U.S. 324 (1993).
An exception, however, applies to certain liens. A chapter 13 plan can “modify
the rights of holders of secured claims, other than a claim secured only by a security
interest in real property that is the debtor’s principal residence.” 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(2)
(emphasis added).
There is an exception to the exception. A claim is not a “secured claim,” for
bankruptcy purposes, if the subject lien is entirely underwater:
An allowed claim of a creditor secured by a lien on property in
which the [bankruptcy] estate has an interest … is a secured claim
to the extent of the value [to which the lien attaches] and is an
unsecured claim [as to the remainder]. [11 U.S.C. § 506(a)(1),
emphasis added]
Therefore a chapter 13 plan can “modify” the rights of a junior lienholder on a
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principal residence if the lien is entirely underwater. Zimmer, 313 F.3d 1220 (construing
Nobleman, 508 U.S. 324); Lam, 211 B.R. 36 (same).
Typically a debtor seeks to “modify” the lienholder’s rights in two ways. First, the
debtor’s plan proposes to treat the claim as unsecured for purposes of distributions
during the plan’s term. Second, the plan contemplates that several years later, upon
completion of payments under the plan or receipt of a chapter 13 discharge, the lien will
be avoided.
This begs the question, as of what date should the bankruptcy court determine if
the junior lien is entirely underwater? The Bankruptcy Code does not provide an explicit
answer.
(A) Statutory analysis
Two sections of the Bankruptcy Code are most relevant. In favor of using the
petition date, section 502(b) provides,
the court, after notice and a hearing, shall determine the amount of
[claims to which an objection is made] in lawful currency of the
United States as of the date of the filing of the [bankruptcy] petition
… [11 U.S.C. § 502(b), emphasis added, inapplicable exceptions
omitted]
On the other hand, a good argument can be made that the dollar amount of a
claim is a different issue from whether a claim is treated as a secured claim or an
unsecured claim. The same date may or may not apply to both determinations.
Section 506, quoted in part above, is entitled “[d]etermination of secured status.”
It states that value:
shall be determined in light of the purpose of the valuation and of
the proposed disposition or use of such property, and in conjunction
with any hearing on such disposition or use or on a plan affecting
such creditor’s interest. [11 U.S.C. § 506(a)(1)]
It is important not to read too much into the emphasized language. It does not
state that valuation must be as of the hearing date (or any other specific date), only that
it must be determined “in conjunction with” the confirmation hearing. Nevertheless, it is
true that the statute could be read to imply that valuation as of the hearing date is
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favored if no other considerations apply. In this case, as discussed below, other
considerations do apply.
It is also true that Congress specified the petition date as the valuation date in
the next paragraph of the statute, which was added in 2005. See 11 U.S.C. § 506(a)(2)
(value of certain types of personal property collateral is determined “as of the date of
filing of the petition”). As other courts have pointed out, however, the specific reference
to the petition date in paragraph (2) of the statute does not mean that the petition date is
prohibited under paragraph (1) – it simply leaves the appropriate date of valuation under
paragraph (1) to the discretion of the bankruptcy courts. In re Marsh, 929 F.Supp.2d
852, 855-56 (N.D. Ill. 2013). See generally In re Johnson, 165 B.R. 524, 528 (Bankr.
S.D. Ga. 1994) (“The legislative history of § 506 unequivocally indicates that [§ 506(a)]
is intended to accommodate a flexible approach to valuations rather than a single, fixed
method.”) (citing H.R.Rep. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977) pp. 356–57, U.S.Code
Cong. & Admin.News 1978, pp. 5787, 6312).
Based on the foregoing analysis, section 506(a) provides no clear answer as to
the date of valuation. Another section of the Bankruptcy Code is similar, in that it may
appear at first glance to suggest a valuation date but in fact is ambiguous.
For purposes of confirming a chapter 13 plan, the “value, as of the effective date
of the plan, of property to be distributed under the plan” must be not less than the
allowed amount of the secured claim.” 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(B)(ii) (emphasis added).
It has been argued that the statute’s reference to “the effective date of the plan” requires
a valuation date around the same time.
The reference to the effective date, however, modifies “property to be distributed
under the plan,” not “the allowed amount of the secured claim.” See In re King, 2003
WL 22110779, at *2 n. 11 (Bankr. E.D. Pa.) (citing In re Beard, 108 B.R. 322, 324
(Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1989)). “In other words, § 1325(a)(5)(B)(ii) merely provides that the
size of a secured claim should be adjusted by a discount factor, but the section
presupposes that the value of the claim has already been fixed.” TD Bank, N.A. v.
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Landry, 479 B.R. 1, 5 (D. Mass. 2012) (citations omitted). Again, the statute does not
specify the date of valuation.
Turning to the case law, there is also no clear answer. The Supreme Court has
interpreted section 506 to provide the benefits of appreciation to secured creditors in a
chapter 7 case after a judicial valuation in one of the debtor’s prior unsuccessful chapter
11 cases, but this is a chapter 13 case and there was no prior judicial valuation. See
Dewsnup, 502 U.S. 410, 417.
Valuation dates in general have been the subject of much disagreement. See
generally In re Wood, 190 B.R. 788, 790-91 & nn. 1-7 (Bankr. M.D. Pa. 1996) (citing
numerous cases applying divergent approaches to proper valuation date). Some of the
case law predates the 2005 amendments adding § 506(a)(2), but they were interpreting
the language that is now in § 506(a)(1) so those cases continue to be relevant regarding
the proper date for valuation.
It is true that majorities appear to have emerged in the case law in favor of
certain dates for sections of the Bankruptcy Code other than section 1322(b)(2), but
those decisions have not converged on any generally applicable rule that would help in
applying section 1322(b)(2) itself. See In re Alpine Group, Inc., 151 B.R. 931, 933-36
(9th Cir. BAP 1993) (reversible error for bankruptcy court to value collateral as of
petition date, rather than as of sale date, for purposes of determining whether creditor
was oversecured under section 506(b)); In re Boyd, 2009 WL 2823660, at *3 n. 3
(Bankr. N.D. Cal.) (in applying “best interest” test, “the bulk of the reported cases that
the Court could find concluded that either the hearing date or a later date, such as the
date the plan was confirmed or the date the confirmation became final, [is] the
appropriate date for valuation”); King, 2003 WL 22110779, at *2-3 (agreeing with “the
majority of cases addressing valuation of collateral in the cram down context” of
§ 1325(a)(5)(B), which “adopt the [ ] position...that collateral should be valued as of or
near the confirmation date,” because among other things if secured claims were fixed at
the petition date then “secured creditors would be receiving adequate protection
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automatically when the Code does not contemplate this right”); cf. In re Farmer, 257
B.R. 556, 563 (Bankr. D. Mont. 2000) (applying “dual valuation method” under which
“the petition date shall be used as the date to establish a value for motions … for relief
from the automatic stay, and the confirmation date shall be used as the date to establish
the value for satisfying the confirmation requirements of 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(B)”);
and compare Johnson, 165 B.R. 524, 527-29 (valuation for purposes of chapter 13
confirmation should be as of petition date). See also Wood, 190 B.R. 788, 794-95 (in
chapter 11 case prior to enactment of § 1123(b)(5), applying a totality of the
circumstances test in determining the appropriate valuation date, and choosing petition
date when property had appreciated “solely” due to debtor’s successful postpetition
rezoning efforts); In re Aubain, 296 B.R. 624 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2003) (applying the Wood
factors); In re Dheming, 2013 WL 1195652, at *3 (Bankr. N.D. Cal.) (“The Court
concludes that the equitable approach set forth in Aubain and Wood may be appropriate
where there are unusual circumstances.”).
The relatively few cases to address the appropriate valuation date under section
1322(b)(2) reach inconsistent conclusions. Compare, e.g., In re Crain, 243 B.R. 75, 82-
83 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1999) (“valuation should occur on or near the time of the chapter
13 confirmation hearing …” based on § 506(a)), with Aubain, 296 B.R. 624, 634-39
(disagreeing with Crain, applying totality of circumstances approach, and using
valuation as of petition date when lender did not participate in case until shortly before
completion of plan); In re Dean, 319 B.R. 474, 477-78 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2004)
(disagreeing with both Crain and Aubain and concluding that “the petition date is the
appropriate date to value debtors' principal residence because debtors have used the
property as their principal residence throughout the bankruptcy case from the date of
their petition to the present”); In re Landry, 462 B.R. 317, 320-23 (Bankr. D. Mass.
2011) (applying confirmation date) (“Landry I”), reversed, 479 B.R. 1 (“Landry II”)
(applying petition date).
To add to the confusion, “value is only one side of the § 1322(b)(2) coin” and to
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determine “whether a mortgage claim is out of the money it is necessary to know the
amount of the senior debt on the collateral,” which may vary over time. In re Sarno, 463
B.R. 163, 165 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2011) (citation omitted). In Sarno the senior debt was
almost unchanged from the petition date, but the decision holds that because an
integral part of determining the treatment of junior liens under a plan is to determine the
dollar amount of senior liens, and because that dollar amount is determined as of the
petition date, therefore the proper date for valuing the home is the petition date.
Parties in this district often assume that two decisions of the Bankruptcy
Appellate Panel for the Ninth Circuit (the “BAP”) apply the petition date for purposes of
valuation under § 1322(b)(2) and the parallel provisions of chapter 11. See In re
Abdelgadir, 455 B.R. 896, 901 (9th Cir. BAP 2011) (interpreting 11 U.S.C. § 1123(b)(5));
In re Benafel, 461 B.R. 581 (9th Cir. BAP 2011) (applying Abdelgadir approach to
§ 1322(b)(2)). Although the tentative ruling reached below is to agree that the petition
date is the appropriate date, Abdelgadir and Benafel did not actually determine what
date should be used for valuation under section 1322(b)(2).
Those cases address the different issue of what date applies in determining
whether a residence is a debtor’s “principal residence,” and they specifically distinguish
valuation issues. “The value of [the collateral securing a creditor’s] claim, whether [the
claim] is secured or unsecured, is a distinct issue from whether [its] claim is secured by
the Debtors’ principal residence,” and the value of the collateral and the consequent
“status” of a claim as secured or unsecured may change “[t]hroughout a bankruptcy
proceeding.” Abdelgadir, 455 B.R. at 901-02. See also In re Schayes, 483 B.R. 209,
215 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 2012) (“The value of an unsecured creditor’s claim…is distinct from
whether that creditor has a claim that is secured by the debtor’s principal residence.”).
See also In re Zieder, 263 B.R. 114, 119 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 2011) (Section 506(a)
“expressly addresses the possibility of multiple determinations [of value] at different
times.”).
Nevertheless, although Abdelgadir and Benafel do not explicitly hold that the
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petition date should be used for valuation, that conclusion appears to flow logically from
their reasoning, as held by a District Court in another jurisdiction. Landry II, 479 B.R. 1,
7-8 (citing Abdelgadir and Benafel). As a preliminary matter Landry II rejects the
argument that, because the “purpose of the valuation was to determine how to distribute
the property under the plan,” therefore the confirmation date should be used:
[That argument] conflates the analysis of whether a creditor holds a
particular type of claim (a claim secured by the debtor's principal
residence) with a determination of how the value of the property is
to be distributed after the nature of the claim has been established.
[Landry II, 479 B.R. at 6, emphasis in original]
In other words, according to Landry II, although the distributions on account of a
claim are determined in connection with confirmation of a plan, the petition date is used
to determine not only the dollar amount of that claim (§ 502) but also the “type” of the
claim, meaning whether it is a type of claim that can be modified under section
1322(b)(2). Part of that analysis is whether the property is in fact the “principal
residence,” and another part of that analysis is whether the junior lien is entirely
underwater, and it is consistent for both parts of the analysis to be done as of the same
date – the petition date. That is not the only possible reading of the statute, but it
appears to be most in keeping with section 502 and the flexibility of section 506.
Moreover, it would be illogical to determine whether the property is
the debtor's principal residence for purposes of § 1322(b)(2) on the
petition date, but to determine the value of the property (which may
often be related to the use of the property) at a different date. For
example, suppose a debtor used the property as his principal
residence on the petition filing date; then, prior to the effective date
of the plan, stopped living there (perhaps due to financial hardship),
as a result of which the property began to deteriorate and declined
in value. Or suppose the debtor moved out and rented the property
to tenants who improved the property and increased its value. It
would be incongruous to conclude that the operative date for
determining each prong of the § 1322(b)(2) analysis would be
different, especially in light of the relationship between those two
prongs. Such an approach would not only be illogical, but it would
allow for the possibility of gamesmanship. [Landry II, 479 B.R. at 8
n. 7, citation omitted.]
For all of these reasons, although there is no plain meaning to the relevant
statutory provisions and there is no clear answer in the case law, the tentative ruling is
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that the petition date rather than the date of the confirmation hearing is the most
appropriate date to use for determining whether a junior lien is subject to the
antimodification provisions of section 1322(b)(2). In other words, both property
valuation and the determination of the senior lien amount apparently should be
determined as of the petition date.1
B. Policy Considerations
Whatever date is used for valuation, an argument can be made that either the
debtor or the junior lienholder will receive a “windfall” depending on whether the
property appreciates or depreciates after that date. For the following reasons, however,
using the petition date appears to be better from a policy perspective.
Various scenarios are possible: as of the petition date, the junior lien could be
partially secured or fully underwater, and thereafter the property could depreciate or
appreciate. Each scenario is examined below.
Suppose that on the petition date the junior lienholder has a secured claim, of
any dollar amount. In that event the junior lienholder is entitled to demand “adequate
protection,” failing which the bankruptcy court “shall” grant relief from the automatic stay
(11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(1)), so the junior lienholder has legal protections against any “down
1 It is true that there are statements in both Abdelgadir and Benafel approving of
the bankruptcy courts’ use of the confirmation hearing date in those cases. But the BAP
was addressing senior liens (the debtors in those cases argued that the liens were not
secured by a “principal residence” at all, so they could be modified – bifurcated – even
though they were senior liens). Even with bifurcation, however, a senior lien is a
secured claim to at least some extent, so it is entitled to the benefits of section 506(b)
and 1325(a)(5)(B)(ii) and as noted above the cases generally hold that for those
purposes valuation should be as of the date of the confirmation hearing. See, e.g.,
Alpine Group, Inc., 151 B.R. 931. The treatment of senior secured claims has no
bearing on the different question of what date should be used for the analysis under a
separate statutory provision (section 1322(b)(2)) with respect to a different type of claim:
a wholly unsecured junior lien. Therefore the statements in Abdelgadir and Benafel
should not be interpreted as applying a flat rule that the confirmation hearing date
always governs. See Adbelgadir, 455 B.R. 896, 902 (noting that the bankruptcy court
used the confirmation hearing date for valuation, initially describing that court’s reliance
on section 506(a) as “compelling” because the purpose of valuation was for
confirmation, but later noting that there is a conflict in the cases as to the proper date of
valuation and stating that the bankruptcy court’s use of the confirmation hearing date
“may” be appropriate, citing Crain, 243 B.R. 75, and Dean, 319 B.R. 474). See also
Benafel, 461 B.R. 581, 587 (same).
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side” after the petition date. Conversely, if the collateral appreciates then the partially
secured junior lienholder will gain the benefits of increased collateral value, such as the
right in the event of a sale of the property to collect up to the full dollar amount of its
debt including attorney fees and other charges. See Alpine Group, Inc., 151 B.R. 931,
933-36.
On the other hand, if the junior lien is entirely underwater as of the petition date
then by definition the junior lienholder would receive no present economic value if it
were free to exercise its nonbankruptcy rights and foreclose. This also means that the
debtor, who is paying senior liens in order to retain the property, is investing substantial
funds in property that is fully encumbered, which is a risky investment from a purely
economic perspective. If the junior lienholder thereafter could use an increased value to
prevent the debtor from modifying its debt, then the financial restructuring would
essentially allocate all of the risk to the debtor and all of the benefits to the junior
lieholder. “Heads I win, tails you lose.”
It makes sense to interpret ambiguous provisions of the Bankruptcy Code
equitably and consistent with reorganization and fresh start policies of the Code. As
one court put it, the question is whether “the junior lienor should enjoy the benefit …
when it no longer bears the risk,” to which “the answer must be ‘no.’” Marsh, 929
F.Supp.2d 852, 858.
In addition, it is not just the debtor’s interests that are at stake. If the debtor is
forced to pay more to the junior lienholder, that will have to come out of disposable
income, which generally means at the expense of unsecured claims. If the debtor lacks
any disposable income then the debtor likely will have to surrender the property. That
affects not only the debtor but also the senior lienholder who no longer will receive
monthly payments, and instead will have the costs associated with a nonperforming
loan and foreclosure. The only marginal benefit may be to the junior lienholder: it might
prefer to take its chances with foreclosure, but that is a small benefit in exchange for the
likely costs to all other parties in interest.
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Another policy concern comes from the fact that, as noted above, “value is only
one side of the § 1322(b)(2) coin” and the dollar amount of the senior debt is important
to determine whether the junior lien is entirely underwater. Sarno, 463 B.R. 163, 165.
Any negotiated reduction of the senior debt might transform a junior lien that is entirely
underwater on the petition date into a lien that is at least partially secured as of the
confirmation hearing, which is a disincentive to enter into any loan modification that
would reduce the debt. It seems contrary to the purposes of the Bankruptcy Code to
interpret it in a way that discourages consensual loan reduction.
There are some countervailing policy considerations. The foregoing discussion
contemplates valuation as of the petition date for some purposes but as of the
confirmation hearing date for other purposes, which potentially could lead to duplicative
litigation and perhaps inconsistent results. As noted above, however, valuation already
can occur as of multiple dates for different purposes, and it is not necessarily
inconsistent to reach different results under different sections of the Bankruptcy Code.
Another potential problem is that valuation as of the petition date will be
retroactive, which is more challenging than a present valuation. Appraisers may be
reluctant to opine as to historical value, and it is difficult for appraisers and the court not
to look back with “20/20 hindsight” that distorts what the court would have found if the
issue had been presented at the historical time – e.g., if the real estate market has
subsequently rebounded from low values as of the petition date, then a low valuation
may seem unduly pessimistic in hindsight, even if it would have been accurate at the
time. These are real concerns, but they are not insurmountable and bankruptcy courts
deal with similar issues all the time.
Nor is it an insurmountable problem that a debtor at least theoretically could file a
bankruptcy petition when the property has reached its lowest value, so as to retain all
the anticipated appreciation. First, other considerations such as job loss, major illness,
or divorce generally play a much larger role in whether and when to file a bankruptcy
petition. Second, anticipated trends in real estate values are uncertain. Third, any fixed
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valuation date theoretically can be manipulated – if the date of the confirmation hearing
controls then debtors or junior lienholders may attempt to delay that hearing when that
would suit their needs – so this concern does not necessarily have much bearing on
whether the court should use the petition date or the date of the confirmation hearing.
Fourth, any manipulation can be addressed using some of the many other tools
available to the bankruptcy court, including good faith requirements. See Abdelgadir,
455 B.R. 896, 900 (quoting bankruptcy court’s comments that “[g]ood faith is always an
issue,” in addressing the possibility that a debtor’s purported change in principal
residence is a sham to be able to modify liens against the property).
On balance, policy considerations appear to point in the same direction as the
statutory analysis. The petition date appears to be the most appropriate date to
determine whether the junior lienholder’s claim is or is not subject to modification under
section 1322(b)(2).
III. CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the tentative ruling is to use the Petition Date as the date
for valuation and determining the dollar amount of senior liens under Zimmer and Lam.
As noted above, however, the parties have not briefed the foregoing issues and this is
not a final ruling. Based on the complexity of the issues and the upcoming holidays, the
following briefing schedule will apply: January 7, 2014 for briefs by the junior
lienholder(s); January 28, 2014 for opposition brief(s) by the debtor; and February 4,
2014 for any reply by the junior lienholder(s).
###
Date: November 27, 2013
Case 2:12-bk-49133-NB Doc 37 Filed 11/27/13 Entered 11/27/13 15:23:37 Desc
Main Document Page 12 of 13

This form is mandatory. It has been approved for use by the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Central District of California.
August 2010 F 9021-1.1.NOTICE.ENTERED.ORDER
NOTICE OF ENTERED ORDER AND SERVICE LIST
Notice is given by the court that a judgment or order entitled (specify) TENTATIVE RULING THAT
PETITION DATE IS THE APPROPRIATE DATE TO DETERMINE IF JUNIOR LIENS ARE SUBJECT
TO MODIFICATION was entered on the date indicated as AEntered@ on the first page of this judgment or
order and will be served in the manner indicated below:
I. SERVED BY THE COURT VIA NOTICE OF ELECTRONIC FILING (ANEF@) B Pursuant to controlling
General Order(s) and Local Bankruptcy Rule(s), the foregoing document was served on the following
person(s) by the court via NEF and hyperlink to the judgment or order. As of 11/27/13, the following
person(s) are currently on the Electronic Mail Notice List for this bankruptcy case or adversary proceeding
to receive NEF transmission at the email address(es) indicated below.
Caroline Djang cdjang@rutan.com
Kathy A Dockery (TR) efiling@CH13LA.com
Gerald S Kim cdcaecf@bdfgroup.com
Peter L Lago pllago@msn.com
United States Trustee (LA) ustpregion16.la.ecf@usdoj.gov
Darlene C Vigil cdcaecf@bdfgroup.com
Service information continued on attached
page
II. SERVED BY THE COURT VIA U.S. MAIL: A copy of this notice and a true copy of this judgment or
order was sent by United States Mail, first class, postage prepaid, to the following person(s) and/or
entity(ies) at the address(es) indicated below:
Debtor:
Cesario Gutierrez
11849 Horton Ave.
Downey, CA 90241
Service information continued on attached
page
III. TO BE SERVED BY THE LODGING PARTY: Within 72 hours after receipt of a copy of this judgment
or order which bears an AEntered@ stamp, the party lodging the judgment or order will serve a complete
copy bearing an AEntered@ stamp by U.S. Mail, overnight mail, facsimile transmission or email and file a
proof of service of the entered order on the following person(s) and/or entity(ies) at the address(es),
facsimile transmission number(s), and/or email address(es) indicated below:
Service information continued on attached
page
Case 2:12-bk-49133-NB Doc 37 Filed 11/27/13 Entered 11/27/13 15:23:37 Desc
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