Henry v. Arizona Board of Regents

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WO
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA
Katrin Nicole Henry,
Plaintiff,
v.
Arizona Board of Regents,
Defendant.
No. CV-26-00050-TUC-RM
ORDER
Plaintiff Katrin Nicole Henry initiated this action on January 27, 2026, by filing a
pro se Complaint (Doc. 1), and an Application for Leave to Proceed in Forma Pauperis
(Doc. 2). Plaintiff later filed an Amended Application for Leave to Proceed in Forma
Pauperis. (Doc. 7.) Due to numerous discrepancies between the financial disclosures in
the original Application and the Amended Application, the Court denied the Amended
Application with leave for Plaintiff to refile an application that explained the discrepancies.
(Doc. 8.) Plaintiff then filed a Second Amended Application for Leave to Proceed in Forma
Pauperis (Doc. 9), along with a Declaration (Doc. 9-1), and a copy of her 2025 income tax
return (Doc. 10). Plaintiff has also filed a Motion for Extension of Time to Complete
Service of Process (Doc. 12) and a Motion to Stay (Doc. 14).
For the following reasons, the Court will grant Plaintiff’s Second Amended
Application for Leave to Proceed in Forma Pauperis, deny as moot her Motion for
Extension of Time to Complete Service of Process and Motion to Stay, and dismiss her
Complaint with leave to amend.
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I. Application for Leave to Proceed in Forma Pauperis
The Court may authorize the commencement and prosecution of any action without
prepayment of fees if a litigant submits an affidavit showing that she is unable to pay the
fees. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1). The Court finds that Plaintiff has adequately explained the
discrepancies between her Applications for Leave to Proceed in Forma Pauperis, and that
she has adequately demonstrated that she is unable to pay the filing fees for this action.
Accordingly, the Court will grant Plaintiff’s Second Amended Application for Leave to
Proceed in Forma Pauperis.
II. Motion for Extension of Time to Complete Service of Process and
Motion to Stay
Plaintiff asks the Court to extend her deadline for completing service of process
(Doc. 12) and to stay any dismissal deadlines (Doc. 14).
When a plaintiff is authorized to proceed in forma pauperis, the Court will order the
United States Marshals Service (“USMS”) to complete service of process on the plaintiff’s
behalf. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d); Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(c)(3). However, as discussed below,
Plaintiff’s Complaint is being dismissed on screening under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2).
Accordingly, the Court will not direct USMS to complete service of process at this time.
If Plaintiff files an amended complaint and the Court determines that the amended
complaint states a claim on which relief may be granted, the Court will at that time issue a
service order setting a deadline to effect service.
Because the Court will order USMS to complete service of process if and when
Plaintiff files a complaint that survives screening under § 1915(e)(2), the Court will deny
as moot Plaintiff’s Motion for Extension of Time to Complete Service of Process and
Motion to Stay.
III. Statutory Screening of Complaints
The Prison Litigation Reform Act states that a district court “shall dismiss” an in
forma pauperis complaint if, at any time, the court determines that the action “is frivolous
or malicious” or that it “fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. §
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1915(e)(2). Section 1915(e) “applies to all in forma pauperis complaints, not just those
filed by prisoners.” Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1129 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc); see also
Calhoun v. Stahl, 254 F.3d 845 (9th Cir. 2001) (per curiam).
A pleading must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the
pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are not
required, but Rule 8 “demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully harmed-
me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). “Threadbare recitals of the
elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.”
Id.
“[A] complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a
claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Bell
Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim is plausible “when the
plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that
the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. “Determining whether a complaint
states a plausible claim for relief [is] . . . a context-specific task that requires the reviewing
court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Id. at 679. Thus, although a
plaintiff’s specific factual allegations may be consistent with a constitutional claim, a court
must assess whether there are other “more likely explanations” for a defendant’s conduct.
Id. at 681.
The Court must “construe pro se filings liberally.” Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338,
342 (9th Cir. 2010). A complaint filed by a pro se litigant “must be held to less stringent
standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Id. (internal quotation omitted).
Nevertheless, “a liberal interpretation of a civil rights complaint may not supply essential
elements of the claim that were not initially pled.” Ivey v. Bd. of Regents, 673 F.2d 266,
268 (9th Cir. 1982).
If the Court determines that a complaint could be cured by the allegation of other
facts, a pro se litigant is entitled to an opportunity to amend the complaint before dismissal
of the action. See Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1127-29.
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IV. Plaintiff’s Complaint
Plaintiff, a former student at the University of Arizona College of Pharmacy, alleges
in her Complaint that faculty and staff at the College of Pharmacy discriminated against
her because she refused the COVID-19 vaccine for religious reasons; that an instructor
made unwanted sexual advances toward and retaliated against her; that another instructor
misinterpreted a get-well bouquet as inappropriate, then retaliated against and stalked
Plaintiff; that University employees failed to accommodate Plaintiff after she injured
herself in a fall on a staircase; and that the College of Pharmacy expelled Plaintiff based
on failing grades without timely posting grades or offering an adequate grade appeal
process. (Doc. 1.) Plaintiff seeks monetary damages, forgiveness of her student loans, and
removal of complaints, concerns, and non-passing grades from her school records. (Id. at
27-28.)1
Plaintiff lists only the Arizona Board of Regents as a named defendant, but in the
first numbered paragraph of the Complaint, she refers to “defendants” in the plural, and
she states that she is suing not only the Arizona Board of Regents but also the College of
Pharmacy and the University of Arizona. (Doc. 1 at 1-3.) Furthermore, Plaintiff identifies
numerous individuals by name in the factual allegations of the Complaint, and it is unclear
whether she is intending to include any of those individuals as defendants in this action.
The Complaint purports to bring four causes of action, but each count bundles
together numerous distinct legal theories. In the First Cause of Action, Plaintiff alleges
religious discrimination, retaliation, and defamation, in violation of the First Amendment
to the United States Constitution, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §
1983, the Emergency Use Authorization for the COVID-19 Vaccine (“EUA”), Arizona
Attorney General Opinion No. 121-007, the Arizona Civil Rights Act, Arizona Executive
Order 2021-15, the University Nondiscrimination and Anti-Harassment Policy, and the
University HIPPA Policy. (Doc. 1 at 3, 24-25 ¶¶ 1, 121-124.) In the Second Cause of
Action, Plaintiff alleges sexual harassment and retaliation in violation of Title VII and the
1 All record citations refer to the page numbers generated by the Court’s electronic filing
system.
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Arizona Civil Rights Act. (Id. at 5, 25-26 ¶¶ 11, 125-130.) In the Third Cause of Action,
Plaintiff alleges disability discrimination in violation of the Americans with Disabilities
Act (“ADA”), the Rehabilitation Act, the 2022 CDC Clinical Guidance for COVID-19
Vaccination, and the University ADA/504 Compliance Policy. (Id. at 6, 26 ¶¶ 15, 131-
134.) In the Fourth Cause of Action, Plaintiff alleges violations of the Fourteenth
Amendment to the United States Constitution and the University Grade Appeal Policy. (Id.
at 726-27 ¶¶ 23, 135-138.) The Complaint includes 84 paragraphs of “Facts Common to
All Accounts [sic],” and each Count purports to incorporate all preceding allegations.
V. Discussion
A complaint is properly characterized as a shotgun pleading if: (1) it contains
multiple counts, with each count adopting the allegations of all preceding counts, “causing
each successive count to be a combination of the entire complaint”; (2) it contains
numerous “conclusory, vague, and immaterial facts not obviously connected to any
particular cause of action”; (3) it fails to separate each cause of action or claim for relief
into a distinct count; or (4) it “asserts multiple claims against multiple defendants without
specifying which of the defendants are responsible for which acts or omissions, or which
of the defendants the claim is brought against.” Gibson v. City of Portland, 165 F.4th 1265,
1288 (9th Cir. 2026). “[D]istrict courts do not have to accept such shotgun pleadings,” as
“[i]t is not the job of the district courts to make sense of the pleading, to supply facts to
support the claim, or to imagine the claims that might fit the facts.” Id. at 1289.
Here, Plaintiff has lumped numerous legal theories together in each Count and has
failed to clearly articulate which factual allegations support which specific claims.2
Plaintiff’s Complaint is an impermissible shotgun pleading that fails to provide sufficient
notice of Plaintiff’s claims and their basis. The Complaint does not comply with Rule 8’s
requirement of providing a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader
is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). The Court will accordingly dismiss Plaintiff’s
2 Furthermore, as discussed above, Plaintiff has listed only the Arizona Board of Regents
as a named defendant, but it is not entirely clear if she is intending to also sue other entities
or individuals.
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Complaint with leave to amend.
The Court notes that the following legal defects in the Complaint cannot be cured
by amendment. First, the Arizona Board of Regents is treated as an arm of the State and
is not a “person” subject to damages liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Will v. Michigan
Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 64 (1989) (“[A] State is not a person within the meaning
of § 1983.”); Kay v. Likins, 160 F. App’x 605, 607 (9th Cir. 2005) (“The University of
Arizona is an ‘arm’ of the State,” and “neither the school nor the Arizona Board of Regents
. . . may be sued under § 1983”). Second, the EUA, internal University policies, Arizona
Executive Order, Arizona Attorney General Opinion, and CDC guidance referenced in the
Complaint do not create private causes of action. Accordingly, the Complaint will be
dismissed with prejudice to the extent it asserts § 1983 claims for damages against the
Arizona Board of Regents, and to the extent it asserts claims directly under the EUA,
internal University policies, Arizona Attorney General Opinion No. 121-007, Arizona
Executive Order 2021-15, and CDC guidance. Because these claims are dismissed with
prejudice, Plaintiff may not re-assert them in an amended complaint.
VI. Leave to Amend
Plaintiff may file an amended complaint within thirty days. An amended complaint
supersedes the original Complaint. Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1262 (9th Cir.
1992); Hal Roach Studios v. Richard Feiner & Co., 896 F.2d 1542, 1546 (9th Cir. 1990).
After amendment, the Court will treat the original Complaint as nonexistent. Ferdik, 963
F.2d at 1262. Any cause of action raised in the original Complaint and voluntarily
dismissed or dismissed without prejudice is waived if it is not alleged in a second amended
complaint. Lacey v. Maricopa County, 693 F.3d 896, 928 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc).
If Plaintiff files an amended complaint, she must clearly separate her legal claims,
identify which specific facts support each specific claim, specifically name each defendant
that is being sued, state exactly what each defendant did or failed to do, and explain what
specific injury Plaintiff suffered because of each defendant’s conduct. Conclusory
allegations that a defendant or group of defendants violated the law are not acceptable and
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will be dismissed.3
VII. Warnings
If Plaintiff’s address changes, she must file and serve a notice of a change of address
in accordance with Rule 83.3(d) of the Local Rules of Civil Procedure. Plaintiff must not
include a motion for other relief with a notice of change of address. Failure to comply may
result in dismissal of this action.
If Plaintiff fails to timely comply with every provision of this Order, including these
warnings, the Court may dismiss this action without further notice. See Ferdik, 963 F.2d
at 1260-61 (a district court may dismiss an action for failure to comply with any order of
the Court).
IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Second Amended Application for Leave to
Proceed in Forma Pauperis (Doc. 9) is granted. Plaintiff is granted leave to proceed in
this action without pre-paying the filing fees.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion for Extension of Time (Doc.
12) and Motion to Stay (Doc. 14) are denied as moot.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Complaint (Doc. 1) is dismissed
with leave to amend, as set forth above. Plaintiff may file an amended complaint
correcting the deficiencies addressed herein within thirty (30) days of the date this Order
is filed. If Plaintiff fails to file an amended complaint within thirty days, the Clerk of Court
is directed to dismiss this action without prejudice and without further notice to Plaintiff.
Dated this 24th day of April, 2026.
3 Plaintiff may wish to review the Court’s informational Handbook for Self-Represented
Litigants, available at https://www.azd.uscourts.gov/handbook-self-represented-litigants,
prior to submitting an amended complaint. Plaintiff is also advised that the Court and the
Step Up to Justice Pro Bono Law Center have collaborated to offer a free, advice-only
clinic to the public. More information is available at https://www.azd.uscourts.gov/fed
eral-court-advice-only-clinic-phoenix [https://perma.cc/P2FA-X68N].
Case 4:26-cv-00050-RM Document 15 Filed 04/27/26 Page 7 of 7