Grossenbach v. Arizona Board of Regents et al

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WO
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA
Daniel Grossenbach,
Plaintiff,
v.
Arizona Board of Regents, et al.,
Defendants.
No. CV-25-00477-TUC-JGZ (MAA)
ORDER
Pending before the Court is a motion to dismiss filed by Defendants Arizona Board
of Regents (ABOR); Douglas Goodyear, named in his official capacity as ABOR’s Chair;
and Suresh Garimella, named in his official capacity as the University of Arizona’s
President. (Doc. 16.) On November 21, 2025, Magistrate Judge Michael A. Ambri issued
a Report and Recommendation (“R&R”) recommending that the Court grant Defendants’
motion to dismiss only as to Count VI and deny the motion in all other respects. (Doc. 20.)
The R&R concludes that Plaintiff’s Title VII claim is timely under equitable tolling and
estoppel and that the Eleventh Amendment does not bar Plaintiff’s constitutional claims
for prospective relief under Ex parte Young.
On December 5, 2025, Defendants filed a timely Objection to the R&R, and Plaintiff
has filed a Response. (Docs. 22, 24.) Defendants also filed a Motion to Stay Discovery
Pending Resolution of Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss. (Doc. 19.) The Motion is fully
briefed. (Docs. 19, 21, 23.)
After reviewing the record, the R&R, and the arguments raised in Defendants’
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Objection, the Court will sustain the Objection in part and overrule it in part, adopt the
R&R in part, and deny as moot Defendants’ Motion to Stay Discovery Pending Resolution
of Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss.
I. 	BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Daniel Grossenbach filed this action against the Arizona Board of Regents
(“ABOR”); Douglas Goodyear, named in his official capacity as ABOR’s Chair; and
Suresh Garimella, named in his official capacity as President of the University of Arizona
(collectively, “Defendants”). (Doc. 1.)
Grossenbach 	founded 	an 	organization 	named 	SaveCFSD, 	through 	which 	he
advocates “for truth, trust, and transparency within Catalina Foothills School District 16
[‘CFSD’].” 	(Doc. 	1 	¶ 	67.) 	According 	to 	the 	Complaint, 	Grossenbach 	formed 	the
organization because he believes CFSD is acting contrary to his “sincerely held religious
beliefs” by “secretly surveying children about their gender and sexuality, pushing radical
gender ideologies upon those students, and unconscionably and intentionally keeping that
information from parents.” (Id. ¶¶ 2, 5.)
At the time relevant to this action, Grossenbach was employed as an adjunct
professor at the University of Arizona. (Id. ¶ 53.) On November 30, 2023, he was informed
that his teaching contract would not be renewed. (Id. ¶ 143.) Grossenbach alleges that his
employment was discontinued because the University received complaints about his
advocacy with SaveCFSD.
Grossenbach filed this action on August 22, 2025. (Doc. 1.) He asserts claims under
(1) Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, (2) the Free Speech Clause of the First
Amendment, (3) the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment, (4) First Amendment
retaliation, (5) the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and (6)
Arizona’s public records law. (Id. at 50, 52, 55, 57, 60, 63.)
On October 17, 2025, Defendants filed the pending motion to dismiss the Complaint
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). (Doc. 16.)
On November 21, 2025, Magistrate Judge Michael A. Ambri issued a R&R
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recommending that the motion be granted only as to Plaintiff’s claim under Arizona’s
public records law and denied in all other respects. (Doc. 20.) The R&R further concluded
that Plaintiff’s Title VII administrative charge was timely under the doctrines of equitable
tolling and equitable estoppel and that the Eleventh Amendment does not bar Plaintiff’s
constitutional claims for prospective relief under Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
II. 	LEGAL STANDARD
A. Report and Recommendation
When reviewing a magistrate judge’s R&R, this Court “may accept, reject, or
modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate
judge.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). “[T]he district judge must review the magistrate judge’s
findings and recommendations de novo if objection is made, but not otherwise.” United
States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc) (emphasis in
original). The party seeking de novo review must provide “specific written objections to
the proposed findings and recommendations” of the magistrate judge. Fed. R. Civ. P.
72(b)(2) (emphasis added). “[D]istrict courts conduct proper de novo review [of a
magistrate judge’s findings and recommendations] where they state they have done so,
even if the order fails to specifically address a party’s objections.” United States v. Ramos,
65 F.4th 427, 433 (9th Cir. 2023) (citing Wang v. Masaitis, 416 F.3d 992, 1000 (9th Cir.
2005)).
B. Dismissal Under Rule 12(b)(6)
When considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, the
court must accept as true all factual allegations in the complaint and all reasonable
inferences that may be drawn from such allegations. LSO, Ltd. v. Stroh, 205 F.3d 1146,
1150 n. 2 (9th Cir.2000). Such allegations must be construed in the light most favorable to
the nonmoving party. Shwarz v. United States, 234 F.3d 428, 435 (9th Cir. 2000).
A motion to dismiss brought under Rule 12(b)(6) tests the legal sufficiency of a
claim. Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001). “To survive a motion to
dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a
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claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’ ” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)
(quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A claim has facial
plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. A claim
may be dismissed only if ‘it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of
facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.’” Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d
729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45–46 (1957)).
III. 	DISCUSSION
Defendants make five objections to the R&R: (1) the Eleventh Amendment bars
Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims against ABOR; (2) the Eleventh Amendment bars § 1983 damages
claims against Defendants Goodyear and Garimella in their official capacities; (3) Plaintiff
fails to state a valid claim for prospective relief under Ex parte Young; (4) Plaintiff’s Title
VII claim is untimely and not subject to equitable tolling or equitable estoppel; and (5) the
Title VII claims against Goodyear and Garimella should be dismissed as duplicative of the
claim against ABOR. (See Doc. 22.) The Court will address the objections in turn.
A. Sovereign Immunity
1. 	Plaintiff’s § 1983 Claims Against ABOR
Defendants object to the Magistrate Judge’s conclusion that Plaintiff’s § 1983
claims may proceed against ABOR, arguing that ABOR is entitled to Eleventh Amendment
immunity. (Doc. 22 at 2–3.) The Court agrees.
“Section 1983 provides a method by which individuals can sue for violations of
their federal rights.” Cortez v. Cnty. of L.A., 294 F.3d 1186, 1188 (9th Cir. 2002). “One of
the requisite elements for stating a claim under § 1983 is that the violation was committed
by a ‘person’ acting under color of state law.” Id. (citation omitted). “[A] state is not a
‘person’ for purposes of section 1983 [and] likewise ‘arms of the State’ . . . are not ‘persons’
under section 1983.” Gilbreath v. Cutter Biological, Inc., 931 F.2d 1320, 1327 (9th Cir.
1991).
ABOR is an arm of the State of Arizona for Eleventh Amendment purposes. See
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Arizona Students' Ass'n v. Arizona Bd. of Regents, 824 F.3d 858, 865 (9th Cir. 2016);
Rutledge v. Ariz. Bd. of Regents, 660 F.2d 1345, 1349 (9th Cir. 1981), abrogated on other
grounds by Haygood v. Younger, 769 F.2d 1350, 1356 (9th Cir. 1985) (en banc); Ronwin
v. Shapiro, 657 F.2d 1071, 1073 (9th Cir. 1981) (“[W]e conclude that the [Arizona] Board
of Regents is protected by the eleventh amendment.”). Because ABOR is not a “person”
within the meaning of § 1983, Plaintiff fails to state a claim against ABOR.
Accordingly, Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims against ABOR are dismissed with prejudice.
2. 	Section 1983 Damages Claims Against Goodyear and Garimella
Defendants argue that sovereign immunity bars Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims for
monetary relief against Defendants Goodyear and Garimella in their official capacities.
(Doc. 22 at 3.) The Court agrees as a matter of law that § 1983 does not permit claims for
monetary damages against state officials sued in their official capacities. Doe v. Lawrence
Livermore Nat'l Lab., 131 F.3d 836, 839 (9th Cir. 1997).
Because Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss was brought under Rule 12(b)(6), the
relevant inquiry is whether Plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted, not whether all forms of relief requested are available. Defendants mischaracterize
the R&R. The Magistrate Judge did not recommend allowing § 1983 claims for monetary
relief to proceed against Defendants Goodyear or Garimella. Rather, the R&R permits
Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims to proceed only to the extent Plaintiff seeks prospective equitable
relief under Ex parte Young. (Doc. 20 at 9.) To the extent Plaintiff’s Prayer for Relief could
be construed to seek monetary damages from these Defendants under § 1983, such relief
is unavailable as a matter of law, but that limitation does not require dismissal of Plaintiff’s
§ 1983 claims.
3. 	Whether Plaintiff States a Valid Claim for Prospective Relief Under
Ex parte Young
Defendants object to the Magistrate Judge’s conclusion that Plaintiff states a valid
claim for prospective relief under Ex parte Young. Specifically, Defendants argue that
Plaintiff seeks impermissible retrospective relief, monetary damages are barred by the
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Eleventh Amendment, Plaintiff fails to allege a sufficient connection between Defendants
Goodyear and Garimella and the alleged constitutional violations, and Plaintiff fails to
demonstrate a reasonable likelihood of future injury. (Doc. 22 at 3–5.) The Court disagrees.
Under Ex parte Young, the Eleventh Amendment does not bar suits against state
officials in their official capacities where a plaintiff alleges an ongoing violation of federal
law and seeks relief that is prospective in nature. Verizon Md., Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n
of Md., 535 U.S. 635, 645 (2002). At the pleading stage, a plaintiff need only plausibly
allege such an ongoing violation and request prospective relief; he need not prove
entitlement to that relief. Because Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss was brought under Rule
12(b)(6), the Court’s inquiry is limited to whether Plaintiff has stated a plausible claim.
a. 	Declaratory Relief
Defendants contend that Plaintiff’s request for declaratory relief is impermissibly
retrospective because it would declare that Defendants violated federal law in the past.
(Doc. 22 at 3–4.) While Ex parte Young does not permit purely retrospective declaratory
relief, declaratory relief is not barred where, as here, it is sought in connection with
prospective injunctive relief and addresses an ongoing or continuing violation of federal
law. Green v. Mansour, 474 U.S. 64, 68–71 (1985); Doe v. Lawrence Livermore Nat’l Lab.,
131 F.3d 836, 839–842 (9th Cir. 1997).
Plaintiff seeks reinstatement and injunctive relief to prevent the continuation of
allegedly unconstitutional employment practices. Declaratory relief sought in connection
with that prospective relief is therefore permissible under Ex parte Young.
b. Monetary Relief
Defendants argue that Ex parte Young does not apply because Plaintiff seeks
monetary relief, including lost income. That argument rests on a mischaracterization of the
relief Plaintiff seeks.
As an initial matter, Plaintiff brings different claims and seeks different forms of
relief against different Defendants, and he does not seek monetary damages under § 1983
from Defendants Goodyear or Garimella in their official capacities. (Docs. 20 at 8, 24 at
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2–3.) Instead, Plaintiff seeks prospective equitable relief against those Defendants, while
monetary relief is sought only where permitted by law against the appropriate entity
Defendant. Plaintiff’s claims for reinstatement and injunctive relief fall squarely within Ex
parte Young and therefore may proceed. See Jensen v. Brown, 131 F.4th 677, 696 (9th Cir.
2025) (explaining that a declaratory judgment that the defendants’ actions violated the
plaintiff’s Constitutional rights is “prospective relief” that is not barred by the Eleventh
Amendment.); see also Doe v. Lawrence Livermore Nat. Lab., 131 F.3d 836, 842 (9th Cir.
1997) (“reinstatement is a legitimate request for prospective injunctive relief”). The proper
course, therefore, is to dismiss only those forms of relief barred by sovereign immunity,
not Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims in their entirety.
More broadly, although sovereign immunity bars money damages and other
retrospective relief against a state or its instrumentalities, it does not bar claims seeking
prospective injunctive relief against state officials to remedy an ongoing violation of
federal law. Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 149–56 (1908); see also Quern v. Jordan, 440
U.S. 332, 337 (1979); Agua Caliente Band of Cahuilla Indians v. Hardin, 223 F.3d 1041,
1045 (9th Cir. 2000). Under Ex parte Young, individuals may pursue claims against a state
for prospective equitable relief, including any measures ancillary to that relief. Green v.
Mansour, 474 U.S. 64, 68–71 (1985); Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 689–92 (1978)
(allowing the recovery of attorney's fees and costs).
Plaintiff’s request for attorney’s fees and costs is likewise not barred. The Eleventh
Amendment does not preclude an award of attorney’s fees ancillary to prospective relief.
See Buffin v. California, 23 F.4th 951, 959 (9th Cir. 2022) (“When § 1983 plaintiffs have
prevailed against a state official in his official capacity, they may recover attorney's fees
under 42 U.S.C § 1988.”). Accordingly, Plaintiff may seek attorney’s fees if he ultimately
prevails on his § 1983 claims for prospective relief.
c. 	Connection to the Challenged Conduct
Defendants argue that Plaintiff fails to allege a sufficient connection between
Defendants Goodyear and Garimella and the alleged constitutional violations. Ex parte
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Young requires that a state official have “some connection with the enforcement” of the
challenged conduct. Los Angeles Cnty. Bar Ass’n v. Eu, 979 F.2d 697, 704 (9th Cir. 1992).
“This connection must be fairly direct; a generalized duty to enforce state law or general
supervisory power over the persons responsible for enforcing the challenged provision will
not subject an official to suit.” Id. (citing Long v. Van de Kamp, 961 F.2d 151, 152 (9th
Cir. 1992)).
Here, Plaintiff’s claims are not premised on a generalized obligation to enforce state
law. Rather, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Goodyear and Garimella hold senior
leadership positions within the University and are responsible for the administration and
enforcement 	of 	policies governing 	faculty 	employment, 	including appointment 	and
renewal decisions. (See Doc. 1 ¶¶ 42, 44.) Taking those allegations as true, the Court cannot
conclude at the pleading stage that Defendants lack the requisite connection under Ex parte
Young. See Eu, 979 F.2d at 704.
d. Ongoing Injury
Finally, Defendants argue that Plaintiff fails to allege a reasonable likelihood of
future injury. The Ninth Circuit has explained that “reinstatement constitutes prospective
injunctive relief because a wrongful discharge is a continuing violation” that is “not limited
merely to remedy past violations, [but] serve the purpose of preventing present and future
harm.” Flint v. Dennison, 488 F.3d 816, 825 (9th Cir. 2007). Taking Plaintiff’s allegations
as true, he has plausibly alleged continuing effects of the challenged conduct, which is
sufficient under Rule 12(b)(6).
Accordingly, the Court concludes that Plaintiff has plausibly stated a claim for
prospective equitable relief under Ex parte Young.
B. Title VII
1. 	Timeliness of Plaintiff’s Title VII Claim
Defendants object to the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation that the Court deny
dismissal of Plaintiff’s Title VII claim on timeliness grounds. Defendants argue that the
claim accrued on November 30, 2023, and that neither equitable tolling nor equitable
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estoppel applies as a matter of law. (Doc. 22 at 5–8.) The Court disagrees.
A prospective plaintiff must file a charge of discrimination with the EEOC within
300 days of the alleged discriminatory employment action. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1). A
charge accrues when the “alleged unlawful employment practice occurred.” Delaware
State Coll. v. Ricks, 449 U.S. 250, 258 (1980). Defendants contend that because Plaintiff
was informed on November 30, 2023, that his teaching contract would not be renewed, his
claim accrued on that date as a matter of law and expired on September 25, 2024. (Doc. 22
at 5–6.)
At the pleading stage, dismissal on timeliness grounds is appropriate only where
untimeliness is apparent on the face of the complaint. Von Saher v. Norton Simon Museum
of Art at Pasadena, 592 F.3d 954, 969 (9th Cir. 2010). Where a complaint plausibly alleges
facts supporting timeliness—or where timeliness turns on factual issues such as the date of
accrual, 	the 	applicability 	of 	equitable 	doctrines—dismissal 	under 	Rule 	12(b)(6) 	is
improper. Supermail Cargo, Inc. v. U.S., 68 F.3d 1204, 1206 (9th Cir. 1995) (stating that
“a complaint cannot be dismissed unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can
prove no set of facts that would establish the timeliness of the claim.”); see also Stoll v.
Runyon, 165 F.3d 1238, 1242 (9th Cir. 1999).
The time period for filing a charge is subject to equitable doctrines such as tolling
or estoppel. Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 455 U.S. 385, 393 (1982) (“We hold that
filing a timely charge of discrimination with the EEOC is not a jurisdictional prerequisite
to suit in federal court, but a requirement that, like a statute of limitations, is subject to
waiver, estoppel, and equitable tolling”). “Equitable tolling focuses on whether there was
excusable delay by the plaintiff: If a reasonable plaintiff would not have known of the
existence of a possible claim within the limitations period, then equitable tolling will serve
to extend the statute of limitations for filing suit until the plaintiff can gather what
information he needs.” Lukovsky v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco, 535 F.3d 1044, 1051
(9th Cir. 2008) (punctuation modified). “Equitable estoppel, on the other hand, focuses
primarily on actions taken by the defendant to prevent a plaintiff from filing suit,
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sometimes referred to as ‘fraudulent concealment.’” Id. Accepting the allegations of the
Complaint as true, Plaintiff has plausibly alleged facts supporting the application of both
doctrines.
According to the Complaint, Plaintiff was informed on November 30, 2023, that his
teaching contract would not be renewed and was told that the University intended to hire a
full-time faculty member to teach the relevant course. (Doc. 1 at ¶¶ 143–144.) Plaintiff
initially accepted that explanation but later became skeptical and submitted a public-
records request seeking documents related to the non-renewal decision. (Id. at ¶¶ 145–146,
150.)
Plaintiff alleges that over the following months the University repeatedly delayed
responding to his records request, requiring numerous follow-ups and ultimately a demand
letter from counsel. (Doc. 1 at ¶¶ 151–173, ¶ 175; Doc. 1-16 at 1.) The University produced
the requested documents on July 26, 2024—after what Plaintiff calls a “239-day campaign
of delay.” (Doc. 1 at ¶¶ 150, 151, 176.)
Plaintiff further alleges that the records produced on that date contain evidence that
his contract was not renewed because of complaints relating to his advocacy activities and
revealed communications supporting claims of discrimination and retaliation. (Doc. 1 at ¶¶
80, 122, 131, 180, 181.)
Drawing all reasonable inferences in Plaintiff’s favor, these allegations plausibly
support the Magistrate Judge’s conclusion that a reasonably prudent person would not have
known of the existence of a potential Title VII claim until July 26, 2024, when the
University produced the requested documents. (Doc. 20 at 5.) Prior to that time, Plaintiff
knew that his contract would not be renewed but did not know the alleged discriminatory
basis for that decision. See Boyd v. U.S. Postal Serv., 752 F.2d 410, 414 (9th Cir. 1985)
(“The time period for filing a complaint of discrimination begins to run when the facts that
would support a charge of discrimination would have been apparent to a similarly situated
person with a reasonably prudent regard for his rights.”).
The Complaint also alleges facts supporting equitable estoppel. Plaintiff alleges that
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Defendants falsely represented that the non-renewal decision was based on plans to hire a
full-time faculty member and delayed producing records that allegedly revealed the true
reasons for the decision. Accepting these allegations as true, a factfinder could conclude
that Defendants’ actions prevented Plaintiff from discovering the basis of his claim earlier.
Finally, the EEOC’s administrative dismissal of Plaintiff’s charge as untimely does
not mandate dismissal here. The EEOC’s notice does not reflect consideration of equitable
tolling or equitable estoppel, and such a determination is not dispositive of the Court’s
analysis under Rule 12(b)(6). See Lee v. Sullivan, 787 F. Supp. 921, 937 (N.D. Cal. 1992)
(“Thoughtful deference to agency determinations is appropriate only as to those matters as
to which the agency has a particular expertise.”); see also Loper Bright Enters. v.
Raimondo, 603 U.S. 369, 413, 144 S. Ct. 2244, 2273 (2024) (“[C]ourts need not . . . defer
to an agency interpretation of the law simply because a statute is ambiguous.”).
Taking the allegations of the Complaint as true and drawing all reasonable
inferences in Plaintiff’s favor, the Court cannot conclude that the running of the statute of
limitations is apparent on the face of the complaint. Although equitable tolling and estoppel
are applied “sparingly,” see Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 113–14
(2002), Plaintiff has alleged sufficient facts to plausibly support his application at the
pleading stage. Accordingly, dismissal of Plaintiff’s Title VII claim on timeliness grounds
is not warranted.
2. 	Title VII Claims Against Goodyear and Garimella
Defendants object to the Magistrate Judge’s conclusion that Plaintiff states a valid
Title VII claim against Defendants Goodyear and Garimella in their official capacities,
arguing that those claims are redundant of Plaintiff’s Title VII claim against ABOR and
should therefore be dismissed. (Doc. 22 at 8–9.) Plaintiff does not dispute that Goodyear
and Garimella are named in their official capacities only. Plaintiff nevertheless contends
that dismissal is inappropriate at this stage.
“A suit against a government official in his official capacity is equivalent to a suit
against the government itself.” Larez v. Los Angeles, 946 F.2d 630, 645 (9th Cir. 2001).
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Accordingly, “[w]hen both a government officer and a government entity are named, and
the officer is named only in an official capacity, the court may dismiss the officer as a
redundant defendant.” Ctr. for Bio–Ethical Reform, Inc. v. Los Angeles Cnty. Sheriff’s
Dep’t, 533 F.3d 780, 799 (9th Cir. 2007) (emphasis added) (citing Kentucky v. Graham,
473 U.S. 159, 165–66 (1985)). The cases addressing dismissal of redundant official-
capacity defendants use permissive, not mandatory, language, indicating that dismissal is
discretionary rather than required. See, e.g., id.; Roy v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 114 F. Supp.
3d 1030, 1047 (C.D. Cal. 2015).
Because Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss was brought under Rule 12(b)(6), the
relevant inquiry is whether Plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted, not whether the claims are duplicative. Alleged redundancy alone is not a basis
for dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6).
Here, Defendants have not shown that dismissal of Goodyear and Garimella is
warranted at the pleading stage. Although Title VII liability ultimately runs against the
employer, Defendants have identified no prejudice arising from the inclusion of official
capacity defendants, nor have they demonstrated that dismissal is required under Rule
12(b)(6). At this stage, Plaintiff has plausibly alleged that Goodyear and Garimella acted
in their official capacities with respect to the challenged employment actions, which is
sufficient to state a claim. The Court may revisit the issue of redundancy at a later stage if
appropriate. The Court therefore declines to dismiss Defendants Goodyear and Garimella
at this time.
//
//
//
//
//
//
//
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Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED:
1. 	The Magistrate Judge’s R&R (Doc. 20) is adopted in part.
2. 	Defendants’ Objection (Doc. 22) is sustained in part and overruled in part.
3. 	Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 16) is granted in part and denied in
part.
a. 	Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims (Counts II-V) against Defendant Arizona Board
of Regents are dismissed with prejudice.
b. 	Plaintiff’s Arizona public records statute claim, A.R.S. § 39-121.02,
(Count VI) is dismissed without prejudice.
c. 	The following claims remain: (1) Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims (Count II-V)
against Defendants Goodyear and Garimella in their official capacities to
the extent Plaintiff seeks prospective equitable relief under Ex parte
Young; (2) Plaintiff’s Title VII claim (Count I) against Defendant Arizona
Board of Regents; and (3) Plaintiff’s Title VII claim (Count I) against
Defendants Goodyear and Garimella in their official capacities.
4. 	Defendants’ Motion to Stay Discovery (Doc. 19.) is denied as moot.
Dated this 9th day of March, 2026.
Case 4:25-cv-00477-JGZ-MAA Document 26 Filed 03/10/26 Page 13 of 13