Young v. Commissioner of Social Security Administration

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA
Lindsey Young,
Plaintiff,
v.
Commissioner of Social Security
Administration,
Defendant.
No. CV-25-00342-TUC-JGZ (JEM)
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Plaintiff Lindsey Young (“Young”) seeks judicial review of a final decision by the
Commissioner of the Social Security Administration (“Commissioner”). (Doc. 1.) The
matter, on referral to the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge for Report and
Recommendation, is ripe for determination. (Doc. 11, 17, 21, 22.) As more fully set forth
below, the undersigned recommends that the district court reverse the ALJ’s decision.
BACKGROUND
Procedural History
On June 8, 2022, Young protectively filed a Title II application for a period of
disability and disability insurance benefits under the Social Security Act alleging disability
beginning May 20, 2022. (AR 189-92.) Young’s application was denied initially on
December 21, 2022, and denied on reconsideration on August 28, 2023. (AR 75-84
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(disability determination at the initial level); AR 85-95 (disability determination at the
reconsideration level).) On May 22, 2024, Young appeared and testified at an
administrative hearing before Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) Laura Speck Havens.
(AR 48-74.) On July 8, 2024, the ALJ issued her non-disability decision. (AR 18-31.) On
May 19, 2025, the Appeals Counsel denied Young’s request for review. (AR 1-6.)
The ALJ’s decision is the final decision of the Commissioner and the district court
has jurisdiction pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g) and 1383(c)(3).
The ALJ’s Decision
The ALJ found that Young has not engaged in substantial gainful activity since May
20, 2022, her alleged onset date. (AR 21.) The ALJ determined that Young suffers from
the severe impairments of hemiplegic migraines, degenerative disc disease of the lumber
spine and obesity. Id. The ALJ determined that Young does not have an impairment or a
combination of impairments that meets or medically equals the severity of one of the listed
impairments in 20 CFR Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. (AR 24.) The ALJ determined
Young’s residual functional capacity (“RFC”) as the ability:
to perform light work as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(b) except for
standing/walking for up to 4 hours per workday; occasionally climbing
ladders/ropes/scaffolds or ramps/stairs, balancing, stooping, kneeling,
crouching, or crawling; and withstanding occasional exposure to hazards
(e.g., unprotected heights or moving machinery), humidity/wetness, or loud
noise.
(AR 25.) The ALJ determined that Young is unable to perform any past relevant work. (AR
30.) Considering Young’s age, education, work experience and RFC, the ALJ found that
she can make a successful adjustment to other work that exists in significant numbers in
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the national economy. (AR 30.) Accordingly, the ALJ found that Young has not been
under a disability from her alleged onset date through the date of the ALJ’s decision. (AR
31.)
Background
Initial Determination: Young filed her initial claim for disability alleging that she
suffers from the following illness, injuries, or conditions: hemiplegic
migraines/complicated migraines, migraine with aura, foot drop, vertigo, tremors,
degenerative disease, headache disorder, chronic headache “DO”, insomnia, pituitary
gland tumor, aphasia, “consciousness [and] awareness findings,” and anxiety. (AR 76.)
Disability examiner Randall Garland, Ph.D., found that Young has the medically
determinable impairments of migraine, vertiginous syndromes, disorders of muscle,
ligament and fascia, depressive, bipolar and related disorders, and anxiety and obsessive
compulsive disorder. (AR 79.) Dr. Garland classified Young’s migraine, vertiginous
syndrome, and muscle, ligament and fascia disorders as severe and he classified Young’s
depressive, bipolar, anxiety and obsessive-compulsive disorders as non-severe. Id. Dr.
Garland determined that Young is mildly limitated in her ability to understand, remember,
or apply information, interact with others, concentrate, persist or maintain pace, and adapt
or manage oneself. (AR 80.)
Reconsideration Determination: At the reconsideration level, Young alleged
disability due to the following illnesses, injuries, or conditions: hemiplegic
migraines/complicated migraines, migraine with aura, foot drop, memory loss, aphasia,
vertigo, tremors, degenerative disease, headache disorder, consciousness and awareness
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findings, chronic headache disorder, anxiety, insomnia, and pituitary gland tumor. (AR 85.)
Additionally, Young alleged the follow changed conditions as of June 1, 2022: dizziness,
lack of stamina, fatigue, frequent urination, lack of balance, lack of grip strength, pain,
slurred speech, stiffness, stuttering, swelling, tingling, tremors/shakiness, trouble
sleeping/insomnia, vomiting, weakness, headaches, migraines, incontinence,
hallucinations, vision problems, irritability, nightmares, anxiety, depression, panic attacks,
and limitations in bending, kneeling, lifting, reaching, squatting, stair climbing, using
hands, walking, following instructions, understanding, and concentrating, and memory
loss. Id. Disability examiner Kevin Donovan, Ph.D., found that Young’s migraine,
vertiginous syndrome, and muscle, ligament and fascia disorders are severe. (AR 87.) Dr.
Donovan found that Young’s depressive, bipolar, anxiety and obsessive-compulsive
disorders are non-severe. Id. Dr. Donovan determined that Young is mildly limited in her
ability to understand, remember, or apply information, interact with others, concentrate,
persist or maintain pace, and adapt or manage oneself. (AR 88.)
Hearing Testimony: Young’s headaches make it difficult for her to speak due to
aphasia and short-term memory loss. (AR 53.) She does not exercise or go outside because
it exacerbates her migraines. (AR 56.) Young testified to having two to three headaches
per month. (AR 61.) She attends therapy weekly. (AR 58.)
Young was diagnosed with a pituitary tumor. (AR 59.) She is in pain at a level four
to five daily, but when she has a migraine her pain it increases to an eight or nine. (AR 61.)
Young has a medication cocktail that she takes at the onset of a migraine, and if that is
unsuccessful, she goes to the emergency room. (AR 61.)
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Young testified that she also experiences saddle paresthesia and can either be unable
to urinate or defecate or do so unknowingly. (AR 67.) She suffers from hypotension which
can cause her to faint. (AR 65.) Her hypotension can worsen during migraine episodes
because she is unable to eat. (AR 66.)
As for her ability to walk, Young testified “I can – if I’m not having a migraine, I -
- - I can walk like to get the mail; can walk, you know, to the car; can walk - if it’s an air-
conditioning like a building, can walk inside to go to an appointment. I don’t walk for
exercise mostly because it’s outside and it’s hot and that makes everything worse.” (AR
59.) Young cannot sit comfortably for longer than ten minutes. (AR 60.) During a migraine
attack, Young cannot dress, walk or use the restroom without assistance. (AR 65.) She feels
that she can no longer work because she is unreliable. (AR 67.)
Vocational expert (“VE”) Linda Tolley (“Tolley”) testified that employers tolerate
“about a half day per month” of unplanned absences. (AR 71.) VE Tolley testified, “When
the employee gets to the point of where their (sic) missing one day per month consistent of
unscheduled absences, at that point, they are usually in jeopardy of losing their job.” Id.
VE Tolley testified that there are no jobs where an employee would be allowed to “lay
down on the position.” Id. VE Tolley testified that unscheduled breaks would not be
tolerated in the unskilled positions that she identified. (AR 72.) According to VE Tolley, if
an employee is unable to maintain concentration for at least two-hour periods and required
redirection the employee would be unable to sustain fulltime competitive employment.
(AR 73.)
…
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ISSUES ON REVIEW
Young raises two issues for review. (Doc. 17 at p. 1.) First, Young argues that the
ALJ failed to comply with applicable regulations in rejecting the opinion of Stephanie
Green, FNP. Id. Second, she argues the ALJ failed to reconcile her mental findings in the
paragraph B criteria at step two of the sequential evaluation process with the assessed
limitations in the residual functional capacity (“RFC”). Id. The Commissioner argues
against Young’s claims of error. (Doc. 21.) As explained below, this Court agrees with
Young on her second claim of error.
FIVE-STEP SEQUENTIAL EVALUATION PROCESS
The Commissioner employs a five-step sequential process to evaluate claims. 20
C.F.R. § 404.1520; see also Heckler v. Campbell, 461 U.S. 458, 460-462 (1983). To
establish disability the claimant bears the burden of showing: (1) s/he is not working;
(2) s/he has a severe physical or mental impairment; (3) the impairment meets or equals
the requirements of a listed impairment; and (4) the RFC precludes the performance of past
work. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4). At step five, the burden shifts to the Commissioner to
show that the claimant has the RFC to perform other work that exists in substantial numbers
in the national economy. Hoopai v. Astrue, 499 F.3d 1071, 1074 (9th Cir. 2007). If the
Commissioner conclusively finds the claimant “disabled” or “not disabled” at any point in
the five-step process, the ALJ does not proceed to the next step. 20 C.F.R.
§ 404.1520(a)(4).
“The ALJ is responsible for determining credibility, resolving conflicts in medical
testimony, and for resolving ambiguities.” Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th
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Cir. 1995) (citing Magallanes v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 747, 750 (9th Cir. 1989)). The findings
of the Commissioner are meant to be conclusive if supported by substantial evidence. 42
U.S.C. § 405(g). Substantial evidence is “more than a mere scintilla but less than a
preponderance.” Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1098 (9th Cir. 1999) (quoting Matney v.
Sullivan, 981 F.2d 1016, 1018 (9th Cir. 1992)). The court may overturn the decision to
deny benefits only “when the ALJ’s findings are based on legal error or are not supported
by substantial evidence in the record as a whole.” Aukland v. Massanari, 257 F.3d 1033,
1035 (9th Cir. 2001). This is so because the ALJ “and not the reviewing court must resolve
conflicts in the evidence, and if the evidence can support either outcome, the court may not
substitute its judgment for that of the ALJ.” Matney, 981 F.2d at 1019 (quoting Richardson
v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 400 (1971)); Batson v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 359 F.3d
1190, 1198 (9th Cir. 2004). The Commissioner’s decision, however, “cannot be affirmed
simply by isolating a specific quantum of supporting evidence.” Sousa v. Callahan, 143
F.3d 1240, 1243 (9th Cir. 1998) (citing Hammock v. Bowen, 879 F.2d 498, 501 (9th Cir.
1989)). Reviewing courts must consider the evidence that supports as well as detracts from
the Commissioner’s conclusion. Day v. Weinberger, 522 F.2d 1154, 1156 (9th Cir. 1975).
A claimant is "disabled" for the purpose of receiving benefits if she is unable to
engage in any substantial gainful activity due to an impairment which has lasted, or is
expected to last, for a continuous period of at least twelve months. 42 U.S.C. §
423(d)(1)(A); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1505(a). "The claimant bears the burden of establishing a
prima facie case of disability." Roberts v. Shalala, 66 F.3d 179, 182 (9th Cir. 1995), cert.
denied, 517 U.S. 1122 (1996); Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1289 (9th Cir. 1996).
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ANALYSIS
The ALJ Erred in Failing to Consider or Record Her Consideration of Young’s
Mild Limitation in All Four of the Paragraph B Domains in Formulating the
RFC
Young argues that despite finding that she is mildly limited in her ability to
understand, remember or apply information, interact with others, concentrate, persist or
maintain pace, and adapt or manage herself, the ALJ erroneously failed to consider her
mild limitations in determining her RFC. (Doc. 17 at pp. 15-17.) She argues that this error
is not harmless. Id. at 18-19. The Commissioner argues that the ALJ did not err claiming
that when a claimant’s mental impairments are only mildly limiting, an ALJ is not required
to incorporate mental limitations into the RFC. (Doc. 21 at pp. 7-9.) As explained below,
this Court agrees with Young.
When a claimant has presented a “colorable claim” of mental impairment, the ALJ
is required “to follow a special psychiatric review technique.” Bridges v. Comm'r of Soc.
Sec., No. 2:24-CV-03487-CKD, 2026 WL 206087, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 27, 2026) (quoting
Keyser v. Comm'r Soc. Sec. Admin., 648 F.3d 721, 725-26 (9th Cir. 2011); citing 20 C.F.R.
§ 404.1520a(a)). “In it, the ALJ rates the degree of functional limitation for four functional
areas and determines whether the impairment is severe.” Bridges, 2026 WL 206087, at *3
(citing Keyser, 648 F.3d at 725; 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520a). The four areas are known as the
“paragraph B” criteria: understanding and applying information; interacting with others;
concentrating, persisting, and maintain pace; and adapting or managing oneself. See 20
C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1 §§ 12.04(B), 12.06(B), 12.15(B). “Agency policy
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explains that ‘the limitations identified in the ‘paragraph B’ ... criteria are not an RFC
assessment[.] ... The mental RFC assessment used at steps 4 and 5 of the sequential
evaluation process requires a more detailed assessment[.]’ ” Bridges, 2026 WL 206087, at
*3 (citing Social Security Ruling (SSR) 96-8p).
Here, at the initial and reconsideration levels, Young was determined to be mildly
limited in all four paragraph B domains. (AR 80, 88.) The ALJ also conducted a paragraph
B analysis and found:
First, in the area of understanding, remembering, or applying information,
the claimant has mild limitation. She did often endorse experiencing memory
loss associated with her hemiplegic migraines, and her treatment providers
sometimes noted her to have mildly impaired remote memory, though there
was little explanation for how they reached that conclusion beyond reflecting
the claimant’s subjective complaints. (5F/22, 27, 32; 8F/24). But the claimant
was also often noted to have a normal capacity for recent and remote
memory, and otherwise typically demonstrated full orientation, alertness,
and cognition (5F/100;11F/5; 13F/42; 18F/206; 21F/2). Thus, the
undersigned finds that the claimant’s ability to understand, remember, and
apply information independently, appropriately, effectively, and on a
sustained basis is only slightly limited, therefore justifying the designation
of “mild” limitation (see 20 CFR 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1, Listing of
Impairments, 12.00F2).
Second, in the area of interacting with others, the claimant has mild
limitation. During therapy sessions, the claimant regularly described her
stressful relationship with and eventual separation from her spouse, as well
as her feeling pathologized by healthcare providers, which the undersigned
acknowledges could reasonably lead to heightened anxiety interacting with
others and feeling of isolation (see generally 18F). However, the claimant
has nearly always reflected to present with an appropriate mood and effect
(see 5F; 8F; 9F; 13F; 18F); in fact, she was positively described to be pleasant
and cooperative (e.g., 18F/205; 19F/36). Further, the claimant did not
endorse having issues getting along with others, including authority figures,
and she denied ever having been terminated from a job because of such issues
(6E/6). She also expressed having an active interest in engaging in
community events, and eventually did so after separating from her spouse
and moving to Tucson (18F/26, 130). Thus the undersigned finds that the
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claimant’s ability to interact with others independently, appropriately,
effectively, and on a sustained basis is only slightly limited, therefore
justifying the designation of “mild” limitation (see 20 CFR 404, Subpart P,
Appendix 1, Listing of Impairments, 12.00F2).
Third, in the area of concentrating, persisting, or maintaining pace, the
claimant has mild limitation. She frequently reported experiencing difficulty
concentrating to her therapist after establishing mental healthcare in July
2023, and her neurologist indicated that her migrainous (sic) symptoms
constantly affected her ability to concentrate (although, again, there was little
explanation for this conclusion beyond reflecting the claimant’s subjective
complaints) (16F/2; 18F/81, 94, 102, 111, 138, 149, 169, 207). Despite this,
the claimant was consistently noted to have a normal capacity for attention
and concentration (e.g., 5F/100; 11F/5; 13F/42). Thus, the undersigned finds
that the claimant’s ability to concentrate, persist, and maintain pace
independently, appropriately effectively, and on a sustained basis is only
slightly limited, therefore justifying the designation of “mild” limitation (see
20 CFR 2024, Subpart P, Appendix 1, Listing of Impairments, 12.00F2).
Finally, in the area of adapting or managing oneself, the claimant has mild
limitation. She periodically seemed to experience some difficulty managing
symptoms of anxiety and depression, particularly while she was still living
with her spouse and dealing with their impending separation (see generally
18F). However, the claimant was pretty consistently reflected to be making
good progress in therapy, especially after relocating to Tucson, and was
lauded by her therapist for being a strong advocate for herself (18F/97).
Otherwise, she was regularly noted to demonstrate normal insight and
judgment (5F/17, 22, 32; 18F/206; 19F/106; 21F/2). Thus, the undersigned
finds that the claimant’s ability to adapt and manage herself independently,
appropriately, effectively, and on a sustained basis is only slightly limited,
therefore justifying the designation of “mild” limitation (see 20 CFR 404,
Subpart P, Appendix 1, Listing of Impairments, 12.00F2).
(AR 23-24.)
After conducting the foregoing paragraph B analysis, the ALJ considered the state
agency psychological consultants’ medical opinions that were issued at the initial and
reconsideration levels as follows:
Regarding the claimant’s mental limitations, state agency psychological
consultants Randall Garland, PhD, and Kevin Donovan, PhD, both
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determined that the claimant would have no more than mild limitations in
any domain of mental functioning (2A/5; 3A/4). Dr. Garland’s and Dr.
Donovan’s opinions were both adequately supported by and consistent with
the claimant’s unremarkable mental status examinations and lack of historic
mental health treatment at the time of each psychological consultant’s
individual review, and they were also consistent with the mental health
records generated within the last year detailing only mild psychologically
based symptoms and significant positive progress.
(AR 29.) Thereafter, in the RFC formulation, the ALJ stated:
After careful consideration of the entire record, the undersigned finds that
the claimant has the [RFC] to perform light work as defined in 20 CFR
404.1567(b) except for standing/walking for up to 4 hours per workday;
occasionally climbing ladders/ropes/scaffolds or ramps/stairs, balancing,
stopping, kneeling, crouching, or crawling; and withstanding occasionally
exposure to hazards (e.g. unprotected heights or moving machinery),
humidity/wetness, or loud noise.
***
Given the totality of the evidence, the undersigned finds that the claimant
does suffer from functional limitations caused by her impairments, which
would prevent her from performing work activity in excess of the residual
functional capacity noted above. Specifically, the undersigned finds that the
claimant’s lumbar pain, foot drop, and large body habitus support a degree
of exertional limitation slightly below what would be typically expected of
light work. Likewise, the undersigned also finds it appropriate to incorporate
certain postural and environmental limitations that would be made
unreasonably uncomfortable or even dangerous by the claimant’s various
impairments in combination, including her chronic hemiplegic migraines,
which—albeit far milder and better controlled than they once were—
reasonably risk being exacerbated.
(AR 25, 30.)
The RFC contains no mental limitations. See AR 25. Additionally, although the ALJ
assessed mild limitations in all four paragraph B domains, the ALJ did not mention these
limitations after step two. See AR 24-30. Nor did the ALJ ask VE Tolley to respond to
questioning while assuming a hypothetical person with Young’s physical RFC as well as
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Young’s mild limitation in all four paragraph B domains. See AR 69-71 (VE testimony in
response to ALJ’s hypothetical that did not require the VE to assume the hypothetical
person had mild (or any) limitation in the four paragraph B domains).
The RFC is the most a person can do despite his or her limitations. See 20 C.F.R. §
404.1545(a). An ALJ is required to consider all of a claimant’s medically determinable
impairments, even those that are not severe, in formulating a claimant’s RFC. See 20 C.F.R.
§4 04.1545(a)(2). District courts within the Ninth Circuit recognize that “consideration of
‘the limiting effects of all impairments’ does not necessarily require the inclusion of every
impairment into the final RFC if the record indicates the non-severe impairment does not
cause a significant limitation in the [claimant’s] ability to work.” See Michelle M. v. Saul,
Case No.: 19-cv-00272-JLB, 2020 WL 1450442, at *7 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 25, 2020) (quoting
Medlock v. Colvin, No. CV 15-9609-KK, 2016 WL 6137399, at *5 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 20,
2016)). These courts also recognize that an ALJ errs when a court cannot discern
definitively from the hearing decision whether the ALJ considered a claimant’s non-severe
mental impairment(s) and any corresponding limitation(s) before assigning a claimant an
RFC without any mental restrictions. Michelle M., 2020 WL 1450442, at *7. See also
Solomon v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 376 F. Supp. 3d 1012, 1021 (D. Ariz. 2019)
(finding error where the ALJ’s decision provides no indication that the ALJ considered the
claimant’s mild limitation in social functioning and concentration, persistence and pace
when evaluating the claimant’s RFC and citing Ghanim v. Colvin, 763 F.3d 1154, 1166
(9th Cir. 2014) (holding that “[i]n determining a claimant's residual functional capacity,
the ALJ must consider all of a claimant's medically determinable impairments, including
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those that are not severe”) and De La Cruz v. Colvin, 2014 WL 2865076, *2-3 (C.D. Cal.
2014) (remanding because ALJ failed to assess all of the claimant's medically determinable
impairments in the RFC analysis) and Winter-Duncan v. Astrue, 2012 WL 1641891, *4
(W.D. Wash. 2012) (same)); Hutton v. Astrue, 491 Fed. Appx. 850, 850 (9th Cir. 2012)
(holding the ALJ erred “in failing to include Hutton’s post-traumatic stress disorder . . . in
his hypotheticals to the vocational expert at [s]tep [f]ive,” after finding it caused the
claimant “‘mild’ limitations in the areas of concentration, persistence, or pace”); Silvester
H. v. Kijakazi, Case No. 5:20-cv-02503-SP, 2022 WL 4466717, at *7-8 (C.D. Cal. Sept.
26, 2022) (collecting cases and finding that “[d]espite the ALJ's assurances, the opinion
does not include any discussion or analysis of how plaintiff's non[-]severe mental
impairments were factored into the RFC determination, and the RFC itself does not contain
any non[-]exertional limitations . . . For this reason, it is not clear to the court that in
determining plaintiff's RFC the ALJ actually considered the mild limitations across the
functional areas found at step two.”); Vrdoljak v. Kijakazi, 665 F. Supp. 3d 923, 930-21
(N.D. Ill. 2023) (reversing where ALJ found “mild” limitations in all four paragraph B
domains but did not include any mental restriction in the RFC, without explanation);
Bridges, 2026 WL 206087 at *5-6 (finding ALJ erred when ALJ only considered evidence
of physical limitation in assessing RFC and did not consider paragraph B limitations).
As laid out above, the ALJ's decision contains no indication that the ALJ considered
Young’s mild limitation in the four paragraph B domains of mental functioning in
determining the RFC. The entirety of the ALJ’s RFC formulation discussion is devoted to
Young’s physical impairments. See AR 25-30.
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The Commissioner argues that when a claimant’s mental impairments are non-
severe and only mildly limiting at step two, an ALJ is not required to incorporate mental
limitations in the RFC. (Doc. 21 at p. 8.) While the Commissioner is correct that there is
no requirement that an ALJ incorporate mental limitations in an RFC, the ALJ is required
to consider the limiting effects of all impairments. See Tammy W. v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec.,
787 F. Supp. 3d 1175, 1183 (W.D. Wash. 2025) (recognizing that “[t]his [c]ourt and others
have held that an ALJ is not required to import any restriction in the RFC based on a ‘mild’
mental limitation but does need to at least consider the issue. . .Therefore, ‘the question is
not whether the ALJ’s paragraph B findings are consistent with the RFC, but whether the
ALJ has provided an adequate explanation for the mental limitations contained in the
RFC.”). See also, Wendy C. v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 3:19-CV-05486, 2020 WL
3287286, at *6 (W.D. Wash. June 18, 2020) (recognizing that in formulating the RFC “the
ALJ must consider the step three limitations along with all the relevant evidence.”). For
this reason, this Court finds that the cases relied upon by the Commissioner are not
persuasive. See Doc. 21 at p. 8 (citing Woods, 32 F.4th at 794 (rejecting claimant’s
argument that the ALJ was required to include mild mental limitations in the RFC);
Sanchez v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., No. CV-21-01709-HX-DLR, 2023 WL 6119631,
at *2 (D. Ariz. Sept. 19, 2023) (recognizing that “there is no requirement that every non-
severe mental limitation be translated into a functional limitation in the RFC.”); Pugh v.
Kijakazi, No. 2:20-cv-02255, 2022 WL 1782517, at *5 (E.D. Cal. June 1, 2022) (holding
there is “scant legal support” for the position that the ALJ is required to account for mild
mental limitations in the RFC). None of the cases relied upon by the Commissioner stand
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for the proposition that it is permissible for an ALJ to fail to provide an adequate
explanation for including—or failing to include—mental limitations in a claimant’s RFC.
Indeed, the great weight of authority is to the contrary.
This Court also finds that the Commissioner’s attempt to distinguish Lubin v.
Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 507 F. Appx. 709, 712 (9th Cir. 2013), relied upon by Young, also
fails. (Doc. 21 at p. 8.) In Lubin, the court of appeals found, inter alia, that the ALJ erred
in failing to include the finding that Lubin suffered moderate difficulties in maintaining
concentration, persistence, or pace in the RFC determination or in the hypothetical question
to the vocational expert. 507 F. Appx. at 912. The Commissioner argues that Lubin does
not support Young’s argument because the claimant in Lubin was found to have moderate
limitations at step two in contrast to Young’s mild limitation here. (Doc. 21 at p. 8.) This
is a distinction without a difference. Just as the ALJ in Lubin was found to have erroneously
failed to include a moderate limitation assessed in one of the four paragraph B domains in
the RFC determination, the ALJ here failed to consider (or record her consideration of)
Young’s mild limitation in all four of the paragraph B domains in the RFC determination.
Finally, the Commissioner summarily argues that “[s]ince the ALJ considered
[Young’s] allegations about her mental limitations, the relevant medical evidence, and
evaluated the prior administrative findings relevant to her mental impairment, the ALJ did
exactly what [Young] requests.” (Doc. 21 at p. 9.) The Commissioner’s argument (which
is one sentence long) is underdeveloped and contains no legal analysis. Id. Accordingly,
this Court does not consider it. See Huerta v. Astrue, No. EDCV 11-1868-MLG, 2012 WL
2865898, at *1 (C.D. Cal. July 12, 2012) (declining to consider an issue in a social security
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appeal where the court found the issue underdeveloped and lacking any legal analysis).
The ALJ’s Error is Not Harmless
Having found error, this Court must determine whether the error is harmless. An
error is harmless if it was “inconsequential to the ultimate non[-]disability
determination[.]” Robbins v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 466 F.3d 880, 885 (9th Cir. 2006) (internal
quotation marks omitted). An ALJ must include those limitations that are supported by
substantial evidence and an ALJ is not free to disregard properly supported limitations in
hypotheticals posed to a vocational expert. Id. (additional citation omitted).
This Court cannot determine that the outcome at steps four and five would be the
same had the ALJ not erred in failing to include Young’s mild limitation in all four
paragraph B domains in the hypothetical question that she posed to VE Tolley. See Aida I.
v. Saul, Case No. 3:19-cv-00476-AJB-RNB, 2020 WL 434319, at *4-5 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 28,
2020) (finding harmful error because the court cannot determine how the vocational expert
would have testified had the specific mild limitations to which Dr. Nicholson opined were
included in the hypotheticals posed to the vocational expert); Bridges, 2026 WL 206087,
at *5 (finding harmful error where the ALJ assessed mild mental limitations at step two but
failed to mention these limitations after the step two evaluation and the RFC contained no
mental limitations).
This Court determines the ALJ’s error is not harmless.
Remand Is Recommended
Upon finding the ALJ committed reversible error, the district court has the
discretion to remand or reverse and award benefits. Mack v. Saul, No. 1:18-cv-01287-
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DAD-BAM, 2020 WL 2731032, at *3 (E.D. Cal. May 25, 2020) (citing McAllister v.
Sullivan, 888 F.2d 599, 603 (9th Cir. 1989)). The United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit has held that, “[g]enerally, we direct the award of benefits in cases where no
useful purpose would be served by further administrative proceedings, or where the record
has been thoroughly developed.” Mack, 2020 WL 2731032, at *3 (quoting Ghokassian v.
Shalala, 41 F.3d 1300, 1304 (9th Cir. 1994)). “Where . . . an ALJ makes a legal error, but
the record is uncertain and ambiguous, the proper approach is to remand the case to the
agency.” Treichler v. Comm’r of Social Sec. Admin., 775 F.3d 1090, 1105 (9th Cir. 2014);
see also Garrison v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 995, 1021 (9th Cir. 2014).
Young requests remand to the Commissioner for further proceedings. (Doc. 17 at p.
19.) This Court determines that remand to the Commissioner is required so the ALJ may
first consider Young’s mild limitation in all four of the paragraph B domains in formulating
the RFC.
Remaining Issue
On remand, Young’s claim that the ALJ erred in her consideration of FNP Stephanie
Green’s opinion should also be considered. See Augustine ex rel. Ramirez v. Astrue, 536 F.
Supp. 2d 1147, 1153 n.7 (C.D. Cal. 2008) (determining that “th[e] [c]ourt need not address
the other claims plaintiff raises, none of which would provide plaintiff with any further
relief than granted, and all of which can be addressed on remand.”); Slover v. Kijakazi,
Case No. 1:21-cv-01089-ADA-BAM, 2023 WL 5488416, at *5 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 23, 2023)
(declining to address claimant’s remaining arguments upon finding error requiring
remand); Hiler v. Astrue, 687 F.3d 1208, 1212 (9th Cir. 2012) (holding that “because we
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remand the case to the ALJ for the reasons stated, we decline to reach [the claimant’s]
alternative ground for remand”).
RECOMMENDATION
For the foregoing reasons, it is RECOMMENDED that the district court
REVERSE the decision of the ALJ and REMAND this matter to the Commissioner for
further proceedings. Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(b)(2), any party may
serve and file written objections within fourteen days of being served with a copy of the
Report and Recommendation. A party may respond to the other party’s objections within
fourteen days. No reply brief shall be filed on objections unless leave is granted by the
District Court. If objections are not timely filed, they may be deemed waived. If objections
are filed, the parties should use the following case number: 25-cv-00342-JGZ.
Dated this 22nd day of June, 2026.
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