Robles v. Unknown Party

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA
Raul Michael Robles,
Petitioner,
v.
Unknown Hodak,
Respondent.
No. CV-25-00278-TUC-SHR (JEM)
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Before the Court is Petitioner Raul Michael Robles’s (“Petitioner”) second amended
Petition Under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 for Writ of Habeas Corpus by a Person in Federal Custody
(“Petition”). (Doc. 8.) Respondent filed Respondent’s Return and Answer to Petition For a
Writ of Habeas Corpus Under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (“Answer”). (Doc. 15.) Petitioner did not
file a reply and the time for filing a reply has elapsed. Pursuant to Local Rules 72.1 and
72.2 of the Local Rules of Civil Procedure, this matter was referred to the undersigned for
Report and Recommendation. (Doc. 9.) As explained below, the undersigned recommends
the Petition be dismissed.
…
…
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BACKGROUND
Petitioner is serving a 135-month term of imprisonment in the custody of the Federal
Bureau of Prisons (“Bureau”) at the Federal Corrections Institute in Seagoville, Texas for
possession with the intent to distribute 50 grams or more of methamphetamine (actual) in
violation of federal law. (Doc. 15-1 at p. 6, ¶ 20.)1
Petitioner has earned 365 days of time credit under the First Step Act (“FSA”) that
have been applied toward his early release to begin serving his imposed term of
supervision. (Doc. 15-1 at p. 7, ¶ 25.) With the application of the 365 days of FSA time
credit, Petitioner’s projected release date is October 10, 2027. Id. Without the application
of the 365 days of FSA time credit, Petitioner’s projected release date is October 9, 2028.
Id.
In addition to the 365 days of earned FSA time credit, as of October 7, 2025,
Petitioner has earned 215 days of FSA time credit that may be applied toward his prerelease
custody in a Residential Reentry Center (“RRC”), commonly referred to as a halfway
house, and/or home confinement (“HC”). Respondent explains that as Petitioner continues
to serve his sentence, he may continue to earn FSA time credit, up to 380 total days, that
may be applied toward prerelease custody. Id. at p. 8, ¶ 26. In addition to his FSA time
credit, Petitioner may also be recommended for up to 365 days of RRC placement pursuant
to the Second Chance Act of 2007 (“SCA”). Id. at ¶ 27.
On March 30, 2025, Petitioner was referred for RRC placement in Fort Worth,
1 Factual references are taken from the exhibits to Respondent’s Answer unless otherwise
indicated.
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Texas, with a target date of September 25, 2025. (Doc. 15-1 at p. 8, ¶ 28.) In Petitioner’s
RRC referral, Warden Edwardo Gutierrez stated:
Inmate Robles has been reviewed for RRC placement in compliance with the
Second Chance Act (SCA) and is being referred to 365 days under SCA
Conditional Placement days. He was reviewed for Direct Home Confinement
(HC) and determined eligible. He is eligible for Federal Time Credits (FTC)
and has earned 475 days of time credits. As of the date of this referral, he has
earned 110 days of FTC days towards RRC/HC. His current Conditional
Transition to Community Date if 09-25-2025. Unit Team is requesting 09-
25-2025 RRC placement date. Unit Team believes this date is adequate and
appropriate for his release needs and includes SCA and FTC days towards
RRC/HC.
Id. at pp. 58-59.
On May 27, 2025, Petitioner’s Unit Manager emailed the Dallas Residential Reentry
Management Office (“Dallas RRM”) stating:
Inmate Robles, 60439-177, approached me today during our Open House
hours and asked if I would inquire as to if his RCC date: 08/05/2026, for Vol
of America, Ft. Worth, is correct or entered in error?
Id. at p. 8, ¶ 30 & p. 61.
On May 28, 2025, Dallas RRM responded, “The date is correct. He is receiving his
full FSA of 365 and 65 days of SCA. The RRC has minimum bed space.” Id.
PETITION, ANSWER, AND SUMMARY OF CONCLUSION
The Petition raises one ground for relief. (Doc. 8 at p. 4.) The Petition alleges
Petitioner is being “held beyond the time of [his] release[], and [his] earned SCA credits
were taken from [him] without fair due process.” Id.
Respondent seeks dismissal of the Petition on several grounds. (Doc. 15 at pp. 6-
10.) Respondent argues, inter alia: the district court lacks jurisdiction over the Petition,
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Doc. 15 at pp. 8-9; Petitioner failed to exhaust his administrative remedies, Id. at pp. 6-8;
Petitioner’s claim is not ripe, Id. at pp. 17-20; the district court lacks authority to compel
discretionary Bureau action, Id. at pp. 9-11, and; Petitioner lacks a liberty interest in both
the application of his FSA time credit and halfway house placement under the SCA, Id. at
pp. 11-16.
As more fully set forth below, this Court finds that Petitioner’s claim is not ripe,
that Petitioner failed to exhaust his administrative remedies, and that his failure should not
be excused. Accordingly, this Court recommends that the district court dismiss the
Petition.2
FSA TIME CREDIT
Enacted into law in December 2018, the FSA addresses the reentry of incarcerated
individuals into society. Thigpen, 2024 WL 1705256, at *2. The application of earned FSA
time credit to create an earlier release date for an eligible prisoner is governed by statute.
See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3624(g) and 3632(d)(4)(C). FSA time credit can only be applied to create
an earlier release date for an eligible prisoner if the prisoner, inter alia: “(A) has earned
time credits under the risk and needs assessment system . . . in an amount that is equal to
the remainder of the prisoner’s imposed term of imprisonment; [and] (B) has shown
through the periodic risk reassessments a demonstrated recidivism risk reduction or has
maintained a minimum or low recidivism risk, during the prisoner’s term of imprisonment
. . .” 18 U.S.C. § 3624(g)(1)(A), (B); see also 28 C.F.R. § 523.44(b)(1)-(2).
2 Given the dispositive nature of these findings, this Court concludes it is not necessary to
address Respondent’s lack of jurisdiction and lack of liberty interest arguments.
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If a prisoner meets the eligibility criteria, the Bureau “may transfer [a prisoner who
has been sentenced to serve a term of supervised release after imprisonment] to begin any
such term of supervised release at an earlier date, not to exceed 12 months, based on the
application of earned FSA time credit.” 18 U.S.C. § 3624(g)(3); see also 28 C.F.R. §
523.44(d) (directing that “[t]he [Bureau] may apply [FSA time credit] toward early transfer
to supervised release under 18 U.S.C. § 3624(g) . . .”). Any remaining FSA time credit
earned—beyond 12 months in the case of a prisoner who has been sentenced to a term of
supervised release—are to be applied toward time in prerelease custody, which includes
community confinement placement. See 18 U.S.C. § 3632(d)(4)(C); see also 28 C.F.R. §
523.44(b), (c) (directing that “[t]he Bureau may apply [FSA time credit] toward prerelease
custody . . .”).
RRC PLACEMENT UNDER THE SCA
The SCA sets forth standards by which the Bureau is required to make decisions
concerning prisoner placement into RRCs. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3621, 3624. Under the SCA,
the Director of the Bureau is required to “ensure that a prisoner serving a term of
imprisonment spends a portion of the final months of that term, not to exceed 12 months,
under conditions that will afford that prisoner a reasonable opportunity to adjust to and
prepare for the reentry of that prisoner into the community. Such conditions may include a
community correctional facility.” Bruce, 2009 WL 2509170, at *1 (quoting 18 U.S.C. §
3624(c)(1)). “The SCA is not, however, an additional source of time credits.” Untalan v.
Derr, No. CV 23-00091 JMS-RT, 2023 WL 2868519, at *4 (D. Hawai’i Apr. 10, 2023)
(citing Suggs v. Saad, 2017 WL 1862468, at *5 (N.D.W. Va. May 9, 2017)) (internal
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quotations omitted). And the SCA “does not require that an inmate receive a full twelve
months of halfway house placement, only that an inmate be considered for placement up
to twelve months to the extent practicable.” Untalan, 2023 WL 2868519, at *4 (quoting
Suggs, 2017 WL 1862468, at *5).
ANALYSIS
Ripeness
Article III of the United States Constitution limits the jurisdiction of federal courts
to “actual, ongoing cases or controversies.” Lewis v. Continental Bank Corp., 494 U.S.
472, 477 (1990) (additional citations omitted). One component of the Article III case-or-
controversy requirement is ripeness. Bova v. City of Medford, 564 F.3d 1093, 1095-96 (9th
Cir. 2009) (citing Colwell v. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 558 F.3d 1112, 1121, 1123
(9th Cir. 2009)). Ripeness addresses when litigation may occur. See Lee v. Or., 107 F.3d
1382, 1387 (9th Cir. 1997).
“Under 18 U.S.C. § 3624(g)(1)(A), FSA earned time credit can be applied toward
prerelease custody or supervised release only when accumulated credits are equal to the
remainder of the prison term.” Turner v. Heisner, CV-22-00178-PHX-JAT (ESW), 2022
WL 2195348, at *3 (D. Ariz. May 16, 2022); see also Tumbaco v. Birkholz, No. 2:23-CV-
10663-FMO AJR, 2024 WL 4744025, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 9, 2024) (explaining that where
“a prisoner alleges they were denied time credits under the FSA, the ripeness requirement
is not met until favorable disposition of their claim would result in immediate release”).
Here, Respondent establishes that Petitioner’s projected release date without
application of his earned time credit is October 9, 2028, which is 1,056 days from
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November 18, 2025.3 (Doc. 15-1 at ¶ 24.) Respondent contends that since Petitioner has
less than 1,056 days of FSA time credit,4 he is currently ineligible to have his FSA time
credit applied. Id. at ¶ 25. See 18 U.S.C. § 3624(g)(1)(A) (prisoner is not eligible to have
FSA earned time credit applied toward prerelease custody or supervised release until the
accumulated time credits are “in an amount equal to the remainder of the prisoner’s
imposed term of imprisonment” and other conditions are met); see also Velasquez v.
Gunther, No. CV-24-02446-PHX-JAT (ASB), 2025 WL 1135304, at *3 (D. Ariz. Mar. 4,
2025) (finding the petition not ripe where the petitioner was not eligible for application of
earned time credits), report and recommendation adopted, No. CV-24-02446-PHX-JAT,
2025 WL 1135244 (D. Ariz. Apr. 17, 2025); Tapia v. Barron, 2:23-cv-01531-BJR-BAT,
2024 WL 2946184, at *4-5 (W.D. Wash. Jan. 12, 2024) (holding that “the [c]ourt finds
because [the p]etitioner is not yet eligible for application of time credits under the FSA,
even though she may have accrued some credits, her § 2241 Petition is not ripe for review
and subject to dismissal without prejudice.”); see also Turner, 2022 WL 2195348, at *3
(holding that “[b]ecause [the p]etitioner is not yet eligible for application of time credits
under the FSA, the undersigned is persuaded by [the r]espondent's argument that the § 2241
Petition is not ripe for review.”).
This Court agrees with Respondent that since Petitioner’s remaining term of
imprisonment exceeds his FSA time credit, he is not eligible to have his FSA time credit
applied. As such, this Court finds that the claim alleged in the Petition is unripe and non-
3 (the date of Respondent’s Answer)
4 (as of October 7, 2025, Petitioner had 580 FSA time credit days)
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justiciable. This Court recommends that the district court dismiss the Petition on this basis.
Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies
The Bureau operates an Administrative Remedy Program designed to allow an
inmate to seek formal review of an issue relating to any aspect of his confinement,
including earned time credit. 28 C.F.R. §§ 542.10 and 542.14(d)(2); see also Doc. 15-1 at
pp. 2-5, ¶¶ 3-13 (Declaration of Lorri Mitchell setting forth summary of the Bureau’s
Administrative Remedy Program). The Bureau’s Administrative Remedy Program consists
of four levels of review beginning with an attempt at informal resolution (BP-8), a request
to the Warden (BP-9), and then appeals to the Regional Director (BP-10), and the Office
of General Counsel (BP-11). (Doc. 15-1 at p. 3, ¶ 4.)
As a prudential matter, courts require a habeas petitioner to exhaust available
administrative remedies before filing a petition for relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. See e.g.,
Reno v. Koray, 515 U.S. 50, 54–55 (1995); Tucker v. Carlson, 925 F.2d 330, 332 (9th Cir.
1991); Martinez v. Roberts, 804 F.2d 570, 571 (9th Cir. 1986); Ruviwat v. Smith, 701 F.2d
844, 845 (9th Cir. 1983). The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has
recognized that:
[T]he requirement of exhaustion of remedies [is to] aid judicial review by
allowing the appropriate development of a factual record in an expert forum;
conserve the court's time because of the possibility that the relief applied for
may be granted at the administrative level; and allow the administrative
agency an opportunity to correct errors occurring in the course of
administrative proceedings.
Ruviwat, 701 F.2d at 845. An inmate’s failure to exhaust administrative remedies has been
excused for futility where the Bureau has officially predetermined an issue or where
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resolution of a claim can be accomplished based solely on statutory interpretation. See e.g.,
Martinez v. Gutierrez, No. CV 22-00505-TUC-RM (AMM), 2023 WL 6466490, at *3 (D.
Ariz. July 14, 2023), report and recommendation adopted, No. CV-22-00505-TUC-RM,
2023 WL 6464850 (D. Ariz. Oct. 4, 2023) (finding administrative exhaustion futile where
the petitioner raised a facial challenge to the Bureau's implementation of the statutes and
regulations governing application of an inmate's FSA time credit and it appeared “very
likely that the outcome of any further appeals to the Regional Director or the Office of
General Counsel would have been consistent with the adverse decisions.”).
Respondent requests dismissal of the Petition because Petitioner did not exhaust his
administrative remedies. (Doc. 15 at pp. 6-8.) While Petitioner claims that he exhausted
his administrative remedies he also alleges that “[d]ue to the time frame and injunction,
other remidies (sic) were not reasonibly (sic) availible (sic).” (Doc. 8 at p. 4.) Attachments
to the Petition support a finding that Petitioner attempted only the informal resolution of
his grievance by submitting to the Bureau a document that he styled a BP-8. See (Doc. 8-1
at pp. 1-2 (letter style grievance characterized as a BP-8). The Declaration of Lori Mitchell
submitted by Respondent establishes that Petitioner has not filed any administrative
remedies or appeals through the Bureau’s Administrative Remedy Program. (Doc. 15-1 at
p. 6, ¶¶ 15-17.)
Considering the foregoing, this Court determines that a fair interpretation of the
record supports a finding that Petitioner completed the first step of the Bureau’s
Administrative Remedy Program. However, Respondent has established that Petitioner did
complete all levels of the Bureau’s Administrative Remedy Program. As such, Respondent
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has not had an opportunity to first address the Petition’s allegation.
Respondent’s evidence establishes that on March 30, 2025, Petitioner was referred
to RRC placement by Warden Edwardo Gutierrez. In his referral, Warden Guiterrez stated,
in relevant part, that Petitioner “is being referred to 365 days under SCA Conditional
Placement days . . He [is eligible] for Direct Home Confinement (HC) . . . He is eligible
for Federal Time Credits (FTC) and has earned 475 days of time credits [and] he has earned
110 days of FTC days towards RRC/HC [and has a] current Conditional Transition to
Community Date of 09-25-2025.” (Doc. 15-1 at pp. 58-59.) Considering the foregoing,
the Unit Team requested a September 25, 2025, RRC placement for Petitioner. Id.
On May 27, 2025, Petitioner’s Unit Manager sent an inquiry on Petitioner’s behalf
asking if Petitioner’s “RRC date: 08/05/2026, for Vol of America, Ft. Worth, is correct[.]”
Id. at p. 8, ¶ 30 & at p. 61. The next day, Dallas RRM responded, “The date is correct. He
is receiving his full FSA of 365 and 65 days of SCA. The RRC has minimum bed space.”
Id.
There appears to be a discrepancy between Warden Gutierrez’s representation of
Petitioner’s FSA and SCA time credit and Dallas RRM’s representation of Petitioner’s
FSA and SCA time credit. Compare Doc. 15-1 at p. 59 (representing Petitioner is being
referred for 365 SCA days, that he has earned 475 days of time credit, and 110 days of time
credit towards RRC/HC), with Id. at p. 61 (representing Petitioner is receiving “his full”
365 days of FSA and 65 days of SCA). This Court finds that the Bureau should have the
opportunity at the administrative level to communicate with Petitioner concerning its
calculation of his FSA and SCA time credit. Accordingly, this Court determines that the
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administrative exhaustion requirement should not be waived and recommends that the
Petition also be dismissed because of Petitioner’s failure to exhaust his administrative
remedies.
RECOMMENDATION
For the foregoing reasons, the Magistrate Judge RECOMMENDS that the district
court enter an order DENYING the Petition (Doc. 1).
Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(b)(2), any party may serve and file
written objections within fourteen days of being served with a copy of the Report and
Recommendation. A party may respond to the other party=s objections within fourteen
days. No reply shall be filed unless leave is granted by the district court. If objections are
not timely filed, they may be deemed waived. Failure to file timely objections to any factual
or legal determination of the Magistrate Judge may be considered a waiver of a party's right
to de novo consideration of the issues. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114,
1121 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc). If objections are filed, the parties should use the following
case number: CV-25-278-SHR.
Dated this 22nd day of January, 2026.
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