Redditt v. Gutierrez

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WO
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA
Jason C Redditt,
Petitioner,
v.
M. Gutierrez,
Respondent.
No. CV-25-00030-TUC-AMM (BGM)
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
On January 21, 2025, Petitioner Jason C. Redditt, who is currently incarcerated with
the Federal Bureau of Prisons (Bureau) and housed at the United States Penitentiary in
Tucson, Arizona (USP-Tucson), filed a Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus Under
28 U.S.C. § 2241. (Doc. 1.) Redditt raises multiple grounds for relief in his petition,
alleging that Bureau officials acted in an arbitrary and capricious manner to deprive him of
his good conduct time. (Id. at 6.) Redditt requests that the Court excuse him from the
PLRA’s exhaustion requirement, find that Bureau officials acted in an arbitrary and
capricious manner to impermissibly find him guilty of a jailhouse violation, and order the
Bureau to restore 41 days of lost good conduct time. (Id. at 7.)
Under LRCiv 72.1 and 72.2, Redditt’s petition was referred to Magistrate Judge
Bruce G. Macdonald for a report and recommendation. (Doc. 10 at 3.) Upon review of
the parties’ briefs and relevant documentary evidence, the Magistrate Judge recommends
that the District Judge, after her independent review, deny Redditt’s petition and dismiss
with prejudice this case.
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BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY1
Jason Redditt is currently serving an aggregate 845-month term of imprisonment
for various federal crimes, including carjacking and firearm offenses. (Doc. 16-1 at 11-
12.) Redditt has been housed at USP-Tucson since December 22, 2020, (id. at 17), and is
projected to be released from Bureau custody on September 20, 2060, (id. at 10).
On February 16, 2024, Bureau Special Investigative Services (SIS) technician
Baeza intercepted an incoming certified mail package addressed to inmate Redditt. (Id. at
27, 30.) The technician then performed a NIK2 test on a sheet of paper from the package,
which tested positive for morphine. (Id. at 30-31.) Based on the positive NIK test results,
another SIS technician, technician Islas, initiated an investigation. (Id. at 27.)
The investigation revealed that Redditt was in contact with a former Bureau inmate
via email and telephone. (Id.) On February 6, 2024, Redditt had emailed the former inmate
and mentioned he was waiting on a motion from the former inmate for a sentence reduction.
(Doc. 16-4 at 5.) Two days later, the former inmate confirmed that he sent the motion and
exhibits via certified mail to the institution the previous night. (Id.) SIS corroborated that
the package was sent via certified mail on February 7, 2024, the same day the former inmate
claimed. (Doc. 16-1 at 24.) The return address on the package listed the former inmate’s
full name and former federal inmate registration number. (Id.) On February 28, 2024,
Redditt phoned the former inmate to inform him that he was placed in the Special Housing
Unit (SHU) because of the package he received from the former inmate. (Id.)
On April 2, 2024, technician Islas authored Incident Report No. 3917560. (Doc.
16-1 at 27.) Redditt received a copy of the report the following day. (Id.) Lieutenant
Karlan, the investigating officer, advised Redditt of his rights concerning the disciplinary
1 The information in the background section is given in the light most favorable to Redditt.
See Porter v. Ollison, 620 F.3d 952, 956 (9th Cir. 2010) (reciting facts in light favorable
to petitioner).
2 Narcotics Identification Kit. See Torres v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, No. 2:19-CV-2015
DB P, 2020 WL 469347, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 29, 2020) (“[P]laintiff was charged with
possession of narcotics after a NIK (Narcotics Identification Kit) tested positive on pieces
of cardstock found in plaintiff’s property.”).
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process and Redditt was given an opportunity to make a statement. (Id. at 29.) Redditt
declined to make a statement or present evidence at that time. (Id.) Following the
investigation, the Bureau charged Redditt with attempted introduction of drugs/alcohol,
criminal mail abuse, and criminal phone abuse. (Id. at 27.) Lieutenant Karlan then referred
the matter to the Unit Disciplinary Committee (UDC) for further processing. (Id. at 29.)
On April 5, 2024, the UDC conducted a hearing of the incident in question. (Id. at
28.) During the hearing, Redditt requested that his phone calls starting back from
December be reviewed again and asserted the calls were based on his sentence reduction
and that there was no talk or code about the introduction of drugs. (Id.) Based on the
evidence, the UDC referred the incident to the DHO for further consideration. (Id.) The
same day, Redditt signed copies of a Notice of Discipline Hearing Before the DHO and
Inmate Rights at Discipline Hearing forms. (Id. at 40-41, 44.)
On June 6, 2024, DHO Padgett conducted a discipline hearing. (Id. at 22-26.)
Redditt was present at the hearing along with his designated staff representative Unit
Manager Stangl. (Id. at 22.) After being advised of the charges against him and his due
process rights, Redditt denied the charges and provided a written statement. (Id. at 23, 33-
34.) In the statement, Redditt asserted that he had been working with a former Bureau
inmate since December 2023, preparing a motion for compassionate release. (Id. at 33.)
Redditt stated he instructed the former inmate to send the motion via certified mail because
“games are played with the regular mail.” (Id.) Redditt admitted he vented his frustrations
to the former inmate on the phone because he was accused of something he would never
do. (Id. at 34.) Redditt also claimed that the phone calls and emails used in the incident
report were made to look like he was attempting to introduce drugs, while the calls, if
listened to in their entirety, would not reflect that he engaged in criminal activity. (Id.)
At the hearing, Redditt also submitted a written inmate-witness statement. (Id. at
23, 39.) The inmate asserted that he was present on March 7, 2024, when Reddit also
received legal mail. (Id. at 39.) The witness testified that, on that date, Redditt repeatedly
told staff they could keep the original document if they made a copy for him. (Id.)
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Unit Manager Stangl, Redditt’s designated staff representative, also provided a
statement at the discipline hearing. (Id. at 22.) Stangl stated that she listened to phone
calls pertaining to the investigation at Redditt’s request. (Id.) She confirmed that Redditt
had been receiving calls since December 2023, concerning his legal paperwork. (Id.)
Stangl also provided a separate statement to the DHO in which she asserted she had listened
to the phone calls outlined in the incident report and that they were consistent with section
11 of the report. (Id.) Section 11 of the incident report states, in pertinent part:
On February 28, 2024, Reddit completed a phone call to [redacted] phone
number [redacted]. During the phone call, Redditt told [redacted] that he is
housed in the Special Housing Unit due to the article of mail he received
from [redacted]. He further advised [redacted] that the article of mail had
[redacted] full name and his BOP registration number, in which gave SIS
staff all the information needed to correlate it with the outside caller sending
the drugs. Redditt further stated, I would have never tried getting drugs under
my name.
(Doc. 16-1 at 27.)
After consideration and a thorough review of the evidence, DHO Padgett found that
Redditt committed the prohibited act of attempted introduction of drugs. (Id. at 24-25.)
DHO Padgett also found that Redditt did not commit the other charged prohibited acts of
criminal mail abuse and criminal phone abuse because the charges were largely duplicative
of the attempted introduction charge. (Id. at 25.) In reaching his findings, the DHO relied
on the information in the incident report, the NIK test, a staff memorandum, the SIS
investigation, the inmate-witness statement, Redditt’s witness statement, the staff
representative statement, and photo evidence forms. (Id. at 24.) As a result of the culpable
finding associated with the drug violation, DHO Padgett imposed the following sanctions
against Redditt: (a) 41 days loss of good conduct time; (b) 180 days loss of personal
telephone privileges; and (c) 180 days loss of personal email privileges. (Id. at 25.)
The day after the hearing, Redditt received a copy of the DHO’s report, which
included his written findings and conclusions. (Id. at 26.) The report also detailed the
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reasons for the sanctions against Redditt. (Id. at 25-26.) Redditt was advised of his right
to appeal the DHO’s findings and conclusions within twenty (20) calendar days through
the administrative remedy procedure. (Id. at 26.)
On January 21, 2025, Redditt filed the petition at hand. (Doc. 1.) On August 20,
2025, the Bureau filed its return and answer. (Doc. 16.) On October 9, 2025, Redditt filed
his reply. (Doc. 20.) While Redditt’s petition was pending, he also filed a motion for leave
to file declaration, a proposed declaration, a second motion for temporary restraining order,
a motion for entry of default, and a motion to expand the record. (Docs. 21, 22, 25, 26,
28.3) This Report and Recommendation follows.
LEGAL STANDARD
A district court may grant habeas relief when a petitioner is in custody in “violation
of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3).
Generally, motions to contest the legality of a sentence are filed under § 2255 in the
sentencing court, while petitions that challenge the manner, location, or conditions of a
sentence’s execution are brought under § 2241 in the custodial court. Hernandez v.
Campbell, 204 F.3d 861, 864 (9th Cir. 2000). An inmate may obtain relief under § 2241
for the loss of good time credits if the prison disciplinary proceeding did not comply with
due process of law. Bostic v. Carlson, 884 F.2d 1267, 1269 (9th Cir. 1989), overruled on
other grounds by Nettles v. Grounds, 830 F.3d 922 (9th Cir. 2016) (en banc). This is
because the loss of good time credits may affect the duration of the inmate’s confinement.
See Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 487-88 (1973) (ruling that inmates’ suit seeking
restoration of good time credits was “within the core of habeas corpus in attacking the very
duration of their physical confinement”). A petitioner bears the burden of proving that he
is being held contrary to constitutional mandates by a preponderance of the evidence.
Skaftouros v. United States, 667 F.3d 144, 158 (2d Cir. 2011); Lambert v. Blodgett, 393
F.3d 943, 969 n.16 (9th Cir. 2004).
3 The Court addresses these motions at the end of its analysis.
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DISCUSSION
Redditt brings his § 2241 petition raising three grounds for habeas relief. (Doc. 1
at 6.) He contends that: (i) DHO Padgett’s finding was not supported by adequate evidence;
(ii) Bureau officials made the inmate grievance procedure unavailable to him; and (iii) Unit
Manager Stangl, and all others associated with the investigation and discipline hearing of
his incident report, used a capricious discipline proceeding to deprive him of good conduct
time. (Id.) Redditt requests that the Court “excuse him from the PLRA,” find that Bureau
officials engaged in arbitrary and capricious conduct during his appeal, find that technician
Islas filed a misleading report, and order the Bureau to restore his good conduct time. (Id.
at 7.) While the Court finds that the Bureau fails to demonstrate available administrative
remedies and waives the prudential exhaustion requirement, it concludes that the DHO’s
finding was supported by sufficient evidence, an unavailable grievance procedure fails to
constitute a due process violation, it lacks the authority to evaluate the credibility of
disciplinary witnesses, and Redditt was provided with an impartial DHO. The Court also
finds that none of Redditt’s post-petition motions entitle him to injunctive or habeas relief.
Redditt’s petition should therefore be denied and this case dismissed.
I. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies
“As a prudential matter, courts require that habeas petitioners exhaust all available
judicial and administrative remedies before seeking relief under § 2241.” Ward v. Chavez,
678 F.3d 1042, 1045 (9th Cir. 2012) (citation omitted). If a petitioner fails to exhaust
prudentially required administrative remedies, courts are instructed to either dismiss the
petition without prejudice or stay the proceedings until the petitioner exhausts his remedies.
Hernandez v. Sessions, 872 F.3d 976, 988 (9th Cir. 2017).
However, an inmate is “required to exhaust only available remedies,” Albino v.
Baca, 747 F.3d 1162, 1171 (9th Cir. 2014), abrogated in part on other grounds by Perttu
v. Richards, 605 U.S. 460, 475 (2025), and administrative remedies may be functionally
unavailable where: (i) the administrative procedure operates as a dead end—with officers
unwilling to provide any relief to aggrieved inmates; (ii) an administrative scheme is so
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opaque that it becomes incapable of use; or (iii) prison administrators thwart inmates from
taking advantage of a grievance process through machination, misrepresentation, or
intimidation, Ross v. Blake, 578 U.S. 632, 643-44 (2016). This list is non-exhaustive and
there are other limited circumstances that render administrative remedies unavailable,
including the failure of prison officials to properly process a prisoner’s timely filed
grievance. Andres v. Marshall, 867 F.3d 1076, 1078-79 (9th Cir. 2017). Because failure
to exhaust administrative remedies is an affirmative defense, it is the defendant’s burden
to prove that there was an available administrative remedy that the prisoner did not exhaust.
Albino, 747 F.3d at 1172. Once the defendant has carried that burden, the burden shifts to
the prisoner to come forward with evidence “showing that there is something in his
particular case that made the existing and generally available administrative remedies
effectively unavailable to him.” Id.
A. Prudential Exhaustion Requirement Waived
The Court interprets Redditt’s second ground for habeas relief both as an assertion
that administrative remedies were unavailable to him in the administrative exhaustion
context and as a separate substantive ground for habeas relief. (See Doc. 1 at 6.)
In ground two of the petition, Redditt asserts that his due process rights were
violated during his appeal of the DHO’s decision because the Bureau’s Regional and
Central Offices allegedly engaged in conduct that made the inmate grievance procedure
unavailable. (Id.) Redditt supports the assertion with reference to section 12 of Bureau
Program Statement 1330.18 and 28 C.F.R. § 542.18, (id.), which provide guidance on
Bureau response time to inmate grievance requests and appeals, see 28 C.F.R. § 542.18;
Bureau Program Statement 1330.18.4 Redditt states that he accepted the “Regional
Office’s non-response in the time allotted (30 days) as a denial” and filed his BP-11 to the
Central Office. (Doc. 1 at 6.) Redditt then asserts that the Central Office rejected his BP-
11 “to try to cure the Regional Office’s default/due process violation and [backdated] their
4 United States Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Prisons, Administrative Remedy
Program (2014), https://www.bop.gov/policy/progstat/1330_018.pdf.
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response.” (Id.)
The Bureau, on the other hand, limits its response to Redditt’s second ground for
habeas relief to asserting that the claim is inactionable. (See Doc. 16 at 13.) As it concerns
Redditt’s contention that administrative remedies were unavailable to him in the exhaustion
context, the Bureau responds by dropping a footnote denying the allegation and asserting
that the “record shows that [it] afforded [Redditt] extended deadlines as well as remarks on
how to submit a proper appeal.” (Id. at n.2.) By interpreting Redditt’s petition too
narrowly, however, the Bureau abandons its burden of demonstrating there was an
available administrative remedy that Redditt failed to exhaust. (See id.)
While the Bureau includes a summary of Redditt’s grievance history as it concerns
his habeas claims, (see Doc. 16 at 6-8), it fails to link the summary to any cogent argument
that Redditt failed to exhaust administrative remedies prior to filing suit, (see id.). It is not
the Court’s responsibility to sift through the Bureau’s brief and exhibits and construct a
failure to exhaust argument, see Indep. Towers of Washington v. Washington, 350 F.3d
925, 929 (9th Cir. 2003) (reiterating that the court cannot manufacture a party’s arguments
and that a “bare assertion of an issue does not preserve a claim”), and the Bureau’s footnote
is insufficient to meet its burden to demonstrate there was an available administrative
remedy that Redditt failed to exhaust, see Albino, 747 F.3d at 1176 (concluding that
defendants failed to carry their initial burden of proving their affirmative exhaustion
defense). The Court therefore waives the prudential exhaustion requirement and proceeds
to the merits of Redditt’s petition.
II. Due Process Requirements In Disciplinary Hearings
Under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause, a prisoner is entitled to
certain due process protections when he is charged with a disciplinary violation. Wolff v.
McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 564-71 (1974). “Due process in a prison disciplinary hearing is
satisfied if the inmate receives written notice of the charges, and a statement of the evidence
relied on by the prison officials and the reasons for disciplinary action.” Zimmerlee v.
Keeney, 831 F.2d 183, 186 (9th Cir. 1987) (citation omitted). The inmate also has a limited
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right to call witnesses and to present documentary evidence “when permitting him to do so
would not unduly threaten institutional safety and goals.” Id. Finally, “[f]indings that
result in the loss of liberty will satisfy due process if there is some evidence which supports
the decisions of the disciplinary board.” (Id.)
A. “Some Evidence” Standard
In Redditt’s first ground for habeas relief, he asserts that the DHO’s disciplinary
finding was “not supported by adequate evidence.” (Doc. 1 at 6.) Redditt adds that the
incident report was drafted in a misleading manner to give the appearance of misconduct.
(Id.) Redditt asks the Court to find that the incident report was created using exaggerations,
misstatements, and concealed material facts, and that the Court restore his good conduct
time. (Id. at 7.) The Court finds that the “some evidence” standard has been satisfied and
that Redditt’s first ground for habeas relief should be denied.
Ascertaining whether the “some evidence” standard is satisfied “does not require
examination of the entire record, independent assessment of the credibility of witnesses, or
weighing of the evidence. Instead, the relevant question is whether there is any evidence
in the record that could support the conclusion reached by the disciplinary board.” Lane v.
Salazar, 911 F.3d 942, 951 (9th Cir. 2018) (quoting Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445,
455-56 (1985)). This standard is “minimally stringent,” and “evidence only must bear
some indicia of reliability to be considered some evidence.” Castro v. Terhune, 712 F.3d
1304, 1314 (9th Cir. 2013). Evidence may also qualify as some evidence even “if it does
not logically preclude any conclusion but the one reached.” Id. A prison administrative
decision may be overturned only if “no reasonable adjudicator could have found the inmate
guilty of the offense on the basis of the evidence presented.” Diaz v. Gunther, No. CV 24-
03210, 2025 WL 4051894, at *7 (D. Ariz. Dec. 3, 2025) (citing Henderson v. U.S. Parole
Comm’n, 13 F.3d 1073, 1077 (7th Cir. 1994)).
B. Some Evidence Supports Disciplinary Finding
Here, there is sufficient evidence in the record to support the DHO’s finding that
Redditt attempted to introduce drugs into the institution. The record indicates that: (i)
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Redditt initiated email contact with a former inmate asking the inmate to send him mail,
(Doc. 16-4 at 5); (ii) Redditt previously instructed the former inmate to only send him
certified mail, (Doc. 16-1 at 33); (iii) the former inmate indicated he would be sending the
mail certified, (Doc. 16-4 at 5); (iv) the former inmate confirmed he sent the information
via certified mail on February 7, 2024, (id.); (v) Bureau officials intercepted and tested the
mail for narcotics, (Doc. 16-1 at 30-32); (vi) paper in the mail tested positive for morphine,
(id. at 30); (vii) Redditt called and complained to the former inmate that he was sent to the
SHU for attempting to introduce drugs, (id. at 27); (viii) during the call, Redditt advised
the former inmate that the inmate included his full name and former registration number in
the return address, which gave SIS staff all the information needed to correlate it with the
outside caller sending drugs, (id.); and (ix) during the call, Redditt vented to the former
inmate that he would never have tried to obtain drugs using his own name, (id.). This
evidence is more than sufficient to satisfy the “some evidence” standard, and Redditt’s first
ground for habeas relief should be denied.
III. No Due Process Violation For Unavailable Grievance Procedure
As previously mentioned, Redditt’s second ground for habeas relief is based on the
assertion that his due process rights were violated during the grievance appeal process by
Bureau officials who made the grievance procedure unavailable to him. (Doc. 1 at 6.)
Redditt asserts the officials violated their own program statement by rejecting his grievance
appeal in an attempt to cure their own procedural mistakes. (Id.) The Court finds that even
if Bureau officials violated their own program statement by failing to respond to Redditt’s
grievance appeals in a timely manner, such violations fail to constitute valid grounds upon
which a § 2241 habeas petition may be granted,5 and Redditt’s second ground for habeas
relief should be denied.
5 This is not to say that an obfuscated administrative grievance procedure will preclude a
prisoner from bringing a § 2241 habeas petition. See Ross v. Blake, 578 U.S. 632, 644
(2016) (cleaned up) (“When rules are so confusing that no reasonable prisoner can use
them, then they're no longer available.”). Rather, an unavailable prison grievance
procedure, standing alone, is not a sufficient ground for § 2241 habeas relief. Ramirez v.
Galaza, 334 F.3d 850, 860 (9th Cir. 2003).
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The Ninth Circuit has repeatedly concluded that a failure by the Bureau to follow
its own program statements is not a cognizable ground for § 2241 habeas relief. See, e.g.,
Martin v. United States, No. 23-4037, 2025 WL 1662682, at *1 (9th Cir. June 12, 2025)
(citing Reeb v. Thomas, 636 F.3d 1224, 1227 (9th Cir. 2011)) (“[A]ny claim that the
B[ureau] violated its own program statements is not cognizable in a § 2241 habeas
petition.”). It has also instructed that a prisoner’s claim that Bureau officials “added
things” to an appeal to “mask [its] procedural errors” fails to establish the deprivation of a
liberty interest because “inmates lack a separate constitutional entitlement to a specific
prison grievance procedure.” Ramirez v. Galaza, 334 F.3d 850, 860 (9th Cir. 2003).
Redditt’s second ground for habeas relief should therefore be denied.
IV. Redditt Provided With Unbiased Decisionmaker
Redditt’s third ground for habeas relief is based on the assertion that Bureau staff
associated with the investigation of the incident report and discipline hearing used a
capricious disciplinary proceeding to deprive him of his good time credits. (Doc. 1 at 6.)
Redditt adds that Unit Manager Stangl, who was supposed to help him obtain and present
evidence before and during the disciplinary hearing, actually helped technician Islas and
the DHO find him guilty based on inadequate facts. (Id.) Redditt contends that Stangl also
failed to report employee conduct violations by all officers involved. (Id.)
The Court finds that to the extent Redditt challenges the sufficiency of the evidence
upon which he was found to be culpable, it has already concluded that the DHO’s finding
was based on sufficient evidence. The Court also finds that to the extent Redditt alleges
Bureau personnel, separate from the DHO, were biased in their participation of the
disciplinary process, the Court is not required to independently assess the credibility of
witnesses to ensure the proceeding comported with due process requirements. See Lane,
911 F.3d at 951 (ruling that the “some evidence” standard does not require “independent
assessment of the credibility of witnesses”). Finally, the Court concludes that Redditt fails
to demonstrate that the DHO was a victim, witness, investigator, or otherwise significantly
involved in the incident; that the DHO relied on knowledge outside the prison disciplinary
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proceedings to make his findings; or that the DHO displayed deep-seated and unequivocal
antagonism that would render fair judgment impossible. See 28 C.F.R. § 541.8(b) (“The
DHO will be an impartial decision maker who was not a victim, witness, investigator, or
otherwise significantly involved in the incident.”); Burgess v. Rios, No. 1:12-CV-00544,
2015 WL 3402933, at *6 (E.D. Cal. May 27, 2015) (citing Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35,
46-47 (1975)) (“There is a presumption of honesty and integrity on the part of decision
makers which may be overcome by evidence of a risk of actual bias or prejudgment based
on special facts and circumstances.”); Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 555-56 (1994)
(instructing that bias is shown only when a decisionmaker “relies upon knowledge outside
the prison disciplinary proceedings” or displays “deep-seated and unequivocal antagonism
that would render fair judgment impossible”). Redditt’s third ground for habeas relief
should therefore be denied and the petition dismissed in its entirety.
V. Miscellaneous Motions
Redditt filed a number of motions after his petition was fully briefed and pending
resolution. (See Docs. 21, 25, 26, 28.) The Court addresses these motions in turn.
A. Motion to Add Declaration
On October 24, 2025, nine months after Redditt filed his petition and fifteen days
after he filed his reply, Redditt filed a Motion to Add Petitioner’s Declaration and a
proposed lodged Declaration. (Docs. 21, 22.) In the motion, Redditt requests that the Court
allow the declaration to be added to his petition “along with exhibit (F) of memorandum
of law.” (Doc. 21 at 1.) Notably, the motion fails to include an Exhibit F or a memorandum
of law. (See generally id.) Moreover, Redditt’s declaration proclaims his innocence and
reiterates the arguments made in his petition. (See Doc. 22.)
“The abuse of the writ doctrine forbids the reconsideration of claims that were or
could have been raised in a prior habeas petition.” Eldridge v. Howard, 70 F.4th 543, 551
(9th Cir. 2023) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Under the doctrine, “a
successive petition that raises identical grounds for relief as a prior petition must be
dismissed unless the petitioner can show (1) cause for bringing a successive petition and
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that prejudice would result or (2) that a fundamental miscarriage of justice would result
from failure to entertain the claim.” Alaimalo v. United States, 645 F.3d 1042, 1049 (9th
Cir. 2011). Redditt’s declaration raises identical grounds for relief as his initial petition
and Redditt fails to demonstrate cause for bringing the successive motion and that prejudice
or a fundamental miscarriage of justice would result from failing to entertain his claims.
(See Docs. 21, 22.) Even if the Court were to consider the claims in Redditt’s declaration,
nothing in the declaration alters the Court’s findings and recommendations concerning his
petition. Redditt’s motion to add declaration should therefore be denied.
B. Second Motion For Temporary Restraining Order
On December 9, 2025, shortly after District Judge Martinez denied his first motion
for temporary restraining order, (see Doc. 24), Redditt filed a letter with the Court, which
the Court interprets as a second motion for temporary restraining order, (see Doc. 25). In
his motion, Redditt requests that the Court order the Bureau to deliver to him family
pictures and religious books that were sent to the institution, a declaration allegedly sent
by the former Bureau inmate who mailed Redditt the illegal narcotics for which he was
disciplined, to resend a motion for compassionate release that allegedly never made it to
the intended recipient, to unblock certain family members from contacting him, and to
comply with other requests for injunctive relief. (See Doc. 25.) The Court finds that
Redditt requests relief that is not of the same character as the relief that may be granted
finally and recommends that his second motion for temporary restraining order be denied.
A plaintiff seeking a temporary restraining order (TRO) must satisfy the same legal
standard governing preliminary injunctions, including establishing each of the following
elements: (i) a likelihood of success on the merits, (ii) a likelihood of irreparable injury if
injunctive relief is not granted, (iii) a balance of hardships favoring the moving party, and
(iv) an advancement of the public interest. See Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, 555 U.S.
7, 20 (2008). For a prisoner to be entitled to a TRO or a preliminary injunction, “there
must be a relationship between the injury claimed in the motion for injunctive relief and
the conduct asserted in the underlying complaint.” Pac. Radiation Oncology, LLC v.
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Queens Med. Ctr., 810 F.3d 631, 636 (9th Cir. 2015). This relationship is established
where the TRO would grant “relief of the same character as that which may be granted
finally.” Id. (quoting De Beers Consol. Mines v. United States, 325 U.S. 212, 220 (1945)).
Absent such a relationship or nexus, district courts lack authority to grant emergency
injunctive relief. Pac. Radiation Oncology, 810 F.3d at 636; see also LA All. for Hum. Rts.
v. Cnty. of L.A., 14 F.4th 947, 956 (9th Cir. 2021) (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted) (explaining that a district court may grant injunctive relief only on “the merits of
the case or controversy before it, and does not have the authority to issue an injunction
based on claims not pled in the complaint”).
Here, Redditt’s second motion for temporary restraining order is unrelated to the
factual allegations and legal claims outlined in his § 2241 habeas petition. (Compare Doc.
1 at 6-7 with Doc. 25 at 1-4.) Moreover, the relief that Redditt seeks in his second TRO is
not of the same character that which may be granted finally, which is the restoration of his
good conduct time. (See Doc. 1 at 7.) To the extent Redditt seeks injunctive relief to
receive a declaration from the former inmate who sent him illegal drugs, he fails to argue,
much less demonstrate, that he satisfies any of the requisite Winter factors. (See Doc. 25.)
Redditt also fails to support his allegations with an affidavit as required by Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 65(b)(1). As such, the Court lacks the authority to grant Redditt’s second
motion for injunctive relief and his request should be denied.
C. Declaration for Entry of Default
On December 9, 2025, the same day he filed his second TRO motion, Redditt filed
a Declaration for Entry of Default. (Doc. 26.) In the declaration, Redditt asserts that “more
than 20 days” have passed since the Bureau was served with a copy of his reply and it has
failed to “answer or otherwise defend as [to his] response.” (Id. at 1.) Redditt adds that
the Bureau is not “in the military service” and is not an “infant[ ] or incompetent[ ].” (Id.
at 2.) The Bureau responded six days later, informing Redditt that it was neither authorized
nor required to file a sur-reply to his reply and requesting that his motion for entry of default
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be denied. (Doc. 27.) The Court agrees with the Bureau and recommends that Redditt’s
declaration for entry of default be denied.
“Default may be entered when a party has failed to plead or otherwise defend an
action.” Cowen v. Aurora Loan Servs., No. CIV 10-452, 2010 WL 3342196, at *1 (D. Ariz.
Aug. 25, 2010) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(a)). “However, default cannot be entered unless
documentation establishes that a defendant has been served with a summons and complaint
(or has agreed to waive service), the time allowed for responding has expired, and
defendant has failed to file a pleading or motion permitted by law.” Cowen, 2010 WL
3342196, at *1 (citation omitted). The term “otherwise defend” is understood to include
motions attacking service, motions to dismiss, motions for bills of particulars, or motions
for summary judgment. Id.
The Court’s June 24, 2025 Service Order instructs the Bureau to answer Redditt’s
petition “within 20 days of the date of service,” and allows Redditt an optional “30 days
from the date of service of the answer” to file a reply. (Doc. 10 at 3.) There is no provision
in the District of Arizona’s Local Rules or the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure permitting
a party opposing a § 2241 petition to file a sur-reply. See Burgess v. Shinn, No. CV-21-
01164, 2022 WL 2341218, at *1 (D. Ariz. June 29, 2022) (“[N]either the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure nor the District’s Local Rules entitle a party to a sur-reply as a matter of
right.”) In fact, “sur-replies are highly disfavored and permitted only in extraordinary
circumstances.” Finley v. Maricopa Cnty. Sheriff's Off., No. CV-14-02609, 2016 WL
777700, at *1 n.1 (D. Ariz. Feb. 29, 2016). Redditt’s declaration for entry of default should
therefore be denied.
D. Motion to Expand Record
On March 13, 2026, Redditt filed a Motion to Expand Record Pursuant to Rule 7 of
the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States District Courts. (Doc. 28.)
In the motion, Redditt expands on the same grounds for relief offered in his initial petition
and raises new arguments in an attempt to demonstrate that the prison disciplinary
proceedings violated his due process rights. (See id. at 11-25.) Redditt also includes
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exhibits that have already been considered or have been rejected by the Court. (See Doc.
28-1 at 1-16.) Redditt’s motion to expand the record should be denied.
“The Rules Governing Section 2254 Proceedings are applicable to petitions for writs
of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241.” Muktar v. Gurule, No. CV-16-4028, 2017 WL
2414574, at *1 n.1 (D. Ariz. May 9, 2017) (citing Rule 1(b) of the Rules Governing Section
2254 Cases). Rule 7 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases provides:
(a) In General. If the petition is not dismissed, the judge may direct the
parties to expand the record by submitting additional materials relating to the
petition. The judge may require that these materials be authenticated.
(b) Types of Materials. The materials that may be required include letters
predating the filing of the petition, documents, exhibits, and answers under
oath to written interrogatories propounded by the judge. Affidavits may also
be submitted and considered as part of the record.
(c) Review by the Opposing Party. The judge must give the party against
whom the additional materials are offered an opportunity to admit or deny
their correctness.
SECT 2254 Rule 7. “The purpose of Rule 7 is to enable the judge to dispose of some
habeas petitions not dismissed on the pleadings, without the time and expense required for
an evidentiary hearing.” Williams v. Schriro, 423 F. Supp. 2d 994, 1002 (D. Ariz. 2006)
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
Here, there is no need to expand the record because the grounds for relief outlined
in Redditt’s petition are without merit and an evidentiary hearing is not necessary since the
existing record is sufficient to resolve Redditt’s claims. See Schriro v. Landrigan, 423 F.
Supp. 2d 994, 1003 (D. Ariz. 2006) (“[E]xpansion [of the record] is not warranted under
Rule 7 because the exhibits are not relevant.”); cf. Schurz v. Schriro, No. CV-97-580, 2007
WL 2808220, at *26 (D. Ariz. Sept. 25, 2007) (“Section 2254(e)(2), as amended by the
AEDPA, limits a petitioner’s ability to present new evidence through a Rule 7 motion to
expand the record.”). The exhibits Redditt offers have already been considered by the
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Court in recommending the denial of his petition and the denial of his request to add a
declaration. Redditt’s motion to expand record should therefore be denied.
RECOMMENDATION
For the aforementioned reasons, the Magistrate Judge recommends that the District
Judge, after her independent review, enter an order DENYING the Petition for a Writ of
Habeas Corpus Under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (Doc. 1); DENYING the Motion to Add
Petitioner’s Declaration (Doc. 21); DENYING the Declaration in Support of Temporary
Restraining Order (Doc. 25); DENYING the Declaration for Entry of Default (Doc. 26);
DENYING the Motion to Expand Record (Doc. 28); and DISMISSING WITH
PREJUDICE this case. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 72(b)(2), any party may serve and file written objections within fourteen (14)
days of being served with a copy of this Report and Recommendation, and a party may
respond to another party’s objections within (14) days after being served with a copy. No
replies shall be filed unless leave is granted by the District Judge. If objections are filed,
the parties should use the following case number: CV-25-30-TUC-AMM. Failure to file
timely objections to any of the Magistrate Judge’s factual or legal determinations may
result in waiver of the right of de novo review.
Dated this 27th day of March, 2026.
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