USA v. Flores-Mendivil

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WO
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA
United States of America,
Plaintiff,
v.
Mario Humberto Flores-Mendivil,
Defendant.
No. CR-25-01233-001-TUC-AMM
(EJM)
ORDER
On February 1, 2025, United States Border Patrol arrested Defendant Mario
Humberto Flores-Mendivil near Douglas, Arizona for suspected conspiracy to transport
illegal aliens. At the time of his arrest, Defendant was the driver and sole occupant of a
Chrysler 300 that appeared to be driving in tandem behind a Pontiac Torrent on State Route
80 (“SR 80”). United States Border Patrol conducted stops of both vehicles. Agent Dalton
Myers stopped Defendant’s Chrysler, and Agent Casey Sartin stopped the Pontiac. After a
search, agents found three undocumented noncitizens wearing camouflage in the back of
the Pontiac. Agents subsequently questioned the driver of the Pontiac who stated that
Defendant was involved in the transportation of the undocumented noncitizens.1
Pending before the Court is Defendant’s Motion to Suppress for Lack of Reasonable
Suspicion. (Doc. 50.) Defendant seeks to suppress evidence obtained after Agent Myers
1 The Court’s docket shows that the Pontiac driver, Alanus Marston, is not a charged co-
defendant in this case. Instead, an additional docket review shows that Ms. Marston was
charged, plead guilty, and was sentenced by this Court in 25-cr-01162-AMM-EJM to seven
months’ imprisonment on June 18, 2025.
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stopped his vehicle because, he argues, Agent Myers lacked reasonable suspicion. (Id. at
1.) The motion is fully briefed. (Docs. 50, 53, 57, 76, 84, 97.)
The motion was referred to Magistrate Judge Eric J. Markovich, who held an
evidentiary hearing on November 3, 2025. (Doc. 71.) On December 9, 2025, the Magistrate
Judge issued his Report and Recommendation (“R&R”) in which he recommended that the
Court grant Defendant’s Motion to Suppress for Lack of Reasonable Suspicion. (Doc. 76.)
In so doing, the Magistrate Judge concluded that the “instant motion turns on the credibility
of Agent Sartin’s testimony[,]” which the Magistrate Judge found to be “incredible on
important facts that led to [sic] him to conclude that he had a reasonable suspicion to stop
the vehicles.” (Id. at 13.)
On January 6, 2026, the Government filed written objections challenging the
Magistrate Judge’s recommendation to suppress and noting, in relevant part, that the
Magistrate Judge’s focus on Agent Sartin’s credibility minimized the fact that it was Agent
Myers—and not Agent Sartin—who stopped Defendant’s vehicle. (Doc. 84 at 17.) Because
the Government objected in part to the Magistrate Judge’s credibility finding as to Agent
Sartin, this Court conducted a de novo evidentiary hearing on January 22, 2026. (Doc. 101.)
After a de novo review of the parties’ briefing and the record, and for the reasons
stated herein, the Court will sustain the Government’s objection, reject the Magistrate
Judge’s recommendation, and deny the Motion to Suppress for Lack of Reasonable
Suspicion.
I. Standard of Review
The standard of review applied to a magistrate judge’s report and recommendation
depends on whether a party files objections. See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 149–50
(1985). A district court need not review “a magistrate’s factual or legal conclusions, under
a de novo or any other standard, when neither party objects to those findings.” Id. at 150.
If, however, a party objects, the district court “must determine de novo any part of
the magistrate judge’s disposition that has been properly objected to. The district judge
may accept, reject, or modify the recommended disposition; receive further evidence; or
return the matter to the magistrate judge with instructions.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3); 28
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U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C). Although the district court is not required to review an issue de
novo absent a proper objection, the statute “does not preclude further review by the district
judge, sua sponte or at the request of a party, under a de novo or any other standard.”
Thomas, 474 U.S. at 154.
Furthermore, “[u]nder the law of this circuit, a district court errs when it does not
conduct a de novo evidentiary hearing if it rejects the credibility finding of a magistrate
judge who recommends the granting of a motion to suppress.” United States v. Ridgway,
300 F.3d 1153, 1157 (9th Cir. 2002). Likewise, “a district court may not reject the factual
findings of a magistrate judge on a motion to suppress without conducting a de novo
evidentiary hearing.” Id. at 1155 (citing United States v. Bergera, 512 F.2d 391, 392–94
(9th Cir. 1975)).2
II. Facts
Agent Myers has approximately three and a half years of experience working mostly
in the border region near Douglas, Arizona. (Doc. 75 at 54; Doc. 107 at 41.) Agent Sartin
has more than 15 years of experience stationed in Douglas. (Doc. 107 at 10.)
At approximately 6:00 a.m. on Saturday, February 1, 2025, Agent Myers and Agent
Sartin were on duty and attended muster where they learned that a group of three to five
undocumented noncitizens was seen the day before in the mountains near SR 80. (Id. at
10–11, 41–43.) The group was reported between mile marker 392 and mile marker 400 on
SR 80, northeast of Douglas. (Id. at 42–44.)
Agent Myers testified that it is common for undocumented noncitizens to travel
through this area on foot and to wait overnight to be picked up by a vehicle. (Id. at 42, 54.)
Agent Sartin explained that groups travelling on the ridgeline coming from Mexico
typically wait to be picked up between mile marker 400 and mile marker 412 because the
canyons funnel them in that direction. (Id. at 12.)
Agent Myers further clarified that SR 80 is not generally a heavily trafficked
roadway and that there is little vehicle traffic on Saturdays. (Id. at 43.) Agent Sartin
2 The Magistrate Judge did not make separate findings of fact in this matter.
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explained that local ranchers constitute most of the sparse traffic on SR 80. (Id. at 13.)
At approximately 7:30 a.m., Agent Myers positioned himself at mile marker 384 to
wait for additional agents and search for the group. (Id. at 42–43.) From his position, Agent
Myers had a clear view of the highway. (Id. at 44.) Agent Myers then heard Agent Sartin
call over the radio that he was in pursuit of a Chrysler 300 driving in tandem behind a
Pontiac Torrent. (Id. at 15–16, 43–44.) Defendant was driving the Chrysler. (Doc. 50 at 3.)
The Chrysler had California plates, and the Pontiac had a temporary Arizona license plate.
(Doc. 107 at 16–19, 45.) Agent Myers heard Agent Sartin describe the vehicles and say
that “he was going to attempt to get behind the vehicle with the temp tags.” (Id. at 44.)
Agent Sartin began following the vehicles near mile marker 400. (Id. at 13.) He
testified that it was “highly suspicio[us]” for a vehicle with a temporary Arizona license
plate and a vehicle with California plates to be driving in tandem in that area. (Id. at 13–
16.) He first emphasized that driving in tandem is a common practice for smuggling
organizations because they use “scout” vehicles. (Id. at 16.) Agent Sartin also testified that
the temporary Arizona license plate raised his suspicions because smuggling organizations
commonly use “temp tags” and purchase “lower value vehicles as recruitment tools.” (Id.
at 16, 18.) He further explained that a California plate was suspicious in this duo because
“[t]here isn’t much reason . . . for a California plate coming westbound into the city of
Douglas.” (Id. at 16.)
After following the duo for more than ten miles, Agent Sartin entered the opposing
lane of traffic to pull up alongside both vehicles. (Id. at 17.) The vehicles were traveling at
a speed of about 65 miles per hour at this time, and there was still little traffic. (Id.) After
pulling up next to the vehicles, Agent Sartin then attempted to merge his patrol vehicle
between them. (Id. at 17, 19–20.) He testified, however, that it was difficult to get between
the two vehicles despite signaling his intent to do so because the Chrysler and Pontiac were
traveling only “a car length and a half” apart. (Id. at 20.) Agent Sartin explained that it was
“extremely unusual” that the Chrysler did not allow him to merge behind the Pontiac
because most vehicles “will give you the leeway and make room for you because . . . they
see [] a marked vehicle . . . .” (Id.)
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Agent Myers was still at mile marker 384 when he first observed the trio of vehicles
headed in his direction on SR 80. (Id. at 44.) Agent Myers “observed the first vehicle [the
Pontiac] with the temp tags and then Agent Sartin and then a Chrysler with California
plates behind him.” (Id.) When questioned if he had noticed anything unusual as the
vehicles passed, Agent Myers testified that he noticed the “Chrysler was directly behind
[Agent] Sartin” and that the Chrysler was “bumper to bumper” with Agent Sartin’s marked
Border Patrol vehicle. (Id. at 45.) Agent Myers found it unusual that the Chrysler was
tailgating a marked Border Patrol vehicle, noting that people do not typically drive
“extremely close” to Border Patrol vehicles. (Id.) Agent Myers also testified that the
Chrysler’s tailgating created safety concerns. (Id.) After the trio of vehicles passed his
location, Agent Myers pulled onto the highway and started driving behind the Chrysler.
(Id. at 45–46.)
Agent Myers then requested a records check on the Chrysler. (Id. at 46.) The radio
operator informed him that the Chrysler was registered “to a Mario Mendivil out of San
Jose, California . . . .” (Id.) Agent Myers found it “significant” that the Chrysler was
registered to an individual from California, rather than a rental company. (Id. at 46–47.)
He testified that “there’s nothing out there that would make any sense for somebody from
San Jose to need to be out there.” (Id. at 47.)
The radio operator also informed Agent Myers that the Chrysler crossed into the
United States through the Nogales Port of Entry that morning and passed through a Border
Patrol checkpoint on Interstate-19 (“I-19”) about an hour later.3 (Id. at 46, 48.) Agent Myers
found it unusual that the Chrysler would now be traveling on SR 80 because “if your end
destination was going to be Douglas, there would be no reason to ever go up I-19 to go to
I-10.” (Id. at 48–49.)
Agent Myers observed and followed the trio of vehicles for approximately eight
miles. (Id. at 55.) At that point, Agent Sartin reported over the radio that he intended to
3 After the traffic stop and subsequent investigation, Agent Myers learned this information
was incorrect and the Chrysler had instead entered the United States on approximately
January 31, 2025. (Doc. 107 at 49–50.) Agent Myers clarified that, at the time of the stop,
he “believed it had traveled that morning.” (Id. at 50.)
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stop the Pontiac. (Id. at 50.) Agent Myers radioed that he was going to stop the Chrysler.
(Id.) Agent Sartin pulled over the Pontiac and, approximately one mile later, Agent Myers
stopped the Chrysler in a “single agent vehicle stop.” (Id. at 50, 59–60.)
Agent Myers testified that he independently decided to conduct a stop of the
Chrysler based upon a number of factors, including the location of the vehicle; his belief
that the vehicle entered the United States at Nogales and drove through the I-19 checkpoint
earlier that morning thereby making its whereabouts at the time of the stop suspicious; the
fact that it was registered out of San Jose, California and was not a rental vehicle; and the
Chrysler’s unusual behavior tailgating a marked Border Patrol vehicle for several miles.
(Id. at 49, 58–59.) Agent Myers further testified that although it was a “simultaneous stop,”
it was “only simultaneous because of where [Agent Myers and Agent Sartin] were in
accordance with each other . . . [,]” and each agent conducted a separate, single agent
vehicle stop.4 (Id. at 59.)
III. Discussion
As a threshold matter, Defendant challenges the stop of his vehicle. (Doc. 50 at 1.)
The parties do not dispute that it was Agent Myers—and not Agent Sartin—who stopped
Defendant’s vehicle. (Doc. 50 at 1; Doc. 107 at 5.) As such, the only relevant legal issue is
whether Agent Myers had reasonable suspicion to stop the Chrysler.5 The Court finds that
4 At the de novo evidentiary hearing, Agent Sartin testified that he “announced over the
radio that we’d be conducting a stop on both of these vehicles roughly around mile marker
377.” (Doc. 107 at 24.) Agent Sartin further testified that in so doing, he “directed” Agent
Myers to pull over the Chrysler. (Id. at 40.) Notwithstanding this testimony, Agent Myers
testified that he stopped the Chrysler independent of Agent Sartin pulling over the Pontiac.
(Id. at 59.) Agent Myers testified that although he and Agent Sartin were acting “in
accordance with each other,” each agent was conducting a separate, single agent stop. (Id.)
The Magistrate Judge did not find Agent Myers’s testimony incredible, nor has either party
objected to Agent Myers’s credibility. The Court finds that Agent Myers’s testimony is
credible.
5 In this Court’s view, Agent Sartin’s credibility as to his stop of the Pontiac is largely
irrelevant as to whether Agent Myers had reasonable suspicion to stop the Chrysler.
Notably, the Magistrate Judge’s credibility finding as to Agent Sartin related almost
entirely to his reasonable suspicion for the stop of the Pontiac, specifically, his testimony
regarding window tint. (Doc. 79 at 13–15.) The Magistrate Judge found that Agent Sartin’s
testimony about the window tint was inconsistent and unreliable. (Id.) Because the Court
finds that reasonable suspicion for the stop of the Pontiac is irrelevant, the Court will not
reach these extraneous findings. Similarly, the Court would not and does not characterize
Agent Sartin’s formal discipline from 2018 as a “significant blemish on [his] record.” (Doc.
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he did.
Law enforcement officers may conduct an investigatory stop of a vehicle or person
if they are aware of facts leading to a “reasonable suspicion” that criminal activity is afoot.
See United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273 (2002). “[R]easonable suspicion exists when
an officer is aware of specific, articulable facts which, when considered with objective and
reasonable inferences, form a basis for particularized suspicion.” United States v. Montero-
Camargo, 208 F.3d 1122, 1129 (2000) (quoting United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 418
(1981)). “The reasonable-suspicion standard is not a particularly high threshold to reach.”
United States v. Valdes-Vega, 738 F.3d 1074, 1078 (9th Cir. 2013). Moreover, reasonable
suspicion may be based on the collective knowledge of all agents involved in the
investigation even when not all that information is communicated to the agent who
conducts the stop. United States v. Ramirez, 473 F.3d 1026, 1032 (9th Cir. 2007).
The Court “must look at the ‘totality of the circumstances’” when deciding whether
an officer had reasonable suspicion to conduct a stop. Valdes-Vega, 738 F.3d at 1078
(quoting Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 273); see also United States v. Cotterman, 709 F.3d 952, 970
(9th Cir. 2013) (“It is not our province to nitpick the factors in isolation but instead to view
them in the totality of the circumstances.”). “This process allows officers to draw on their
own experience and specialized training to make inferences from and deductions about the
cumulative information available to them that might well elude an untrained person.”
Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 273 (internal citations omitted). “It also precludes a ‘divide-and-
conquer analysis’ because even though each of the suspect’s ‘acts was perhaps innocent in
itself . . . taken together, they [may] warrant[] further investigation.’” Valdes-Vega, 738
F.3d at 1078 (quoting Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 274). “A determination that reasonable suspicion
exists . . . need not rule out the possibility of innocent conduct.” Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 277.
There are several factors that the Court may consider when deciding whether an
agent had reasonable suspicion to stop a vehicle in the border area. United States v.
Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 884–85 (1975). “Not all of these factors must be present or
76 at 13; Doc. 107 at 37.) Rather, as to Agent Sartin’s testimony at the de novo evidentiary
hearing, the Court finds that Agent Sartin was credible.
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highly probative in every case to justify reasonable suspicion.” Valdes-Vega, 738 F.3d at
1079. The factors include the characteristics of the area, proximity to the border, usual
traffic patterns on the road, the agent’s previous experience with smuggling operations,
information about recent illegal border crossings in the area, behavior of the driver, and
characteristics of the vehicle. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 884–85.
The Court finds that Agent Myers articulated several facts that provided him with
reasonable suspicion to conduct an investigatory stop of the Chrysler. Indeed, all the
Brignoni-Ponce factors are present in this stop.
Agent Myers’s experience, the proximity to the border, and the characteristics of
the area support reasonable suspicion. Agent Myers has worked for more than three years
in the Douglas area close to the border. He is familiar with that section of SR 80 as a well-
known corridor for smuggling undocumented noncitizens. As part of the collective
knowledge of the agents involved, Agent Sartin explained that it is common for groups to
travel the ridgeline and wait near mile marker 400 to be picked up. Furthermore, Agent
Myers had information about recent illegal border crossings in that particular area. Agent
Myers had been briefed that morning that a group of three to five undocumented
noncitizens was seen the day before between mile markers 392 and 400.
Likewise, the usual traffic patterns on the road, behavior of the Chrysler, and the
Chrysler’s characteristics gave Agent Myers reason to suspect criminal activity. Agent
Myers testified that Saturdays are slow on SR 80, and Agent Sartin explained that most of
the vehicles seen are local ranchers. Agent Myers heard Agent Sartin radio that he was
following the Pontiac and the Chrysler from mile marker 400, where undocumented
noncitizens commonly exit the mountains and where the group from the day before had
been reported. Agent Sartin also informed Agent Myers that the vehicles had been driving
in tandem for several miles, which Agent Sartin flagged as a common practice for
smugglers. Agent Myers then personally observed the Pontiac, Agent Sartin, and the
Chrysler driving westbound from mile marker 400. Agent Myers noted the temporary
Arizona license plate on the Pontiac and the California plates on the Chrysler. Agent Sartin
explained that the tandem driving in this case was particularly suspicious because the
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Pontiac had temporary tags and the Chrysler had California plates. Based on their training
and experience, Agent Myers and Agent Sartin know that not only is tandem driving a
practice among smugglers, but that smugglers often use vehicles with temporary tags. To
see both these practices together was suspicious. Agent Myers further believed that the
Chrysler’s behavior tailgating Agent Sartin was suspicious, and he began to follow the trio.
Agent Myers ran the California plates and received information that the Chrysler
was registered to an individual from San Jose, California, which he thought was unusual.
He was also informed that the Chrysler had crossed into the United States that day in
Nogales and had been driving on I-19 before coming to SR 80.6 Agent Myers found this
behavior suspicious because the driver would have gone far out of his way for no apparent
reason. Agent Myers then continued to follow and observe the Chrysler for eight miles,
during which time the Chrysler continued to drive unusually close to Agent Sartin, creating
not only a safety concern, but raising suspicion for Agent Myers because it was unusual to
see someone drive bumper to bumper with a marked patrol vehicle rather than slowing
down or passing Agent Sartin.7
Under these facts, the Court finds that Agent Myers had reasonable suspicion to stop
the Chrysler. Although, on their own, each of these facts may have an innocuous
explanation, the Court is not permitted to assess them in isolation through a divide-and-
conquer lens. Valdes-Vega, 738 F.3d at 1078 (quoting Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 273). Rather, the
standard requires the Court to look at the totality of the circumstances surrounding the stop.
Cotterman, 709 F.3d at 970.
Based on the totality of the circumstances, Agent Myers met the low standard of
reasonable suspicion when he stopped the Chrysler. Agent Myers’s experience as an agent;
6 Agent Myers was entitled to rely on this mistaken information in forming the basis for
his reasonable suspicion. See United States v. Twilley, 222 F.3d 1092, 1096 n.1 (9th Cir.
2000) (citing United States v. Wallace, 213 F.3d 1216, 1220 (9th Cir. 2000)) (“A factual
belief that is mistaken, but held reasonably and in good faith, can provide reasonable
suspicion for a traffic stop.”)
7 The Court recognizes that the Magistrate Judge found the agents’ testimony regarding
tandem driving by smugglers “inconsistent” with their experience in this case. (Doc. 76 at
17.) The Court does not reach the same conclusion because, although perhaps a novel
tactic, the act of tailgating a law enforcement vehicle could reasonably be seen as an effort
to distract or interfere with law enforcement’s investigation of the other vehicle.
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the proximity to the border when Agent Myers stopped the Chrysler; the characteristics of
the area as a well-known corridor for smuggling; the information Agent Myers received
about a group of undocumented noncitizens on that stretch of SR 80; the fact that the
Pontiac and Chrysler did not fit usual traffic patterns for a Saturday in the area; the fact
that the Pontiac had temporary Arizona tags, a common practice for smugglers; the fact
that the Chrysler had California plates and was registered to an individual from San Jose
with no apparent reason to be on SR 80 after driving on I-19; the fact that these two
vehicles, with these plates, were also driving in tandem, a common practice for smuggling
operations; and the behavior of Defendant in the Chrysler tailgating a marked Border Patrol
vehicle for miles, taken together, led Agent Myers to reasonably suspect a smuggling
operation was afoot.
Accordingly, the Court will deny Defendant’s Motion to Suppress for Lack of
Reasonable Suspicion.8
IV. Conclusion
The Court has reviewed the Motion to Suppress for Lack of Reasonable Suspicion
(Doc. 50), the Government’s Response (Doc. 53), Defendant’s Reply (Doc. 57), the official
transcript of the evidentiary hearing conducted before the Magistrate Judge (Doc. 75), the
Magistrate Judge’s R&R (Doc. 76), the Government’s Objections (Doc. 84), and
Defendant’s Response (Doc. 97). The Court additionally held a de novo evidentiary
8 One final observation. At the evidentiary hearing, Defendant argued “fruit of the
poisonous tree.” (See Doc. 107 at 6–7.) Defendant’s theory is unclear, but to the extent he
raises fruit of the poisonous tree as to the Chrysler, Agent Myers’s investigatory stop did
not violate the Fourth Amendment. To the extent he raises fruit of the poisonous tree as to
the Pontiac, he is precluded from doing so. A defendant may challenge evidence as fruit of
the poisonous tree if the defendant establishes that his Fourth Amendment rights were
violated in the primary search. See United States v. Baker, 58 F.4th 1109, 1116 (9th Cir.
2023) (quoting Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 174 (1969)) (“Fourth Amendment
rights are personal rights that ‘may not be vicariously asserted.’”). “The proponent of a
motion to suppress has the burden of establishing that his own Fourth Amendment rights
were violated by the challenged search or seizure.” Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 130 n.1
(1978). Defendant has not argued that his Fourth Amendment rights were violated when
Agent Sartin stopped the Pontiac. Nor has he shown that Agent Sartin stopped or searched
the Pontiac based on Agent Myers’s stop of Defendant’s Chrysler. Therefore, Defendant’s
effort to suppress fruit from the tree that is the stop of the Pontiac fails because, simply put,
that is not his tree.
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hearing and considered the testimony and argument offered therein. (Doc. 107.)
Upon de novo review,
IT IS ORDERED that the Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation is NOT
ADOPTED. (Doc. 76.)
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant’s Motion to Suppress for Lack of
Reasonable Suspicion is DENIED. (Doc. 50.)
Dated this 2nd day of February, 2026.
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