Garcia v. Commissioner of Social Security Administration

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WO
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA
Valerie Antionette Garcia,
Plaintiff,
v.
Commissioner of Social Security
Administration,
Defendant.
No. CV-24-00579-TUC-SHR
ORDER
Pending before the Court is a Report and Recommendation (“R&R”) (Doc. 22)
issued by United States Magistrate Judge Jacqueline M. Rateau recommending the Court
reverse the decision of the Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) and remand this matter for
further proceedings. Plaintiff, Valerie Antionette Garcia, has filed an Objection (Doc. 23),
and Defendant did not respond. For the following reasons, the Court will overrule
Plaintiff’s Objection, adopt the R&R, reverse the decision of the ALJ with respect to
Plaintiff’s symptom testimony, and remand this matter for further proceedings.
I. Background1
In September 2021, Plaintiff filed an application for Supplemental Security Income
and Social Security Disability Income benefits based on her diagnoses with schizoaffective
disorder; bipolar disorder; borderline personality disorder; trauma disorder; and substance
1Because neither party objects to the R&R’s recitation of the factual and procedural
history (see generally Doc. 23), the Court adopts the factual findings and will only restate
the relevant procedural history.
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abuse disorder including amphetamine and cannabis use. (Doc. 22 at 1–2.) The ALJ issued
an unfavorable decision in November 2023, which the Social Security Administration
Appeals Counsel adopted as the agency’s final decision. (Id. at 2.)
In December 2024, Plaintiff filed a Complaint in this Court, asserting, in relevant
part, the ALJ erred by rejecting both Plaintiff’s testimony regarding her symptoms and the
assessment of her treating mental health provider, nurse practitioner Sharon Grant (“NP
Grant”). (Doc. 1.) In November 2025, Magistrate Judge Rateau issued an R&R
recommending the Court reject Plaintiff’s arguments regarding NP Grant’s assessment but
find the ALJ erred in discounting Plaintiff’s symptom testimony. (Doc. 22 at 9, 15.)
Regarding the appropriate remedy, the R&R concludes remand for immediate calculation
and payment of benefits is not warranted, instead recommending remanding for further
proceedings. (Id. at 16.)
Plaintiff objects to the R&R, challenging the R&R’s analysis of the ALJ’s findings
regarding NP Grant’s assessment. (Doc. 23 at 3–7.) Additionally, although neither party
challenges the R&R’s conclusion the ALJ erred in discounting Plaintiff’s symptom
testimony, Plaintiff objects to the R&R’s conclusion remand for immediate reward is
inappropriate. (Id. at 7–10.)
II. Standard of Review
The Court “may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or
recommendations made by the magistrate judge.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). If an objection
is made, the Court “must review the magistrate judge’s findings and recommendations de
novo.” United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc). The
Court is obligated to review only the specific portions of the report, proposed findings, or
recommendations to which the parties object. See § 636(b)(1). The party seeking de novo
review must provide “specific written objections to the proposed findings and
recommendations” in the R&R. Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2). If, following review, “the district
court is satisfied with the magistrate judge’s findings and recommendations it may in its
discretion treat those findings and recommendations as its own.” Morris v. Shinn, No. CV
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20-322-TUC-JAS (EJM), 2023 WL 6248830, at *2 n.5 (D. Ariz. Sept. 26, 2023) (quoting
Goffman v. Gross, 59 F.3d 668, 671 (7th Cir. 1995)). District courts “conduct proper de
novo review where they state they have done so, even if the order fails to specifically
address a party’s objections.” United States v. Ramos, 65 F.4th 427, 433–34 (9th Cir. 2023)
(“[T]he district court ha[s] no obligation to provide individualized analysis of each
objection.”).
Objections to R&Rs “are not to be construed as a second opportunity to present the
arguments already considered by the Magistrate Judge.” Betancourt v. Ace Ins. Co. of P.R.,
313 F. Supp. 2d 32, 34 (D.P.R. 2004); see also Camardo v. Gen. Motors Hourly-Rate
Emps. Pension Plan, 806 F. Supp. 380, 382 (W.D.N.Y. 1992) (“The purpose of the Federal
Magistrates Act is to relieve courts of unnecessary work,” and “[t]here is no increase in
efficiency, and much extra work, when a party attempts to relitigate every argument which
it presented to the Magistrate Judge.”). Accordingly, objections that merely repeat or
rehash arguments already addressed in the R&R are insufficient to trigger de novo review
and are instead reviewed for clear error. See Tinlin v. Hudson, No. CV-24-00425-TUC-
JCH, 2025 WL 2468802, at *1 (D. Ariz. Aug. 27, 2025).
III. Analysis
a. Medical Assessment
Plaintiff challenges the R&R’s conclusion the ALJ did not err in discrediting NP
Grant’s medical assessment. Overall, Plaintiff asserts, as she does in her Complaint, the
ALJ did not sufficiently address the supportability and consistency factors required under
the new SSA regulations in his decision to discount NP Grant’s opinion, and his decision
to discredit the assessment was not supported by substantial evidence in the record. (Doc.
1 at 4; Doc. 23 at 3–7.)
The SSA regulations provide the most important factors to consider when evaluating
the persuasiveness of medical opinions are “supportability” and “consistency.” 20 C.F.R.
§ 404.1520c(a). Supportability refers to “the extent to which a medical source supports the
medical opinion by explaining the ‘relevant . . . objective medical evidence.’” Woods v.
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Kijakazi, 32 F.4th 785, 791–92 (9th Cir. 2022) (quoting § 404.1520c(c)(1)). Consistency
refers to “the extent to which a medical opinion is ‘consistent . . . with the evidence from
other medical sources and nonmedical sources in the claim.” Id. at 792 (quoting
§ 404.1520c(c)(2)). An ALJ “cannot reject an examining or treating doctor’s opinion as
unsupported or inconsistent without providing an explanation supported by substantial
evidence” and “must ‘articulate . . . how persuasive’ it finds ‘all of the medical opinions’
from each doctor or other source . . . and ‘explain how [it] considered the supportability
and consistency factors’ in reaching these findings.” Id. (quoting § 404.1520c(b)).
First, Plaintiff asserts the ALJ was required, under 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520, to evaluate
the consistency of NP Grant’s assessment with medical sources other than her own
treatment notes before discounting the opinion. (Doc. 23 at 3–7.) This argument has
already been fully addressed by the R&R. (Doc. 22 at 11–13.) The Court does not find
the R&R’s conclusion on this issue to be clearly erroneous. See Tinlin, 2025 WL 2468802,
at *1. In any event, contrary to Plaintiff’s assertion, internal inconsistency between a
provider’s notes and assessment is a “permissible basis for discounting [a] medical opinion
under the new SSA regulations” regardless of whether that inconsistency is “characterized
as a flaw of ‘consistency’ or ‘supportability.’” Tristan v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin, No.
CV-20-02240-PHX-DWL, 2022 WL 1707953, at *3 (D. Ariz. May 27, 2022).
Next, Plaintiff argues “[t]he ALJ’s evaluation of NP Grant’s underlying treatment
records failed to provide substantial evidence that the treatment record did not support NP
Grant’s assessment when NP Grant observed positive objective findings relevant to
[Plaintiff]’s mood disorders and supportive of the assessed limitations.” (Doc. 23 at 6.)
The Court rejects this argument. Even acknowledging such evidence exists to support NP
Grant’s assessment, the Court will not reverse the ALJ’s determination unless it is based
on legal error or is not supported by substantial evidence. See Reddick v. Chater, 157 F.3d
715, 720–21 (9th Cir. 1998) (“If the evidence can reasonably support either affirming or
reversing the Secretary’s conclusion, the court may not substitute its judgment for that of
the Secretary.”); Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035, 1039–40 (9th Cir. 1995) (stating where
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evidence is susceptible to more than one rational interpretation, it is the ALJ’s conclusion
that must be upheld). As discussed in the R&R, the ALJ provided numerous reasons why
NP Grant’s medical opinion evidence was unsupported by her medical notes before
discounting her assessment. (See Doc. 22 at 10.) Accordingly, the ALJ did not err in
determining NP Grant’s assessment was unsupported by the record. See Kitchen v.
Kijakazi, 82 F.4th 732, 740–41 (9th Cir. 2023) (An ALJ may reject a physician’s “check-
off report[] that do[es] not contain any explanation of the bases of their conclusions,”
especially when that check-off form was internally inconsistent with other medical
records.); Cottrell v. Bisignano, No. 24-4200, 2025 WL 3553139, at *1 (9th Cir. Dec. 11,
2025).
Because the ALJ sufficiently addressed both consistency and supportability in his
analysis and substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s reasons for discrediting NP Grant’s
medical opinion, the Court will overrule Plaintiff’s objections and adopt the R&R’s
conclusion on this issue.
b. Disposition
As discussed, neither party objects to the R&R’s conclusion the ALJ materially
“erred in discounting [Plaintiff]’s symptom testimony by not providing clear and
convincing reasons supported by substantial evidence.”2 (Doc. 22 at 15.) Instead, Plaintiff
objects to the R&R’s determination remand for immediate calculation and payment of
benefits is an inappropriate remedy, arguing such remedy is appropriate because “there
were no significant factual conflicts that require resolution before a finding of disability,
and this record as a whole does not create serious doubt that [Plaintiff] was disabled.”
(Doc. 23 at 10.)
Under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), a court may affirm, modify, or reverse a decision of the
Commissioner “with or without remanding the cause for a rehearing.” Thus, if appropriate,
“courts are free to reverse and remand a determination by the Commissioner with
instructions to calculate and award benefits.” Garrison v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 995, 1019 (9th
2The Court will adopt the R&R’s conclusion the ALJ erred in discrediting Plaintiff’s
symptom testimony.
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Cir. 2014). However, if “the record as a whole creates serious doubt as to whether the
claimant is, in fact, disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act,” the Court may
decline remand for the immediate award of benefits and instead remand for further
proceedings. Id. at 1021. “An automatic award of benefits in a disability benefits case is
a rare and prophylactic exception to the well-established ordinary remand rule.” Leon v.
Berryhill, 880 F.3d 1041, 1044 (9th Cir. 2017); see also Treichler v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec.
Admin., 775 F.3d 1090, 1101 n.5 (9th Cir. 2014) (“[O]ur jurisprudence . . . requires remand
for further proceedings in all but the rarest cases.”).
Contrary to Plaintiff’s assertion, the record indicates there remains doubt as to
Plaintiff’s disability status. The Court’s conclusion the ALJ erred in discrediting Plaintiff’s
symptom testimony does not automatically require the ALJ to find Plaintiff disabled on
remand, particularly in light of the Court’s conclusion the ALJ did not err in discounting
NP Grant’s assessment. See 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(5)(A) (stating “[a]n individual’s statement
as to pain or other symptoms shall not alone be conclusive evidence of disability”); 20
C.F.R. 404.1529(a) (explaining statements about pain or other symptoms will not alone
establish disability). Further, because the Court cannot say for certain Plaintiff is disabled
within the meaning of the Social Security Act, it declines to exercise its discretion to
remand for immediate award of benefits. Treichler, 775 F.3d at 1101 (explaining remand
for award of benefits is appropriate only where there is “not the slightest uncertainty” as to
the outcome of the proceeding); Leon, 880 F.3d at 1045 (stating remand for award of
benefits is “intended as a rare and prophylactic exception to the ordinary remand rule when
there is no question that a finding of disability would be required if [the improperly rejected
evidence] were accepted as true”). The Court will adopt the R&R’s recommended
disposition over Plaintiff’s objection and remand for further proceedings. See Garrison,
759 F.3d at 1021.
IV. Conclusion
IT IS ORDERED:
(1) Plaintiff’s Objection (Doc. 23) is OVERRULED.
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(2) The R&R (Doc. 22) is ADOPTED.
(3) The ALJ’s decision is REVERSED to the extent it discredited Plaintiff’s
symptom testimony, and this matter is REMANDED to the agency for further
proceedings.
(4) The Clerk of Court shall enter judgment accordingly and close this case.
Dated this 31st day of March, 2026.
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