Zuniga v. Pima, County of et al

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA
Robert Zuniga,
Plaintiff,
v.
Pima County, et al.,
Defendants.
______________________________________
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CV 24-00263-TUC-JGZ (MAA)
REPORT AND
RECOMMENDATION
Pending before the court is a motion for summary judgment filed by the defendants, on
December 22, 2025. Doc. 74.
The plaintiff, Robert Zuniga, filed a response on January 21, 2026. Doc. 76. The
defendants filed a reply on February 5, 2025. Doc. 78.
The case has been referred to the Magistrate Judge for report and recommendation
pursuant to the Local Rules of Practice. Doc. 16.
Background
“The plaintiff, Robert Zuniga, is employed as a Corrections Lieutenant with the Pima
County Sheriff’s Department.” Order granting motion to dismiss in part, Doc. 28, p. 2;
Amended Complaint, Doc. 49, p. 3. “Zuniga alleges that his superiors concealed the truth about
medical failures at the jail forcing plaintiff to come forward as a whistle-blower and release the
truth on social media and to news reporters on December 09, 2021.” Doc. 28, p. 2 (punctuation
modified); Doc. 49, pp. 3-5. “He asserts that he subsequently experienced racial
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discrimination, retaliation, workplace bullying, and harassment.” Doc. 28, p. 2 (punctuation
modified); Doc. 49, pp. 3-5. On May 23, 2024, Zuniga filed his original Complaint in this
court claiming national origin discrimination pursuant to Title VII and civil rights violations
pursuant to 42 U.S.C.§ 1983. Doc. 28, p. 2; Doc. 1, p. 5.
On June 24, 2025, Zuniga filed an Amended Complaint claiming (I) national origin
discrimination (Title VII); (II) retaliation (Title VII); (III) hostile work environment (Title VII);
(IV)(a) a Monell violation regarding investigations (42 U.S.C.§ 1983); (IV)(b) national origin
discrimination under the Equal Protection Clause (42 U.S.C. § 1983); (IV)(c) First Amendment
retaliation (42 U.S.C. § 1983); (IV)(d) a Fourteenth Amendment property interest due process
violation (42 U.S.C. § 1983); and (V) interference and retaliation in violation of the Family and
Medical Leave Act. Amended Complaint, Doc. 49.
On December 22, 2025, the defendants filed the pending motion for summary judgment
on all claims. Doc. 74.
The motion should be granted in part. The defendants are entitled to judgment on
Zuniga’s Title VII national origin discrimination claims, his Family and Medical Leave Act
(FMLA) claims, and those Constitutional claims that rely on national origin discrimination.
Summary Judgment
Summary judgment is available only “if the movant shows that there is no genuine
dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.
R. Civ. P. 56(a).
“The moving party initially bears the burden of proving the absence of a genuine issue
of material fact.” In re Oracle Corp. Sec. Litig., 627 F.3d 376, 387 (9th Cir. 2010). “Where [as
here] the non-moving party bears the burden of proof at trial, the moving party need only prove
that there is an absence of evidence to support the non-moving party’s case.” Id. “Where the
moving party meets that burden, the burden then shifts to the non-moving party to designate
specific facts demonstrating the existence of genuine issues for trial.” Id. “[T]he non-moving
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party must come forth with evidence from which a jury could reasonably render a verdict in the
non-moving party’s favor.” Id.
“In judging evidence at the summary judgment stage, the court does not make credibility
determinations or weigh conflicting evidence.” Soremekun v. Thrifty Payless, Inc., 509 F.3d
978, 984 (9th Cir. 2007). “Rather, it draws all inferences in the light most favorable to the non[-
]moving party.” Id.
Discussion: Title VII
In Counts I, II, and III, Zuniga claims national origin discrimination pursuant to Title
VII. “Under Title VII, it is unlawful for an employer to discriminate against any individual with
respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment because of his race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin.” Vasquez v. County of Los Angeles, 349 F.3d 634, 642
(9 Cir. 2003); see 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1).th
In Count I, Zuniga asserts that when he exposed false statements made by the Sheriff to
the Board of Supervisors, he was reassigned to a less-desirable position in Juvenile Court
without supervisory duties. Doc. 49, pp. 3-7; Doc. 76, pp. 8-9. He claims this reassignment
was discrimination due to his national origin, Hispanic. Doc. 49, pp. 36-37; Doc. 76, p. 8.
Zuniga acknowledges the court is to “analyze [his] Title VII claims through the
burden-shifting framework of McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817,
36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973),” which may be used when there is no direct evidence of discrimination.
Hawn v. Exec. Jet Mgmt., Inc., 615 F.3d 1151, 1155–56 (9th Cir. 2010). “Under this analysis,
[the plaintiff] must first establish a prima facie case of employment discrimination.” Id.
“To establish a prima facie case, [the plaintiff] must offer evidence that gives rise to an
inference of unlawful discrimination.” Hawn v. Exec. Jet Mgmt., Inc., 615 F.3d 1151, 1155–56
(9th Cir. 2010) (punctuation modified). “[The plaintiff] may establish a prima facie case based
on circumstantial evidence by showing: (1) that [he is a] member[] of a protected class; (2) that
[he was] qualified for [his] position[] and performing [his] job[] satisfactorily; (3) that [he]
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experienced adverse employment actions; and (4) that similarly situated individuals outside [his]
protected class were treated more favorably, or other circumstances surrounding the adverse
employment action give rise to an inference of discrimination.” Id.
“If [the plaintiff] establish[es] a prima facie case, the burden of production, but not
persuasion, then shifts to the employer to articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason
for the challenged action.” Id. (punctuation modified). “If [the employer] meets this burden,
[the plaintiff] must then raise a triable issue of material fact as to whether the [employer’s]
proffered reasons for [the adverse employment actions] are mere pretext for unlawful
discrimination. Id.; see also Odima v. Westin Tucson Hotel Co., 991 F.2d 595, 602 (9th Cir.
1993) (“The district court must not substitute its own judgment about whether the employment
decisions were wise, or even fair, for that of the employer.”).
Zuniga asserts he was reassigned because his employers were angry that he made certain
statements to the public. Doc. 77, ¶¶ 39, 40, 41, 42. He asserts he was reassigned to an inferior
position because of his national origin, Hispanic. He argues this is a reasonable inference
because his employer treated non-Hispanic similarly situated individuals more favorably.
First, Zuniga raises the example of Sergeant Jeremy Kreibich, a white supervisor. Doc.
76, p. 10. He asserts that Kreibich “engaged in the same conduct as Plaintiff, including
overseeing COVID-related issues, bypassing the chain of command, and speaking negative[ly]
of Sheriff Nanos publically, [but he] was reassigned within the jail [,] retained supervisor
authority and was not forced to work below his rank.” Doc. 76, pp. 10-11; Plaintiff’s
Statement of Facts, Doc. 77, ¶¶ 44-45 (citing Exhibit 12, Exhibit 3, 55:24-56:8).
Zuniga’s citations to the record, however, do not entirely support his allegations. He
cites to Exhibit 12, which is, according to Zuniga, a memorandum written by Captain Robert
Koumal in which he discusses Corrections Sergeant Kreibich and himself. Doc. 77, ¶ 44 (citing
Exhibit 12, Doc. 77-1, p. 50). In that memorandum, Koumal states that both Kreibich and
Zuniga “lacked the professional maturity to separate personal from professional perspective,”
and both “identify as whistle-blowers,” but “their actions and behaviors are more consistent as
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political, organizational obstructionists, and both fail to specify any illicit activities.” Exhibit
12, Doc. 77-1, p. 50. It appears from the Exhibit that Kreibich and Zuniga both drew the ire
of their employer. Exhibit 12 does not, however, discuss what discipline, if any, was given to
Kreibich. It does not state that when Kreibich was disciplined, he, unlike Zuniga, retained his
supervisory authority and was not forced to work below his rank. Doc. 77-1, p. 50.
Zuniga also cites to Exhibit 3, which is a transcript of Chief Deputy Kastigar’s
deposition. Doc. 77-1, p. 15. In the cited section, Kastigar states that he does not know if
Zuniga was transferred to a position where he had no one under him. Doc. 77-1, p. 15. He
does, however, state that the objective of Zuniga’s reassignment was “to take him out of the
supervisory capacity of his current oversight, his span of control because of the loss of their
support for him.” Doc. 77-1, p. 55, l. 24 – p. 56, l. 2. He continued: “The word I’ve used
several times is toxic, but they didn’t care for it. They didn’t like what he was saying. They
were mad at him for continually berating the organization. . . . And it seemed justifiable to me
that there was some urgency here.” Doc. 77-1, p. 57, l. 2-8.
Assuming that Kreibich is a similarly situated non-Hispanic whistle-blower, Zuniga has
not shown that Kreibich was “similarly situated but treated more favorably.”
Zuniga further argues that white employees Sergeant Aaron Cross and Lieutenant
Heather Lappin are similarly situated comparators. He alleges that they also criticized Sheriff
Nanos but they were “reassigned only to equivalent-rank positions without loss of authority or
humiliation.” Doc. 76, p. 11; Doc. 77, ¶ 46 (citing Nanos deposition, Exhibit 11, 51:8-9, 52:15-
24). The evidence he provides, however, fails to establish that the two were similarly situated
or were disciplined more leniently. Zuniga directs the court to the Nanos deposition, but in the
first portion indicated, Nanos states only that he “was the one to make the final decision as to
discipline.” Exhibit 11, 51:8-9; Doc. 77-1, p. 47. In the second portion indicated, Nanos
discusses Zuniga’s original complaint and whether it was filed immediately before Zuniga was
reassigned. Exhibit 11, 52:15-24; Doc. 77-1, p. 15; see also Doc. 79, ¶ 46 (arguing, among
other things, that “no evidence is offered in support of the alleged fact.”). Zuniga has not shown
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that Cross and Lappin were “similarly situated but treated more favorably.” Zuniga has not,
therefore, made out a prima facie case of national origin discrimination.
In the alternative, assuming that Zuniga has made out a prima facie case, the defendants
have articulated a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for taking away Zuniga’s supervisory
duties: He alienated the people working under him. Doc. 77-1, p. 55, l. 24 – p. 56, l. 2. They
did not like what Zuniga was saying and were angry at him for continually berating the
organization. Doc. 77-1, p. 57, l. 2-8.
In Chief Deputy Kastigar’s opinion, “[t]he toxic rhetoric and politically based hostility
he flung in and around the PCADC [Pima County Adult Detention Complex] created such
counterproductive work shifts that his subordinates decried an inability to perform operational
tasks.” Doc 75-1, pp. 27, 30. Kastigar summarized as follows: “Mr. Zuniga’s transfer was
based on operational necessity and had no nexus to his race.” Id.
In Captain Koumal’s opinion, Zuniga’s “actions and behaviors were inappropriate,
misinformed, and in poor judgment.” Doc. 75-1, p. 31. “He lost credibility with his peers for
a lack of work ethic, and Pima County and external partners for disclosing inaccurate and
sensitive medical information into the public realm as an active investigation concluded.” Id.
He failed to “maintain the ultimate degree of professionalism,” which “commanders are
required to maintain.” Id. “His lack of professional maturity compromised his ability to
function effectively, as he appeared reactive, acting without any self-awareness despite a
misguided self-sense of ethical and moral obligation, politically motivated to promote self-
interest as an advocate against the department and County, and most importantly, through his
actions he as mentioned previously lost trust among superiors, peers, direct reports, and
professional stakeholders.” Doc. 75-1, p. 32. “He created an appearance of impropriety or
allowed for cause members of the public to have a negative opinion of the County.” Doc. 75-1,
p. 32. “His actions and behaviors were unbecoming of a commander and that is why he was
re-assigned. Period.” Id.
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In Captain Lowing’s opinion, “Zuniga has repeatedly demonstrated that he has failed to
meet the expectations of a Corrections Bureau Commander, and has proven to share his
disgruntled attitude with his peers and staff.” Doc. 75-1, p. 34. He “sought out media attention
to make [false] allegations of corruption based on reports and numbers, which he as a
commander of the Medical Unit creates and is responsible for.” Id. He “was transferred to
Juvenile Court, allowing him to reflect on his actions and focus on his career development . .
. .” Id.
Having offered a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the discipline, the burden shifts
to Zuniga to offer some evidence that the employer’s proffered reasons for the adverse
employment action are a mere pretext for unlawful discrimination. He has not done so.
Summary judgment should be granted for Count I.
In Count II, Zuniga claims he suffered retaliation. “To make out a prima facie case of
retaliation, an employee must show that (1) he engaged in a protected activity; (2) his employer
subjected him to an adverse employment action; and (3) a causal link exists between the
protected activity and the adverse action.” Ray v. Henderson, 217 F.3d 1234, 1240 (9th Cir.
2000). “If a plaintiff has asserted a prima facie retaliation claim, the burden shifts to the
defendant to articulate a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for its decision.” Id. “If the
defendant articulates such a reason, the plaintiff bears the ultimate burden of demonstrating that
the reason was merely a pretext for a discriminatory motive.” Id.
Zuniga alleges that on December 21, 2021, he “filed a formal complaint with Pima
County Human Resources, alleging racial discrimination, retaliation, workplace bullying, and
harassment.” Doc. 49, ¶¶ 13-14. He asserts that he was reassigned “just three hours after
Plaintiff filed his discrimination complaint.” Id. Presumably, he argues that the timing of the
reassignment provides “a causal link . . . between the protected activity and the adverse action.”
See Ray, 217 F.3d at 1240; see also Thomas v. City of Beaverton, 379 F.3d 802, 812 (9th Cir.
2004) (“The causal link between a protected activity and the alleged retaliatory action can be
inferred from timing alone when there is a close proximity between the two.”) (punctuation
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modified); but see Whitley v. City of Portland, 654 F. Supp. 2d 1194, 1216 (D. Or. 2009)
(“However, employers are not required to stop a previously planned adverse employment action
upon discovering that a Title VII suit has been filed, and their proceeding along lines previously
contemplated, though not yet definitively determined, is no evidence whatsoever of causality.”)
(punctuation modified).
Assuming arguendo that Zuniga has made out a prima facie case, the burden of
production shifts to the employer to “articulate a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for its
decision.” Ray v. Henderson, 217 F.3d 1234, 1240 (9th Cir. 2000); but see Doc. 75-1, p. 31
(“his transfer was for business related reasons . . . in advance of any discriminatory
complaint.”). Here, the employer states that the reassignment was made because Zuniga’s
“toxic” behavior alienated his subordinates and made it impossible for them “to perform
operational tasks.” See above; Doc 75-1, p. 27. Having offered a legitimate, nondiscriminatory
reason for the discipline, the burden shifts to Zuniga to offer some evidence that the employer’s
proffered reasons for the adverse employment action are a mere pretext for unlawful
discrimination. He has not done so. Summary judgment should be granted for Count II.
In Count III, Zuniga claims he was subject to a hostile work environment. A plaintiff
alleging a hostile work environment must allege (1) that “he was subjected to verbal or physical
conduct” directed at a protected characteristic, (2) “that the conduct was unwelcome,” and (3)
“that the conduct was sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the plaintiff’s
employment and create an abusive work environment.” Vasquez v. County of Los Angeles, 349
F.3d 634, 642 (9 Cir. 2003); see 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1).th
“To determine whether conduct was sufficiently severe or pervasive to violate Title VII,
[the court will] look at all the circumstances, including the frequency of the discriminatory
conduct; its severity; whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive
utterance; and whether it unreasonably interferes with an employee’s work performance.”
Vasquez v. County of Los Angeles, 349 F.3d 634, 642 (9 Cir. 2003) (punctuation modified).th
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Zuniga argues that he suffered a hostile work environment due to his national origin. He
provides no evidence, however, that he was subjected to verbal or physical conduct directed at
his national origin, Hispanic. Doc. 76, pp. 13-14. Summary judgment should be granted on
Count III.
Discussion: Civil Rights
In Count IV(a), Zuniga claims that Pima County’s policy of “referring employee
complaints back to the Sheriff’s Department for ‘self-investigation’ even when those complaints
named the Sheriff or command staff as wrongdoer” violates of his civil rights under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983. Doc. 49, ¶ 115.
“Section 1983 imposes liability upon any person who, acting under color of state law,
deprives another of a federally protected right.” Karim-Panahi v. Los Angeles Police Dep’t,
839 F.2d 621, 624 (9 Cir. 1988). “To make out a cause of action under section 1983, plaintiffsth
must plead that (1) the defendants acting under color of state law (2) deprived plaintiffs of rights
secured by the Constitution or federal statutes.” Id.
“Section 1983 also imposes liability upon municipalities for constitutional deprivations
resulting from actions taken pursuant to government policy or custom.” Id. (citing Monell v.
Dep’t of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 694, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 2037, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978)). But
“where there is no underlying constitutional violation by an individual government employee,
there can be no Monell liability by the local government.” Bowen v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 2018
WL 6038293, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 29, 2018)
The defendants argue that the plaintiff has not identified an unconstitutional custom or
policy. Doc. 74, pp. 8-9. The plaintiff, however, has alleged that Pima County has a policy of
“referring employee complaints back to the Sheriff’s Department for ‘self-investigation’ even
when those complaints named the Sheriff or command staff as wrongdoer.” Doc. 49, ¶¶ 20,
115. And this policy, he asserts, facilitates the Sheriffs Department’s violation of his
“constitutional rights of due process, equal protection, and/or First Amendment.” Doc. 76, p.
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14; see Rivera v. City of Lacey, 2018 WL 11223349, at *1 (W.D. Wash. July 9, 2018) (“[T]he
repeated failure to investigate citizen complaints of officials’ misconduct can support a theory
that a municipality overlooks, and thereby encourages, constitutional deprivations as a matter
of policy.”); but see Fink v. Ohannessian, 2024 WL 621091, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 9, 2024),
(“[T]here is no federal constitutional claim based solely on a failure to investigate or
re-investigate.), aff’d, 2026 WL 311569 (9th Cir. Feb. 5, 2026).
In their reply, the defendants concede that the Pima County Sheriffs Department
investigated the first Human Resources (“HR”) complaint, but they assert that Human
Resources investigated the remaining complaints at Plaintiff’s request. Doc. 78, p. 4. The court
finds there remains a genuine issue of material fact on this issue in so far as Zuniga claims an
underlying due process or First Amendment violation. It does not appear that Zuniga can prove
an underlying equal protection violation. See Kastl v. Maricopa Cnty. Cmty. Coll. Dist., No.
CV-02-1531-PHX-SRB, 2006 WL 2460636, at *8 (D. Ariz. Aug. 22, 2006) (“A plaintiff who
fails to establish intentional discrimination for purposes of Title VII ... also fails to establish
intentional discrimination for purposes of § 1983.), aff’d, 325 F. App’x 492 (9th Cir. 2009).
Summary judgment should be granted on Count IV(a) in so far as it relates to a violation of
Zuniga’s equal protection rights.
In Counts IV(b), IV(c), and IV(d), Zuniga claims the county and the individual
defendants violated his rights under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,
the First Amendment, and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, respectively.
Doc. 49, ¶¶ 117, 118, 119. The defendants argue that the claims against the individual
defendants are barred due to qualified immunity.
“Government officials enjoy qualified immunity from civil damages unless their conduct
violates clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would
have known.” Jeffers v. Gomez, 267 F.3d 895, 910 (9th Cir. 2001) (punctuation modified). “A
public official is not entitled to qualified immunity when the contours of the allegedly violated
right were sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he was doing
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violated that right.” Id. “Determining whether a public official is entitled to qualified immunity
requires a two-part inquiry: (1) Was the law governing the state official’s conduct clearly
established? (2) Under that law could a reasonable state official have believed his conduct was
lawful?” Id. “This standard gives ample room for mistaken judgments by protecting all but the
plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.” Id.
The defendants maintain that “Plaintiff cannot and has not identified functions performed
by the named individuals for liability, supported by the unsubstantiated findings made and
Plaintiff’s admissions noted above.” Doc. 74, p. 9. In other words, they argue that Zuniga
cannot prove his case in this court because his prior HR complaints were found to be
“unsubstantiated.” See Doc. 75, ¶¶ 11-19. The defendants, however, fail to provide the court
with case law establishing that this court is bound by a prior administrative decision. Moreover,
it seems likely that the HR investigations were performed under a different standard of review.
This court does not determine whether Zuniga’s claims are “substantiated.” This court
determines whether there remains a genuine issue of material fact and the movant is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law after “draw[ing] all inferences in the light most favorable to the
non[-]moving party.” See Fed.R.Civ.P. 56; Soremekun v. Thrifty Payless, Inc., 509 F.3d 978,
984 (9th Cir. 2007). Summary judgment should not be granted on Zuniga’s Section 1983 claims
directed at his First Amendment and Due Process rights. See, e.g., Taylor v. Clark, 2011 WL
917382, at *18 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 16, 2011) (Summary judgment denied even though the “vast
majority of investigations of allegations against Defendant McKesson yielded findings that they
were unsubstantiated or lacked sufficient evidence.”), report and recommendation adopted as
modified, 2011 WL 904241 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 16, 2011); see also Karl v. City of Mountlake
Terrace, 678 F.3d 1062, 1068-1075 (9th Cir. 2012) (analyzing motion for summary judgment
on the basis of qualified immunity where the plaintiff alleged a First Amendment retaliation
claim).
Discussion: Family and Medical Leave Act
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In Count V, Zuniga claims Pima County violated his rights under the Family and Medical
Leave Act (FMLA) (29 U.S.C. § 2615). Doc. 49, p. 40.
“The FMLA creates two interrelated, substantive employee rights: first, the employee
has a right to use a certain amount of leave for protected reasons, and second, the employee has
a right to return to his or her job or an equivalent job after using protected leave.” Bachelder
v. Am. W. Airlines, Inc., 259 F.3d 1112, 1122 (9th Cir. 2001). “Implementing this objective,
Congress made it unlawful for an employer to interfere with, restrain, or deny the exercise of
or the attempt to exercise, any right provided by the Act.” Id. (punctuation modified).
Zuniga claims that Captain Elsa Navarro interfered with his FMLA rights “by
unilaterally adding eight (8) hours of sick leave to Plaintiff’s approved FMLA time card,
locking timecards to prevent accurate leave entry, and citing leave-related issues in disciplinary
documents.” Doc. 49, ¶ 124.
The defendants maintain that this incident was investigated and “[t]he inadvertent
addition of eight hours was discovered and corrected by PCSD Finance Department before
Plaintiff’s timecard was finalized.” Doc. 74, p. 11; Doc. 75, ¶ 30. Accordingly, “Plaintiff
suffered no loss of FMLA benefits.” Doc. 74, p. 11. Zuniga presents no evidence tending to
show that this apparent administrative error affected his ability to exercise FMLA leave. He
concedes that the error was eventually corrected. Doc. 77, ¶ 30.
Zuniga also claims that “Captain Elsa Navarro further retaliated against Plaintiff for
exercising FMLA rights by issuing retaliatory Letter of Counseling and escalating disciplinary
measures shortly after Plaintiff’s protected leave.” Doc. 49, ¶ 125.
The defendants maintain that HR investigated this charge of retaliation and found that
“the Letter of Counseling was issued for performance issues.” Doc. 74, p. 11. The defendants
further assert that Zuniga has no evidence that the Letter of Counseling was issued in response
to his FMLA complaint to HR. Id.; Doc. 75, ¶ 31. Zuniga presents no evidence to the contrary.
Doc. 76, pp. 16-17. He asserts that Navarro asked him to tell her if he was meeting with HR
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on January 29, 2025, but he does not state that she was aware of the content of that meeting.
Doc.77-1, ¶ 22. Summary judgment should be granted on Count V.
RECOMMENDATION
The Magistrate Judge recommends that the District Court, after its independent review
of the record, enter an order GRANTING IN PART the motion for summary judgment filed by
the defendants, on December 22, 2025. Doc. 74. The court should grant the defendants’ motion
on Count I, national origin discrimination (Title VII); Count II, retaliation (Title VII); Count III,
hostile work environment (Title VII); Count IV(a), a Monell violation regarding investigations
(42 U.S.C.§ 1983) alleging an underlying Equal Protection claim; Count IV(b), national origin
discrimination under the Equal Protection Clause (42 U.S.C. § 1983); and Count V, interference
and retaliation in violation of the Family and Medical Leave Act. Amended Complaint, Doc.
49. The court should deny the motion on Count IV(a), Monell violation regarding investigations
(42 U.S.C.§ 1983) alleging an underlying First Amendment or Due Process clause violation,
Count IV(c), a First Amendment retaliation violation (42 U.S.C. § 1983), and Count IV(d), a
Fourteenth Amendment property interest due process violation (42 U.S.C. § 1983).
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §636 (b), any party may serve and file written objections within
14 days of being served with a copy of this report and recommendation. If objections are not
timely filed, the party’s right to de novo review may be waived. The Local Rules permit the
filing of a response to an objection. They do not permit the filing of a reply to a response
without the permission of the District Court.
DATED this 15 day of April, 2025.th
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