USA v. Bohn et al

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
WO
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA
United States of America,
Plaintiff,
v.
Venicia Monique Bohn,
Defendant.
No. CR-24-08211-001-TUC-RM (MAA)
ORDER
On September 29, 2025, Magistrate Judge Michael A. Ambri issued a Report and
Recommendation (“R&R”) (Doc. 71), recommending that this Court deny Defendant’s
Motion to Suppress Evidence (Doc. 46). On October 10, 2025, Defendant filed an
Objection (Doc. 73) and on October 23, 2025, the Government filed a Response to the
Objection (Doc. 75). For the following reasons, the Court will overrule the R&R and grant
Defendant’s Motion to Suppress Evidence.
I. Background
On October 21, 2024, at around 9:00 p.m., Corporal Nicholas Carpenter of the
Benson Police Department conducted a traffic stop of a vehicle traveling west on Interstate
10 (“I-10”), near mile marker 302. (Doc. 65 at 18.) Corporal Carpenter had first seen the
vehicle as it traveled toward I-10 on State Route 80, passing by the intersection of Ocotillo
Road and State Route 80 in Benson, Arizona, where Corporal Carpenter was parked
observing traffic. (Id. at 14.) From Benson, State Route 80 runs north/south toward the
border between the United States and Mexico. (Id.) Corporal Carpenter describes the
Case 4:24-cr-08211-RM-MAA Document 78 Filed 12/05/25 Page 1 of 13

- 2 -
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
Benson area as a “hotbed” for human smuggling efforts, in part because of the connection
to the border provided by State Route 80. (Id. at 13.) However, thousands of people drive
through the Benson area each day because of its position along I-10—a main thoroughfare
in Arizona—and of course, not all of them are engaged in illegal activity. (Id. at 57.)
At a hearing conducted before Magistrate Judge Ambri on August 26, 2025,
Corporal Carpenter stated that when he first saw the vehicle he eventually pulled over, the
characteristics that caught his attention were that the vehicle had a temporary license plate
and that its rear was apparently lower than its front. (Id. at 15.) In Corporal Carpenter’s
experience, a temporary license plate can indicate that the driver of the vehicle is trying to
hide his or her true identity; in addition, the rear being lower than the front can indicate
that there are more occupants of the vehicle than is typical. (Id. at 15, 24.) After having
made these observations, Corporal Carpenter decided to follow the vehicle and check its
registration. (Id. at 15.) The registration matched the vehicle. (Id.)
Corporal Carpenter continued following the vehicle as it traveled onto the on-ramp
from State Route 80 to I-10. (Id. at 17.) As it entered the westbound I-10 near the 303 mile
marker, the vehicle went into the left-hand lane of travel. (Id. at 18.) At that point, prior to
construction which opened the entirety of the relevant section of I-10 into three lanes, the
vehicle was traveling along a portion of the roadway between mile markers 302 and 303
which contained only two lanes. (Id. at 19.) The distance from where the on-ramp near the
303 mile marker connected with I-10 to where I-10 opened into three lanes was about 0.4
or 0.5 miles. (Id. at 66.) The I-10 is a divided highway, with lanes for eastbound and
westbound travel that are separated by an intervening space.1
Corporal Carpenter testified that he determined the vehicle had engaged in a traffic
violation by remaining in the left-hand lane while traveling that 0.4 or 0.5 mile stretch
where I-10 had only two lanes. A.R.S. § 28-721(A) requires a person to drive on the right
half of a roadway of sufficient width subject to certain exceptions, such as where the
1 The Court takes judicial notice of the separated eastbound and westbound lanes, as they
are clearly visible on a map of the area where Ms. Bohn was stopped. See Fed. R. Evid.
201; see also Benson, Arizona, GOOGLE MAPS, http://maps.google.com.
Case 4:24-cr-08211-RM-MAA Document 78 Filed 12/05/25 Page 2 of 13

- 3 -
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
roadway has three lanes, and where the roadway is designated for one-way traffic. Corporal
Carpenter explained that there appeared to be nothing preventing the vehicle from traveling
in the right-hand lane. (Id. at 17.) Therefore, Corporal Carpenter initiated a traffic stop, and
the vehicle came to a halt next to the westbound on-ramp near mile marker 302. (Id. at 18.)
At the location where the vehicle stopped, I-10 had already expanded into three lanes. (Id.)
Corporal Carpenter approached the vehicle from the passenger side, briefly
explained through the window why he had stopped the car, and saw three people in the
backseat that were “asleep or attempting to appear asleep.” (Id. at 21.) He testified that in
his experience, such behavior could indicate a desire to avoid contact with law
enforcement. (Id. at 25.) He also testified that when he initiated the traffic stop, the vehicle
was traveling at around sixty-five miles per hour, whereas the posted speed limit on the
relevant section of I-10 was seventy-five miles per hour, and that in his experience this
could also indicate a desire to avoid contact with law enforcement. (Id.) Based upon these
conclusions and his previous observations about the temporary registration and apparent
heavy burden of the vehicle, upon returning to his patrol car—accompanied by Defendant
Bohn, the driver of the vehicle—Corporal Carpenter immediately radioed dispatch and
requested that Border Patrol be called to the scene. (Id. at 24.)
Standing at the passenger side of his patrol car, Corporal Carpenter explained to Ms.
Bohn in greater detail the traffic violation he had pulled her over for, questioned where she
had come from, what her destination was, and whether the vehicle belonged to her. (Id. at
45-46.) Corporal Carpenter then received confirmation via radio that a Border Patrol unit
was on its way. (Id. at 47.) After hearing this, Corporal Carpenter asked Ms. Bohn, “Do
you know the people in the car are illegal aliens?” (Id.) At the hearing conducted before
Magistrate Judge Ambri on August 26, 2025, Corporal Carpenter admitted that this
question was a guess and that at the time he had no definite knowledge upon which to base
a statement that the people in the vehicle were undocumented. (Id. at 48-49.) After asking
this question, Corporal Carpenter closed his computer, walked back to Ms. Bohn’s vehicle,
and began requesting identification from the vehicle’s passengers. (Government’s Exhibit
Case 4:24-cr-08211-RM-MAA Document 78 Filed 12/05/25 Page 3 of 13

- 4 -
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
A, Defendant’s Exhibit M at 4:47.)
Corporal Carpenter’s body-worn camera footage shows that Border Patrol agents
arrived about five minutes after Corporal Carpenter requested that his dispatch call them
to the scene. (Id. at 7:50.) Within another five minutes, Border Patrol agents had confirmed
that two of the four passengers in the vehicle were undocumented. (Id. at 11:12.) In the
course of discussion about how to proceed regarding the people in the stopped vehicle,
Corporal Carpenter stated, “Cochise County’s not doing anything with them.” (Id. at
11:07.) Later on, when issuing the written warning for traveling in the left lane, Corporal
Carpenter further stated, “If BP didn’t need it, I wouldn’t be doing it.” (Id. at 26:44.) After
confirmation that two passengers in the vehicle were undocumented, and after the issuance
of the written warning, Border Patrol agents arrested Ms. Bohn and codefendant Debbie
Ann Valle, a passenger in the front seat of Ms. Bohn’s vehicle. (Doc. 1.)
Corporal Carpenter’s initial written report regarding these incidents is dated October
21, 2024—the same night. (Doc. 65 at 32.) That initial report was very brief, containing no
specific details about the alleged traffic violation, Corporal Carpenter’s observations
regarding the registration tag, or the apparent heavy burden of the vehicle. (Id. at 32.) It
was not until an April 3, 2025 meeting with a Border Patrol agent and counsel for the
United States where Corporal Carpenter was “asked to provide additional explanation for
the stop” that Corporal Carpenter clarified in an supplemental report that the alleged traffic
violation had occurred just before mile marker 302, where I-10 was two lanes, and provided
details regarding the characteristics of the vehicle that aroused his suspicion. (Id. at 53.)
Since it was positioned at chest height, Corporal Carpenter’s body-worn camera did not
capture footage of the alleged traffic violation, and Ms. Bohn’s vehicle is not visible in the
video until Corporal Carpenter exits his patrol car to speak to her and her passengers. (See
Government’s Exhibit A, Defendant’s Exhibit M.)
In July 2025, about eight months after Ms. Bohn’s arrest, Corporal Carpenter
videotaped himself recreating the drive along I-10 that led to Ms. Bohn being stopped on
the traffic violation of traveling in the left lane on a two-lane road. (Doc. 65 at 37.) Corporal
Case 4:24-cr-08211-RM-MAA Document 78 Filed 12/05/25 Page 4 of 13

- 5 -
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
Carpenter estimated the time he believed Ms. Bohn had been in violation of A.R.S. § 28-
721(A) at 21 seconds. (Id. at 38.) Similarly, in April 2025, Defendant’s private investigator
Raymundo Pacheco also videotaped himself test-driving the distance where I-10 was
formerly two lanes, recreating Ms. Bohn’s drive at various speeds—65, 67, and 64 miles
per hour. (Id. at 73.) Each time, it took Mr. Pacheco between 24 and 26 seconds to traverse
the distance where Corporal Carpenter believed Ms. Bohn had been in violation of A.R.S.
§ 28-721(A). (Id. at 70.)
Judge Ambri’s R&R concludes that reasonable suspicion existed for the traffic stop
conducted by Corporal Carpenter and that the traffic violation was more than de minimis.
(Doc. 71 at 9.) The R&R further concludes that Corporal Carpenter’s alien smuggling
investigation was appropriately initiated upon seeing the three occupants in the back seat
appearing to fake sleep, since Corporal Carpenter had already observed factors such as the
vehicle’s temporary registration tag, apparent heavy burden, and slower than expected
speed—all in the context of the relevant portion of I-10 being a common route for human
smuggling efforts. (Id. at 9-10.)
II. Standard of Review
A district judge must “make a de novo determination of those portions” of a
magistrate judge’s “report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which
objection is made.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); see also Fed. R. Crim. P. 59(b)(3) (“The district
judge must consider de novo any objection to the magistrate judge’s recommendation”).
Failure to object to the findings and recommendations of the magistrate judge “waives a
party’s right to review.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 59(b)(2). A district judge “may accept, reject, or
modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate
judge.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).
III. Discussion
In her Objection to the R&R, Ms. Bohn contends that there was no reasonable
suspicion to support Corporal Carpenter’s traffic stop because Ms. Bohn’s violation of
A.R.S. § 28-721(A) was de minimis. (Doc. 73.) She further argues that Corporal Carpenter
Case 4:24-cr-08211-RM-MAA Document 78 Filed 12/05/25 Page 5 of 13

- 6 -
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
lacked reasonable suspicion to support his subsequent alien smuggling investigation. (Id.)
Finally, she asserts that neither Corporal Carpenter’s testimony about the reasons for the
traffic stop nor his testimony about the reasons for the subsequent alien smuggling
investigation should be deemed credible, because Corporal Carpenter did not provide a
detailed report of the incident until months after the fact. (Id.) In its Response, the
Government argues that there was reasonable suspicion to support both the traffic stop and
the alien smuggling investigation, and that Corporal Carpenter’s testimony is reliable.
(Doc. 75.)
“The Fourth Amendment prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures by the
Government, and its protections extend to brief investigatory stops of persons or vehicles
that fall short of traditional arrest.” United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273 (2002)
(internal citations omitted). An officer is permitted to initiate a brief investigative traffic
stop when he has reasonable suspicion to believe that a traffic violation has occurred. See
Kansas v. Glover, 589 U.S. 376, 380 (2020). If an officer extends the duration of a traffic
stop to conduct an unrelated investigation, he must have independent reasonable suspicion
of another crime. Rodriguez v. United States, 575 U.S. 348, 349 (2015). The exclusionary
rule mandates that “evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment cannot be
used in a criminal proceeding against the victim of the illegal search and seizure.” United
States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 347 (1974) (citing Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 654
(1961)). “This prohibition applies as well to the fruits of the illegally seized evidence.” Id.
(citing Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 485 (1963)).
The Court will analyze the two main arguments proffered by Ms. Bohn—first, that
Corporal Carpenter lacked reasonable suspicion for the traffic stop, and second, that
Corporal Carpenter lacked reasonable suspicion for the immigration investigation—in turn.
The Court finds that Corporal Carpenter’s testimony regarding these events is reliable in
light of the corroboration provided by his body-worn camera footage.2
2 For example, even though Corporal Carpenter’s detailed report of Ms. Bohn’s traffic stop
was not written until April 3, 2025, he can be heard in the body-worn camera footage telling
Border Patrol agents that he thought the rear of the car was lower than its front, a detail
that did not appear in his initial report. And even though the body-worn camera did not
Case 4:24-cr-08211-RM-MAA Document 78 Filed 12/05/25 Page 6 of 13

- 7 -
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
a. Traffic Stop
As discussed above, Judge Ambri’s R&R concludes that Corporal Carpenter’s
traffic stop was lawful because Ms. Bohn violated A.R.S. § 28-721(A), and her violation
was more than de minimis. (Doc. 71 at 9.) In their Objection and Response, respectively,
Ms. Bohn and the Government contest only whether Ms. Bohn’s violation was de minimis.
(See Docs. 73, 75.) This issue need not be addressed, however, because applying the plain
language of the statute, the Court concludes that Ms. Bohn did not violate A.R.S. § 28-
721(A), and Corporal Carpenter’s traffic stop was therefore unconstitutional. If an officer
makes a mistake of law and conducts a traffic stop based upon facts that do not amount to
a violation, “his suspicions cannot be reasonable,” and such a stop violates the Fourth
Amendment. United States v. Mariscal, 285 F.3d 1127, 1130 (9th Cir. 2002).
A.R.S. § 28-721(A) provides that “[o]n all roadways of sufficient width, a person
shall drive a vehicle on the right half of the roadway,” subject to certain exceptions,
including “[o]n a roadway designated and signposted for one-way traffic.” A “‘roadway’
means that portion of a highway that is improved, designed, or ordinarily used for vehicular
travel[.]” A.R.S. § 28-601(22). “If a highway includes two or more separate roadways,
roadway refers to any such roadway separately but not to all such roadways collectively.”
Id. (emphasis added). A.R.S. § 28-731, entitled “Driving on divided highways,”
contemplates that “[i]f a highway is divided into two roadways by leaving an intervening
space . . . a person shall drive a vehicle only on the right-hand roadway.” (emphasis added).
Here, the section of I-10 where Ms. Bohn was stopped by Corporal Carpenter is a
divided highway; there is an intervening space between the eastbound and westbound
lanes.3 The eastbound and westbound lanes therefore constitute two separate roadways,
each designated for one-way traffic. Since a roadway designated for one-way traffic is
excepted from the requirements of A.R.S. § 28-721(A), Corporal Carpenter’s application
of the statute was contrary to law, and he lacked reasonable suspicion to premise his traffic
capture video of Ms. Bohn’s vehicle before Corporal Carpenter made his traffic stop, Ms.
Bohn can be heard agreeing with Corporal Carpenter that she was driving in the left-hand
lane of I-10 before he pulled her over.
3 Supra note 1.
Case 4:24-cr-08211-RM-MAA Document 78 Filed 12/05/25 Page 7 of 13

- 8 -
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
stop upon a purported violation of A.R.S. § 28-721(A).4 As such, Corporal Carpenter’s
traffic stop violated Ms. Bohn’s Fourth Amendment rights, and all evidence procured from
her and her vehicle as a result must be suppressed.
b. Immigration Investigation
Even if Corporal Carpenter’s traffic stop had been constitutionally justified at its
inception, the traffic stop was unconstitutionally prolonged without reasonable suspicion
in violation of Ms. Bohn’s Fourth Amendment rights. United States v. Steinman, __ F.4th
__, No. 23-1703, 2025 WL 3180282 at *6 (9th Cir. Mar. 5, 2025) (if a traffic stop was
appropriately made, a reviewing court must analyze if the stop was prolonged and, if so,
whether the prolongation was supported by reasonable suspicion).
1. The Traffic Stop was Prolonged
Absent independent reasonable suspicion of wrongdoing, an officer may not extend
the duration of a traffic stop with tasks unrelated to either the mission of addressing the
traffic violation which warranted the stop, or officer safety. United States v. Landeros, 913
F.3d 862, 866 (9th Cir. 2019); United States v. Evans, 786 F.3d 779, 786 (9th Cir. 2015).
“Determining whether to issue a traffic ticket,” “checking the driver’s license, determining
whether there are outstanding warrants against the driver, and inspecting the automobile’s
registration and proof of insurance” are all related to the mission of the traffic stop.
Rodriguez v. United States, 575 U.S. 348, 349 (2015). Conducting a criminal history check
on a driver is permissible as a precaution for officer safety. Steinman, 2025 WL 3180282
at *9. In contrast, “[a] demand for a passenger’s identification is not part of the mission of
a traffic stop” and is, “if anything, ‘inversely related to officer safety.’” Landeros, 913 F.3d
at 866 (quoting Evans, 786 F.3d at 787).
Here, Corporal Carpenter—and subsequently, Border Patrol agents—prolonged the
duration of Ms. Bohn’s traffic stop with an immigration investigation that was entirely
4 Pursuant to A.R.S. § 28-721(B), on all roadways, “a person driving a vehicle proceeding
at less than the normal speed of traffic at the time and place and under the conditions then
existing shall drive the vehicle in the right-hand lane then available for traffic . . . except
when overtaking and passing another vehicle . . . or when preparing for a left-turn . . . .”
The Government does not contend that Corporal Carpenter had reasonable suspicion to
stop Ms. Bohn for a violation of A.R.S. § 28-721(B).
Case 4:24-cr-08211-RM-MAA Document 78 Filed 12/05/25 Page 8 of 13

- 9 -
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
unrelated to the purported traffic violation Ms. Bohn was pulled over for. Just a little over
two minutes after initiating contact with Ms. Bohn, Corporal Carpenter asked her whether
she knew that the people in the backseat of her car were illegal. Just a few seconds after
that, Corporal Carpenter shut his computer, abandoning his work on verifying the vehicle
information provided by Ms. Bohn, and began requesting identification from the vehicle’s
passengers—behavior that the Ninth Circuit has established is neither within the scope of
a traffic stop nor related to the interests of officer safety. And of course, once Border Patrol
agents arrived, their investigation protracted the stop far longer.
2. No Reasonable Suspicion Existed
Reasonable suspicion is “a particularized and objective basis for suspecting the
particular person stopped of criminal activity.” United States v. Valdes-Vega, 738 F.3d
1074, 1078 (9th Cir. 2013). “Reasonable suspicion requires specific, articulable facts
which, together with objective and reasonable inferences, form a basis for suspecting that
a particular person is engaged in criminal conduct.” United States v. Thomas, 211 F.3d
1186, 1189 (9th Cir. 2000) (internal quotations and citation omitted). A “mere hunch” is
insufficient to establish reasonable suspicion. Valdes-Vega, 738 F.3d at 1078. An analysis
of reasonable suspicion requires evaluation of the totality of the circumstances. Arvizu, 534
U.S. at 273. An officer is permitted to draw upon his experience and specialized training
“to make inferences from and deductions about the cumulative information available” id.,
but “experience may not be used to give officers unbridled discretion in making a stop.”
United States v. Jimenez-Medina, 173 F.3d 752, 754 (9th Cir. 1999).
In the context of alien-smuggling, the totality of the circumstances may include such
factors as (1) characteristics of the area; (2) proximity to the border; (3) typical traffic
patterns; (4) the officer’s prior experience with alien traffic; (5) recent illegal border
crossings in the area; (6) erratic or evasive behavior; (7) vehicle characteristics; and (8)
behavior of people in the car. United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 884–85
(1975). The Ninth Circuit has found, for example, that reasonable suspicion of alien
smuggling existed where a driver of a rental car appeared to be attempting to avoid a border
Case 4:24-cr-08211-RM-MAA Document 78 Filed 12/05/25 Page 9 of 13

- 10 -
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
patrol checkpoint in an area where there had been an unusually high number of arrests for
alien smuggling in the preceding days. United States v. Garcia-Barron, 116 F.3d 1305 (9th
Cir. 1997); see also United States v. Palos-Marquez, 591 F.3d 1272 (9th Cir. 2010) (finding
reasonable suspicion where, in an area close to the border, agents received a tip regarding
the car that was stopped and observed the car driving extremely erratically). This Court has
found that reasonable suspicion existed where an officer observed a minivan close to the
border that appeared heavily laden, but the officer could not see passengers or objects that
would explain the “sag,” therefore suggesting that passengers or contraband were
concealed below the minivan’s window line. United States of Am., Plaintiff, v. Sterling Lee
Runyon, Defendant., No. CR 24-09257-TUC-AMM(EJM), 2025 WL 1678435 (D. Ariz.
May 29, 2025), report and recommendation adopted sub nom. United States v. Runyon,
No. CR-24-09257-001-TUC-AMM (EJM), 2025 WL 1677689 (D. Ariz. June 13, 2025).
“[R]easonable suspicion may not be based on broad profiles which cast suspicion
on entire categories of people without any individualized suspicion of the particular person
to be stopped.” United States v. Sigmond–Ballesteros, 285 F.3d 1117, 1121 (9th Cir. 2002).
For example, the Ninth Circuit has concluded that no reasonable suspicion existed where
a driver was traveling twenty-five miles per hour below the speed limit on a highway
known for human smuggling, in a car registered to a Mexican citizen living in an area that
had experienced a recent uptick in human smuggling. Jimenez-Medina, 173 F.3d at 752. In
another instance, the Ninth Circuit concluded that no reasonable suspicion existed where a
car driven in an area “notorious” for smuggling appeared heavily laden and the driver
glanced at Border Patrol agents several times. United States v. Rodriguez, 976 F.2d 592
(9th Cir. 1992); see also United States v. Lewis, 295 F. Supp. 3d 1103 (C.D. Cal. 2018)
(finding no reasonable suspicion where rental car was driven erratically on highway known
for human smuggling but also frequented by many legal residents; therefore, location was
of little probative value).
Here, even when considered in their totality, the factors cited by Corporal
Carpenter—the vehicle’s presence on I-10, its temporary registration tag, apparent “heavy
Case 4:24-cr-08211-RM-MAA Document 78 Filed 12/05/25 Page 10 of 13

- 11 -
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
load,” slow speed, and passengers “faking” sleep—are insufficient to form reasonable
suspicion justifying the immigration investigation that took place. First, just as in Lewis,
the fact that Ms. Bohn was driving on I-10 is of little probative value because it is a main
thoroughfare in Arizona used by many thousands of people engaged in lawful activities.
Corporal Carpenter’s observation that Ms. Bohn was on State Route 80 before she entered
I-10 is also of limited probative value because State Route 80 stretches for over seventy
miles before connecting with the United States-Mexico border. Corporal Carpenter did not
assert that he had any reason to believe that Ms. Bohn had recently crossed the border when
he summoned Border Patrol to the scene. (See Doc. 65.)
Corporal Carpenter’s statement that Ms. Bohn’s vehicle appeared heavily laden
similarly fails to support a finding of reasonable suspicion in light of the fact that that the
vehicle was heavily laden, but not in violation of the law—as Corporal Carpenter saw,
three people, the maximum number allowed, were in the backseat. This clear explanation
of why the back of the vehicle may have appeared to sag stands in sharp contrast to cases
such as Runyon, where an officer observed a low-riding vehicle without any visible
passengers or cargo, leading to the inference that something, or someone, was intentionally
concealed within. Furthermore, during the evidentiary hearing conducted before Judge
Ambri on August 26, 2025, Corporal Carpenter admitted that he saw no dirt, grass, or other
potential indicators of illicit travel in remote areas on either Ms. Bohn’s passengers or the
vehicle itself. (Doc. 65 at 48.)
Ms. Bohn’s driving behaviors were also innocuous and do not rise to the level of
evasive or suspicious conduct. In his April 3, 2025, supplemental report, Corporal
Carpenter described Ms. Bohn’s vehicle entering the far-left lane after merging onto I-10
and proceeding at sixty-five miles per hour in an area where the posted speed limit was
seventy-five miles per hour. (Doc. 65 at 25.) He testified that this demonstrated, in his
opinion, an “avoidance technique.” (Id.) However, it is unclear why entering the far-left
lane would suggest an avoidance of police presence. In addition, proceeding at ten miles
below the posted speed limit, especially at night, is also unsuspicious behavior; this
Case 4:24-cr-08211-RM-MAA Document 78 Filed 12/05/25 Page 11 of 13

- 12 -
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
deviation from the speed limit is significantly less than the twenty-five mile per hour
difference observed by police in Jimenez-Medina. The Court is mindful that Corporal
Carpenter’s experience as an officer is relevant in an evaluation of the reasonableness of
his behavior, but as previously discussed, “experience may not be used to give officers
unbridled discretion in making a stop.” Jimenez-Medina, 173 F.3d at 754.
Finally, the temporary registration tag on Ms. Bohn’s car and the behavior of her
passengers—Corporal Carpenter testified that he believed they pretended to sleep when he
pulled over Ms. Bohn—also fail to adequately support a finding of reasonable suspicion.
Even though temporary registration tags may sometimes be used by criminals seeking to
avoid detection, such tags are also consistent with lawful behavior. Furthermore, Corporal
Carpenter compared the tag and the vehicle it was attached to before initiating his traffic
stop, and found that the tag matched the vehicle. (Doc. 65 at 45.) Similarly, accepting as
true Corporal Carpenter’s assertion that pretending to sleep is an avoidance tactic (id. at
25), sleeping in the back of a car, especially at nighttime, is not necessarily indicative of
criminal activity, as Corporal Carpenter conceded (id. at 58). And when Corporal Carpenter
radioed for Border Patrol, he had not yet attempted to initiate contact with the occupants
of the backseat; he had merely observed them with their eyes closed. (Government’s
Exhibit A, Defendant’s Exhibit M at 1:30 – 2:20.)
It is true that even though a collection of factors considered in isolation from one
another may have an innocent explanation, they may collectively amount to reasonable
suspicion. United States v. Berber-Tinoco, 510 F.3d 1083, 1087 (9th Cir. 2007).
Nonetheless, the Court finds that there was insufficient reasonable, particularized suspicion
to warrant Corporal Carpenter’s immigration investigation. Altogether, the facts show a
car laden with the legal maximum number of passengers; that those passengers were not
attempting to conceal themselves; that they were resting in the backseat; and that the driver
engaged in no evasive behavior. As discussed above, the vehicle’s presence on I-10 and
State Route 80, without any indication that it had recently crossed the border, also lacks
significant probative value.
Case 4:24-cr-08211-RM-MAA Document 78 Filed 12/05/25 Page 12 of 13

- 13 -
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
As such, the Court concludes that Ms. Bohn’s traffic stop was prolonged without
reasonable suspicion, in violation of her Fourth Amendment rights. Since the traffic stop
was unconstitutional at its inception as discussed in Section III(a), the Court will suppress
all evidence obtained from Ms. Bohn and her vehicle, including any statements made by
Ms. Bohn. Even if the traffic stop had been valid at its inception, the Court would suppress
all evidence obtained following the unconstitutional prolongation of the stop.
Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED that Defendant’s Objection (Doc. 73) is granted.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Report and Recommendation (Doc. 71) is
overruled, as set forth herein.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant’s Motion to Suppress (Doc. 46) is
granted, as set forth herein.
Dated this 5th day of December, 2025.
Case 4:24-cr-08211-RM-MAA Document 78 Filed 12/05/25 Page 13 of 13