USA v. Sandoval

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
WO
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA
United States of America,
Plaintiff,
v.
Zionn Olah Tascyi Sandoval,
Defendant.
No. CR-23-00729-001-TUC-JAS (MSA)
REPORT AND
RECOMMENDATION
Pending before the Court is a petition to revoke Defendant Zionn Sandoval’s term
of supervised release. For the following reasons, the Court will recommend that the district
court find that Defendant violated his conditions of supervision as alleged.
I. Background
In 2024, Defendant pleaded guilty to one count of possession of an unregistered
firearm. (Doc. 56.) He was sentenced to a term of imprisonment with a 36-month term of
supervised release to follow. (Doc. 64.) The judgment requires that he follow certain
conditions of supervision. Relevant here, mandatory condition 1 provides that Defendant
“must not commit another federal, state or local crime.” (Id. at 2.) Standard condition 10
provides that Defendant “must not own, possess, or have access to a firearm, ammunition,
destructive device, or dangerous weapon.” (Id. at 3.)
In late 2025, Defendant’s probation officer filed an amended petition to revoke
Defendant’s supervised release, alleging that he had violated mandatory condition 1 and
standard condition 10. (Doc. 70.) The petition alleges that, on October 1, Tucson police
Case 4:23-cr-00729-JAS-MSA Document 88 Filed 03/30/26 Page 1 of 4

- 2 -
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
officers searched a vehicle in which Defendant was a passenger. (Id. at 1–2.) The police
found a Springfield XD pistol under the seat where Defendant was sitting. (Id.) The police
then searched Defendant’s vehicle, where they found a magazine that fit the Springfield
XD pistol as well as a box of 9-millimeter ammunition. (Id.) Defendant denied the
allegations and proceeded to an evidentiary hearing. (Docs. 79, 80.)
At the hearing, the Government presented the testimony of Joel Woodward,
Defendant’s probation officer. (Doc. 85 at 5–6.) Officer Woodward testified that, on
October 2, 2025, he received an electronic notification that local law enforcement had run
a check on Defendant. (Id. at 9.) Officer Woodward requested information about the check
and was then contacted by a Tucson police detective. (Id.) The detective explained that,
while surveilling a residence, the police saw Defendant arrive and then leave with another
individual. (Id. at 8.) The detective stated that the police stopped and searched the vehicle,
and that the search revealed a Springfield XD pistol under the seat where Defendant was
sitting. (Id.) The detective explained that the police then searched the vehicle that they had
seen Defendant drive to the surveilled residence, and that that search revealed a magazine
that fit the Springfield XD pistol as well as 9-millimeter ammunition. (Id.)
At the hearing, the Court took judicial notice of various court documents. (Id. at 5.)
These include the complaint in Defendant’s new case. (Pl.’s Ex. 1.) The complaint adds
the following relevant information: Defendant was the registered owner and sole occupant
of the vehicle that police saw him drive to the surveilled residence; and the front passenger
seat where Defendant was sitting during the first search had a raised lip under it that would
have made it difficult for a backseat passenger to shove a firearm under the seat. (Id. at 1.)
II. Legal Standard
A district court may revoke a term of supervised release if the defendant violates a
condition of his supervision. 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3). The Government must prove the
violation by a preponderance of the evidence. United States v. Turner, 312 F.3d 1137, 1142
(9th Cir. 2002).
. . . .
Case 4:23-cr-00729-JAS-MSA Document 88 Filed 03/30/26 Page 2 of 4

- 3 -
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
III. Discussion
Allegation A accuses Defendant of violating mandatory condition 1 by committing
the offense of felon in possession of a firearm. Allegation B accuses Defendant of violating
standard condition 10 by possessing or having access to a firearm and ammunition. The
Court finds that the Government has proven these violations by a preponderance of the
evidence.
The offense of felon in possession of a firearm has four elements: the defendant
knowingly possessed a firearm; the firearm had been moved in interstate commerce; the
defendant had a legal status that made it unlawful for him to possess firearms; and the
defendant knew of his prohibited status. Ninth Circuit Model Jury Instruction 14.15; see
18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). The record shows that Defendant is a convicted felon who knows
of his status. (Doc. 64.) The complaint in Defendant’s new case indicates that the firearm
in question was moved through interstate commerce. (Pl.’s Ex. 1.) The question, then, is
whether there is reason to believe that Defendant knowingly possessed the firearm. The
answer is yes.
The Court credits Officer Woodward’s account of his conversation with a Tucson
police detective. In that conversation, Officer Woodward learned that Defendant was a
passenger in a vehicle that was searched, and that police officers found a firearm under the
seat where he was sitting. The firearm was found in a spot where Defendant easily could
have placed it, indicating that the firearm was his. And although there was a backseat
passenger behind Defendant, the lip underneath Defendant’s seat would have made it
difficult for that passenger to place the firearm there. Further, it is highly significant that a
search of Defendant’s vehicle turned up a magazine that fit the firearm. As noted, the
vehicle was registered to Defendant, and officers observed that he was the sole occupant
of it when he arrived at the surveilled residence. The proximity of the firearm to Defendant
and the presence of a matching magazine in his vehicle make it more likely than not that
the firearm belonged to him and that he knowingly possessed it. Thus, the Government has
shown by a preponderance that Defendant violated mandatory condition 1 by committing
Case 4:23-cr-00729-JAS-MSA Document 88 Filed 03/30/26 Page 3 of 4

- 4 -
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
the offense of felon in possession of a firearm. Such possession necessarily establishes a
violation of standard condition 10.
At the hearing, Defendant’s counsel highlighted the absence of certain evidence,
such as testimony from a Tucson police officer or evidence from Defendant’s cellphone.
(Doc. 85 at 29–31.) The question for the Court, though, is not what information is missing;
it is whether the information available establishes a violation by a preponderance of the
evidence. Defendant’s counsel also emphasized that there are explanations for the firearm’s
presence besides Defendant’s knowing possession of it. (Id. at 30–31.) While it is certainly
“possible” that Defendant was unaware of the firearm’s presence, the facts support the
inference that that was not the case. Officers found evidence of firearm possession in two
locations—a firearm within arm’s reach of Defendant and a matching magazine in
Defendant’s vehicle. It is more likely than not that Defendant knowingly possessed the
firearm and ammunition. Defendant’s arguments to the contrary are not persuasive.
IV. Conclusion
The Court recommends that the district court find that the Government has proven
Allegations A and B (Doc. 70) by a preponderance of the evidence.
This recommendation is not immediately appealable to the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. The parties have 14 days to file specific written objections
with the district court. Fed. R. Crim. P. 59(b)(2). The parties have 14 days to respond to
objections. The parties may not file replies on objections absent the district court’s
permission. A failure to file timely objections may result in the waiver of de novo review.
United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc).
Dated this 30th day of March, 2026.
Case 4:23-cr-00729-JAS-MSA Document 88 Filed 03/30/26 Page 4 of 4