Hartman et al v. Aksamit et al

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
WO
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA
Steve Hartman, et al.,
Plaintiffs,
v.
Shawn Aksamit, et al.,
Defendants.
No. MC-26-00002-PHX-JJT
ORDER
At issue are the following Motions: [1] Motion to Quash Subpoena to Arizona
Department of Transportation, Motor Vehicle Division filed by Defendant Shawn Aksamit
(Doc. 1), to which Plaintiffs Steve Hartman, Vicki Hartman, Carrie Garcia, Sean Garcia
(through Guardian ad Litem Rene Garcia), and Braydon Hartman (through Guardian ad
Litem Lauren Hartman) filed a Response1 (Doc. 22), and Defendant filed a Reply
(Doc. 25); [2] Motion to Transfer Defendant Shawn Aksamit’s Motion to Quash Subpoena
to Arizona Department of Transportation Pursuant to FRCP 45(f) filed by Plaintiffs
(Doc. 12), to which Defendant filed a Response (Doc. 20), and Plaintiffs filed a Reply
(Doc. 21); and [3] Motion to Quash Deposition Subpoena to the Arizona Department of
Transportation filed by Defendant (Doc. 26), to which Plaintiffs filed a Response
1 As Defendant points out (Doc. 25 at 11), Plaintiffs filed their Response three weeks late
without seeking an extension to the response deadline from the Court or providing good
cause therefor. Plaintiffs’ filing of a Motion to Transfer (Doc. 12) did not automatically
stay the response deadline. Under Local Rule 7.2(i), the Court may deem Plaintiffs’ failure
to timely respond as consent to the Court’s granting of Defendant’s motion to quash the
document subpoena. But as the Court will discuss, the procedural posture of the matters
before the Court compels further analysis in this instance.
Case 2:26-mc-00002-JJT Document 32 Filed 10/09/26 Page 1 of 6

- 2 -
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
(Doc. 28), and Defendant filed a Reply (Doc. 31). The Court finds these matters
appropriate for resolution without oral argument. LRCiv 7.2(f).
In an underlying lawsuit in the District Court for the Southern District of California
(Case No. 3:25-cv-01201-GPC-LR), Plaintiffs have brought claims of negligence and loss
of consortium against Defendant based on damages allegedly sustained by Plaintiffs when
Defendant’s utility task vehicle collided with Plaintiffs’ dune buggy on April 5, 2025, at
Imperial Sand Dunes Recreation Area, a federal government property operated by the U.S.
Bureau of Land Management in California. (Doc. 2 at 1.) In the course of discovery in that
litigation, Plaintiffs served a subpoena duces tecum on the Arizona Department of
Transportation Motor Vehicle Division (“ADOT”) demanding the production of
documents regarding Defendant’s driving record and the status of Defendant’s driver’s
license before and at the time of the collision. (Doc. 2 at 3–4; Doc. 3 at 16–21 (“document
subpoena”).) The date of production provided on the document subpoena was February 9,
2026, and the location of production was in San Diego, California. (Doc. 3 at 16.) On
January 30, 2026, Defendant moved to quash the document subpoena by opening the
present matter in this Court, arguing that the document subpoena violated the geographical
limits for document production under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 45(c) and that it
improperly required the disclosure of Defendant’s privileged or protected information and
sought irrelevant information. (Docs. 1, 2.) Defendant served the motion to quash the
document subpoena on ADOT and Plaintiffs on February 3, 2026. (Docs. 8–10.)
Subsequently, Plaintiffs filed a Motion to Transfer, asking the Court to transfer the
motion to quash the document subpoena to the Southern District of California under Rule
45(f). (Doc. 12.) In the Motion, they informed the Court that ADOT had already complied
with the subpoena and produced the requested documents on January 29, 2026, the day
before Defendant filed the Motion to Quash and four days before Defendant served it.
(Doc. 12 at 1.) Plaintiffs thus argue that the remaining questions raised in the motion to
quash the document subpoena are better answered by the court adjudicating the underlying
matter, justifying a transfer under Rule 45(f).
Case 2:26-mc-00002-JJT Document 32 Filed 10/09/26 Page 2 of 6

- 3 -
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
Defendant reports that Plaintiffs tried to use the documents they obtained from
ADOT in the deposition of Defendant on February 2, 2026, but Defendant objected and
refused to answer questions based on the documents. (Doc. 20 at 5.) Because Defendant
asserted the information in the documents is privileged as early as February 3, 2026, when
he served Plaintiffs with the motion to quash the document subpoena, he contends that
Plaintiffs were obligated to destroy or sequester the information obtained from ADOT and
not use it until the privilege claim is resolved, as provided by Rule 45(e)(2)(B), and that
Plaintiffs failed to comply with the requirements of that Rule. (Doc. 25 at 7.)
Plaintiffs then served a subpoena ad testificandum on ADOT for a deposition set for
March 10, 2026, at which they intended to use the documents obtained from ADOT that
are the subject of the pending motion to quash the document subpoena. (Doc. 19-3 at 25.)
On March 3, Defendant filed a motion to quash the deposition subpoena, and on March 17,
the parties stipulated to the withdrawal of the deposition subpoena and the motion to quash.
(Doc. 24.)
Next, Plaintiffs sought most of the same documents that are the subject of the motion
to quash the document subpoena through other means; although the Federal Driver’s
Privacy Protection Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2721, prohibits disclosure of personal information in
a motor vehicle record except in limited circumstances, Arizona law provides an exception
for disclosure to an “attorney licensed to practice law . . . in connection with any civil . . .
proceeding in any court . . . , including . . . investigation in anticipation of litigation,” in
A.R.S. § 28-455(C)(4). (Doc. 31 at 4.) Apparently, under that exception, Plaintiffs again
obtained Defendant’s motor vehicle record from ADOT, including information otherwise
deemed as personal and privileged. (Doc. 31 at 4.)
On April 28, 2026, Plaintiffs served another subpoena ad testificandum on ADOT
for a deposition set for May 27, 2026. (Doc. 26-2 at 25.) On May 19, Defendant filed
another Motion to Quash Deposition Subpoena (Doc. 26), arguing Plaintiffs’ attempt to
depose a representative of ADOT was simply an end-run around the privilege Defendant
asserted over the documents ADOT produced, which privilege Defendant raised in the first
Case 2:26-mc-00002-JJT Document 32 Filed 10/09/26 Page 3 of 6

- 4 -
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
Motion to Quash (Docs. 1, 2). Notwithstanding the new Motion to Quash, the Rule 30(b)(6)
deposition of ADOT went forward, and Defendant again argues that, because he has
asserted privilege under the California Constitution, Plaintiffs improperly failed to
“destroy, sequester or file the transcript of the deposition under seal for a determination of
[Defendant’s] assertion of privilege in the information obtained during the deposition”
under Rule 45(e)(2)(B). (Doc. 31 at 2.)
Considering this procedural history, the Court agrees with Plaintiffs on one point:
the District Court for the Southern District of California is the appropriate venue for the
resolution of the remaining issues. To be sure, Defendant’s motion to quash the document
subpoena had at least some merit; among other things, Plaintiffs’ subpoena required
compliance beyond the geographical limits set forth in Rule 45(c). But Defendant’s motion
to quash the document subpoena was too late; ADOT already produced the requested
documents to Plaintiffs. At that point, this dispute morphed into one about Plaintiffs’
compliance—or non-compliance—with Rule 45(e)(2)(B), which addresses instances in
which “information produced in response to a subpoena is subject to a claim of privilege.”
Ultimately, a court must determine whether Defendant’s claim of privilege under the
California Constitution has merit, as well as whether the information Plaintiffs obtained is
relevant to the underlying claims in this lawsuit. Those questions are better answered by
the court adjudicating the lawsuit.
Rule 45(f) provides that the Court may transfer the pending motions to the Southern
District of California, in which the court that issued the subpoenas is located, “if the person
subject to the subpoena consents or if the [Court] finds exceptional circumstances.” The
Advisory Committee’s note to the 2013 amendment to Rule 45(f) states that, in deciding
whether transfer is appropriate, “[t]he prime concern should be avoiding burdens to local
nonparties subject to subpoenas,” and “transfer may be warranted in order to avoid
disrupting the issuing court’s management of the underlying litigation, as when that court
has already ruled on issues presented by the motion.” Thus, a risk of inconsistent rulings
that could disrupt the management of the underlying litigation can be considered an
Case 2:26-mc-00002-JJT Document 32 Filed 10/09/26 Page 4 of 6

- 5 -
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
exceptional circumstance. See Cont’l Auto. Sys., U.S., Inc. v. Omron Auto Elecs., Inc., 14
C 3731m, 2014 WL 2808984, at *2 (N.D. Ill. June 20, 2014); see also Moon Mountain
Farms, LLC v. Rural Cmty. Ins. Co., 301 F.R.D. 426, 429-30 (N.D. Cal. 2014) (collecting
cases and noting that attempting to circumvent the authority of the presiding judge in the
underlying action is an exceptional circumstance contemplated by Rule 45).
Here, the “prime concern” of “avoiding burdens to local nonparties subject to
subpoenas” is satisfied by a transfer because ADOT—the local nonparty—already
complied with the subpoenas, so it bears no further burden; indeed, in this sense the present
motions to quash are moot. The remaining issues—whether Plaintiffs failed to comply with
Rule 45(e)(2)(B), whether Defendant’s assertion of privilege under the California
Constitution has merit, and whether the information sought by Plaintiffs is relevant to the
claims in the underlying lawsuit—are best answered by the court that will consider and
rule on the evidence in that lawsuit. Among other things, that court is in a far better position
than this one to decide what evidence is relevant, and ultimately probative, to Plaintiffs’
claims in the underlying lawsuit. For these reasons, the Court will transfer the remaining
questions in this matter to the District Court for the Southern District of California.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED granting the Motion to Transfer Defendant
Shawn Aksamit’s Motion to Quash Subpoena to Arizona Department of Transportation
Pursuant to FRCP 45(f) filed by Plaintiffs (Doc. 12), to the extent that the pending Motion
to Quash Subpoena to Arizona Department of Transportation, Motor Vehicle Division
(Doc. 1) and Motion to Quash Deposition Subpoena to the Arizona Department of
Transportation (Doc. 26) filed by Defendant Shawn Aksamit require a determination of
whether Plaintiffs failed to comply with Rule 45(e)(2)(B), whether Defendant’s assertion
of privilege under the California Constitution has merit, and whether the information
sought by Plaintiffs is relevant to their claims in the underlying lawsuit.
. . .
. . .
. . .
Case 2:26-mc-00002-JJT Document 32 Filed 10/09/26 Page 5 of 6

- 6 -
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED directing the Clerk of Court to transfer this matter
to the District Court for the Southern District of California as soon as practicable and close
the matter in this Court.
Dated this 9th day of October, 2026.
Honorable John J. Tuchi
United States District Judge
Case 2:26-mc-00002-JJT Document 32 Filed 10/09/26 Page 6 of 6