Stone et al v. Brnovich et al

2:26-cv-06267AzdOct 13, 2026

Full text

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
WO
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA
John W Stone, et al.,
Plaintiffs,
v.
Susan M Brnovich, et al.,
Defendants.
No. CV-26-06267-PHX-JGZ
ORDER
Plaintiffs Reverend John W. Stone and Shirley D. Stone, proceeding pro se, filed
their Complaint on September 3, 2026. (Doc. 1.) Plaintiffs bring this action individually
and purportedly as next friends of three minor children, W.S., T.S., and M.S. The
Complaint names as Defendants United States District Judge Susan M. Brnovich; Arizona
Governor Kathleen Hobbs; Arizona Attorney General Kristin Mayes; El Mirage Police
Chief Paul Marzocca; El Mirage Police Sergeant Matthew Jacobs; El Mirage Mayor Alexis
Hermosilla; El Mirage Municipal Court Judge Michael Parascandola; CubeSmart LP;
Metropolitan Life Insurance Company; Maricopa County Superior Court Judges Melissa
Zabor, Jennifer Ryan-Touhill, and Michael Herrod; Sarea Laron McCree; Brittany
Houston; Heiress Dupree; and various Doe Defendants. (Id. at 1.)
Plaintiffs have also filed an Emergency Motion for Mandatory Disqualification of
Chief District Court Judge Jennifer G. Zipps and Application for Out-of-Circuit Judicial
Assignment, which the Court will deny. (Doc. 11.)1 And Plaintiff John Stone has requested
1 Plaintiffs seek the undersigned’s recusal based primarily on the undersigned’s receipt of
filings Plaintiffs sent to the undersigned from their prior action, Stone v. Hobbs, No. CV-
Case 2:26-cv-06267-JGZ Document 12 Filed 10/13/26 Page 1 of 9
- 2 -
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
to receive electronic notice of filings in this matter, (Doc. 6), which the Court will permit.
I. Discussion
A. Prior Litigation and Pleading Deficiencies
This action repackages the allegations and claims raised in Plaintiffs’ prior action,
Stone v. Hobbs, No. CV-25-04158-PHX-SMB. In that case, Judge Brnovich dismissed
Plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint, finding that Plaintiffs failed to comply with Rule 8,
lacked standing to pursue claims based on alleged injuries to their deceased son and minor
grandchildren, and failed to plausibly allege constitutional violations or a conspiracy. (CV-
25-04158-PHX-SMB, Doc. 53.) Judge Brnovich also dismissed four judicial Defendants
and CubeSmart with prejudice. (Id.) Judge Brnovich subsequently denied Plaintiffs’
motions seeking to vacate that Order, rejecting their allegations of judicial fraud, record
tampering, and lack of jurisdiction as insufficient to warrant relief under Rule 60. (Id., Doc.
62.) The court ultimately dismissed the action without prejudice after Plaintiffs failed to
file a Second Amended Complaint within the time permitted. (Id.)
The present Complaint arises from the same underlying controversy, names many
of the same Defendants, and expressly characterizes itself as a “Collateral Attack” on
orders entered in the prior action. Plaintiffs assert three causes of action: (1) a Bivens and
§ 1983 claim alleging judicial forgery, record manipulation, and obstruction; (2) a §
25-04158-PHX-SMB, and an August 14, 2026 letter responding to those filings. Plaintiffs
submitted an Omnibus Emergency Notice addressed to the undersigned, requesting vacatur
of Judge Brnovich’s May 28, 2026 Order, disqualification of Judge Brnovich, reassignment
of the prior action to another judicial officer, emergency intervention concerning three
minor children, and referral of alleged criminal conduct to federal authorities. (CV-25-
04158-PHX-SMB, Doc. 61.) Plaintiffs contend that the undersigned’s receipt of these
filings and subsequent correspondence make the undersigned a material witness, establish
personal knowledge of disputed facts, and create an appearance of partiality. Plaintiffs also
state that they intend to amend this action to name the undersigned as a Defendant, which
they argue provides an additional basis for recusal. (Doc. 11 at 3–5.)
The undersigned’s August 14, 2026 correspondence acknowledged receipt of
Plaintiffs’ materials and advised: “If you wish to challenge a judicial ruling, you may file
an appeal. No further action will be taken in response to your request.” (Id. at 8.) That
correspondence does not make the undersigned a material witness, establish personal
knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts, or provide a reasonable basis to question the
undersigned’s impartiality. See 28 U.S.C. § 455(a), (b)(1). Plaintiffs’ filings are publicly
filed and available to anyone who accesses the Court’s records. Plaintiffs’ stated intention
to name the undersigned as a defendant likewise does not require recusal. See United States
v. Studley, 783 F.2d 934, 940 (9th Cir. 1986) (“A judge is not disqualified by a litigant’s
suit or threatened suit against him.”).
Case 2:26-cv-06267-JGZ Document 12 Filed 10/13/26 Page 2 of 9
- 3 -
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
1985(2) conspiracy claim; and (3) a claim alleging failure to perform a mandatory duty to
rescue under A.R.S. § 13-3620. (Doc. 1 at 6–7.) These claims largely repeat Plaintiffs’
prior allegations of kidnapping, conspiracy, fraud, obstruction, and constitutional
violations, while adding allegations challenging Judge Brnovich’s rulings. Rather than
pursuing appellate review, Plaintiffs appear to be attempting to relitigate matters previously
addressed by the court through a new action.
The Complaint also fails to comply with Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 8 and 10.
Rule 8 requires a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled
to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Rule 10(b) requires a party to state claims or defenses in
numbered paragraphs, each limited as far as practicable to a single set of circumstances,
and to state each claim founded on a separate transaction or occurrence in a separate count
when doing so would promote clarity. Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(b).
The Ninth Circuit has made clear that district courts need not accept “shotgun
pleadings” that are replete with conclusory allegations, assert claims against numerous
defendants without identifying which defendant committed which act, or require the Court
to “make sense of the pleading, to supply facts to support the claim, or to imagine the
claims that might fit the facts.” Gibson v. City of Portland, 165 F.4th 1265, 1288–89 (9th
Cir. 2026). In a May 28, 2026 Order, Judge Brnovich identified similar pleading
deficiencies in Plaintiffs’ prior action, explaining that Plaintiffs asserted blanket allegations
against numerous unrelated defendants, rarely attributed particular conduct to particular
defendants, and relied on broad incorporation of generalized allegations. Stone v. Hobbs,
No. CV-25-04158-PHX-SMB, Doc. 53 at 5–6.
The present Complaint repeats those deficiencies. Although the Complaint itself
spans approximately nine pages, Plaintiffs append more than 100 pages of exhibits,
including pleadings, orders, and other documents from their prior action, and purport to
incorporate those materials as the factual basis for their claims. The Complaint identifies
numerous Defendants but does not explain which acts or omissions are attributable to each
Defendant or how those acts or omissions establish liability under the three asserted causes
Case 2:26-cv-06267-JGZ Document 12 Filed 10/13/26 Page 3 of 9
- 4 -
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
of action. The extensive exhibits do not relieve Plaintiffs of their obligation to provide a
short and plain statement of each claim. The Court will not search through incorporated
exhibits or pleadings from other actions to determine the basis for Plaintiffs’ claims. See
Ferrell v. Durbin, 311 F. App’x 253, 259 (11th Cir. 2009) (“Neither this Court nor the
district court is required to parse the complaint searching for allegations . . . [that] form the
basis of each of Appellants’ claims.”). In addition, the Complaint fails to use consecutively
numbered paragraphs.
B. Failure to State a Claim
i. Count I
Count I asserts claims under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal
Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), and 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging judicial forgery,
record manipulation, and obstruction. Bivens provides a limited remedy for certain
constitutional violations committed by federal officers, while § 1983 provides a remedy
against persons acting under color of state law who deprive individuals of federally
protected rights. See Bivens, 403 U.S. at 397; West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).
Plaintiffs do not clearly identify which Defendants allegedly violated which constitutional
rights or allege facts establishing each Defendant’s personal participation in the alleged
violations. Instead, Plaintiffs rely on generalized allegations of judicial misconduct, fraud,
and obstruction, primarily arising from adverse rulings in their prior litigation. As
explained below, claims for damages arising from the judicial acts of the named judges are
barred by absolute judicial immunity. Plaintiffs otherwise fail to allege sufficient facts
establishing liability under Bivens or § 1983. Accordingly, Count I fails to state a claim.
ii. Count II
Plaintiffs’ conspiracy claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(2) is likewise insufficiently
pleaded. The statute addresses specified conspiracies interfering with federal judicial
proceedings and conspiracies obstructing justice in state courts with the requisite
discriminatory intent. See Kush v. Rutledge, 460 U.S. 719, 724–26 (1983); Bretz v. Kelman,
773 F.2d 1026, 1028–29 (9th Cir. 1985) (en banc). Plaintiffs do not identify the particular
Case 2:26-cv-06267-JGZ Document 12 Filed 10/13/26 Page 4 of 9
- 5 -
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
conduct attributable to each alleged conspirator or allege facts sufficient to establish an
agreement to engage in conduct prohibited by § 1985(2). Their generalized allegations of
conspiracy and judicial obstruction are insufficient to state a claim. Accordingly, Count II
fails to state a claim.
iii. Count III
Section 13-3620 establishes mandatory reporting obligations concerning suspected
child abuse and neglect and imposes criminal penalties for violations. A.R.S. § 13-3620(A).
It does not expressly authorize a private civil action to compel the rescue of minor children.
Courts in this District have declined to recognize an independent private right of action
under § 13-3620. See Johnson v. Chandler Unified School District, No. CV-24-00530-
PHX, Doc. 118 at 13–15 (D. Ariz. Sept. 9, 2026); McCarthy v. Scottsdale Unified School
District No. 48, 409 F. Supp. 3d 789, 821 (D. Ariz. 2019). Plaintiffs identify no basis for
enforcing the asserted rescue obligation through a private civil action. Accordingly, Count
III fails to state a claim. Because § 13-3620 does not authorize the private statutory rescue
remedy Plaintiffs seek, amendment would be futile as to that theory.
C. Judicial Immunity and Requests for Equitable Relief
Plaintiffs’ claims for damages against Defendants Susan M. Brnovich, Michael
Parascandola, Melissa Zabor, Jennifer Ryan-Touhill, and Michael Herrod fail because the
conduct alleged against these Defendants consists of judicial acts undertaken while
presiding over Plaintiffs’ prior federal and state court proceedings. Judges are absolutely
immune from damages liability for judicial acts unless they act in the clear absence of all
jurisdiction. Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356–57 (1978). Judicial immunity applies
even when a plaintiff alleges that the judge acted maliciously or corruptly. Mireles v. Waco,
502 U.S. 9, 11 (1991). Plaintiffs’ allegations concerning the issuance of orders, conduct of
hearings, denial of motions, and dismissal of claims involve judicial functions. Plaintiffs
cannot overcome judicial immunity merely by characterizing those actions as fraudulent
or criminal, or by asserting that the judges exceeded their authority. Amendment cannot
cure the immunity bar as to the judicial conduct alleged.
Case 2:26-cv-06267-JGZ Document 12 Filed 10/13/26 Page 5 of 9
- 6 -
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
Plaintiffs also seek declaratory and injunctive relief concerning orders entered in
their prior proceedings. However, a separate civil action against the presiding judges is not
a substitute for appellate review. See Mullis v. U.S. Bankruptcy Court, 828 F.2d 1385,
1392–94 (9th Cir. 1987). Plaintiffs’ claims for equitable relief against Judge Brnovich are
barred because they arise from acts undertaken in her judicial capacity. Id. at 1394.
Additionally, § 1983 generally prohibits injunctive relief against state judicial officers for
judicial acts unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.
42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiffs allege neither exception and fail to identify an independent
basis for declaratory relief against the state judicial Defendants. Accordingly, the requests
for declaratory and injunctive relief against the judicial Defendants will also be dismissed.
D. Claims Asserted on Behalf of Minor Children.
The Complaint identifies W.S., T.S., and M.S. as Plaintiffs proceeding through John
and Shirley Stone as “next friends.” Although John and Shirley Stone may represent
themselves in this action, they may not represent the minor Plaintiffs pro se. See Johns v.
County of San Diego, 114 F.3d 874, 876 (9th Cir. 1997). Accordingly, the claims
purportedly asserted on behalf of W.S., T.S., and M.S. will be dismissed.
II. Leave to Amend
For the foregoing reasons, the Court will dismiss Plaintiffs’ damages claims against
the judicial Defendants, dismiss their claims for equitable relief against the judicial
Defendants, and dismiss Count III with prejudice to the extent it asserts an independent
private cause of action under A.R.S. § 13-3620 to compel the rescue of the minor children.
The Court has identified the deficiencies in Plaintiffs’ Complaint to permit Plaintiffs to
make an informed decision whether to file an amended complaint.
Within 30 days of the date this Order is filed, Plaintiffs may submit a first amended
complaint correcting the deficiencies identified in this Order. Any amended complaint
must be retyped or rewritten in its entirety and may not incorporate any part of the original
Complaint or pleadings filed in other actions by reference. The amended complaint must
be clearly designated as the “First Amended Complaint” on the face of the document and
Case 2:26-cv-06267-JGZ Document 12 Filed 10/13/26 Page 6 of 9
- 7 -
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
formatted in compliance with LRCiv 7.1. An amended complaint supersedes the original
Complaint. Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1262 (9th Cir. 1992). After amendment, the
Court will treat the original Complaint as nonexistent. Id. Any cause of action alleged in
the original Complaint but omitted from the First Amended Complaint will be deemed
waived, except that claims previously dismissed with prejudice need not be repleaded to
preserve them for appeal. Lacey v. Maricopa Cnty., 693 F.3d 896, 928 (9th Cir. 2012) (en
banc).
Plaintiffs must comply with Rules 8 and 10 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
The amended complaint must contain a short and plain statement of each claim, organized
into separately identified counts and consecutively numbered paragraphs, each limited as
far as practicable to a single set of circumstances. For each claim, Plaintiffs must identify:
(1) the law Plaintiffs believe was violated; (2) the name of the Defendant who violated the
law; (3) exactly what that Defendant did or failed to do; (4) how the action or inaction of
that Defendant is connected to the violation of the law; and (5) what specific injury
Plaintiffs suffered because of that Defendant’s conduct. See Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362,
371–72, 377 (1976).
Plaintiffs must clearly identify the factual allegations supporting each claim and
may not rely on generalized allegations against all Defendants or conclusory assertions of
conspiracy, fraud, or criminal wrongdoing. For each named Defendant, Plaintiffs must
identify the specific acts or omissions attributable to that Defendant, explain how the
conduct violated Plaintiffs’ rights, and allege the resulting injury. Merely naming an
individual or entity as a Defendant, without alleging facts establishing that Defendant’s
liability under a particular cause of action, is insufficient. Plaintiffs must separately identify
each cause of action and clearly connect the supporting factual allegations to that claim.
The Court is not required to search through incorporated materials to determine which
factual allegations support which claims. Failure to adequately link each Defendant’s
conduct to a specific claim and resulting injury may result in dismissal of the claims against
that Defendant.
Case 2:26-cv-06267-JGZ Document 12 Filed 10/13/26 Page 7 of 9
- 8 -
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
If Plaintiffs do not know the names of individual Defendants, they must list the
individual unknown Defendants as Defendant John (or Jane) Doe 1, John Doe 2, and so on
in the caption of their amended complaint. In the body of the amended complaint, Plaintiffs
must allege facts to support how each particular Doe Defendant violated Plaintiffs’ rights.
It is insufficient to simply list a category of Defendants (such as “John Does 1–10”) and
make conclusory allegations against them as a group.
Plaintiffs are further advised that they may not reassert claims against the
judicial Defendants dismissed with prejudice in this Order or use this action to obtain
review or vacatur of orders entered in Stone v. Hobbs, No. CV-25-04158-PHX-SMB.
Plaintiffs also may not pursue claims on behalf of the minor children unless the
children are represented by licensed counsel. See Johns v. County of San Diego, 114
F.3d 874, 876 (9th Cir. 1997).
III. Warnings
A. Address Changes
Plaintiffs must file and serve a notice of a change of address in accordance with
Rule 83.3(d) of the Local Rules of Civil Procedure. Plaintiffs must not include a motion
for other relief with a notice of change of address. Failure to comply may result in dismissal
of this action.
B. Possible Dismissal
Plaintiffs are advised that if a First Amended Complaint fails to state a claim upon
which relief may be granted, the Court may dismiss the remaining claims without further
leave to amend. Plaintiffs are further advised that failure to timely comply with this Order,
including the requirements for filing an amended complaint, may result in dismissal
without further notice. See Ferdik, 963 F.2d at 1260–61 (a district court may dismiss an
action for failure to comply with any order of the Court).
Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiffs’ Emergency Motion for Mandatory
Disqualification (Doc. 11) is denied.
Case 2:26-cv-06267-JGZ Document 12 Filed 10/13/26 Page 8 of 9
- 9 -
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiffs’ claims for damages against
Defendants Susan M. Brnovich, Michael Parascandola, Melissa Zabor, Jennifer Ryan-
Touhill, and Michael Herrod arising from their judicial acts are dismissed.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiffs’ claims for declaratory and injunctive
relief against Defendant Susan M. Brnovich arising from her judicial acts are dismissed.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiffs’ claims for declaratory and injunctive
relief against Defendants Michael Parascandola, Melissa Zabor, Jennifer Ryan-Touhill,
and Michael Herrod, to the extent they seek review or vacatur of orders entered in prior
judicial proceedings, are dismissed.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the claims purportedly asserted on behalf of
W.S., T.S., and M.S. are dismissed.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Count III of Plaintiffs’ Complaint, to the extent
it asserts an independent private cause of action under A.R.S. § 13-3620 to compel the
rescue of the minor children, is dismissed.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiffs may file a First Amended Complaint
within thirty (30) days of the date this Order is filed. Any amended complaint must
comply with the requirements identified in this Order and must not assert claims that
the Court has disallowed.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Request for Electronic Noticing
(Doc. 6) is granted.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that if Plaintiffs fail to file a First Amended
Complaint within thirty (30) days, the Clerk of Court shall, without further notice, enter
judgment dismissing the remaining claims without prejudice and close this case.
Dated this 12th day of October, 2026.
Case 2:26-cv-06267-JGZ Document 12 Filed 10/13/26 Page 9 of 9

Continue your research in ChatGPT or Claude

Connect Omnilex to search the legal corpus from your AI assistant.