Karki v. Bondi et al

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA
Kamala Karki,
Petitioner,
v.
Pamela Bondi, et al.,
Respondents.
No. CV-26-01786-PHX-KML (DMF)
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
TO THE HONORABLE KRISSA M. LANHAM, UNITED STATES DISTRICT
JUDGE:
This matter is on referral to the undersigned for further proceedings and a report and
recommendation pursuant to Rules 72.1 and 72.2 of the Local Rules of Civil Procedure
(Doc. 5 at 4).1
I. BACKGROUND, PROCEDURAL POSTURE, AND HABEAS CLAIMS
Self-represented Petitioner Kamala Karki (“Petitioner” and/or “Karki”) initiated
these proceedings by filing a pro se Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus Under 28 U.S.C.
§ 2241 (“Petition”) (Doc. 1). In the Order screening the Petition, the Court observed:
Petitioner contends she entered the United States as an asylum applicant on
or about January 14, 2025, and she has been in ICE custody since that time.
She claims she was ordered removed on November 10, 2025, she timely
1 Citation to the record as “Doc.” indicates documents as displayed in the official Court
electronic document filing system maintained by the District of Arizona under Case No.
CV-26-01786-PHX-KML (DMF).
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appealed the immigration judge’s decision, and her appeal is pending.
Petitioner concedes she is subject to mandatory detention pursuant to 8
U.S.C. § 1225(b), but contends her prolonged detention violates her Fifth
Amendment due process rights and the Eighth Amendment prohibition
against excessive bail. She seeks immediate release or, in the alternative, a
bond hearing.
(Doc. 5 at 1-2). The Court ordered Respondents to answer the Petition (Id. at 2).
Respondents filed an Answer to Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (“Answer”)
(Doc. 10). Petitioner filed a reply (“Reply”) (Doc. 12).
The parties agree that Petitioner is a native and citizen of Nepal who arrived at a
port of entry seeking asylum on January 14, 2025 (Doc. 1 at 4; Doc. 10 at 1). Petitioner
was classified as an arriving alien and detained pending her immigration proceedings (Doc.
1 at 4; Doc. 10 at 1). On November 10, 2025, an Immigration Judge (“IJ”) ordered
Petitioner removed and Petitioner appealed the IJ’s removal order to the Board of
Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) (Doc. 1 at 4; Doc. 10 at 1). Petitioner avers that she has
remained continuously in immigration detention since she was initially placed in custody
on January 14, 2025 (Doc. 1 at 4; Doc. 12 at 2). Based on the publicly available ICE Online
Detainee Locator System, Petitioner remains in custody at the Eloy Detention Center. 2
In her Petition, Petitioner states that “there is no dispute that Petitioner is an arriving
alien subject to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b). Rather, the dispute is over
whether Petitioner, as an arriving alien, is entitled to a constitutionally due process right
against unreasonably prolonged detention” (Doc. 1 at 4-5). Petitioner begins by outlining
the Government’s statutory authority to detain arriving aliens under § 1225(b) (Id. at 5-6).
Next, Petitioner argues that her immigration detention of over 14 months is
unconstitutionally prolonged and violates due process (Id. at 6-19). Petitioner
acknowledges that the Supreme Court and Ninth Circuit have not yet considered the
constitutionality of prolonged detention under § 1225(b) (Id. at 11) but urges the Court to
follow other courts that have analyzed “as-applied challenges under § 1225(b) similarly to
2 See https://locator.ice.gov/odls/#/search (last accessed May 27, 2026).
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as-applied challenges raised by noncitizens detained under § 1226(c)” (Doc. 1 at 9-10).
Petitioner also urges the Court to adopt the test set forth in Banda v. McAleenan, 385 F.
Supp. 3d 1099 (W.D. Wash 2019), to find that Petitioner’s detention has been unreasonably
prolonged (Id. at 14-19). Finally, Petitioner argues that she has a substantial challenge to
removability which renders her mandatory detention without a bond hearing
unconstitutional (Id. at 19-20). For relief, Petitioner asks the Court to grant the Petition,
order Petitioner’s immediate release with appropriate conditions of supervision or in the
alternative order Respondents to hold a bond hearing before an IJ where to continue
detention the Government must establish by clear and convincing evidence that Petitioner
presents a risk of flight or danger to the community, award Petitioner attorney’s fees and
costs under the Equal Access to Justice Act (“EAJA”) at 5 U.S.C. § 504 and 28 U.S.C.
§ 2412, and grant any other and further relief the Court deems proper (Id. at 26-27).
With their April 10, 2026, Answer, Respondents provided no declaration or
supporting documents of any kind (see Doc. 10). In their Answer, Respondents first argue
that Zadvydas is inapplicable to Petitioner’s present detention because Petitioner’s removal
order is pending appeal before the BIA and therefore the Government’s detention authority
under 8 U.S.C. § 1231 has not yet begun (Id. at 2). Respondents assert that their statutory
authority to detain Petitioner instead derives from § 1225(b)(2)(A) and Petitioner’s
detention throughout the completion of her immigration proceedings is constitutionally
permissible (Id. at 2-6). Specifically, Respondents contend that Petitioner’s due process
claims are foreclosed by law because aliens such as Petitioner who have not entered the
United States have only the procedural rights granted by Congress (Id. at 5-6).3
3 Respondents also argue that “[o]nly Warden Eric Rokosky is a proper respondent” and
request the Court to “dismiss all Respondents other than Warden Eric Rokosky” (Doc. 10
at 1-2). “[I]n habeas challenges to present physical confinement—‘core challenges’—the
default rule is that the proper respondent is the warden of the facility where the prisoner is
being held, not the Attorney General or some other remote supervisory official.” Rumsfeld
v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 435 (2004). The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has “affirm[ed]
the application of the immediate custodian and district of confinement rules to core habeas
petitions filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241, including those filed by immigrant detainees.”
Doe v. Garland, 109 F.4th 1188, 1199 (9th Cir. 2024). Although Doe and Padilla set forth
the rule that a habeas petitioner must name the warden of the facility where they are
detained, the decisions did not preclude naming more than one Respondent as long as the
immediate custodian is named. Because Petitioner’s immediate custodian has been
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Respondents ask the Court to deny the Petition (Id. at 6).
In her Reply, Petitioner reasserts her argument that prolonged detention under
§ 1225(b) violates due process (Doc. 12 at 3-8). Petitioner also cites various district court
decisions finding that § 1225(b) implicitly limits mandatory detention without a bond
hearing to a period of six months (Id. at 6). Citing Zadvydas, Petitioner also urges the
Court to apply the doctrine of constitutional avoidance to construe § 1225(b) to limit
mandatory detention to a reasonably brief period of time (Id. at 8-13), “extendable only if
the government shows justification for detention at a bond hearing” (Id. at 8). Petitioner
also argues that the “overall construction of the statute supports a reading that limits
§ 1225(b) detention to the period before removal proceedings commence” and insists that
§ 1226(a) applies during removal proceedings (Id. at 13-18). Petitioner asks the Court to
order Petitioner’s release with appropriate conditions of supervision if necessary (Id. at 7)
or require that Respondents provide Petitioner with a bond hearing (Id. at 18).
II. DISCUSSION
A. Jurisdiction
A federal district court is authorized to grant a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C.
§ 2241 where the petitioner is “in custody under or by color of the authority of the United
States . . . in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28
U.S.C. § 2241(c)(1), (3). Generally, “challenges to the statutory framework that permits
the alien’s detention without bail,” Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281, 295 (2018),
“questions of law” raised in the application or interpretation of detention statutes, Leonardo
v. Crawford, 646 F.3d 1157, 1160 (9th Cir. 2011), and “[c]laims that the discretionary bond
process itself was constitutionally flawed are cognizable in federal court on habeas because
they fit comfortably within the scope of § 2241.” Hernandez v. Sessions, 872 F.3d 976,
987 (9th Cir. 2017) (quoting Singh v. Holder, 638 F.3d 1196, 1202 (9th Cir. 2011)). Thus,
this Court has jurisdiction over the Petition.
substituted as a Respondent pursuant to this Court’s Order (Doc. 5 at 2), the dismissal of
the remaining Respondents is not recommended.
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B. Petitioner’s Detention is Not Unlawful
1. Zadvydas and/or § 1231 is Inapplicable to Petitioner’s Present
Detention
The Court agrees with Respondents’ contention that Zadvydas and § 1231 are
inapplicable here. In Zadvydas, the statute at issue was § 1231 which pertains to aliens
detained following issuance of a final order of removal. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 688-89.
There is no evidence in this record of a final order of removal, nor does Petitioner assert
such. Because Petitioner’s present detention is authorized by § 1225(b)(2)(A), see infra
Section II(B)(2), the six-month presumptive limit on detention discussed in Zadvydas
regarding § 1231 does not apply here.
2. Petitioner’s Detention is Governed by 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A)
As relevant here, “[a]n alien present in the United States who has not been admitted
or who arrives in the United States (whether or not at a designated port of arrival) . . . shall
be deemed for purposes of this chapter an applicant for admission.” 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a).
Applicants for admission must be inspected by immigration officers to “ensure that they
may be admitted into the country consistent with U.S. immigration law.” Jennings, 583
U.S. at 287. Under § 1225(b)(1)(A)(i) certain inadmissible applicants for admission are
“normally ordered removed ‘without further hearing or review’ pursuant to an expedited
removal process.” Jennings, 583 U.S. at 287 (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(i)). If the
alien indicates either an intention to apply for asylum or a fear of persecution, that alien is
referred for an asylum interview and “shall be detained for further consideration of the
application for asylum.” Id. (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(ii)). Section 1225(b)(2)(A)
provides that if an “immigration officer determines that an alien seeking admission is not
clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted, the alien shall be detained for a
proceeding under section 1229a of this title.” 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A). Regardless of
whether § 1225(b)(1) or § 1225(b)(2) applies, statute “mandates the detention of applicants
for admission” until the applicable immigration proceedings have concluded. Jennings,
583 U.S. at 297 (“Section 1225(b)(1) aliens are detained for ‘further consideration of the
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application for asylum,’ and § 1225(b)(2) aliens are in turn detained for ‘[removal]
proceeding[s].’”).
Here, Petitioner presented herself at a port of entry on January 14, 2025, and was
subsequently taken into custody pending her immigration proceedings. Petitioner has
remained continuously in immigration detention since her initial arrest. Accordingly, the
Court concludes that § 1225(b)(2)(A) governs Petitioner’s present detention.4
Importantly, the termination point for the government’s detention authority has not
yet been reached. As discussed in Jennings, the government’s detention authority lasts
only for a “specified period of time” and ceases upon completion of an alien’s asylum or
removal proceedings. 583 U.S. at 299. Here, Petitioner’s immigration proceedings remain
ongoing. The “specified period of time” in § 1225(b) has not yet elapsed and the
government’s detention authority continues until Petitioner’s immigration proceedings
conclude. Petitioner’s present and continued detention pending her immigration
proceedings is lawful and is not indefinite or unreasonably prolonged. See infra Section
II(B)(3); see also Mamedova v. Noem, No. CV-25-04619-PHX-DWL, 2026 WL 1162282,
at *3 (D. Ariz. Apr. 29, 2026); Savin v. Rivas, No. CV-26-01120-PHX-DWL, 2026 WL
1162384, at *3 (D. Ariz. Apr. 29, 2026); Green v. Rosa, No. CV-26-00888-PHX-MTL
(ASB), 2026 WL 947942, at *2 (D. Ariz. Apr. 8, 2026).
3. Petitioner’s Prolonged Detention Constitutional Claims Fail
Notwithstanding that Petitioner’s detention is mandatory under § 1225(b)(2)(A),
Petitioner argues that due process requires her immediate release or an individualized bond
hearing before an IJ (Doc. 1 at 5-18, 26-27; Doc. 12 at 4-18). Yet, “[a]n alien detained
after arriving at a port of entry . . . is ‘on the threshold [of initial entry].’” Dep’t of
Homeland Sec. v. Thuraissigiam, 591 U.S. 103, 139 (2020) (quoting Shaughnessy v. United
States ex rel. Mezei 345 U.S. 206, 212 (1953)). Accordingly, such an alien is “‘treated’ for
due process purposes ‘as if stopped at the border.’” Id. at 139 (quoting Mezei, 345 U.S. at
4 There is no evidence in the record that Petitioner obtained a positive fear determination.
See 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(ii) (“If the officer determines . . . that an alien has a credible
fear of persecution . . . the alien shall be detained for further consideration of the
application for asylum.”).
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215).
As to the constitutionality of Petitioner’s continued detention through her
immigration proceedings, the United States Supreme Court has squarely held that the rights
of an alien applying for admission at the border are limited to those rights provided by
Congress through statute. See Thuraissigiam, 591 U.S. at 107 (“[T]he Court long ago held
that Congress is entitled to set the conditions for an alien’s lawful entry into this country
and that, as a result, an alien at the threshold of initial entry cannot claim any greater rights
under the Due Process Clause . . . other than those afforded by statute.” (internal citation
omitted)); see also Mendoza-Linares v. Garland, 51 F.4th 1146, 1167 (9th Cir. 2022)
(“[A]ny rights [an alien seeking initial admission to the United States] may have in regard
to removal or admission are purely statutory in nature and are not derived from, or protected
by, the Constitution’s Due Process Clause.”). The Supreme Court has also determined that
an alien such as Petitioner has no statutory right to a bond hearing during removal
proceedings. Jennings, 583 U.S. at 297 (“Until [asylum or removal proceedings end]
nothing in the statutory text imposes any limit on the length of detention. And neither
§ 1225(b)(1) nor § 1225(b)(2) says anything whatsoever about bond hearings.”). In short,
Petitioner has no statutory or constitutional right to a bond hearing throughout the
completion of her immigration proceedings. See Ibarra-Perez v. Howard, 468 F. Supp. 3d
1156, 1175-77 (D. Ariz. 2020); Mamedova, 2026 WL 1162282, at *3; Savin, 2026 WL
1162384, at *3; Green, 2026 WL 947942, at *2.
Petitioner urges the Court to follow other courts that have analyzed “as-applied
challenges under § 1225(b) similarly to as-applied challenges raised by noncitizens
detained under § 1226(c)” (Doc. 1 at 9-10, see also id. at 19-20); however, undersigned is
unpersuaded. Critically, “U.S. immigration law . . . authorizes the Government to detain
certain aliens already in the country pending the outcome of removal proceedings under
§§ 1226(a) and (c).” Jennings, 583 U.S. at 289 (emphasis added); see also Rodriguez Diaz
v. Garland, 53 F.4th 1189, 1196 (9th Cir. 2022) (“8 U.S.C. § 1226, provides the general
process for arresting and detaining aliens who are present in the United States and eligible
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for removal.” (emphasis added)). However, Petitioner stands on a fundamentally different
footing compared to an alien present in the country subject to detention under § 1226(c)—
Petitioner is on the threshold of initial entry and is treated for due process purposes as if
stopped at the border. See Thuraissigiam, 591 U.S. at 139.
Moreover, in Ibarra-Perez v. Howard, 468 F. Supp. 3d 1156 (D. Ariz. 2020), United
States District Judge Lanza of this Court considered a similar claim regarding an alien who
challenged his prolonged detention under 8 U.S.C § 1225(b). Id. at 1160-61. After
summarizing relevant Ninth Circuit and Supreme Court decisions, the Court ultimately
determined that:
[I]t is permissible under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b) to detain an arriving alien who
has expressed a credible fear of persecution and/or who is subject to removal
because he is not clearly entitled to admission. As for how long such
detention may last, although the Ninth Circuit suggested in Rodriguez II
[Rodriguez v. Robbins, 715 F.3d 1127 (9th Cir. 2013)] and Rodriguez III
[Rodriguez v. Robbins, 804 F.3d 1060 (9th Cir. 2015)] that prolonged
detention under § 1225(b) would raise constitutional concerns when applied
to a specific subgroup of arriving aliens—namely, LPRs [lawful permanent
residents] who previously resided in the United States—it did not question
the constitutionality of the prolonged detention of arriving aliens in
Petitioner’s circumstances. Instead, it seemed to reaffirm that, under
[Barrera-Echavarria v. Rison, 44 F.3d 1441 (9th Cir. 1995) (en banc)], such
detention is constitutionally permissible while an asylum/removal
proceeding is pending. Nor has the Ninth Circuit issued any [subsequent]
decisions that overrule those earlier holdings.
Ibarra-Perez v. Howard, 468 F. Supp. 3d at 1175-76.
Similarly, Judge Lanza recently explained that “Thuraissigiam underscores the
conclusion reached in Ibarra-Perez”:
Indeed, “[w]hile Thuraissigiam was decided in the admission context, it cited
and reaffirmed the continuing vitality of Mezei, which addressed the issue of
detention.” Gonzales Garcia v. Rosen, 513 F. Supp. 3d 329, 333 (W.D.N.Y.
2021). Accordingly, since Thuraissigiam was decided, many district
courts—albeit not all (and perhaps not even most) district courts—have
concluded that an arriving alien subject to statutorily mandated detention
under §§ 1225(b)(1) or 1225(b)(2) does not have a constitutional right to a
bond hearing. See, e.g., Korneva v. Rokosky, 2026 WL 851591, *1 (D. Ariz.
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2026); Palma v. Arteta, 2026 WL 697015, *11-12 (S.D.N.Y. 2026); Leon
Alcazar v. Cantu, 2025 WL 2548698, *12-14 (D. Ariz. 2025), adopted by
2025 WL 2304357 (D. Ariz. 2025); Mendoza-Linares v. Garland, 2024 WL
3316306, *2 (S.D. Cal. 2024); Petgrave v. Aleman, 529 F. Supp. 3d 665, 676-
79 (S.D. Tex. 2021); Gonzales Garcia, 513 F. Supp. 3d at 336. See generally
Doe v. Bondi, 2025 WL 3516292, *5-6 (D. Colo. 2025) (surveying the
relevant authorities, noting that “[s]ome courts have held that, at some point,
due process requires a noncitizen subject to prolonged detention under
Section 1225(b) be given an individualized bond hearing before an
immigration judge . . . [b]ut other courts have held that due process imposes
no time limit or hearing requirement when an alien is subject to mandatory
detention under Section 1225(b) while removal proceedings are pending,”
and concluding that “procedural due process does not afford inadmissible
arriving aliens subject to prolonged detention a right to release or a bond
hearing prior to the conclusion of removal proceedings”). Having carefully
considered the latest authorities on this topic, as well as the R&R’s analysis
and the parties’ arguments, and acknowledging the existence of a split in
authority on the issue, the Court still concludes there is no constitutional right
to a bond hearing in this context. This conclusion is also consistent with the
Ninth Circuit’s recent observation that, “after the Supreme Court’s decisions
in Jennings and [Johnson v. Arteaga-Martinez, 596 U.S. 573 (2022)], it
remains undetermined whether the Due Process Clause requires additional
bond procedures under any immigration detention statute.” Rodriguez Diaz
v. Garland, 53 F.4th 1189, 1201 (9th Cir. 2022).
Mamedova, 2026 WL 1162282, at *3. Undersigned finds the reasoning set forth in Ibarra-
Perez and Mamedova persuasive and adopts such to conclude that Petitioner has no
constitutional right to release or a bond hearing in the present procedural posture of her
immigration proceedings.
Undersigned acknowledges that the Presiding Judge in this matter recently issued
an order adopting a Report and Recommendation which determined that prolonged
detention under § 1225(b) violates due process and adopted the six-factor Banda test to
conclude that the petitioner in that matter was entitled to a bond hearing. Kaur v. Lyons,
No. CV-26-00217-PHX-KML (ASB), 2026 WL 967846, at *3-6 (D. Ariz. Mar. 23, 2026),
report and recommendation adopted, 2026 WL 963792 (D. Ariz. Apr. 9, 2026). However,
undersigned instead recommends that Petitioner’s due process claim in this matter be
denied consistent with Ibarra-Perez and Mamedova.
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4. Petitioner’s Additional Arguments in Her Reply Fail
In Petitioner’s eighteen-page Reply, Petitioner raises arguments for relief not
asserted in her Petition (see Doc. 12 at 4-18; see also Doc. 1). Yet, new arguments and
claims may not be raised for the first time in a reply brief. See Delgadillo v. Woodford,
527 F.3d 919, 930 (9th Cir. 2008) (“Arguments raised for the first time in petitioner’s reply
brief are deemed waived.”). Nevertheless, undersigned has considered Petitioner’s
additional arguments and conclude they lack merit.
First, Petitioner is incorrect that § 1226(a) applies to her present detention (see Doc.
12 at 13-14). Petitioner argues that § 1225(b) authorizes detention “only for the period
between their arrest and before they are referred to an immigration judge for removal
proceedings” and once removal proceedings commence detention authority must be under
to § 1226(a) (Id. at 14). However, the Supreme Court in Jennings rejected precisely that
argument. 583 U.S. at 302-03. There, the Supreme Court considered § 1225(b)(1) which
mandates detention “for further consideration of the application for asylum” and
§ 1225(b)(2) which mandates detention “for a [removal] proceeding.” Jennings, 583 U.S.
at 299. The Supreme Court held that “[t]he plain meaning of those phrases is that detention
must continue until immigration officers have finished ‘consider[ing]’ the application for
asylum, § 1225(b)(1)(B)(ii), or until removal proceedings have concluded,
§ 1225(b)(2)(A).” Id. “If [Petitioner’s] interpretation of § 1225(b) were correct, then the
Government could detain an alien without a warrant at the border, but once removal
proceedings began, the Attorney General would have to issue an arrest warrant in order to
continue detaining the alien. To put it lightly, that makes little sense.” Id. at 302. Section
1226(a) does not govern Petitioner’s detention.
Second, Petitioner is mistaken in her Reply arguments that § 1225(b) implicitly
limits detention to six months or some other reasonable period of time (see Doc. 12 at 6,
8). Indeed, Petitioner acknowledges in her Petition that “the statutory text ‘mandate[s]
detention of aliens throughout completion of applicable proceedings’” (Doc. 1 at 5).
Moreover as discussed above, Petitioner’s constitutional arguments for limiting detention
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prior to the conclusion of her immigration proceedings fail. See supra Section II(B)(3).
In short, undersigned concludes that Petitioner’s statutory and constitutional
arguments for relief fail and recommends that no relief be granted on the Petition.
C. Petitioner is Not Entitled to Relief Under the Eighth Amendment
In her Petition, Petitioner argues that her prolonged detention without a bond
hearing violates the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against excessive bail (Doc. 1 at 25-
26). Respondents do not address Petitioner’s Eight Amendment excessive bail claim in
their Answer (see Doc. 10). Nevertheless, the Court concludes that Petitioner’s Eight
Amendment claim fails.
The Eighth Amendment provides that “[e]xcessive bail shall not be required[.]”
U.S. Const. Amend. VIII. The Excessive Bail Clause does not “accord a right to bail in all
cases, but merely [provides] that bail shall not be excessive in those cases where it is proper
to grant bail.” Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524, 545 (1952) (footnote omitted). Here,
statute provides that aliens such as Petitioner must be detained throughout the completion
of immigration proceedings. Additionally, Petitioner is not entitled to bail or any other
relief from immigration detention except at the discretion of the Attorney General. See
Jennings, 583 U.S. at 300 (“[8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A)’s] express exception to detention
implies that there are no other circumstances under which aliens detained under § 1225(b)
may be released.”); Rodriguez v. Robbins, 715 F.3d 1127, 1144 (9th Cir. 2013) (“The
parole process is purely discretionary and its results are unreviewable by IJs”).
Accordingly, Petitioner’s Eighth Amendment excessive bail claim fails. See Banda v.
McAleenan, 385 F. Supp. 3d at 1121 (rejecting Eighth Amendment excessive bail claim
raised by an alien detained under § 1225(b)).
C. Equal Access to Justice Act (“EAJA”), 5 U.S.C. § 504 and 28 U.S.C.
§ 2412, Attorney’s Fees and Costs
In her Petition, Petitioner requests an award of “attorneys’ fees, costs, and other
disbursements pursuant to [EAJA]” (Doc. 1 at 27). Petitioner’s request for EAJA fees
should be denied because Petitioner is not entitled to relief in this matter. See 28 U.S.C.
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§ 2412 (authorizing a court to award fees to a “prevailing party”). Further, Petitioner is
pro se arguing on her own behalf, providing no evidence of fees or costs expended.
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, Petitioner is not entitled to any relief and the Petition
should be denied.
Accordingly,
IT IS RECOMMENDED that no relief be granted to Petitioner in this matter, that
the Petition (Doc. 1) be denied, and that the Clerk of Court be directed to terminate this
matter.
This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1) of the Federal
Rules of Appellate Procedure should not be filed until entry of the District Court’s
judgment. The parties shall have fourteen days from the date of service of a copy of this
recommendation within which to file specific written objections with the Court. See 28
U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 6, 72. The parties shall have fourteen days within which
to file responses to any objections. Failure to file timely objections to the Magistrate
Judge’s Report and Recommendation may result in the acceptance of the Report and
Recommendation by the District Court without further review. See United States v. Reyna-
Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003). Failure to file timely objections to any factual
determination of the Magistrate Judge may be considered a waiver of a party’s right to
appellate review of the findings of fact in an order or judgment entered pursuant to the
Magistrate Judge’s recommendation. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72. In addition, LRCiv 7.2(e)(3)
provides that “[u]nless otherwise permitted by the Court, an objection to a Report and
Recommendation issued by a Magistrate Judge shall not exceed ten (10) pages.”
Dated this 27th day of May, 2026.
Case 2:26-cv-01786-KML Document 14 Filed 05/27/26 Page 12 of 12