Grey v. Sun Health Foundation Incorporated

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WO
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA
Raquel Grey,
Plaintiff,
v.
Sun Health Foundation Incorporated,
Defendant.
No. CV-26-01712-PHX-SHD
ORDER
On March 13, 2026, Plaintiff Raquel Grey filed this action along with an
Application for Leave to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (“IFP”), (Doc. 3). For the following
reasons, Grey’s IFP application will be granted and her Complaint, (Doc. 1), will be
dismissed with leave to amend.
I. IFP APPLICATION
“There is no formula set forth by statute, regulation, or case law to determine when
someone is poor enough to earn IFP status.” Escobedo v. Applebees, 787 F.3d 1226, 1235
(9th Cir. 2015). “An affidavit in support of an IFP application is sufficient where it alleges
that the affiant cannot pay the court costs and still afford the necessities of life.” Id. at 1234
(citing Adkins v. E.I. Dupont de Nemours & Co., 335 U.S. 331, 339 (1948)).
Having reviewed the application to proceed IFP, (Doc. 3), I find that Grey cannot
pay the court costs and still afford necessities. Thus, the motion to proceed IFP will be
granted.
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II. SCREENING THE COMPLAINT
Because Grey is proceeding IFP in this case, her Complaint must be screened.
A. Legal Standard
Congress provided with respect to in forma pauperis cases that a district court
“shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines” that the
“allegation of poverty is untrue” or that the “action or appeal” is “frivolous
or malicious,” “fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted,” or
“seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.”
28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). While much of section 1915 outlines how prisoners
can file proceedings in forma pauperis, section 1915(e) applies to all in forma
pauperis proceedings, not just those filed by prisoners. Lopez v. Smith, 203
F.3d 1122, 1127 (9th Cir. 2000). “It is also clear that section 1915(e) not only
permits but requires a district court to dismiss an in forma pauperis complaint
that fails to state a claim.” Id. Therefore, this court must dismiss an in forma
pauperis complaint if it fails to state a claim or if it is frivolous or malicious.
Kennedy v. Andrews, 2005 WL 3358205, at *2 (D. Ariz. 2005).
“The standard for determining whether a plaintiff has failed to state a claim
upon which relief can be granted under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is the same as the
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) standard for failure to state a
claim.” Watison v. Carter, 668 F.3d 1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012); see also
Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 F.3d 1113, 1121 (9th Cir. 2012) (noting that
screening pursuant to § 1915A “incorporates the familiar standard applied in
the context of failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(6)”).
Hairston v. Juarez, 2023 WL 2468967, at *2 (S.D. Cal. 2023).
B. Grey’s Complaint
Under Rule 8(a)(2), “a pleading must contain a ‘short and plain statement of the
claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677–
78 (2009) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)). While this does not require “detailed factual
allegations, . . . it demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me
accusation.” Id. at 678 (quotation marks omitted). To meet this standard, “a complaint
must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.” Id. (quotation marks omitted). Thus, a complaint must include
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“factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is
liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of
action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id.; see also id. (“Nor
does a complaint suffice if it tenders naked assertions devoid of further factual
enhancement.” (citation modified)). Pro se filings must be construed “liberally when
evaluating them under Iqbal.” Jackson v. Barnes, 749 F.3d 755, 763–64 (9th Cir. 2014).
In her Complaint, Grey asserts a single claim of retaliation under Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act against her former employer, Defendant Sun Health Foundation
Incorporated (“Sun Health”). (Doc. 1 at 5.) Grey alleges that she was hired as an Accounts
Receivable Specialist in November 2024, that she raised concerns to senior management
about her supervisor’s micromanagement and overbearing conduct, and that she was
terminated the day after escalating those concerns to the Vice President and Human
Resources. (Id. at 1–4.) She contends her termination was in retaliation for raising these
complaints. (Id. at 4.)
To make out a prima facie case of retaliation, Grey must allege that (1) she engaged
in protected activity; (2) Sun Health subjected her to an adverse employment action; and
(3) a causal link exists between the protected activity and the adverse action. Ray v.
Henderson, 217 F.3d 1234, 1240 (9th Cir. 2000). Protected activity includes (a) opposing
a practice made unlawful by Title VII or (b) participating in a Title VII investigation,
proceeding, or hearing. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a). While complaining to a supervisor or
upper management can constitute protected activity under Title VII, “the employee must
reasonably believe that the complained-of conduct” is prohibited by Title VII—that is,
amounts to discrimination based on a protected class. Bruner v. City of Phoenix, 2020 WL
5258295, at *4 (D. Ariz. 2020).
Grey’s allegations describe complaints about her supervisor’s micromanagement
and harsh feedback, but nothing in the Complaint suggests that Grey believed her
supervisor’s conduct was based on her race, sex, national origin, or any other protected
characteristic. (See generally, Doc. 1.) Making complaints about workplace conditions
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not prohibited by Title VII does not constitute protected activity. Gutierrez v. Kaiser
Found. Hospitals Inc., 2012 WL 5372607, at *6 (N.D. Cal. 2012) (“While a plaintiff need
not have invoked ‘magic words’ in order for his complaints to constitute protected activity,
he must have alerted his employer to his belief that discrimination, not merely unfair
personnel treatment, had occurred.”). Because Grey has not alleged that she complained
of conduct she believed was prohibited by Title VII, and thus, participated in a protected
activity, she fails to state a claim for retaliation, and her Complaint will be dismissed.
III. LEAVE TO AMEND
Unless a court determines that a pleading cannot be cured by the allegation of other
facts, a pro se litigant is entitled to an opportunity to amend a complaint before dismissal
of the action. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127–29 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc). A
finding that any amendment would be futile justifies dismissal without leave to amend.
Bonin v. Calderon, 59 F.3d 815, 845 (1995).
Here, it cannot be concluded that amendment would be futile. Grey will therefore
be granted an opportunity to amend, but she is advised that failure to allege sufficient facts
supporting her claims—including that she engaged in a protected activity under Title VII—
may result in dismissal of this action without further leave to amend.
Grey is reminded that an amended Complaint supersedes the original Complaint.
Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1262 (9th Cir. 1992); Hal Roach Studios v. Richard
Feiner & Co., 896 F.2d 1542, 1546 (9th Cir. 1990). Thus, after amendment, the original
complaint is treated as nonexistent. Ferdik, 963 F.2d at 1262. Any cause of action raised
in the original complaint is waived if it is not alleged in an amended complaint. See Lacey
v. Maricopa County, 693 F.3d 896, 928 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc). And any Defendant not
renamed in the amended complaint will remain dismissed from this case. See id.
IV. CONCLUSION
Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED that the motion to proceed in forma pauperis, (Doc. 3), is
granted.
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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Complaint, (Doc.1), is dismissed with leave
to amend. Grey has 30 days from the date of this Order to file an amended complaint.
Consistent with LRCiv 15.1, Grey shall file, concurrently with any amended complaint, a
notice of filing the amended pleading that attaches a copy of the amended pleading
indicating in what ways it differs from the Complaint.1
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that if Grey files an amended complaint, the Clerk
of Court shall not issue summons until the Court screens the amended complaint and orders
service consistent with 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d).
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that if Grey fails to file an amended complaint
within 30 days, the Clerk of Court shall enter judgment dismissing this case with prejudice.
Dated this 10th day of April, 2026.
1 The Local Rules and a Handbook for Self-Represented Litigants are available on
this District Court’s website. See U.S. District Court, District of Arizona, Information for
those Proceeding Without an Attorney (Pro Se), https://www.azd.uscourts.gov/proceeding-
without-attorney (last visited April 3, 2026).
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