Mokara v. DeRosa et al

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA
Rocio Boheli Mokara,
Petitioner,
v.
Warden Chuck DeRosa, et al.,
Respondents.
No. CV-26-01653-PHX-KML (ASB)
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
TO THE HONORABLE KRISSA M. LANHAM, UNITED STATES DISTRICT
JUDGE:
Pending before the Court is pro se Rocio Boheli Mokara’s Petition for a Writ of
Habeas Corpus Under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (Doc. 1)1, filed on March 9, 2026. Petitioner is
detained at Eloy Detention Center and seeks release from immigration custody or a bond
hearing. (Id. at 1, 7.) For the reasons that follow, undersigned recommends the Petition be
denied in part and granted in part.
I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND BACKGROUND
The facts before this Court appear largely undisputed. (See Docs. 1, 12.) Petitioner
is a citizen of Equatorial Guinea who entered the United States without inspection on
November 6, 2024, at or near Sasabe, Arizona. (Doc. 12-1 at 1.) Petitioner was considered
subject to removal from the U.S. pursuant to § 212(a)(6)(A)(i) of the Immigration and
Nationality Act (“INA”) as an “alien present in the United States without being admitted
1 Citation to the record indicates documents as they are displayed in the District of Arizona’s
official Court electronic document filing system under Case No. CV-26-01653-PHX-KML (ASB).
Case 2:26-cv-01653-KML Document 13 Filed 04/23/26 Page 1 of 9

- 2 -
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
or paroled[.]” (Id. at 1-4.) It is unclear from the record when Petitioner entered Immigration
and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) custody, but Petitioner was released from ICE custody
in Louisiana on December 18, 2024, into the custody of her sponsor, Lori Portillo. (Doc. 1
at 12-15.) Ms. Portillo lives in Yucca Valley, California with her family. (Id.) Petitioner
remained with her sponsor, Ms. Portillo, until July 9, 2025, when Petitioner was again
detained by ICE. (Id. at 12.) Petitioner had attended her immigration hearing in March
2025, in Santa Ana, California, where she was told to return home and would be informed
of her next court date because the immigration court did not yet have records for her. (Id.)
On July 9, 2025, Petitioner and her sponsor went into the ICE Office in San Bernardino,
California for a “routine reporting visit” and Petitioner was detained. (Id.) According to
Petitioner’s sponsor, “[n]o reason was given to us by the ICE Officers as to why [Petitioner]
was being detained again.” (Id.) Petitioner’s sponsor attests that she is “extremely eager,
willing, and able to provide the [Petitioner] with accommodation, free room and board, at
[her] house[.]” (Id. at 13.) She argues that Petitioner “has only been a source of pure joy to
all of us in the community, and is neither a flight risk, nor a danger to any person in our
community.” (Id.) Petitioner pleads in her Petition that her health has declined since being
in ICE custody, as she has suffered a knee injury and deterioration of her vision in her left
eye. (Id. at 22.) Petitioner also includes in her Petition affidavits and letters of support from
other members of the Yucca Valley community, as well as medical records to substantiate
her claims regarding her deteriorating physical condition. (See id. at 12-25.)
Based on the record before this Court, it appears Petitioner was given an “in custody
redetermination proceeding” before an immigration judge (“IJ”) on August 5, 2025. (Doc.
1 at 10.) The IJ denied Petitioner’s motion for a custody redetermination “due to lack of
jurisdiction” but included an alternative finding, where, if there were jurisdiction,
Petitioner should be released on a $3,500 bond. (Id.) On December 5, 2025, an immigration
judge ordered Petitioner removed. (Doc. 12 at 1.) Petitioner pleads that although she was
ordered removed, the IJ “found [her] testimony to be credible throughout the process.”
(Doc. 1 at 5.) Petitioner’s sponsor attests in her affidavit “I am informed and believe, and
thereon state that [Petitioner] was given a credible fear interview by [Department of
Case 2:26-cv-01653-KML Document 13 Filed 04/23/26 Page 2 of 9

- 3 -
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
Homeland Security] Officials[] before she was paroled into the U.S.[] to apply for asylum.”
(Id. at 13.) Petitioner filed an appeal with the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) on
December 5, 2025. (Id. at 5.)
Petitioner filed a Petition in this Court on March 9, 2026, in which she contests her
detention pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. (Doc. 1.) Petitioner filed three claims in her
Petition, which were previously summarized by the Court as follows:
Petitioner contends her prolonged detention violates her due process rights
(Ground One), is arbitrary (Ground Two), and is unreasonable and punitive
due to the conditions of her confinement (Ground Three). She seeks
immediate release or a bond hearing.
(Doc. 3 at 2.) This Court dismissed Ground Three of the Petition and ordered Respondents
to answer Grounds One and Two. (Id.) In Ground One, Petitioner asserts that her prolonged
detention without individualized review violates the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution.
(Doc. 1 at 6.) Petitioner argues that “[a]t no point has any neutral decision-maker evaluated
whether my decision is justified, leaving me detained for many months without any
individualized custody review.” (Id.) In Ground Two, Petitioner argues that her continued
detention is arbitrary because the immigration judge found her suitable for release in the
bond hearing but lacked jurisdiction to grant bond. (Id.)
Respondents Eric Rokosky; U.S. Attorney General Pamela Bondi; and U.S. ICE
Acting Director Todd Lyons (collectively, “Respondents”)2 filed a Response to Court
Order on April 8, 2026. (Doc. 12.) In their Response, Respondents argue that the Petition
should be denied because Petitioner’s detention is statutorily authorized and constitutional.
(Id. at 2-5.) Respondents also argue that “only Warden Eric Rokosky is a proper
respondent.” (Id. at 1.)3 Respondents assert that Petitioner’s detention is lawful pursuant to
2 Petitioner initially named “Chuck DeRosa, Eloy Detention Center Warden, AFOD of ICE,
ICE Director, and Attorney General” as Respondents. (See Doc. 1.) Pursuant to this Court’s March
16, 2026 Order, Eric Rokosky replaced Respondent Chuck DeRosa, Acting ICE Director Todd
Lyons replaced Respondent ICE Director, and Pamela Bondi replaced Respondent Attorney
General. (See Doc. 5 at 4.) Respondent ICE Acting Field Office Director (AFOD of ICE) was
dismissed as a Respondent. (See id.)
3 Respondents thus request that the Court dismiss all Respondents other than Warden
Rokosky. (Doc. 12 at 2.) “[L]ongstanding practice confirms that in habeas challenges to present
physical confinement-‘core challenges’-the default rule is that the proper respondent is the warden
of the facility where the prisoner is being held, not the Attorney General or some other remote
Case 2:26-cv-01653-KML Document 13 Filed 04/23/26 Page 3 of 9

- 4 -
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001), because Petitioner’s immigration appeal remains
pending before the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) and Petitioner is not subject to
an administratively final order of removal. (Id. at 2.) Respondents argue that Petitioner is
subject to mandatory detention as an applicant for admission. (Id. at 2-3.) Respondents also
argue that Bautista v. Santacruz, No. 5:25-CV-01873-SSS-BFM, 2025 WL 3678485 (C.D.
Cal. Dec. 18, 2025), a class action out of the Central District of California, has no
preclusive effect outside of the Central District of California. (Id. at 4-5) (citing a Ninth
Circuit temporary stay of the Bautista judgment).
Petitioner has not filed a Reply with the Court, and the time for such Reply has now
elapsed.4 (See Doc. 5.)
II. GOVERNING STATUTORY FRAMEWORK
“The writ of habeas corpus remains available to every individual detained within
the United States.” Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 525 (2004) (citing U.S. Const., Art.
I, § 9, cl. 2). Writ of habeas corpus relief extends to a person in federal custody if the
petitioner can demonstrate he “is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or
treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). Accordingly, federal courts have
jurisdiction to grant writs of habeas corpus to non-citizens who are being unlawfully
detained under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. See Trinidad y Garcia v. Thomas, 683 F.3d 952, 956 (9th
Cir. 2012) (“The writ of habeas corpus historically provides a remedy to non-citizens
challenging executive detention.”) (citing INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 301-303 (2001));
supervisory official.” Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 435 (2004). The Ninth Circuit further
clarified this position and “affirm[ed] the application of the immediate custodian and district of
confinement rules to core habeas petitions filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241, including those filed
by immigrant detainees.” Doe v. Garland, 109 F.4th 1188, 1199 (9th Cir. 2024). However, other
courts in this Circuit have found that Doe “did not necessarily preclude naming more than one
respondent so long as the immediate custodian is named.” See, e.g., Doe v. Chestnut, 810 F. Supp.
3d 1169, 1169 n.1 (E.D. Cal. 2025); Gonzalez Elias v. Warden of the Golden State Annex Det.
Facility, No. 1:26-CV-01835-JLT-EPG, 2026 WL 901288, at *1 n.1 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 2, 2026).
Because Petitioner names his immediate custodian, and this Court has already dismissed improper
Respondents (see Doc. 5), undersigned declines to dismiss the other Respondents.
4 Based on the Referral Order issued by this Court, Petitioner had 10 days from the date of
service of Respondents’ Answer to file a Reply. (Doc. 5 at 5.) Respondents filed their Answer
(“Response to Court Order”) on April 8, 2026, and included a Certificate of Service to Petitioner,
dated April 8, 2026. (Doc. 12.) Accordingly, based on the record before this Court, this Petition
became ripe for ruling 11 days later, on April 19, 2026.
Case 2:26-cv-01653-KML Document 13 Filed 04/23/26 Page 4 of 9

- 5 -
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
Lopez-Marroquin v. Barr, 955 F.3d 759, 759 (9th Cir. 2020) (“[D]istrict courts retain
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 to consider habeas challenges to immigration detention
that are sufficiently independent of the merits of the removal order”) (citation omitted).
Respondents do not dispute this Court’s jurisdiction over considering Petitioner’s
prolonged detention. (See Doc. 12.)
The statutory scheme at issue here involves two statutory provisions governing the
detention of non-citizens: 8 U.S.C. §§ 1225 and 1226. Governing the detention of
“applicants for admission” is 8 U.S.C. § 1225. The statute defines “applicants for
admission” as “an alien present in the United States who has not been admitted or who
arrives in the United States” following inspection by immigration authorities. 8 U.S.C. §
1225. On the other hand, 8 U.S.C. § 1226 governs the “apprehension and detention of
aliens” and provides a discretionary framework regarding the detention of a non-citizen
“who is statutorily inadmissible (for example, if they appear at the border without a proper
travel document), but may be entitled to admission or withholding of removal, such as a
noncitizen who has no criminal history, who has not previously been removed from the
United States, and who has stated a credible fear of persecution if removed to the country
of their birth.” See Gomez v. Doe, No. CV 25-03255-PHX-JJT (CDB), 2025 WL 3269886,
at *5 (D. Ariz. Nov. 3, 2025), report and recommendation adopted sub nom. Gomez v.
Unknown Party, 2025 WL 3269055 (D. Ariz. Nov. 24, 2025). According to 8 U.S.C. §
1226(a), “an alien may be arrested and detained pending a decision on whether the alien is
to be removed from the United States. Except as provided in subsection (c) and pending
such decision, the Attorney General...may continue to detain the arrested alien; and...may
release the alien on...bond of at least $1,500 with security approved by, and containing
conditions prescribed by, the Attorney General; or...conditional parole.”
As this Court has previously recognized, the detention analysis changes based on
whether a non-citizen is detained pursuant to § 1225 or § 1226. See Echevarria v. Bondi,
No. CV-25-03252-PHX-DWL (ESW), 2025 WL 2821282, at *4-9 (D. Ariz. Oct. 3, 2025),
appeal dismissed, No. 25-7569, 2026 WL 595586 (9th Cir. Jan. 13, 2026). Courts in this
Circuit and across the country have continued to grapple with whether a non-citizen is an
Case 2:26-cv-01653-KML Document 13 Filed 04/23/26 Page 5 of 9

- 6 -
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
“arriving alien” and thus subject to mandatory detention pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1225 as an
“applicant for admission,” or if rather the non-citizen was “already present in the United
States” and thus subject to the detention parameters in 8 U.S.C. § 1226. See id. (collecting
cases and analyzing the statutory framework of 8 U.S.C. §§ 1225 and 1226). While some
courts disagree, the majority of district courts have “concluded that an alien in Petitioner’s
situation (i.e., an alien who entered the United States without inspection, never formally
applied for admission, and has been living in the United States for years or decades) is
entitled to a bond hearing under § 1226(a).” Id. at 4 (collecting cases); but cf. Chavez v.
Noem, --- F.Supp.3d ---, No. CV-26-00323-PHX-MTL-JFM, 2026 WL 381618, at *1 (D.
Ariz. Feb. 9, 2026) (collecting cases indicating that while most district courts arrived at the
conclusion that non-citizens living in the U.S. “for years or decades” were entitled to a
bond hearing under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), many district courts did not). Accordingly,
undersigned will follow the “dozens of other district courts” that “have recently held that
immigration petitioners present in the United States without admission are not applicants
for admission under § 1225(b)(2)(A) and, therefore, are not subject to mandatory
detention.” Rodriguez v. Bondi, No. CV-25-03917-PHX-JJT (DMF), 2025 WL 4058331,
at *2 n.2 (D. Ariz. Nov. 6, 2025) (collecting cases).
III. ANALYSIS
In the present action, Petitioner arrived in the United States on November 6, 2024,
at or near Sasabe, Arizona. (Doc. 12-1 at 1.) According to the documents provided by
Respondent, Petitioner was considered “an alien present in the United States without being
admitted or paroled” and was classified as subject to removal pursuant to § 212(a)(6)(A)(i)
of the INA. (Id. at 1-4.) Petitioner was then released from ICE custody on December 18,
2024, and lived in Yucca Valley, California, until she was again detained by ICE at her
routine reporting visit on July 9, 2025. (Doc. 1 at 12-15.) While Respondents argue that
Petitioner “is an applicant for admission” and thus subject to mandatory detention, “[i]t is
unclear why Respondents persist in this belief when she was placed in removal proceedings
under section 212(a)(6)(A)(i) of the [INA] as ‘[a]n alien present in the United States
without having been admitted or paroled,’ and not as ‘an arriving alien’ and applicant for
Case 2:26-cv-01653-KML Document 13 Filed 04/23/26 Page 6 of 9

- 7 -
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
admission under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b).” See Rodriguez, 2025 WL 4058331, at *2.
After Petitioner was detained near the border, she was released into the country “in
effect paroled into the United States, on recognizance.” See Gomez, 2025 WL 3269886, at
*10. Accordingly, Petitioner would not be considered an “applicant for admission” after “a
determination was made that [Petitioner] should not be in custody[.]” See id.; see also
Echevarria, 2025 WL 2821282, at *6 (“Given that an immigrant submits an ‘application
for admission’ at a distinct point in time, stretching the phrase ‘at the time of application
for admission’ to refer to a period of years would push the statutory text beyond its breaking
point.”) (quoting Torres v. Barr, 976 F.3d 918, 926 (9th Cir. 2020)). Undersigned will
follow the majority view by this District, as detailed in Echevarria, and find that Petitioner,
as a non-citizen released into the United States, is appropriately considered under the 8
U.S.C. § 1226(a) framework. Thus, undersigned will recommend that this Court find
Petitioner is entitled to a bond hearing pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a).
IV. CONCLUSION AND REMEDY
Having concluded that Petitioner is not an “arriving alien” under 8 U.S.C. § 1225
and her detention is thus governed by 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), undersigned will recommend
that this Court grant the Petition in part. Specifically, undersigned will recommend that this
Court order a bond hearing before a neutral adjudicator that complies with the requirements
set forth in Singh v. Holder, 638 F.3d 1196 (9th Cir. 2011). In the alternative, should the
District Judge find that the bond has already been assessed by the IJ pursuant to its
alternative determination, undersigned will recommend the District Judge release
Petitioner according to the previously determined bond of $3,500. (See Doc. 1 at 10); see
Zepeda v. Noem, No. CV-25-04236-PHX-KML-JFM, slip op. at 3 (D. Ariz. Dec. 11, 2025)
(ordering release of Petitioner upon payment of previously-ordered bond); Aldana
Sanabria v. Rosa, No. CV-25-04439-PHX-JJT (ASB), 2025 WL 3561632, at *2 (D. Ariz.
Dec. 11, 2025) (ordering Petitioner’s release in compliance with the IJ’s alternative bond
determination).
In addition to a bond hearing, Petitioner requests immediate release from detention.
(See Doc. 1.) Courts in this Circuit have found in situations similar to Petitioner’s that a
Case 2:26-cv-01653-KML Document 13 Filed 04/23/26 Page 7 of 9

- 8 -
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
bond hearing before an IJ is the appropriate remedy. See Lopez v. Garland, 631 F. Supp.
3d 870, 882-883 (E.D. Cal. 2022) (“The [c]ourt finds, consistent with other post-Jennings5
cases, that the appropriate remedy is a bond hearing before an immigration judge rather
than immediate release.”) (collecting cases).
Accordingly, undersigned recommends the Petition (Doc. 1) be granted in part
(insofar as a bond hearing is granted or the previously determined bond is followed) and
denied in part (denying other requested relief).
RECOMMENDATION
Based on the foregoing,
IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that the Petition for a Writ of Habeas
Corpus Under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (Doc. 1) be granted in part and denied in part as
follows:
1. Undersigned recommends that the Court grant Petitioner’s request for a bond
hearing and order that, within thirty (30) days of the date her Petition being
granted, Petitioner be afforded a bond hearing before a neutral adjudicator at
which hearing the government must bear the burden of showing that Petitioner
should not be released on bond because she is a flight risk or a danger to the
community or Petitioner be released upon her payment of the previously-
ordered bond of $3,500;
2. It is recommended that the Court order Respondents to provide a notice of
compliance to this Court within seven days of releasing Petitioner or providing
her with a bond hearing.
3. It is recommended all other forms of relief in the Petition be denied.
EFFECT OF RECOMMENDATION
This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of
Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district court’s judgment. The
5 Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281 (2018)
Case 2:26-cv-01653-KML Document 13 Filed 04/23/26 Page 8 of 9

- 9 -
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
parties shall have 14 days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation within
which to file specific written objections with the Court. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.
R. Civ. P. 6(a), 6(b) and 72. Thereafter, the parties have 14 days within which to file a
response to the objections.
Failure to timely file objections to the Magistrate Judge’s Report and
Recommendation may result in the acceptance of the Report and Recommendation by the
district court without further review. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114,
1121 (9th Cir. 2003). Failure to timely file objections to any factual determinations of the
Magistrate Judge will be considered a waiver of a party’s right to appellate review of the
findings of fact in an order of judgment entered pursuant to the Magistrate Judge’s
recommendation. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72.
Dated this 22nd day of April, 2026.
Case 2:26-cv-01653-KML Document 13 Filed 04/23/26 Page 9 of 9