Mozhubaev v. Rosa et al

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF ARIZONA
Amantur Mozhubaev,
Plaintiff
-vs-
Luis Rosa, Jr.,
Defendant.
CV-26-0505-PHX-DJH (JFM)
Report & Recommendation
I. MATTER UNDER CONSIDERATION
Petitioner has filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
2241 (Doc. 1). The Petitioner's Petition is now ripe for consideration. Accordingly, the
undersigned makes the following proposed findings of fact, report, and recommendation
pursuant to Rule 8(b), Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases, Rule 72(b), Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Rule 72.2(a)(2), Local Rules of Civil Procedure.
II. RELEVANT FACTUAL & PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The essential facts of this case are undisputed. Petitioner is a citizen and national
of Kyrgyzstan, who entered the United States to seek asylum on December 10, 2024. He
was detained and placed into expedited removal proceedings and was granted a “credible
fear” interview. The asylum officer found a credible fear and Petitioner was placed in
removal proceedings. Petitioner proceeded to a hearing with an immigration judge (IJ) on
May 15, 2025 and was granted withholding of removal. The Department of Homeland
Security (DHS) appealed the IJ’s decision to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA)
That appeal is still pending. Petitioner has remained detained since December 10, 2024.
(Petition at ¶¶ 1-6; Response at 1-2.)
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B. PRESENT FEDERAL HABEAS PROCEEDINGS
Petition & Motion - Petitioner, detained at the time of the Petition in the Central
Arizona Correctional Complex, commenced the current case by filing through counsel his
Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 on January 27, 2026
(Doc. 1). “Petitioner challenges his ongoing detention pursuant to Zadvydas v. Davis, 533
U.S. 678 (2001), alleging that his removal is not significantly likely to occur within the
reasonably foreseeable future.” (Service Order 1/28/26, Doc. 5 at 1-2.)
Petitioner filed with his Petition a Motion for Temporary Restraining Order (Doc.
2) seeking immediate release.
The Court ordered a response to the Petition and Motion. (Order 1/28/26, Doc. 5.)
Response - On February 4, 2026, Respondents filed their Response (Doc. 7) to the
Petition and Motion, arguing that Petitioner is detained under 28 U.S.C. § 1225(b), his
order of removal is not final and thus his detention is not pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1231 (the
statute at issue in Zadvydas), and Zadvydas does not apply, and Petitioner has no statutory
or constitutional right to release.
Reply - On February 18, 2026 Petitioner filed a Reply (Doc. 8). Petitioner argues
that even if he is detained under § 1225(b), and Respondents fail to address whether due
process requires his release or at least a consideration of release once his “detention
becomes unreasonably prolonged”
III. APPLICATION OF LAW TO FACTS
A. DETENTION UNDER 1225(B) PROPER
In Casas-Castrillon v. DHS, 535 F.3d 941 (9th Cir. 2008), the court observed that
Athe Attorney General's authority over an alien's detention shifts as the alien moves through
different phases of administrative and judicial review.@ Id. at 945. Generally these phases
include the period before there is a final removal order, a post-removal-order “removal
period,” and subsequent thereto.
In Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281 (2018), the Court summarized the pre-
removal detention statutes applicable to aliens seeking admission, such as Petitioner:
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In sum, U.S. immigration law authorizes the Government to detain
certain aliens seeking admission into the country under §§ 1225(b)(1)
and (b)(2).
583 U.S. at 289.1 The detention statute provides:
in the case of an alien who is an applicant for admission, if the
examining immigration officer determines that an alien seeking
admission is not clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted,
the alien shall be detained for a [removal] proceeding
8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A).
The Jennings Court summarized:
That process of [deciding who may enter and/or stay in the
country] generally begins at the Nation's borders and ports of entry,
where the Government must determine whether an alien seeking to
enter the country is admissible. Under [ ] 8 U.S.C. § 1225, an alien
who “arrives in the United States,” or “is present” in this country but
“has not been admitted,” is treated as “an applicant for admission.” §
1225(a)(1). Applicants for admission must “be inspected by
immigration officers” to ensure that they may be admitted into the
country consistent with U.S. immigration law. § 1225(a)(3).
As relevant here, applicants for admission fall into one of two
categories, those covered by § 1225(b)(1) and those covered by §
1225(b)(2).
* * *
Regardless of which of those two sections authorizes their
detention, applicants for admission may be temporarily released on
parole “for urgent humanitarian reasons or significant public benefit.”
§ 1182(d)(5)(A); see also 8 C.F.R §§ 212.5(b), 235.3 (2017). Such
parole, however, “shall not be regarded as an admission of the alien.”
8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A). Instead, when the purpose of the parole has
been served, “the alien shall forthwith return or be returned to the
custody from which he was paroled and thereafter his case shall
continue to be dealt with in the same manner as that of any other
applicant for admission to the United States.” Ibid.
Jennings, 583 U.S. at 287-288. Thus, any parole from detention under § 1225 arises only
under § 1182(d)(5) under the discretion of the Secretary.
1 In responding to the TRO motion, Respondents cited to the recent decision in
Buenrostro-Mendez v. Bondi,166 F.4th 494, 508 (5th Cir. 2026). (Doc. 16 at 3.) See also
Avila v. Bondi, 2026 WL 819258 (8th Cir. Mar. 25, 2026). Cf. Rodriguez v. Warden,
Golden State Annex, 2026 WL 673401 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 10, 2026), report and
recommendation adopted sub nom. Rodriguez v. Warden, 2026 WL 688925 (E.D. Cal.
Mar. 11, 2026) (detailing disagreements with Buenrostro-Mendez). That Fifth Circuit’s
decision in that case is inapposite here. It decided only whether aliens who have gained
entry (albeit illegally) and surreptitiously remained in the country could nonetheless be
deemed to be “seeking admission,” and thus subject to mandatory detention under §
1225(b). Here, Petitioner admits he actually sought admission, not that he has merely been
deemed to be seeking it.
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Here, Petitioner’s removal order is not final, but instead remains pending before the
BIA. Accordingly, his detention is authorized by § 1225(b) and there is no suggestion a
discretionary release has been afforded him under § 1182(d)(5).
B. LIMITED CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS
Petitioner argues that he is entitled to release (or at least a bond hearing) under the
Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution. He asserts
this Court should apply the general standard for evaluating due process claims under
Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976) (balancing individual’s liberty interest, risk of
erroneous deprivation, and government’s interests), and conclude that he is entitled to an
individualized determination (i.e. a hearing) at which the government would be required
to make a showing of the risks of his release and the government’s interest in limiting
those risks by keeping him detained.
Petitioner’s argument presumes he is entitled to the ordinary protections of the Due
Process Clause. The Supreme Court says he is not.
In Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, the petitioning alien had (after a
period of residence) left the United States and spent 19 months “behind the iron curtain”
before attempting to return to the U.S. The Court found he was not challenging his
exclusion, just his continued detention on Ellis Island because other countries would not
take him. 345 U.S. 206, 207 (1953). The Mezei Court quoted a 1950 case for the
proposition that while aliens who had already “passed through our gates, even illegally,
may be expelled only after proceedings conforming to traditional standards of fairness
encompassed in due process of law...But an alien on the threshold of initial entry stands
on a different footing: ‘Whatever the procedure authorized by Congress is, it is due process
as far as an alien denied entry to the country is concerned.’” Mezei, 345 U.S. at 212
(quoting U.S. ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 544 (1950)). The Court went
on to determine whether Mezei could be detained indefinitely on Ellis Island, concluding
that Mezei was not deprived of “any statutory or constitutional right.” 345 U.S. at 215-
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216.
In Dep't of Homeland Sec. v. Thuraissigiam, the Supreme Court discussed the due
process rights of arriving aliens seeking admission. “[A]s to ‘foreigners who have never
been naturalized, nor acquired any domicil or residence within the United States, nor even
been admitted into the country pursuant to law,’ ‘the decisions of executive or
administrative officers, acting within powers expressly conferred by Congress, are due
process of law.’”591 U.S. 103, 138 (2020) (quoting Nishimura Ekiu v. U.S., 142 U.S. 651,
660 (1892)). It is true that the facts of Thuraissigiam were limited to a challenge to the
admission decision, and were so disconnected from detention that the Thuraissigiam court
found no basis for habeas jurisdiction, and the decision contains no language extending its
holding beyond the admission decision. However, the Court’s analysis is a demonstration
of the enduring authority of Mezei.
No Controlling Contrary Authority - Petitioner’s arguments provide no basis for
avoiding Mezei.
In his Reply, Petitioner argues § 1225(b) imposes “indefinite detention.” (Doc. 8
at 2.) This argument was rejected in Jennings. “§§ 1225(b)(1) and (b)(2), unlike §
1231(a)(6), provide for detention for a specified period of time.” Jennings, 583 U.S. at
299. Iin particular, “that detention must continue until immigration officers have finished
consider[ing]’ the application for asylum, § 1225(b)(1)(B)(ii), or until removal
proceedings have concluded, § 1225(b)(2)(A).” Id. To be sure, the time for that to occur
cannot currently be calculated or scheduled. But it does not mean it is without an
identifiable end.
In support of his argument, Petitioner points to Lopez v. United States Dep't of
Homeland Sec., CV-20-1063-PHX-JJT-MTM, 2021 WL 2079840 (D. Ariz. Jan. 28,
2021), report and recommendation adopted, 2021 WL 2075733 (D. Ariz. May 24, 2021).
There, Magistrate Judge Morrissey observed Ҥ 1225(b)(1) does not allow for indefinite
detention, i.e., where removal or release is not “reasonably foreseeable.” Id. at *3. But
that proposition was based on dicta in Rodriguez v. Marin (“Rodriguez IV”), 909 F.3d 252
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(9th Cir. 2018), where the Ninth Circuit observed:
We have grave doubts that any statute that allows for arbitrary
prolonged detention without any process is constitutional or that
those who founded our democracy precisely to protect against the
government’s arbitrary deprivation of liberty would have thought so.
Arbitrary civil detention is not a feature of our American government.
“[L]iberty is the norm, and detention prior to trial or without trial is
the carefully limited exception.” United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S.
739, 755, 107 S.Ct. 2095, 95 L.Ed.2d 697 (1987). Civil detention
violates due process outside of “certain special and narrow
nonpunitive circumstances.” Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 690,
121 S.Ct. 2491, 150 L.Ed.2d 653 (2001) (internal quotation marks
and citation omitted). As Justice Breyer wrote in Rodriguez,
The Fifth Amendment says that “[n]o person shall be ...
deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of
law.” An alien is a “person.” To hold him without bail is to
deprive him of bodily “liberty.” And, where there is no bail
proceeding, there has been no bail-related “process” at all. The
Due Process Clause—itself reflecting the language of the
Magna Carta—prevents arbitrary detention.
138 S.Ct. at 861 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (alteration in original)
(citations omitted).
Rodriguez IV, 909 F.3d at 256–57 (9th Cir. 2018).
Ninth Circuit Judge Bumatay (concurring in denial of pre-removal order bond for
deportable2 aliens under § 1226) addressed the above dicta from Rodriguez IV, and
observed:
Absent any allegation that the extended detention here is unrelated to
an immigration purpose, the mere fact that detention is “prolonged”
doesn't alter the statutory framework. Indeed, in our circuit, the
median processing time for an immigration case to reach a merits
determination is 39 months. Does that mean that any immigration
proceeding appealed in the Ninth Circuit would automatically
invalidate mandatory detention under § 1226(c)? Why should our
delays in processing cases impact Congress's design? And dicta from
Rodriguez v. Marin isn't a basis to rule otherwise. First, the Rodriguez
order was written after the Supreme Court expressly rejected our
2 “The United States immigration laws have long distinguished between deportable aliens
and excludable aliens. A deportable alien is one who has entered the country; an
excludable alien is one who seeks to enter the country.” Sharma v. Reno, 902 F. Supp.
1130, 1135 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (citations omitted). The 1996 immigration act, IIRIRA,
adopted a new term that merged portions of the deportation and exclusion processes into
“removal.” “IIRIRA changes somewhat the nomenclature applicable to immigration cases.
What used to be “excludability” is now “inadmissibility”; what used to be “deportation”
is now “removal.” We use these terms interchangeably. Abebe v. Mukasey, 554 F.3d 1203,
1205 (9th Cir. 2009).
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view that immigration statutes must allow for individualized
bond hearings after detentions become prolonged. 909 F.3d at 255.
Second, Rodriguez's musings were mainly justified by a criminal
law ruling. Id. at 256–57 (quoting United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S.
739, 755, 107 S.Ct. 2095, 95 L.Ed.2d 697 (1987)). But that's
irrelevant when it comes to immigration law. See Demore, 538 U.S.
at 521 [ ]. Third, Rodriguez cites Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678,
690 [ ] (2001), for the proposition that “[c]ivil detention” violates due
process outside of “certain special and narrow nonpunitive
circumstances.” Rodriguez, 909 F.3d at 257 (simplified). But
Zadvydas only holds that immigration detention must “serve its
purported immigration purpose,” Demore, 538 U.S. at 526, 123
S.Ct. 1708, and there is no argument that the detention of criminal
aliens serves no immigration purpose. Finally, Rodriguez quotes at
length Justice Breyer's dissenting opinion in Jennings v. Rodriguez,
583 U.S. 281, 138 S.Ct. 830, 200 L.Ed.2d 122 (2018). Rodriguez, 909
F.3d at 257 (quoting Jennings, 583 U.S. at 330 [ ]) (Breyer, J.,
dissenting). But respectfully, a dissenting view is no reason to upset
congressional will.
In contrast, Rodriguez ignored the long history of deference
to the political branches in administering the immigration
system. See Demore, 538 U.S. at 538–40 [ ] (O'Connor, J.,
concurring); Rodriguez Diaz, 53 F.4th at 1215–18 (Bumatay, J.,
concurring). Thus, no extra bond hearing was due here.
Martinez v. Clark, 124 F.4th 775, 788 (9th Cir. 2024) (Bumatay, J., concurring) (emphasis
added). While Judge Bumatay’s reasoning may not be entirely convincing, it does indicate
that the dicta in Rodriguez IV was not the law.
As noted by Judge Bumatay, in an earlier appeal in the same case as Rodriguez IV,
i.e. in Rodriguez v. Robbins (“Rodriguez II”), 715 F.3d 1127 (9th Cir. 2013), the Ninth
Circuit addressed in a class action the concerns that prolonged detention under §§ 1225(b)
and 1226(c) without a bond hearing would be “constitutionally doubtful,” and thus
construed the statutes to require bond hearings after six months. But that case was reversed
by the Supreme Court in Jennings, finding unsupportable the Ninth Circuit’s attempts to
employ “constitutional avoidance” to write in limitations on detention under those
sections, and remanding for further proceedings on the underlying constitutional claims.
Jennings, 583 U.S. at 312.
Moreover, in so doing, the Supreme Court in Jennings recognized that “some
members of the certified class may not be entitled to bond hearings as a constitutional
matter,” and cited to Mezei, and cited portions of Rodriguez II and III where the Ninth
Circuit had already acknowledged such a limitation citing Mezei. Id. at 313.
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In sum, neither the Supreme Court nor the Ninth Circuit have any remaining
precedent deviating from Mezei’s limitation on the due process rights of admission-
seeking aliens to be released from detention under § 1225(b). Cf. Barrera-Echavarria v.
Rison, 44 F.3d 1441, 1448 (9th Cir. 1995) (finding no constitutional limitation on
prolonged detention of excludable aliens even post removal order, relying in part on
Mezei).3
The undersigned is aware that other district judges in the Ninth Circuit have reached
the opposite conclusion. See Avakian v. Cantu, CV-26-00104-PHX-SHD-CDB, Report
and Recommendation, Doc. 17 at 18-19 (D.Ariz. 2026), adopted 2026 WL 746351, at *2
(D. Ariz. Mar. 17, 2026) (detailing cases).
But at least some judges in this District have found no due process limitation on
detention under § 1225(b). See e.g. Ibarra-Perez v. Howard, CV-20-0739-PHX-DWL,
468 F. Supp. 3d 1156, 1177 (D. Ariz. 2020) (finding no limitation on detention of
admission-seeking alien during removal proceedings); Munoz v. Bondi, CV-25-02951-
PHX-MTL, 2026 WL 380610, at *1 (D. Ariz. Feb. 11, 2026) (same, citing Thuraissigiam’s
reference to rights limited to those provided by statute); Korneva v. Rokosky, CV-26-
01505-PHX-MTL, 2026 WL 851591, at *1 (D. Ariz. Mar. 11, 2026) (same). Cf. Avakian
v. Cantu, CV-26-00104-PHX-SHD, 2026 WL 746351, at *2 (D. Ariz. Mar. 17, 2026)
(finding opposition to claim of due process violation from prolonged detention under §
1225(b) waived by failure to raise in response).
Accordingly, the undesigned concludes that Petitioner has no due process right to
release from his current detention under § 1225(b),4 except as provided by Congress, e.g.
under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5). Thus, the Court need not consider the application of the
Matthews factors or other due process analyses, to determine whether the facts of
3 In Xi v. I.N.S., 298 F.3d 832, 837–38 (9th Cir.2002) the Ninth Circuit observed that
insofar as Barrera extended to post-removal detention, it has been superseded by the
adoption 8 U.S.C. § 1231.
4 When Petitioner has a final order of removal, and his detention shifts to § 1231(a)(6), the
limitations in Xi may apply to afford him a right to a bond hearing.
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Petitioner’s case justify release. Therefore, the Petition must be denied.
“As Applied” Challenge - Finally, Petitioner argues in his Reply that any reliance
on Jennings is improper because his challenge is an “as applied” challenge in an individual
case, and Jennings did not address an “as applied” claim. (Reply at 3-4.) Petitioner cites
no authority for this proposition.
“A facial challenge requires a plaintiff to establish that no set of circumstances
exists under which a statute would be valid. An as-applied challenge, by contrast, focuses
on the statute's application to the plaintiff.” Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Mahogany
Meadows Ave. Tr., 979 F.3d 1209, 1217 (9th Cir. 2020).
Contrary to Petitioner’s contention, Jennings was not a facial challenge. Rather it
was an “as applied” challenge raised by various subclasses of detained immigrants held
pre-removal-order under §§ 1225 or 1226. Jennings, 583 U.S. at 290-291. The class was
defined as: “[A]ll non-citizens within the Central District of California who: (1) are or
were detained for longer than six months pursuant to one of the general immigration
detention statutes pending completion of removal proceedings, including judicial review,
(2) are not and have not been detained pursuant to a national security detention statute,
and (3) have not been afforded a hearing to determine whether their detention is justified.”
Jennings, 583 U.S. at 290. Moreover, at the time of the Supreme Court’s 2018 decision,
the named claimant, Alejandro Rodriguez, had been detained since 2004, some 14 years.
Id. Petitioner proffers no reason why his circumstances are so unique from the Jennings
class that they would call for a different result from that reached in Jennings.
Moreover, Mezei controls this case, not Jennings. Jennings declined to address the
underlying constitutional issues, and was limited to the statutory construction issues. In
contrast, Mezei decided the underlying constitutional issue, i.e. the application of the Due
Process Clause to detention of an excludable alien, and concluded it was limited to the
processes provided by Congress.
/ /
/ /
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C. ZADVYDAS INAPPLICABLE
Petitioner relies primarily on Zadvydas (habeas challenge to post-removal order
detention) to support his claim. However, in Zadvydas, the Court distinguished Mezei in
finding a right to a detention hearing for aliens post-removal order. The Court discussed
Mezei’s status as an “arriving alien” deemed “stopped at the border.” Zadvydas, 533 U.S.
at 693-694 (“this Court's …rejection of his challenge to continued detention rested upon a
basic territorial distinction,” i.e. his detention on Ellis Island was not a “landing”) (citing
Mezei, 345 U.S. at 215). With that distinction in mind, the Zadvydas Court held that for
deportable aliens, who had effected an entry, post-removal order detention without a bond
hearing was limited, and created a six month window in which continued detention was
presumptively constitution. In Xi v. U.S. I.N.S., 298 F.3d 832, 837 (9th Cir. 2002), the
Ninth Circuit recognized Mezei describes the limits of due process rights of arriving aliens
regarding detention, but found Zadvydas’s constitutional construction of § 1231(a)(6) to
apply to all post-removal order aliens, including arriving aliens.
Of course, here, Petitioner is not being detained post-removal order pursuant to §
1231(a)(6). Rather, his removal is still being adjudicated administratively. Thus his
current detention is pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b). Accordingly, the statutory provision
construed by Zadvydas, and applied in Xi, has no application to Petitioner.
Indeed, in Jennings the Court declined to extend Zadvydas to an inadmissible alien,
because: (1) detention under § 1225(b) has a definite term (completion of proceedings);
(2) the detention is statutorily mandated, rather than permissive, and thus not ambiguous;
and (3) unlike § 1231(a)(6) detention, detention under § 1225(b) is subject to exceptions,
namely § 1182(b)(5). Jennings, 583 U.S. at 299-301. (The Jennings Court reached similar
conclusions with respect to detention under § 1226. Id. at 303-306.) Thus the Court found
no opportunity to apply the constitutional avoidance canon employed in Zadvydas.
D. CONCLUSION RE DETENTION
Based on the foregoing, the undersigned concludes that Petitioner is properly
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detained under § 1225(b) and that his only due process rights regarding that detention are
those established by Congress, which at this point is limited to discretionary release under
§ 1182(d)(5) which he has not been granted. Accordingly, his Petition must be denied.
E. MOTION FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER
As noted by Petitioner, to obtain temporary relief, Petitioner “must establish that
he is likely to succeed on the merits.” Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7,
20 (2008). (Motion, Doc. 2 at 3.) Because Petitioner’s Petition is without merit, he cannot
show a likelihood of success on the merits. Accordingly, his Motion for Temporary
Restraining Order must be denied.
IV. RECOMMENDATION
IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED:
(A) Petitioner's Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc. 1) be DENIED.
(B) Petitioner’s Motion for Temporary Restraining Order (Doc. 2) be DENIED.
V. EFFECT OF RECOMMENDATION
This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of
Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district court's judgment.
However, pursuant to Rule 72(b), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the parties shall
have fourteen (14) days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation within
which to file specific written objections with the Court. See also Rule 8(b), Rules
Governing Section 2254 Proceedings. Thereafter, the parties have fourteen (14) days
within which to file a response to the objections. Failure to timely file objections to any
findings or recommendations of the Magistrate Judge will be considered a waiver of a
party's right to de novo consideration of the issues, see United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328
F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003)(en banc), and will constitute a waiver of a party's right to
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appellate review of the findings of fact in an order or judgment entered pursuant to the
recommendation of the Magistrate Judge, Robbins v. Carey, 481 F.3d 1143, 1146-47 (9th
Cir. 2007).
In addition, the parties are cautioned Local Civil Rule 7.2(e)(3) provides that
“[u]nless otherwise permitted by the Court, an objection to a Report and Recommendation
issued by a Magistrate Judge shall not exceed ten (10) pages.”
Dated: April 10, 2026
26-0505r RR 26 04 08 on HC.docx
James F. Metcalf
United States Magistrate Judge
Case 2:26-cv-00505-DJH Document 12 Filed 04/10/26 Page 12 of 12