Singh v. Noem et al

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WO
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA
Parasdeep Singh,
Petitioner,
v.
Kristi Noem, et al.,
Respondents.
No. CV-26-00454-PHX-MTL (DMF)
ORDER
I.
Petitioner, a citizen of India, has been present in the United States since 2022. (Doc.
1 at 6.) His application for asylum was denied but is on appeal. (Id. at 7.) At some
unknown time after, Petitioner was detained by Immigrations and Customs Enforcement
and remains in immigration detention. Petitioner filed this habeas corpus action
challenging his immigration detention and seeking a bond determination hearing under 8
U.S.C. § 1226(a). Respondents argue that Petitioner is subject to mandatory detention
without bond under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A). (Doc. 8 at 2-3.)
II.
A.
For the reasons explained in Chavez v. Noem, — F. Supp. 3d —, 2026 WL 381618,
at *1-2 (D. Ariz. Feb. 9, 2026), the Court finds that a person who entered the United States
illegally and is clearly and beyond a doubt not entitled to admission, is subject to mandatory
detention under § 1225(b)(2)(A). See also Buenrostro-Mendez v. Bondi, 166 F.4th 494 (5th
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Cir. 2026).
Based on this record, the Court finds that Petitioner is present without having been
admitted and is therefore treated as an applicant for admission under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(1).
The Court further finds that an immigration officer has not determined Petitioner clearly
and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted, and therefore mandatory detention under 8
U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A) applies. Petitioner’s statutory and regulatory claims must be
denied.
B.
As far as Petitioner alleges that his detention violates his due process rights, he is
mistaken. The government began removal proceedings against Petitioner under procedures
set forth in the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”). An alien unlawfully present in
the United States “has only those rights regarding admission that Congress has provided
by statute.” Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. Thuraissigiam, 591 U.S. 103, 140 (2020); see also
Espinoza Lopez v. Noem, 26 Civ. 00345 (JHR), 2026 WL 266597, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 2,
2026).
In this case, Petitioner received due process in two respects. First, he was afforded
the procedural protection of the INA. Second, he was subject to the determination
procedures established by Congress in the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigration
Responsibility Act where an immigration officer determined that he was not entitled to a
bond hearing. These procedures represent the due process as provided by Congress in
statute. Petitioner is entitled to nothing further under the Constitution.
C.
The Court also rejects Petitioner claim his detention violates the Administrative
Procedure Act (“APA”), 5 U.S.C. § 706(2), as being arbitrary and capricious. Petitioner
cannot assert an APA claim. Under 5 U.S.C. § 704 (emphasis added), “[a]gency action
made reviewable by statute and final agency action for which there is no other adequate
remedy in a court are subject to judicial review.” By bringing a habeas petition, Petitioner
has an adequate remedy in court, so he cannot also bring an APA claim. See Trump v.
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J.G.G., 604 U.S. 670, 674 (2025) (Kavanaugh, J., concurring) (stating that “habeas corpus,
not the APA,” was the “proper vehicle” for claims involving alien transfers because § 704
provides that “claims under the APA are not available when there is another adequate
remedy in a court” (quotation marks omitted)); see also id. at 672 (majority opinion) (per
curiam) (describing the claims as “within the ‘core’ of the writ of habeas corpus and thus
must be brought in habeas”).
Even on the merits, however, Petitioner’s claim fails. Because Petitioner was
classified and treated as the INA requires, the government has not acted arbitrarily or
capriciously. See F.C.C. v. NextWave Personal Commc’ns Inc., 537 U.S. 293, 300 (2003)
(“The Administrative Procedure Act requires federal courts to set aside federal agency
action that is ‘not in accordance with law . . . .’” (emphasis added) (quoting 5 U.S.C.
§ 706(2)(A))).
D.
Petitioner’s claim that his detention without a bond hearing violates the Suspension
Clause is likewise rejected. The Suspension Clause provides that the “Privilege of the Writ
of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion
the public Safety may require it.” U.S. Const. art. I, § 9, cl. 2. Petitioner has not been
precluded from bringing this habeas petition and asserting constitutional and statutory
challenges to his detention, nor has this Court been precluded from reviewing and ruling
on it. See Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 517 (2003) (holding that § 1226(e) did not bar a
habeas petition raising constitutional challenges, so federal courts had jurisdiction to
review those challenges); Brown v. Muniz, 889 F.3d 661, 676 (9th Cir. 2018) (“[T]he
Suspension Clause establishes no particular review standard for habeas petitions; it does,
however, guarantee access to the federal courts to press a habeas claim.”); Puri v. Gonzales,
464 F.3d 1038, 1042 (9th Cir. 2006); see also I.N.S. v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 337 (2001)
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (“A straightforward reading of [the Suspension Clause] discloses
that it does not guarantee any content to (or even the existence of) the writ of habeas corpus,
but merely provides that the writ shall not (except in case of rebellion or invasion) be
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suspended.”), superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in Nasrallah v. Barr, 590
U.S. 573, 580 (2020); Perez v. Barr, 957 F.3d 958, 963 (9th Cir. 2020) (noting that the
“privilege of habeas corpus entitles the prisoner to a meaningful opportunity to demonstrate
that he is being held pursuant to the erroneous application or interpretation of relevant law”
(emphasis added) (citation and quotation marks omitted)). Petitioner’s Suspension Clause
challenge therefore fails.
Even considering Petitioner’s argument on the merits, however, the Court is
skeptical of the conclusion that classifying an alien as subject to mandatory detention
would violate the Suspension Clause. Although the Ninth Circuit has stated that “[h]abeas
relief for people detained by executive officials of the federal government, including aliens,
has been guaranteed by statute since 1789,” Flores-Miramontes v. I.N.S., 212 F.3d 1133,
1142 (9th Cir. 2000), members of the Supreme Court have reasoned that even § 1226(e)’s
bar of review of mandatory detention under § 1226(c) likely does not violate the
Suspension Clause because “historical evidence suggests that [an alien] would not have
been permitted to challenge his temporary detention pending removal until very recently.”
See Demore, 538 U.S. at 537-38 (O’Connor, J., concurring); id. at 539 (“All in all, it
appears that in 1789, and thereafter until very recently, the writ was not generally available
to aliens to challenge their detention while removal proceedings were ongoing.”);
Thuraissigiam, 591 U.S. at 116 (“[T]he [Suspension] Clause, at a minimum, protects the
writ as it existed in 1789, when the Constitution was adopted.” (quotation marks omitted));
see also St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 342 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“[T]he Suspension Clause
guarantees the common-law right of habeas corpus, as it was understood when the
Constitution was ratified. There is no doubt whatever that this did not include the right to
obtain discretionary release.”). Indeed, given this Court’s conclusion that the INA permits
Petitioner to be classified as an applicant for admission subject to mandatory detention,
any Suspension Clause argument would necessarily require the Court to issue a
“momentous” holding that “an Act of Congress unconstitutionally suspend[ed] the writ of
habeas corpus.” Thuraissigiam, 591 U.S. at 132. Such a conclusion cannot be lightly
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reached, particularly on this limited record and Petitioner’s bare argument.
E.
Finally, the Court also rejects Petitioner’s argument that relief should be granted
here because he is a member of the Bautista class. See Calderon Lopez v. Lyons, –– F.
Supp. 3d ––, 2025 WL 3683918, at *1 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 19, 2025). On March 6, 2026, the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals temporarily stayed the Bautista declaratory judgment,
pending a ruling on the Government’s emergency motion for a stay pending appeal. See
Bautista v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., No. 26-1044 (9th Cir. Mar. 6, 2026). If Petitioner
believes he is entitled to further relief under the judgment in Bautista, he must seek relief
in the Central District of California.
For all these reasons, the Petition must be denied.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus
(Doc. 1) is DENIED. This action is dismissed, all pending motions are denied as moot,
and the Clerk of Court must enter judgment accordingly.
Dated this 23rd day of March, 2026.
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