Walker v. Lukrom REIT LLC et al

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WO
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA
Jesse Lewis Walker,
Plaintiff,
v.
Lukrom REIT LLC, et al.,
Defendants.
No. CV-26-00433-PHX-DWL
ORDER
Plaintiff Jesse Walker (“Walker”), who is proceeding pro se, filed a complaint (Doc.
1), a motion for a temporary restraining order (“TRO”) (Doc. 3), and an application for
leave to proceed in forma pauperis (Doc. 4). Because Walker asserted in his TRO motion
that he had recently been evicted from his apartment, that he was forced to leave his dog
in the apartment, and that his dog may lack access to food and water (Doc. 3), the Court
scheduled an emergency hearing on the TRO motion before screening the complaint
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2).1 Fortunately, both sides reported during the hearing
that Walker had, in the interim, successfully retrieved his dog and his tools of trade from
the apartment.
With that backdrop in mind, the Court turns to Walker’s filings. Walker’s
application for leave to proceed in forma pauperis is granted, and the Court will screen
Walker’s complaint before it is allowed to be served. Under § 1915(e)(2), a complaint is
1 Although section 1915 largely concerns prisoner litigation, section 1915(e) applies
to all in forma pauperis proceedings. Calhoun v. Stahl, 254 F.3d 845, 845 (9th Cir. 2001)
(“[T]he provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) are not limited to prisoners.”).
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subject to dismissal if it contains claims that are “frivolous or malicious,” that “fail[] to
state a claim upon which relief may be granted,” or that “seek[] monetary relief against a
defendant who is immune from such relief.” Id. Additionally, under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 8(a)(2), a pleading must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim
showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Id. Although Rule 8 does not demand
detailed factual allegations, “it demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-
unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).
“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory
statements, do not suffice.” Id.
“[A] complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a
claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Id. (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly,
550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim is plausible “when the plaintiff pleads factual content
that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
misconduct alleged.” Id. “Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for
relief [is] . . . a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial
experience and common sense.” Id. at 679. Thus, although a plaintiff’s specific factual
allegations may be consistent with a constitutional claim, a court must assess whether there
are other “more likely explanations” for a defendant’s conduct. Id. at 681.
The Ninth Circuit has instructed that courts must “construe pro se filings liberally.”
Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010). A “complaint [filed by a pro se litigant]
‘must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.’” Id.
(quoting Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam)). Conclusory and vague
allegations, however, will not support a cause of action. Ivey v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ.
of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982). A liberal interpretation may not supply
essential elements of the claim that were not initially pled. Id.
The complaint asserts that Walker—who has a two-year-old daughter and a one-
year-old son (Doc. 4 at 3)—was locked out of his residence by Defendant Lukrom REIT
LLC (“Lukrom”) pursuant to a writ of restitution on January 20, 2026. (Doc. 1 at 6.)
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Walker included, as part of the complaint, a copy of a December 31, 2025 judgment against
him in an eviction action in Country Meadows Justice Court, in which the court found him
“guilty of special detainer for non-payment of rent,” granted Lukrom immediate possession
of the premises, and ordered a writ of restitution to issue on January 6, 2026. (Id. at 19.)
Walker also included the writ of restitution, dated January 8, 2026, which ordered “the
sheriff or any constable in Maricopa County” to remove Walker “and all persons holding
under or though [sic]” Walker from the premises. (Id. at 21.) The complaint asserts that
Walker’s dog remains in the residence, along with various items of Walker’s personal
property including tools and inventory for his business, but Lukrom has denied him access
to the premises to retrieve or care for his dog and to retrieve his personal property from the
premises. The complaint also names Lukrom’s counsel in the justice court proceedings,
Scott E. Williams of Zona Law Group (“Williams”), as a Defendant, but although the
allegations refer cumulatively to “Defendants,” none of the allegations clarify what acts, if
any, suggest that Williams violated any law or otherwise is liable.
The complaint asserts three claims: (1) violation of the Protecting Tenants at
Foreclosure Act (“PTFA”), 12 U.S.C. § 5220, because Lukrom failed to provide 90 days’
notice to vacate the premises, (2) violation of the Fair Housing Act’s (“FHA”) prohibition
against retaliation, 42 U.S.C. § 3617, because the eviction and other “adverse actions,
including refusing to remedy hazardous conditions,” were allegedly retaliation against
Walker for “requesting repairs and asserting rights related to serious health and safety
hazards,” and (3) violation of the FHA’s prohibition against discrimination, 42 U.S.C.
§ 3604, because the eviction and “denial of safe conditions” were “discrimination or
disparate treatment/impact on the basis of familial status” based on Walker’s status as “a
custodial parent of minor children.” (Doc. 1 at 7.)
None of the claims in the complaint can stand. As for the PTFA claim, aside from
the apparent inapplicability of the PTFA, which protects tenants when their landlord
defaults on a mortgage and the successor landlord wishes to evict bona fide tenants,2 there
2 See, e.g., SD Coastline LP v. Buck, 2010 WL 4809661, *1 (S.D. Cal. 2010) (“The
PTFA . . . provides certain protections to tenants who reside in properties subject to
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is “no private right of action” under the PTFA. Logan v. U.S. Bank Nat. Ass’n, 722 F.3d
1163, 1169 (9th Cir. 2013). The FHA claims cannot stand because there are no allegations
supporting the conclusory statements that Walker was targeted due to his status as a
custodial parent and/or in retaliation for requesting repairs. In addition to lacking factual
allegations in support of these claims, the complaint includes the judgment of the justice
court, which states the eviction was for failure to pay rent. Without substantial allegations
to support the discrimination and retaliation claims, these claims fail.
To the extent the FHA claims are premised on injuries caused by the eviction itself,
they are also barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. However, Plaintiff appears to allege
that he was subjected to additional retaliatory and/or discriminatory acts that preceded the
eviction, such as Defendants’ alleged “refus[al] to remedy hazardous conditions” and
“denial of safe conditions.” (Doc. 1 at 7.) Claims under the FHA premised on such alleged
acts would not be barred by Rooker-Feldman. Lyons v. Gene B. Glick Company, Inc., 844
F. App’x 866, 868-69 (7th Cir. 2021) (“Rooker-Feldman blocks Lyons’s second set of
claims . . . about the eviction . . . [because] Lyons’s alleged injuries from this set of
claims—losses of housing, federal financial rental assistance, credit, and economic
stability—were complete only when the Indiana court ordered the eviction. . . . Because
Lyons would not have suffered these injuries absent the eviction order, Rooker-Feldman
blocks these claims. Lyons’s first set of claims—about discrimination and retaliation
preceding or separate from the state-court suit—are not barred by Rooker-Feldman.”).
As for how to proceed in light of these determinations, “[a] district court should not
dismiss a pro se complaint without leave to amend unless it is absolutely clear that the
deficiencies of the complaint could not be cured by amendment.” Akhtar v. Mesa, 698
F.3d 1202, 1212 (9th Cir. 2012) (cleaned up). “[B]efore dismissing a pro se complaint the
district court must provide the litigant with notice of the deficiencies in his complaint in
order to ensure that the litigant uses the opportunity to amend effectively.” Ferdik v.
foreclosure. Such protections include the right to continue living on the foreclosed
property premises for the duration of their lease and the right to receive a 90 day notice to
vacate.”).
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Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1261 (9th Cir. 1992), as amended (May 22, 1992). In light of
these standards, the Court will grant leave to amend as to Plaintiff’s FHA claims, but only
to the extent those claims are asserted against Lukrom and are based on injuries that are
independent from the eviction. Leave to amend is denied as to the PTFA claim based on
futility. Additionally, leave to amend as to Williams is denied based on futility.
Finally, Plaintiff’s TRO motion is denied for two independent reasons. First,
because the complaint has been dismissed for failure to state a claim, Plaintiff obviously
has not established a likelihood of success on the merits or even serious questions going to
the merits. See, e.g., Toepfer v. City of Vallejo, 2024 WL 4437216, *6 (E.D. Cal. 2024)
(“Plaintiffs have not demonstrated that they are likely to succeed on the merits of their
claims because the Complaint fails to sufficiently plead any claims.”). Second, as noted at
the outset of this order, the parties’ representations during the hearing on the TRO motion
establish that there is no longer a risk of irreparable harm.
Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED that:
1. The application to proceed in forma pauperis (Doc. 4) is granted.
2. The complaint (Doc. 1) is dismissed.
3. The motion for TRO (Doc. 3) is denied.
4. Williams is dismissed as a party.
5. Plaintiff may, within 14 days of the issuance of this order, file an amended
complaint. Any changes shall be limited to supplying new factual allegations in support
of Plaintiff’s FHA claims against Lukrom.
6. If Plaintiff files an amended complaint within 14 days of the issuance of this
order, the Court will screen the amended complaint before deciding whether it may be
served. Lukrom need not respond to the amended complaint until it is screened.
…
…
…
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7. If Plaintiff fails to file an amended complaint within 14 days of the issuance
of this order, the Clerk of Court shall enter judgment accordingly and terminate this action.
Dated this 27th day of January, 2026.
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