USA v. Luis-Azamar

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WO
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA
United States of America,
Plaintiff,
v.
Isaac Luis-Azamar,
Defendant.
No. CR-26-00084-001-PHX-SHD
ORDER
Before me is the Government’s Motion in Limine to Exclude Improper Evidence
and Argument Regarding Lawfulness of Defendant’s Detention by Law Enforcement
(Doc. 24 (the “Motion”)), to which Defendant Isaac Luis-Azamar responded, (see Doc.
48). On May 28, 2026, I held the Final Pretrial Conference in this matter and heard
argument on the Motion. For the reasons stated on the record and in my order entered the
following day, (Doc. 59), I granted the Motion in part, denied it in part, and took the
remainder under advisement. On June 1, 2026, Defendant filed a supplemental response,
(Doc. 60), addressing the sole unresolved issue: whether Defendant may introduce
evidence about ICE conduct unrelated to the actions of the ICE officers on the day of his
father’s arrest (“Other ICE Conduct”). For the reasons set forth below, I will grant the
remaining portion of the Motion and will preclude Defendant from introducing evidence
of Other ICE Conduct.
I. BACKGROUND
On January 30, 2026, ICE Enforcement and Removal Operations officers operating
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in Phoenix identified Defendant’s father, Mr. Luis-Castro, as being in the United States
unlawfully, prompting the officers to stop, using emergency lights and sirens, the truck in
which Mr. Luis-Castro and Defendant were traveling. (Doc. 37 at 1–2; Doc. 28 at 1.) Both
Mr. Luis-Castro and Defendant initially fled on foot,1 but officers caught Mr. Luis-Castro
and took him to the ground to effect his arrest. (Doc. 37 at 2; Doc. 28 at 2.) Defendant
then approached the officer who was apprehending Mr. Luis-Castro (the “Officer”) and
made physical contact with the Officer. (Doc. 37 at 2–3; Doc. 28 at 2.) Defendant was
then arrested and indicted for Assaulting, Resisting, and Impeding a Federal Officer in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 111(a). (Doc. 6.)
As relevant to the Motion, the parties dispute the nature of Defendant’s contact with
the Officer, as well as what prompted it. The Government contends that Defendant threw
two punches at the Officer, landing one, and then forced the Officer to the ground and
struck him. (Doc. 37 at 2–3.) Defendant contends that the Officer used excessive force
against his father, seriously injuring Mr. Luis-Castro’s shoulder, and that Defendant only
pushed the Officer to protect his father, never punching anyone. (Doc. 28 at 2.)
Defendant intends to pursue a defense-of-others affirmative defense at trial
predicated on excessive force by a federal law enforcement officer. (See id.) Anticipating
that Defendant would seek to present testimony about his subjective beliefs concerning
ICE to support his affirmative defense, the Government filed the Motion. (See Doc. 24.)
In response, Defendant argued that he should be allowed to testify about “any relevant prior
experiences or things he saw, heard, or knew about ICE that provided a reasonable basis
for his use of force to defend Mr. Luis-Castro.” (Doc. 48 at 2.) Put another way, he seeks
to “introduce evidence of [Defendant’s] state of mind at the time of the alleged assault”
and extrinsic evidence supporting that state of mind. (Doc. 60 at 3 (“Mr. Luis-Azamar’s
fear that ICE officers would hurt his father if he did not intervene is objectively reasonable,
and he should be permitted to introduce evidence about why he feared them. He should
1 Defendant indicated that he fled because he “was scared when officers stopped him
because he had seen news of immigration officers using excessive force against people.”
(Doc. 28 at 2.)
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also be permitted to introduce extrinsic evidence to corroborate his knowledge and state of
mind.”).)
II. LEGAL STANDARD
Motions in limine seek “to limit in advance testimony or evidence in a particular
area.” United States v. Heller, 551 F.3d 1108, 1111 (9th Cir. 2009). Generally, parties
seek to exclude anticipated prejudicial evidence before the evidence is introduced at trial.
See Luce v. United States, 469 U.S. 38, 40 n.2 (1984). Although not expressly authorized
by the Federal Rules of Evidence, courts may grant such motions under their “inherent
authority to manage trials.” Id. at 41 n.4. Rulings on motions in limine are not immutable,
and they may be revised up to and during trial: “[E]ven if nothing unexpected happens at
trial, the district judge is free, in the exercise of sound judicial discretion, to alter a previous
in limine ruling.” Id. at 41–42.2
III. ANALYSIS
The Government argued in its Motion and at the May 28 Final Pretrial Conference
that Other ICE Conduct is irrelevant and, even if relevant, excludable because it is
prejudicial and likely to confuse the issues. (Doc. 24 at 3.) To be admissible at trial,
evidence must be relevant; that is, it must have “any tendency to make a fact more or less
probable than it would be without the evidence; and the fact is of consequence in
determining the action.” Fed. R. Evid. 401; see also Fed. R. Evid. 402 (making clear that
relevant evidence is admissible unless otherwise prohibited by statute or rule and
confirming that “[i]rrelevant evidence is not admissible”). Even relevant evidence may be
excluded “if its probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of . . . unfair
prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, wasting time, or
needlessly presenting cumulative evidence.” Fed. R. Evid. 403.
A. Relevance Under Rule 401
Whether evidence of Other ICE Conduct—including Defendant’s knowledge of that
2 As I indicated at the Final Pretrial Conference, one situation that may cause me to
alter a prior in limine ruling is if the Government opens the door to otherwise inadmissible
testimony.
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conduct—is relevant depends on the standards applicable to his defense-of-others
affirmative defense.3 There is no Ninth Circuit caselaw addressing this precise issue.
Nonetheless, the Ninth Circuit’s decisions addressing self defense in the context of an
assault charge under 18 U.S.C. § 111 are instructive.
As relevant to the analysis here, in the Ninth Circuit a defendant may assert self
defense against federal law enforcement officers under two distinct theories. First, self
defense may be asserted if the defendant (1) did not know that the alleged victim was a
federal officer, (2) reasonably believed that use of force was necessary to defend oneself
against an immediate use of unlawful force, and (3) used no more force than appeared
reasonably necessary in the circumstances. See United States v. Span, 970 F.2d 573, 576–
77 (9th Cir. 1992) (“Span I”) (citing United States v. Feola, 420 U.S. 671, 684 (1975)); see
also Ninth Circuit Model Jury Instruction 8.3 (2022).4 Under the Feola Theory, a
defendant may assert self defense based on the apprehension of “an immediate use of
unlawful force”—i.e., force that has not yet occurred—but only if the defendant was
unaware that the alleged victim was a federal law enforcement officer. Span I, 970 F.2d at
576 (quoting Ninth Circuit Model Jury Instruction 8.02B (West 1989) (functionally
equivalent to Ninth Circuit Model Jury Instruction 8.3 (2022))); see United States v.
Sanchez-Lima, 161 F.3d 545, 549 (9th Cir. 1998) (holding that a defendant was entitled to
a self-defense instruction because he did not know the alleged victim was a federal law
enforcement officer—he believed he was “being attacked by bandits”—and “a rational jury
could conclude that [the defendant] reasonably believed that he was about to receive
another beating”).
The second theory under which a defendant may assert self defense to a charge of
3 The relevant caselaw in the Ninth Circuit does not distinguish between self defense
and defense of others. See United States v. Acosta-Sierra, 690 F.3d 1111, 1126 (9th Cir.
2012) (reciting general standard for self defense which requires, among other things, “a
reasonable belief that the use of force was necessary to defend himself or another against
the immediate use of unlawful force” (emphasis added)). Accordingly, the applicable
standards for self defense apply equally to Defendant’s defense-of-others defense.
4 For purposes of this Order, this self-defense theory will be referred to as the “Feola
Theory” given that it arises from the Supreme Court’s decision bearing that name.
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assaulting a federal officer does not require that the defendant lack knowledge that the
officer was a federal law enforcement officer and is instead based on a “defendant’s right
to use reasonable force to repel excessive force by a federal law enforcement officer.” Span
I, 970 F.2d at 577; see also United States v. Span, 75 F.3d 1383, 1388 (9th Cir. 1996)
(“Span II”) (“The theory is that a person has a right to resist an officer who is using
excessive force.”). The Ninth Circuit has held that this second self-defense theory (the
“Excessive Force Theory”) can be adequately covered by the general self defense
instruction. United States v. Ornelas, 906 F.3d 1138, 1148 (9th Cir. 2018). Under that
standard, the Excessive Force Theory requires a defendant to have reasonably believed his
use of force was necessary to defend against the officer’s immediate use of unlawful—i.e.,
excessive—force; it does not extend to force that a defendant merely fears may occur at
some point in the future. Indeed, although the Ninth Circuit did not frame the issue as such
in Acosta-Sierra, it made clear that the Excessive Force Theory was not available where
“there was no use of force, let alone any excessive force, from which one might reasonably
suggest that a cognizable theory of self defense would lie.” 690 F.3d 1111, 1126 (9th Cir.
2012).
Additionally, regardless of the specific self-defense theory utilized, a defendant’s
reasonable belief that use of force was required must be judged based on an “objectively
reasonable person” standard rather than a subjective standard. Id. In Acosta-Sierra, the
defendant sought to admit expert testimony concerning a psychotic breakdown that made
him honestly believe that jail officials and others were trying to kill him. Id. The Ninth
Circuit affirmed the district court’s refusal to admit this evidence because “[w]hile mental
health evidence would have explained why Acosta-Sierra subjectively believed that self
defense was necessary under the circumstances, it would not have supported the
proposition that his actions were objectively reasonable.” Id.
In this case, Defendant does not, and cannot, assert defense of others based on the
Feola Theory because he knew that the Officer was a federal law enforcement officer.
Thus, he may only pursue the Excessive Force Theory, predicated on his reasonable belief
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that use of force was necessary to defend his father against excessive force by the ICE
officers, and that he used no more force than appeared reasonably necessary in the
circumstances. See Span I, 970 F.2d at 577 (indicating that excessive-force self-defense
theory was tenable if the jury “1) believed that the exercise of force by [the officers] was
unlawful because it was excessive, and 2) found that the [defendants] reasonably defended
themselves from that unlawful exercise of force”); see also Ornelas, 906 F.3d at 1147–48.5
Evidence of Other ICE Conduct—i.e., conduct by officers not involved in Mr. Luis-
Castro’s arrest, occurring days and weeks before the arrest, and occurring in locations far
from Arizona—is irrelevant to whether Defendant reasonably believed that ICE officers
were using excessive force against his father. Put another way, testimony concerning the
things that different ICE agents did to different people, at different times, and in different
places, does not make it more or less likely the ICE officers who arrested Mr. Luis-Castro
were using excessive force when Defendant intervened. This is true under either an
“objectively reasonable person” standard or a “subjective belief” standard.
The evidence that is relevant to Defendant’s Excessive Force Theory is evidence
concerning the force the ICE officers were actually using when they were arresting his
father in Phoenix, AZ, on January 30, 2026. Defendant effectively concedes that this is
the relevant inquiry: “[T]he officers’ conduct, specifically whether they used excessive
force, is of paramount importance to Mr. Luis-Azamar’s defense.” (Doc. 48 at 2–3.) I
agree, and Defendant may adduce evidence about the ICE officers’ conduct during his
father’s arrest, including via Defendant’s testimony if he chooses to testify.
This same rationale forecloses any argument that Defendant needs this evidence to
establish that he used “no more force than was reasonably necessary in the circumstances.”
Acosta-Sierra, 690 F.3d at 1126 (quotation marks omitted); see also Ornelas, 906 F.3d at
1147–48. The reasonableness of the degree of force a defendant employs is gauged by the
5 I declined to hear argument concerning the parties’ proposed final jury instructions
because the final instruction to the jury will depend in large part on the evidence adduced
by the parties at trial. Nonetheless, the analysis set forth in this Order should indicate the
principles I will use to fashion appropriate final instructions, and how the parties should
prepare for trial.
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circumstances actually confronting him, principally the nature and intensity of the force
the alleged victim is using in the encounter at issue. Thus, Other ICE Conduct—and
Defendant’s knowledge of that conduct—has no tendency to show how much force was
reasonably necessary to repel the force the ICE officers were actually using against Mr.
Luis-Castro on January 30, 2026.
Despite acknowledging the scope of relevant evidence—namely the ICE officers’
conduct vis-à-vis Mr. Luis-Castro—Defendant cites People v. Goetz, 497 N.E.2d 41 (N.Y.
1986), for the proposition that the “background and other relevant characteristics of a
particular actor” are relevant under the objective reasonableness standard applicable in self-
defense cases in the Ninth Circuit. (Doc. 48 at 2.) Defendant’s reliance on Goetz is
misplaced. First, Goetz is readily distinguishable because the victims there were not federal
law enforcement officers and the defendant’s self-defense theory was not predicated on
any force exerted by the victims against him. Second, and relatedly, even if Goetz was
instructive as to how to apply the Ninth Circuit’s “objectively reasonable person” standard,
it would not alter the analysis here because, as explained above, Other ICE Conduct has no
bearing on whether Defendant reasonably believed the ICE officers were using excessive
force on his father when he intervened.
In his supplemental response, Defendant further argues that his mental state that he
“feared for his life based on videos he had seen on social media” is relevant and admissible
evidence. (Doc. 60 at 3.) Such evidence is irrelevant because, as explained above,
Defendant’s state of mind and fear of potential future excessive force by federal law
enforcement officers does not make it more or less likely that he reasonably believed his
use of force was necessary to stop excessive force that was actually occurring. See Span I,
970 F.2d at 577; Span II, 75 F.3d at 1388. Simply put, Defendant’s state of mind is
irrelevant to whether he observed the ICE officers engaging in excessive force against his
father.
Likewise, Defendant’s citation to United States v. Saenz, 179 F.3d 686 (9th Cir.
1999), and United States v. James, 169 F.3d 1210 (9th Cir. 1999), for the proposition that
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a defendant asserting self-defense may testify that he knew of a victim’s prior acts of
violence, and may introduce extrinsic evidence of those acts to corroborate his state of
mind, (Doc. 60 at 2–3), is unavailing. Both cases address a defendant’s knowledge of the
prior violent acts of the alleged victim—that is, the very person against whom the defendant
used force—to establish that the defendant’s apprehension of that particular individual was
reasonable. But, as previously discussed, Defendant’s apprehension is irrelevant because
his Excessive Force Theory must be predicated on the ICE officers’ conduct toward his
father.
Saenz and James also do not help him because in this case the alleged victim is the
Officer, and Defendant does not contend that the Officer had any history of violence, much
less that Defendant knew of any such history. Instead, Defendant proffers evidence of acts
committed by different ICE officers, against different people, in a different state. Neither
Saenz nor James authorizes the admission of a third party’s conduct to establish the
reasonableness of a defendant’s fear of the alleged victim, and Defendant’s “imputation”
argument, (see Doc. 60 at 3 n.1), fails given that he cites no authority to support this theory,
and I am aware of none. Furthermore, adoption of Defendant’s imputation theory would
be untenable because a § 111 defendant could place the entire institutional history of a
federal agency before the jury any time an Excessive Force Theory was presented.
B. Confusion of Issues and Unfair Prejudice Under Rule 403
Even if evidence of Other ICE Conduct were marginally relevant to Defendant’s
Excessive Force Theory, such evidence must be excluded because any minimal probative
value is substantially outweighed by a danger of confusing the issues. Defendant indicated
in his supplemental response that he may attempt to turn this trial into a referendum on
ICE’s conduct generally, based on the actions of ICE officers in Minnesota in the days and
weeks before the alleged assault:
To show that he reasonably believed force was necessary, Mr. Luis-Azamar
may introduce evidence of his state of mind at the time of the alleged assault.
On January 30, 2026, Mr. Luis-Azamar told the FBI that when he saw the
armed ICE agents, he feared for his life because of videos he had seen on
social media, including those in which ICE officers shot United States
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citizens. His fear was not based on things that existed solely in his head or
that were known only to him. On January 7, 2026, and January 24, 2026, the
world watched ICE agents shoot and kill two people in Minnesota. These
shootings happened in the weeks leading up to Mr. Luis-Azamar’s own
encounter with ICE officers and made international news.
(Doc. 60 at 3.) The introduction of evidence concerning the conduct of ICE agents who
were not involved with Mr. Luis-Castro’s arrest would confuse the issues and waste time.
The danger of confusing the issues is compounded by a substantial risk of unfair
prejudice. “Unfair prejudice within [the] context [of Rule 403] means an undue tendency
to suggest decision on an improper basis, commonly, though not necessarily, an emotional
one.” Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 180 (1997) (internal quotation marks
omitted). The Other ICE Conduct evidence Defendant proposes to introduce—that ICE
officers shot and killed United States citizens in Minnesota in the days and weeks before
his father’s arrest—is precisely the kind of emotionally charged material that invites a
verdict resting on the jury’s views of ICE as an institution or of immigration enforcement
generally, rather than on the narrow question whether Defendant forcibly assaulted the
Officer without justification. Allowing Defendant to place unrelated actions by other
officers before the jury would create a serious risk that the jury would acquit or convict out
of sympathy or hostility to ICE generally, untethered to the charged conduct and the facts
introduced at trial. This danger of unfair prejudice, together with the dangers of confusing
the issues and wasting time, substantially outweighs whatever minimal probative value the
proposed Other ICE Conduct evidence might have, and I do not believe an instruction could
cure these dangers. Accordingly, even if marginally relevant, Rule 403 provides an
independent basis to exclude evidence of the Other ICE Conduct.
C. Sixth Amendment
In the penultimate sentence of his supplemental response, Defendant contends in
brief and conclusory fashion that precluding the Other ICE Conduct evidence would deny
him the right to present a complete defense guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment. (Doc. 60
at 3–4.) This argument fails because the right to present a defense, though fundamental, is
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not unlimited. Rather, as the Supreme Court has explained, that right is not absolute and a
defendant has no “right to offer testimony that is incompetent, privileged, or otherwise
inadmissible under standard rules of evidence.” Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 410
(1988); see also United States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303, 308 (1998) (“A defendant’s right
to present relevant evidence is . . . subject to reasonable restrictions” and “rules excluding
evidence from criminal trials . . . do not abridge an accused’s right to present a defense so
long as they are not arbitrary or disproportionate to the purposes they are designed to serve”
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
Because Defendant’s proposed Other ICE Conduct evidence is irrelevant under
Rule 401, and is independently excludable under Rule 403, its exclusion does not violate
his right to present a defense. Defendant has not explained how or why the Sixth
Amendment would require me to disregard those rules of evidence. Furthermore, as noted
above, Defendant is free to present the substance of his Excessive Force Theory: he may
testify about what he observed during his father’s arrest, including the force used by the
ICE officers, may introduce other evidence of the officers’ conduct towards his father, and
may argue that the force they were applying to Mr. Luis-Castro was excessive and that his
response was reasonable.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the remaining portion of the Motion will be granted.
Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED granting the remaining portion of the Government’s Motion in
Limine to Exclude Improper Evidence and Argument Regarding Lawfulness of
Defendant’s Detention by Law Enforcement (Doc. 24). Defendant is precluded from
introducing evidence of ICE conduct unrelated to the actions of the ICE officers on the day
of his father’s arrest.
Dated this 4th day of June, 2026.
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