Harden v. Arizona, State of et al

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WO
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA
Sharon Harden,
Plaintiff,
v.
State of Arizona, et al.,
Defendants.
No. CV-25-04483-PHX-JJT
ORDER
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff alleges that she owns or is the successor-in-interest to a residential property
located in Arizona. (Doc. 1, Compl., ¶ 7.) According to Plaintiff, the State of Arizona and
its officials “interfered with Plaintiff’s rights to access, use, and control her private
residential Property” by selling or transferring the property without a condemnation
proceeding or eminent domain authority. (Compl. ¶¶ 8–9.) Plaintiff had no notice, no
hearing, and was not paid just compensation for the property. (Compl. ¶¶ 10–13.)
Plaintiff sued the State of Arizona and the Arizona Attorney General’s Office on
December 4, 2025. She asserted claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violations of the
Fourteenth Amendment, Fifth Amendment, and equal protection clause, a claim for “abuse
of authority,” and violations of state law. (Compl., ¶¶ 14–19.) A few days later, she filed
her Motion for Ex Parte Temporary Restraining Order and Immediate Injunction Without
Notice (Doc. 9) and related memorandum (Doc. 10), which the Court denied and ordered
fulsome briefing on the issue (Doc. 13). Defendants have since filed a response to
Case 2:25-cv-04483-JJT Document 37 Filed 06/18/26 Page 1 of 10

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Plaintiff’s Motion for Temporary Restraining Order (Doc. 18), and Plaintiff replied
(Doc. 21). Defendants have also moved to dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint for lack of
jurisdiction and failure to state a claim (Doc. 19), to which Plaintiff filed a response (Doc.
26) and supplemental response1 (Doc. 24), and Defendants replied (Doc. 31).
While briefing on Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss was ongoing, Plaintiff filed an
Emergency Motion for Order Compelling Issuance and Recordation of Deed of
Reconveyance, Quieting Title, and for Ancillary Writ of Possession (Doc. 27). She also
filed her First Amended Complaint as a matter of right (Doc. 28), which the Court struck
as improper pursuant to Local Rule of Civil Procedure 15.1(b) (Doc. 30). A few days later,
Plaintiff filed her Motion for Leave to File Second Amended Complaint (Doc. 32), lodged
her proposed amendment (Doc. 33), and filed a Notice of Filing Second Amended
Complaint (Doc. 34). Three months later, Plaintiff filed a document titled “Full Redline
First Amended Complaint” (Doc. 36).
II. PLEADING AMENDMENTS
First, the Court must resolve whether Plaintiff’s recent amendments are operative.
A party may amend a complaint once as a matter of course within 21 days after serving it,
or within 21 days of service of, among others, a Rule 12(b)(6) motion. Fed. R. Civ. P.
15(a)(1). Otherwise, a party must obtain leave of court or the other party’s consent before
amending a complaint. Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). When amending as a matter of course, the
party must file a separate notice of filing the amended pleading. LRCiv 15.1(b). When
amending by motion, the party must attach a copy of the proposed amended pleading as an
exhibit to the motion. LRCiv 15.1(a). In either case, the party seeking an amendment must
indicate “in what respect [the amended pleading] differs from the pleading which it
amends, by bracketing or striking through the text that was deleted and underlying the text
that was added.” LRCiv 15.1.
. . .
1 Plaintiff filed the supplemental response twice. (Compare Doc. 24 with Doc. 25.) For
ease of reference, the Court will cite only to the first-filed supplemental response at Doc.
24.
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Plaintiff seeks to file a Second Amended Complaint both by motion and as a matter
of course. (See Docs. 32–34, 36.) Regardless of whether this Court construes Plaintiff’s
requested amendment as a matter of course or by motion, her filings still fail to comply
with Local Rule 15.1. Plaintiff’s Notice of Filing Second Amended Complaint, which was
required if she sought amendment as a matter of course, does not indicate the specific
changes made. (See Doc. 34.) Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave, which was required if she
sought amendment by motion, did not attach a copy of the proposed amendments indicating
the changes made, either. (See Docs. 32–33.) The document she filed three months later
that purportedly contains “redlines” shows a pleading unlike any of the pleadings she has
filed on the record. (Compare Doc. 36 (purported redlines of a pleading) with Compl. and
Doc 28 (stricken First Amended Complaint) and Doc. 33 (lodged Second Amended
Complaint). Redlining a pleading that does not exist on the record does not satisfy the
requirements of the local rules.
Ultimately, Plaintiff’s purported amendments fail because she does not indicate how
the proposed Second Amended Complaint differs from the original Complaint.
Accordingly, the Court denies Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to File Second Amended
Complaint (Doc. 32) for failure to comply with Local Rule 15.1. The operative complaint
remains the original Complaint at Doc. 1 that names the State of Arizona and the Arizona
Attorney General’s Office as defendants.2
III. SUBJECT-MATTER JURISDICTION
Next, the Court considers Plaintiff’s pending TRO motion (Docs. 9–10) and
Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 19). In briefing both, Defendants argue that the Court
lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s claims under the Rooker-Feldman
doctrine. The Court must resolve this jurisdictional question before turning to Plaintiff’s
motion for pendente lite relief, as the latter issue is moot if this Court is without subject-
matter jurisdiction. Shell Offshore Inc. v. Greenpeace, Inc., 864 F. Supp. 2d 839, 842 (D.
2 While named as defendants in later iterations of Plaintiff’s pleadings, Maricopa County
and the Maricopa County Sherriff’s Office were not named in the operative pleading and
are, therefore, not parties to this action.
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Alaska 2012), aff’d, 709 F.3d 1281 (9th Cir. 2013) (“A district court may not grant a
preliminary injunction if it lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the claim before it.”);
Price v. City of Stockton, 390 F.3d 1105, 1117 (9th Cir. 2004) (per curiam) (“A federal
court may issue an injunction if it has personal jurisdiction over the parties and subject
matter jurisdiction over the claim”) (citation omitted).
“A motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1) may
attack either the allegations of the complaint as insufficient to confer upon the court subject
matter jurisdiction, or the existence of subject matter jurisdiction in fact.” Renteria v.
United States, 452 F. Supp. 2d 910, 919 (D. Ariz. 2006) (citing Thornhill Publ’g Co. v.
Gen. Tel. & Elecs. Corp., 594 F.2d 730, 733 (9th Cir. 1979)). “Where the jurisdictional
issue is separable from the merits of the case, the [court] may consider the evidence
presented with respect to the jurisdictional issue and rule on that issue, resolving factual
disputes if necessary.” Thornhill, 594 F.2d at 733; see also Autery v. United States, 424
F.3d 944, 956 (9th Cir. 2005) (“With a 12(b)(1) motion, a court may weigh the evidence
to determine whether it has jurisdiction.”). The burden of proof is on the party asserting
jurisdiction to show that the court has subject-matter jurisdiction. See Indus. Tectonics, Inc.
v. Aero Alloy, 912 F.2d 1090, 1092 (9th Cir. 1990). “[B]ecause it involves a court’s power
to hear a case,” subject-matter jurisdiction “can never be forfeited or waived.” United
States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625, 630 (2002). Courts “have an independent obligation to
determine whether subject-matter jurisdiction exists, even in the absence of a challenge
from any party.” Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 513–14 (2006).
The Rooker-Feldman doctrine provides that federal district courts lack subject-
matter jurisdiction to consider an appeal from the final judgment of a state court. Noel v.
Hall, 341 F.3d 1148, 1154–55 (9th Cir. 2003). As the Ninth Circuit has noted, the doctrine
is easy to apply in its routine form; a disappointed party may not seek reversal of a state
court judgment by appealing to a federal district court. Id. at 1155. The Rooker-Feldman
doctrine also prohibits federal district courts from considering de facto appeals—suits in
which “the adjudication of the federal claims would undercut the state ruling.” Bianchi v.
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Rylaardsam, 334 F.3d 895, 898 (9th Cir. 2003). Thus, Rooker-Feldman “looks to federal
law to determine whether the injury alleged by the federal plaintiff resulted from the state
court judgment itself or is distinct from that judgment.” Id. at 901 (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted). And when refusing to consider a forbidden de facto appeal, a
federal district court must also decline “to decide any issue in the suit that is ‘inextricably
intertwined’ with an issue resolved by the state court in its judicial decision.” Noel, 341
F.3d at 1159 (citation omitted). “If a federal plaintiff has brought a de facto appeal from a
state court decision—alleging legal error by the state court and seeking relief from the state
court’s judgment—he or she is barred by Rooker-Feldman.” Kougasian v. TMSL, Inc., 359
F.3d 1136, 1142 (9th Cir. 2004).
The Ninth Circuit case law illustrates the distinction between a legal wrong from
“an allegedly erroneous decision by a state court,” which is barred by the Rooker-Feldman
doctrine, and “an allegedly illegal act or omission by an adverse party,” which is not
necessarily barred. See Searle v. Allen, 148 F.4th 1121, 1129 (9th Cir. 2025), cert. denied
sub nom. Roshan v. Searle, No. 25-961, 2026 WL 1052084 (U.S. Apr. 20, 2026) (citation
omitted) (collecting cases). For instance, a plaintiff is not barred from suing a defendant
for engaging in fraudulent conduct that led to an adverse state court judgment, Kougasian,
359 F.3d at 1137–38, or challenging the constitutionality of a statute that results in ongoing
injury to the plaintiff, Maldonado v. Harris, 370 F.3d 945, 950 (9th Cir. 2004), Searle, 148
F.4th at 1130, or suing for an injury stemming from distinct post-judgment actions taken
by a defendant, Fontana Empire Ctr., LLC v. City of Fontana, 307 F.3d 987, 995 (9th Cir.
2002).
Here, Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s claims fall squarely within the scope of
Rooker-Feldman and request the Court to take judicial notice of filings from a state court
probate matter related to the real property at issue in Plaintiff’s Complaint. (Doc. 19 at 2–
3, 6–7.) “[T]he court may judicially notice a fact that is not subject to reasonable dispute
because it: (1) is generally known within the court’s territorial jurisdiction; or (2) can be
accurately and readily determined from sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be
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questioned.” Harris v. Cnty. of Orange, 682 F.3d 1126, 1131–32 (9th Cir. 2012) (citing
Fed. R. Evid. 201). “We may take judicial notice of undisputed matters of public record,
including documents on file in federal or state courts.” Id. (citations omitted). When, as
here, a party attacks subject-matter jurisdiction on the basis of the Rooker-Feldman
doctrine, courts take judicial notice of documents from the prior state court litigation that
purportedly bars the federal action. See Reusser v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., 525 F.3d 855,
857 & nn.1–2 (9th Cir. 2008) (taking judicial notice of state court record); Finnegan v. City
of Dana Point, No. CV 17-976 DSF (DFMX), 2017 WL 4676583, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Aug.
2, 2017), aff’d, 735 F. App’x 385 (9th Cir. 2018) (same). Plaintiff does not challenge the
authenticity of these records, or that they relate to the same property at issue in her
Compliant. According, the Court takes judicial notice of the records provided by Defendant
of the matter In re Dorothy Jean Porter, PB2021-003939, before the Maricopa County
Superior Court of Arizona. (Docs. 19-1.)
The state court records show that the property at issue belonged at one time to
Plaintiff’s mother, Ms. Dorothy Jean Porter, who passed away on July 17, 2020. (Doc. 19-
1 at 3.) Plaintiff applied to be appointed the personal representative of her mother’s estate
on August 24, 2021. (Doc. 19-1 at 3.) When she applied, Plaintiff failed to identify her
mother’s other children, of which there were four. (Doc. 19-1 at 3.) Plaintiff was appointed
as the personal representative and she deeded the property to herself and began paying the
mortgage. (Doc. 19-1 at 4.) On March 16, 2023, one of Plaintiff’s mother’s other children,
Stanley Nicholas Wright, petitioned the state court to remove Plaintiff as the personal
representative and transfer the property back to the estate. (Doc. 19-1 at 4.) In finding that
Plaintiff intentionally misrepresented material facts (i.e., the decedent had other interested
heirs) that led to her appointment, the state court granted Mr. Wright’s petition, removed
Plaintiff as the personal representative, and ordered Plaintiff to transfer title of the property
to the estate. (Doc. 19-1 at 5.) Plaintiff did not timely transfer title, leading the state court
to hold a show-cause hearing on June 28, 2024. (Doc. 19-1 at 18–21.) At that hearing,
Plaintiff signed a quitclaim deed transferring title to the estate and Mr. Wright was
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appointed by the state court as the personal representative of the estate. (Doc. 19-1 at 19.)
Plaintiff appealed the state court’s order (Doc. 19-1 at 23–25) but that appeal was closed
as abandoned (Doc. 19-1 at 27
On September 10, 2024, the state court authorized Mr. Wright to take possession of
the property and ordered that Plaintiff vacate the property. (Doc. 19-1 at 29.) Plaintiff did
not vacate and the state court issued a Writ of Restitution for Plaintiff’s removal (Doc. 19-
1 at 31–33, 40). But by then, Plaintiff recorded a separate title transfer affidavit and
quitclaim deed regarding the property. (Doc. 19-1 at 42.) The state court later declared
those documents void ab initio. (Doc. 19-1 at 42–43.) The property was eventually sold
(Doc. 19-1 at 45–46), and Plaintiff’s mother’s estate was fully settled on December 3, 2025
(Doc. 19-1 at 48). The next day, Plaintiff sued the State of Arizona and Arizona Attorney
General’s Office in this Court.
Against that backdrop, it is clear that Plaintiff is a “state-court loser” seeking to undo
the state court’s adjudication of her mother’s estate. Plaintiff alleges that the State violated
her constitutional rights when its officials enforced “directives,” which this Court takes to
mean the state court’s orders, to force Plaintiff to vacate and transfer her ownership of the
property. (Compl. ¶ 9.) In other words, Plaintiff challenges the state court’s orders
removing her as the personal representative, removing her from the property, and
approving for formal settlement of the estate, thereby depriving her of her alleged property
ownership interest.
Plaintiff’s briefing confirms that her claims are barred under the Rooker-Feldman
doctrine. In responding to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss,3 Plaintiff argues that “[t]his case
arises from the unlawful seizure and dispossession [of the property] through a purported
foreclosure and writ execution.” (Doc. 26 at 1–2.) She asserts that her mother’s estate was
closed in August 2021, so the subsequent probate orders were void. (Doc. 26 at 1–2.) She
3 The Court reviewed Plaintiff’s supplemental response (Doc. 24) despite it being an
improper sur-reply, but that brief merely sets forth Plaintiff’s narrative of the actions she
took as personal representative of the estate in the summer of 2021 and asserts in a
conclusory fashion that she had “privileges” as the property owner. It does not
meaningfully respond to any arguments raised by Defendants’ motion.
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contends that “unconstitutional execution or enforcement” of a state court order creates an
independent injury not barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. (Doc. 26 at 8–9.)
But Plaintiff’s alleged injuries flow directly from the state court matter, and
whatever deprivation that Plaintiff purports to have occurred was caused by that state court.
Without that matter proceeding in the way it did, Plaintiff would not have been stripped of
her personal representative authority over her mother’s estate or removed from the
property.
Plaintiff attempts to circumvent the Rooker-Feldman doctrine by asserting that the
state court did not have jurisdiction to issue its judgment because the probate matter was
already closed by the time Mr. Wright initiated probate proceedings. It may be that a void
state court judgment does not warrant the benefit of Rooker-Feldman,4 but the Court is not
persuaded that the state court here lacked jurisdiction to enter its judgment. A probate
proceeding is initiated by the filing of an application, which is what Plaintiff filed, or a
petition for relief, which is what Mr. Wright filed, and in both instances the state court
assumes jurisdiction over those matters dealing with a decedent’s estate. Ariz. R. Prob. P.
3(b), 14, 15, A.R.S. § 14-1302 (endowing subject-matter jurisdiction over decedent’s
estates to the state court). Assuming for the moment that Plaintiff’s mother’s estate was
closed when Plaintiff was appointed the personal representative, the effect of “closing” an
estate is administrative and does not preclude an interested party from petitioning the state
court for additional relief as it pertains to that particular estate. See, e.g., Ariz. R. Prob. P.
51(e) (noting that administrative closure of an estate does not discharge fiduciary duties
related to the estate); see also A.R.S. § 14-3938 (permitting subsequent administration of
an estate after administrative closure). In light of the relevant probate record, it is apparent
that the state court retained jurisdiction over the estate of Plaintiff’s mother and, pursuant
to Mr. Wright’s petition for relief, took action to administer that estate pursuant to the
4 This principle has not been expressly articulated but is nonetheless supported by Ninth
Circuit authority. See In re Gruntz, 202 F.3d 1074, 1087 (9th Cir. 2000) (a state court
judgment modifying a stay is void and not given effect under Rooker-Feldman).
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applicable laws and procedures. Plaintiff points to no statute or procedural rule that
convinces this Court otherwise.
Accordingly, Plaintiff’s claims challenging whatever state action that was taken in
and incident to the probate matter is barred under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. See, e.g.,
Searle, 148 F.4th at 1130–31 (claims challenging a county’s issuance of a deed pursuant
to a state court foreclosure judgment were barred); Henrichs v. Valley View Dev., 474 F.3d
609, 614–16 (9th Cir. 2007) (claims challenging a state court’s judgment quieting title were
barred). Dressing her claims in constitutional garb does not remove them from the
preclusive ambit of Rooker-Feldman. Benavidez v. Cnty. of San Diego, 993 F.3d 1134,
1142 (9th Cir. 2021) (“[T]his doctrine applies even where the challenge to the state court
decision involves federal constitutional issues, including section 1983 claims.”) (citation
modified).
If a plaintiff fails to establish subject-matter jurisdiction, “the court, on having the
defect called to its attention or on discovering the same, must dismiss the case, unless the
defect be corrected by amendment.” Tosco Corp. v. Communities for a Better Env’t, 236
F.3d 495, 499 (9th Cir. 2001), abrogated on other grounds by Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 559
U.S. 77 (2010) (citation omitted). But here, any amendment would be futile. No matter
how many constitutional violations Plaintiff asserts, at the heart of Plaintiff’s complaints
is the state court judgment. The Rooker-Feldman doctrine will preclude those claims. See
Watkins v. Proulx, 235 F. App’x 678, 679 (9th Cir. 2007) (“Because [the plaintiff’s] action
is barred by Rooker-Feldman, amendment of his complaint would have been futile.”); Spell
v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, No. 2:19-06652 FMO (ADS), 2019 WL 7404830, at *7 (C.D. Cal.
Nov. 6, 2019), report and recommendation adopted, No. 2:19-06652 FMO (ADS), 2019
WL 7403654 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 30, 2019). Accordingly, the Court dismisses these claims
without leave to amend.
Because the Court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s instant claims,
the Court also lacks authority to enter a temporary restraining order, preliminary injunction,
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or other forms of emergency relief based on those claims and will deny Plaintiff’s motions
(Docs. 9, 27) as moot.
IT IS ORDERED denying Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to File Second Amended
Complaint (Doc. 32).
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED denying as moot Plaintiff’s Motion for Ex Parte
Temporary Restraining Order and Immediate Injunction (Doc. 9).
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED denying as moot Plaintiff’s Emergency Motion for
Order Compelling Issuance and Recordation of Deed of Reconveyance, Quieting Title, and
for Ancillary Writ of Possession (Doc. 27).
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED granting Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 19).
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED dismissing Plaintiff’s Complaint for Violations of
Civil Rights [42 U.S.C. § 1983] and Related Claims (Doc. 1) without leave to amend. The
Clerk of Court shall enter Judgment accordingly and terminate this matter.
Dated this 18th day of June, 2026.
Honorable John J. Tuchi
United States District Judge
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