Zambrano v. Casago International LLC et al

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA
Lizzette Zambrano,
Plaintiff,
v.
Casago International LLC, et al.,
Defendants.
No. CV 25-3420-PHX-ESW
REPORT
AND RECOMMENDATION
TO THE HONORABLE STEVEN M. McNAMEE, SENIOR UNITED STATES
DISTRICT JUDGE:
On July 16, 2025, Plaintiff Lizzette Zambrano filed this wrongful death action in
the Superior Court of Arizona in and for Maricopa County (Case No. CV25-25021) against
numerous Defendants. (Doc. 1-3.) The Complaint alleges that Plaintiff’s husband, Jorge
Guillen, was electrocuted in a hot tub at the Sonoran Sea Resort in Puerto Peñasco, Mexico.
(Id.)
This matter was removed to the District of Arizona on September 16, 2025. (Doc.
1.) 	It is the second removal of the Superior Court case. 	The first removal occurred on
August 11, 2025 when Defendants Sonoran Sea W1001, LLC; Sonoran Sea W1002, LLC;
Russel Brown Richerson; Sonoran Sea W401, LLC; Maureen C. Sheffield; Friedrich J.
Berhorst; Steven N. Page; Sonoran Sea West 808, LLC; and John Brito filed a Notice of
Removal in District of Arizona, Case No. 2:25-cv-02888-JJT, Doc. 1. Those Defendants
Case 2:25-cv-03420-SMM Document 38 Filed 11/26/25 Page 1 of 5

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argued that
The only real parties in interest in this case are the Plaintiffs,
who are citizens of the State of Texas, and Defendants Sonoran
Sea Resort Home Owners A.C. (the “HOA”), which is a
Mexican non-profit corporation and therefore a citizen of
Mexico, and Kristian Julian Osuna Acuna, who is an individual
resident of Puerto Peñasco, Sonora, Mexico, and therefore a
citizen of Mexico (“Mr. Osuna”). As such, there is complete
diversity between the Plaintiffs on the one hand and the HOA
and Mr. Osuna on the other hand. Every other Defendant in this
case is a fraudulently joined Defendant that must be ignored
for federal removal and diversity jurisdictional purposes.
(Case No. 2:25-cv-02888-JJT, Doc. 1 at 3.) 	On August 12, 2025, District Judge John J.
Tuchi remanded the case sua sponte, holding that even if the Arizona Defendants were
fraudulently joined, diversity jurisdiction would not exist under the Defendants’ theory
because “there must be diverse Americans on both sides of the dispute for diversity
jurisdiction to exist.” (Case No. 2:25-cv-02888-JJT, Doc. 5 at 2) (citing Voltage Pictures,
LLC v. Gussi, S.A. de C.V., 92 F.4th 815, 822 (9th Cir. 2024)).
On September 16, 2025, Defendant Cooney filed a Notice of Removal (Doc. 1) in
the instant case, asserting that Plaintiff “has fraudulently joined numerous parties as
Defendants in an attempt to defeat diversity jurisdiction[.]” (Id. at 2.) Defendant Cooney
asserts that “once the fraudulently joined Defendants are disregarded for diversity
jurisdiction and removal jurisdiction purposes, removal is proper on the basis of diversity
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(2).” (Id.)
On October 16, 2025, Plaintiff filed the pending Motion to Remand (Doc. 19).
Defendants filed a Joint Response (Doc. 31), to which Plaintiff replied (Doc. 35). Because
not all Defendants have appeared or consented to Magistrate Judge jurisdiction pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 636(c), the undersigned submits this Report and Recommendation pursuant to
General Order 21-25 and recommends that the District Judge grant the Motion to Remand
(Doc. 19).1
1 The Ninth Circuit has held that “[b]ecause a 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) remand order is
dispositive of all federal proceedings in a case, . . . a motion to remand is properly
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I. DISCUSSION
A. Legal Standards
Federal courts have removal jurisdiction only if they would have had original
subject matter jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). The removal statute is strictly construed,
and “[f]ederal jurisdiction must be rejected if there is any doubt as to the right of removal
in the first instance.” Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 980 F.2d 564, 566 (9th Cir. 1992). The removing
party bears the burden of establishing federal jurisdiction. Valdez v. Allstate Ins. Co., 372
F.3d 1115, 1117 (9th Cir. 2004). 	28 U.S.C. § 1441(b)(2) prohibits removal based on
diversity jurisdiction “if any of the parties in interest properly joined and served as
defendants is a citizen of the State in which such action is brought.” Finally, “[a] successive
removal petition is permitted only upon a relevant change of circumstances—that is, when
subsequent pleadings or events reveal a new and different ground for removal.” Reyes v.
Dollar Tree Stores, Inc., 781 F.3d 1185, 1188 (9th Cir. 2015) (internal quotation marks
and citation omitted) (emphasis in original).
B. Analysis
Plaintiff’s Motion to Remand (Doc. 19) correctly states that the Notice of Removal
filed in the instant case asserts the same fundamental theory as the prior Notice of Removal
filed in Case No. 2:25-cv-02888-JJT, Doc. 1. 	Both Notices of Removal assert that all
Arizona defendants were fraudulently joined, leaving complete diversity between a Texas
plaintiff and Mexican defendants. The only difference is the statutory citation—§
1332(a)(2) instead of § 1332(a)(3).
The undersigned is unpersuaded that pleadings or events following the District
Judge’s prior Order remanding the case “reveal a new and different ground for removal.”
Reyes, 781 F.3d at 1188. 	There have been no amendments to the Superior Court
Complaint, no change in the parties, and no intervening changes in law. Defendant
Cooney’s Notice of Removal (Doc. 1) merely identifies a different subsection of the
characterized as a dispositive motion under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A), meaning that a
remand order cannot be issued by a magistrate judge.” Flam v. Flam, 788 F.3d 1043, 1047
(9th Cir. 2015).
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diversity statute to support the same removal theory already rejected by this Court.
Moreover, establishing fraudulent joinder is a “heavy burden” and courts apply “a
general presumption against fraudulent joinder.” Hunter v. Philip Morris USA, 582 F.3d
1039, 1046 (9th Cir. 2009); Grancare, LLC v. Thrower, 889 F.3d 543, 548 (9th Cir. 2018).
“There are two ways to establish fraudulent joinder: (1) actual fraud in the pleading of
jurisdictional facts, or (2) inability of the plaintiff to establish a cause of action against the
non-diverse party in state court.” Hunter, 582 F.3d at 1044 (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted). If “there is a possibility that a state court would find that the complaint
states a cause of action,” the joinder was proper and remand is required. Grancare, 889
F.3d at 548. (emphasis in original).
The undersigned finds that Defendants have not met the above burden as to Casago
International, LLC (“Casago”), which the Complaint asserts is a limited liability company
organized under the laws of Arizona. 	(Doc. 1-3 at ¶ 3.) Plaintiff alleges that Casago
operates the booking website used to reserve the stay and serves as property manager of
the Sonoran Sea Resort where the alleged wrongful death occurred. (Id. at ¶¶ 4, 36.)
Plaintiff alleges that Casago “is responsible for maintaining the premises in a safe condition
for guests.” (Id. at ¶ 36.) 	Although Defendants dispute these factual allegations through
Declarations (see Doc. 31-1 at ¶ 7), conflicting evidence on contested facts does not
establish fraudulent joinder. See Allen v. Boeing Co., 784 F.3d 625, 634 (9th Cir. 2015)
(“the inability to make the requisite decision in a summary manner itself points to an
inability of the removing party to carry its burden”). The undersigned will recommend that
the Court grant Plaintiff’s Motion to Remand (Doc. 19). 	Because the undersigned
recommends remand, this Report and Recommendation does not address Defendants’
pending Motions to Dismiss (Docs. 5, 14).
II. CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing,
IT IS RECOMMENDED that the Court grant Plaintiff’s Motion to Remand (Doc.
19) and direct the Clerk of Court to remand this action to the Superior Court of Arizona.
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This Report and Recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to
the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. 	Any notice of appeal pursuant to Fed. R. App. P.
4(a)(1) should not be filed until entry of the District Court’s judgment. The parties shall
have fourteen days from the date of service of a copy of this Report and Recommendation
within which to file specific written objections with the Court. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1);
Fed. R. Civ. P. 6, 72. 	Thereafter, the parties have fourteen days within which to file a
response to the objections. 	Failure to file timely objections to the Magistrate Judge’s
Report 	and 	Recommendation 	may 	result 	in 	the 	acceptance 	of 	the 	Report 	and
Recommendation by the District Court without further review. See United States v. Reyna-
Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003). Failure to file timely objections to any factual
determinations of the Magistrate Judge may be considered a waiver of a party’s right to
appellate review of the findings of fact in an order or judgment entered pursuant to the
Magistrate Judge’s recommendation. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72.
Dated this 26th day of November, 2026.
Honorable Eileen S. Willett
United States Magistrate Judge
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