Gilchrist et al v. Arizona Department of Child Safety et al

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WO
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA
Rachel Gilchrist, et al.,
Plaintiffs,
v.
Arizona Department of Child Safety, et al.,
Defendants.
No. CV-25-03389-PHX-DWL
ORDER
Having previously granted Plaintiffs’ application to proceed in forma pauperis (Doc.
7), the Court screens the first amended complaint (“FAC”) (Doc. 10) pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(e)(2)1 and dismisses the FAC with leave to amend.
I. 	Legal Standard
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), a complaint is subject to dismissal if it contains
claims that are “frivolous or malicious,” that “fail[] to state a claim upon which relief may
be granted,” or that “seek[] monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such
relief.” Id. Additionally, under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2), a pleading must
contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to
relief.” 	Id. 	Although Rule 8 does not demand detailed factual allegations, “it demands
more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” 	Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,
1 	Although section 1915 largely concerns prisoner litigation, section 1915(e) applies
to all in forma pauperis proceedings. Calhoun v. Stahl, 254 F.3d 845, 845 (9th Cir. 2001)
(“[T]he provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) are not limited to prisoners.”).
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supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id. On the other hand, “[i]f the
pleading contains prolix evidentiary averments, largely irrelevant or of slight relevance,
rather than clear and concise averments stating which defendants are liable to plaintiffs for
which wrongs, based on the evidence, then . . . the very prolixity of the complaint [makes]
it difficult to determine just what circumstances were supposed to have given rise to the
various causes of action.” McHenry v. Renne, 84 F.3d 1172, 1178 (9th Cir. 1996).
“[A] complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a
claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Bell Atlantic
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). 	A claim is plausible “when the plaintiff
pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” 	Id. 	“Determining whether a complaint
states a plausible claim for relief [is] . . . a context-specific task that requires the reviewing
court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Id. at 679.
The Ninth Circuit has instructed that courts must “construe pro se filings liberally.”
Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010). A “complaint [filed by a pro se litigant]
‘must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.’” 	Id.
(quoting Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam)). Conclusory and vague
allegations, however, will not support a cause of action. Ivey v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ.
of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982). 	A liberal interpretation may not supply
essential elements of the claim that were not initially pled. Id.
II. 	The FAC
The FAC does not set forth a coherent narrative of the relevant events and actions,
but this much is clear: two children (designated in the FAC as “Child A” and “Child B”)2
were allegedly removed from the custody of pro se Plaintiffs Rachel Gilchrist (the
children’s biological mother) and John Gilchrist (biological father of one of the two
children) by Defendant Arizona Department of Child Safety (“DCS”). (Doc. 10.) Attached
2 	Attached to the FAC are state court materials containing the children’s full names.
It is unclear whether either child is still a minor at this time, as nearly ten years have passed
since the attached “Dependency Mediation Results and Order” issued. (Doc. 10 at 40-49.)
The Court will order the Clerk to seal the FAC in case either child remains a minor.
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to the FAC are, inter alia, various state court records from Maricopa County Superior Court
dependency case no. JD529818, dated April 2016, including two copies of a document
entitled “Dependency Mediation Results and Order,” which indicates that Plaintiffs agreed
to the placement of the children with Joshua Cool, who is the biological father of one of
the children and a “[n]on-licensed relative” of the other child. (Id. at 46.) Plaintiffs assert
that the dependency was “void ab initio,” that “[a]ll actions taken under JD528918 were
ultra vires and unconstitutional,” and that Plaintiffs did not learn that the dependency “was
never 	legally 	initiated” 	until 	2025, 	when 	“concealed 	records, 	misidentified 	court
documents and familial disclosures revealed” “key defects,” including lack of “personal
service of the March 11 [2016] petition,” certain alleged procedural flaws, and various
complaints 	about 	the 	children’s 	care 	(e.g., 	vaccination 	without 	Plaintiffs’ 	consent,
visitation restrictions, concerns with placement). (Id. at 4.)
The FAC names as Defendants (1) DCS, (2) former DCS Director Greg McKay, (3)
current DCS Director Kathryn Ptak, (4) Brandi Curley, the assigned DCS caseworker in
2016, (5) Jenna Oden Garcia, the Assistant Attorney General who prosecuted the
dependency, (6) Sarah Priestley, the children’s guardian ad litem, and (7-8) “Investigator
1” and “Investigator 2,” who “were present for the warrantless removal [of the children]
on March 13, 2016.” 	(Id. at 6.) 	All of the individual defendants are named in their
individual capacities. (Id.)
Plaintiffs seek $45,360,000 in compensatory damages, $90,720,000 in punitive
damages, declaratory relief establishing that “Case No. JD528918 was never adjudicated
and was void ab initio,” “[a]ll orders entered therein lacked jurisdiction and legal effect,”
“[t]he March 11, 2016 petition was never properly served,” “DCS violated Plaintiffs’ First,
Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights,” “Arizona lacked jurisdiction under the PKPa,”
and “[a]ll DCS actions were ultra vires,” as well as injunctive relief requiring DCS to erase
the “dependency history related to JD528918,” correct its internal records, produce
unredacted case files and placement logs, and otherwise unravel the dependencies.” (Doc.
10 at 21-22.)
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III. 	Analysis
A. 	DCS Is A Non-Jural Entity
“DCS is a non-jural entity that cannot be sued” and “is therefore dismissed without
leave to amend.” Jimenez-Bencebi v. Arizona, 2024 WL 2923715, *9 (D. Ariz. 2024).
B. 	Absolute Immunity
“[T]he initiation and pursuit of child-dependency proceedings [are] prosecutorial in
nature and warrant[] absolute immunity on that basis.” Miller v. Gammie, 335 F.3d 889,
896 (9th Cir. 2003). Furthermore, “[a]bsolute immunity from liability under 42 U.S.C. §
1983 has been accorded state employees responsible for the prosecution of child neglect
and delinquency petitions, the guardian ad litem who serves as an advocate for the children
in such proceedings, and psychologists and psychiatrists who provide information and
findings for use in the proceedings by the State Department of Social Services . . . because
their participation in the court proceedings is an integral part of the judicial process.”
Babcock v. Tyler, 884 F.2d 497, 501-02 (9th Cir. 1989).
As such, Garcia (the Assistant Attorney General who prosecuted the dependency)
and Priestley (the children’s guardian ad litem) are immune and are dismissed without
leave to amend.
C. 	Rule 8
The remaining Defendants are the current and former director of DCS, a DCS
employee, and “Investigator 1” and “Investigator 2,” who “were present for the warrantless
removal [of the children] on March 13, 2016” (Doc. 10 at 6). Far from being a “short and
plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,” Fed R. Civ. P.
8(a)(2), the complaint is a lengthy hodgepodge of allegations, many of which are sentence
fragments in bullet point form, such that it is not possible to discern the meaning and
significance 	because 	no 	subject-verb 	construction 	establishes 	who 	did 	what. 	The
allegations do not create a cohesive narrative, and there is no easily discernable connection
between the events described and the legal conclusions asserted. 	There is no way to
determine what conduct, by which defendants, supports the various causes of action. Rule
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8 requires “simplicity, directness, and clarity,” such that a defendant should easily be able
to determine “what he is being sued for.” McHenry, 84 F.3d at 1178. Where a complaint
contains the factual elements of a cause, but those elements are scattered throughout the
complaint without any meaningful organization, the complaint does not set forth a “short
and plain statement of the claim” for purposes of Rule 8. Sparling v. Hoffman Constr. Co.,
864 F.2d 635, 640 (9th Cir. 1988).
The Court will dismiss the complaint with leave to amend. “Dismissal of a pro se
complaint without leave to amend is proper only if it is absolutely clear that the deficiencies
of the complaint could not be cured by amendment.” 	Schucker v. Rockwood, 846 F.2d
1202, 1203-04 (9th Cir. 1988) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
Plaintiff’s amended complaint must adhere to all portions of Rule 7.1 of the Local
Rules of Civil Procedure (“LRCiv”). Additionally, Plaintiff is advised that the amended
complaint must satisfy the pleading requirements of Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. Specifically, the amended complaint shall contain a short and plain statement
of the grounds upon which the Court’s jurisdiction depends, a short and plain statement of
each specific claim asserted against each Defendant, and a good faith demand for the relief
sought. 	Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(1)-(3). 	These pleading requirements are to be set forth in
separate and discrete numbered paragraphs, and “[e]ach allegation must be simple, concise,
and direct.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(d)(1); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(b) (“A party must state its
claims or defenses in numbered paragraphs, each limited as far as practicable to a single
set of circumstances.”).
Plaintiff is advised that if the amended complaint fails to comply with the Court’s
instructions 	explained 	in 	this 	Order, 	the 	action 	may 	be 	dismissed 	pursuant 	to
28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) and/or 	Rule 	41(b) 	of 	the 	Federal 	Rules 	of 	Civil
Procedure. See McHenry, 84 F.3d at 1177 (affirming dismissal with prejudice of amended
complaint that did not comply with Rule 8(a)). Given this specific guidance on pleading
requirements, the Court is not inclined to grant Plaintiff leave to file another amended
complaint if the first amended complaint is found to be deficient. See Ferdik v. Bonzelet,
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963 F.2d 1258, 1261 (9th Cir. 1992) (affirming dismissal with prejudice where district
court had instructed pro se plaintiff regarding deficiencies in prior order dismissing claim
with leave to amend); Ascon Props., Inc. v. Mobil Oil Co., 866 F.2d 1149, 1160 (9th Cir.
1989) (“The district court’s discretion to deny leave to amend is particularly broad where
plaintiff has previously amended the complaint.”).
Plaintiff is directed to become familiar with the Local Rules and the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure and is reminded that the Federal Court Self-Service Clinic provides free
civil legal help to self-represented litigants. (See Notice to Self-Represented Litigant, Doc.
6 at 7.)
Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED that the FAC (Doc. 10) is dismissed with leave to file a Second
Amended Complaint by April 3, 2026. The Second Amended Complaint must adhere to
LRCiv 7.1.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that if Plaintiff fails to file a Second Amended
Complaint by April 3, 2026, the Clerk of Court shall terminate the action.
Dated this 13th day of March, 2026.
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