LeBlance v. Uber Technologies Incorporated

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WO
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA
Keith LeBlance,
Plaintiff,
v.
Uber Technologies Incorporated,
Defendant.
No. CV-25-03028-PHX-DWL
ORDER
In July 2025, Plaintiff Keith LeBlance (“Plaintiff”) sued Defendant Uber
Technologies Inc. (“Defendant”) in Maricopa County Superior Court. (Doc. 1-1 at 19-37.)
Although Plaintiff’s complaint is not a model of clarity, Defendant interprets it as alleging
that Defendant acted improperly by “complying with an Income Withholding Order
requiring Uber to garnish the income Plaintiff earned from the [Uber] Driver App.” (Doc.
7 at 5.) The primary relief sought in the complaint is $6.5 million in damages, although
the complaint also includes a request for “equitable relief enjoining further garnishments
without court authority.” (Doc. 1-1 at 19, 36.)
In August 2025, Defendant removed this action to federal court and moved to
compel arbitration. (Docs. 1, 7.)
In September 2025, after Plaintiff failed to respond, the Court summarily granted
the motion to compel arbitration, ordered the parties to engage in private arbitration as
contemplated in the arbitration agreement, and stayed this action pending the completion
of the arbitration proceeding. (Doc. 8.)
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On February 23, 2026, Plaintiff attempted to file an amended complaint that
purported to add Joy L. Malave (“Malave”) as a co-plaintiff (Doc. 24), along with various
other motions and documents, but the Court struck the amended complaint and denied the
motions because they were impermissibly filed in violation of the stay and without a
request to lift the stay (Doc. 29).
On May 27, 2026, Defendant filed a status update indicating that Plaintiff had not
initiated the arbitration. (Doc. 36.)
On June 1, 2026, the Court issued an order noting that Plaintiff had “inundated the
Court with improper filings, resulting in the issuance of three orders reminding Plaintiff
that this action is stayed pending completion of the arbitration proceeding” but had not
initiated the arbitration proceeding, as was his responsibility under the parties’ arbitration
agreement, such that dismissal with prejudice was likely justified at that juncture. (Doc.
37.) However, “in an abundance of caution and in light of Plaintiff’s pro se status,” the
Court gave Plaintiff “one final opportunity to come into compliance,” setting a June 15,
2026 deadline for Plaintiff to initiate arbitration and file proof thereof on the docket. (Id.)
On June 3, 2026, Malave, who identifies herself as Plaintiff’s “lawful spouse,” filed
a motion to intervene. (Doc. 38.) Defendant opposes the motion. (Doc. 40.) The time to
file a reply has expired and Malave did not file a reply.
The intervention request lacks merit. As an initial matter, Rule 24(c) provides that
“[a] motion to intervene must . . . be accompanied by a pleading that sets out the claim or
defense for which intervention is sought.” Malave’s motion fails to comply with this
requirement—it is not accompanied by a proposed pleading.
Although this omission could be cured it if were the only deficiency, see Arizonans
for Fair Elections v. Hobbs, 335 F.R.D. 261, 268 n.1 (D. Ariz. 2020), a separate
requirement under both Rule 24(a), which governs intervention as of right, and Rule 24(b),
which governs permissive intervention, is that the intervention request be “timely.” That
requirement is not satisfied here. “[T]imeliness for an intervention motion is generally
governed by three factors: (1) the stage of the proceeding at which the applicant seeks to
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intervene; (2) the prejudice to other parties; and (3) the reason for and length of the delay.”
Brown v. Google LLC, 172 F.4th 1128, 1133 (9th Cir. 2026) (citation omitted). “The
timeliness requirement seeks to prevent a tardy intervenor from derailing a lawsuit within
sight of the terminal.” Id. (citation omitted).
Beginning with the first factor, Malave seeks to intervene nearly a year after this
case was initially filed by her husband and more than nine months after it was stayed
pending the resolution of binding arbitration. This effectively qualifies as a late stage in
the proceeding in which the case is “within sight of the terminal.” Id. See generally id. at
1138 (“We apply a ‘nuanced, pragmatic approach’ to determine whether the intervention
occurred at an appropriate stage of the case.”).
Turning to the third factor, Malave fails to offer any explanation for the delay.
Moreover, Malave seems to acknowledge that she has always been aware that her interests
were being impaired by Defendant’s challenged conduct—in her motion, Malave asserts
that her “50% undivided community property interest in [Plaintiff’s entity] is being directly
and irreparably harmed by the weekly garnishment and withholding of ‘instant pay’ in the
LLC’s gross commercial receipts by Uber.” (Doc. 38 at 3.) This underscores why Malave
could have joined in her husband’s filing of this action at its inception in July 2025 or, at a
minimum, should have sought to intervene after Defendant removed it to federal court and
sought to compel arbitration in August 2025. In Brown, the Ninth Circuit affirmed a district
court’s finding of untimeliness where there was a “three-month delay,” there were “no . . .
extenuating circumstances . . . to excuse the delay,” and there was a “lack of explanation
for” the delay. Brown, 172 F.4th at 1138. The same logic applies here, where the
unexplained delay is even longer.
Finally, as for the second factor, the Court agrees with Defendant that it would be
prejudicial to allow a new plaintiff to intervene into a stayed case more than nine months
after the entry of an order compelling binding arbitration. (Doc. 40 at 4-5.)
…
…
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Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED that Malave’s motion to intervene (Doc. 38) is denied.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, in light of Plaintiff’s notice of compliance
(Doc. 41), the Court will not dismiss this action with prejudice under Rule 41(b) at this
time. This action remains stayed. Every six months from the issuance of this order, and
then within 10 days of the conclusion of the arbitration proceeding, Defendant shall file a
status report.
Dated this 29th day of June, 2026.
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