Watt v. Trulieve Holdings Incorporated et al

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WO
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA
Before the Court is Plaintiff’s Motion to Amend Complaint, or Alternatively,
Motion for Partial Reconsideration (Doc. 18), Defendants’ Responses (Docs. 19, 241), and
Plaintiff’s Reply (Doc. 22). Having considered the parties’ briefing, the Court now rules as
follows.2
I. BACKGROUND
On March 21, 2025, Plaintiff filed this action against Defendants for common law
fraud, fraudulent concealment, breach of express and implied warranties, negligence,
unjust enrichment, and violations of the Arizona Consumer Fraud Act (“ACFA”) and other
state consumer protection acts. (Doc. 1 at 2–3, ¶ 3; Doc. 1 at 26–41). Plaintiff alleges
1 The Court called for a response to Plaintiff’s Motion for Partial Reconsideration
as Local Rule 7.2(g)(2) prohibits such responses unless ordered by the Court. (Doc. 23).
2 Because it would not assist in resolution of the instant issues, the Court finds the
pending motion is suitable for decision without oral argument. See LRCiv 7.2(f); Fed. R.
Civ. P. 78(b); Partridge v. Reich, 141 F.3d 920, 926 (9th Cir. 1998).
Erik Watt,
Plaintiff,
vs.
Trulieve Holdings Incorporated, et al.,
Defendants.
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No. CV-25-00962-PHX-SPL
ORDER
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Defendants sell marijuana-infused edible products with a tetrahydrocannabinol (“THC”)
content that exceeds the legal limits imposed by Arizona’s and Florida’s consumer safety
laws. (Id. at 2, ¶ 1). On August 28, 2025, the Court dismissed the Complaint (the “Dismissal
Order”) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, concluding Plaintiff lacked Article III
standing as he “ha[d] not established that he ha[d] suffered an injury-in-fact by purchasing
a product that he otherwise would not have, due to his reliance on affirmative
misrepresentations about the lawfulness of Defendants’ product.” (Doc. 17 at 6–7). The
Dismissal Order, however, did not state whether the Court dismissed Plaintiff’s claims with
or without prejudice and with or without leave to amend. (See id. at 7). Plaintiff filed the
instant Motion on September 11, 2025, seeking leave to amend his Complaint and
requesting the Court partially reconsider the Dismissal Order if the Dismissal Order was
with prejudice and/or without leave to amend. (Doc. 18 at 2–3).
II. LEGAL STANDARD
Reconsideration is disfavored and “appropriate only in rare circumstances.” Defs.
of Wildlife v. Browner, 909 F. Supp. 1342, 1351 (D. Ariz. 1995). Motions for
reconsideration are “not the place for parties to make new arguments not raised in their
original briefs,” nor should such motions “be used to ask the Court to rethink what it has
already thought.” Motorola, Inc. v. J.B. Rodgers Mech. Contractors, 215 F.R.D. 581, 582
(D. Ariz. 2003). Under Local Rule 7.2(g)(1), a motion for reconsideration should ordinarily
be denied “absent a showing of manifest error or a showing of new facts or legal authority
that could not have been brought to its attention earlier with reasonable diligence.” See also
Sch. Dist. No. 1J, Multnomah Cnty. v. ACandS, Inc., 5 F.3d 1255, 1263 (9th Cir. 1993)
(granting a motion for reconsideration is appropriate if “the district court (1) is presented
with newly discovered evidence, (2) committed clear error or the initial decision was
manifestly unjust, or (3) if there is an intervening change in controlling law.”). A party’s
“[m]ere disagreement with a previous order is an insufficient basis for reconsideration.”
Guillen v. Thompson, No. CV 08-1279-PHX-MHM, 2010 WL 3239419, at *2 (D. Ariz.
Aug. 16, 2010).
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III. DISCUSSION
To the extent the Court previously dismissed Plaintiff’s claims with prejudice and
without leave to amend, Plaintiff seeks reconsideration of the Dismissal Order on the
ground of manifest error as dismissals for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction generally must
be without prejudice, (Doc. 18 at 6), and district courts “must give plaintiffs at least one
chance to amend a deficient complaint,” (Id. at 7 (citation omitted)). Defendants argue a
dismissal with prejudice is appropriate because no amendment could cure Plaintiff’s lack
of Article III standing, (Doc. 24 at 4–5), therefore making leave to amend futile, (Id. at 9).
The Dismissal Order was silent as to whether dismissal was with or without
prejudice. “[D]ismissals for lack of Article III jurisdiction [typically] must be entered
without prejudice,” Barke v. Banks, 25 F.4th 714, 721 (9th Cir. 2022)), unless it appears
that no amendment could cure a plaintiff’s lack of standing, Fieldturf, Inc. v. Sw.
Recreational Indus., Inc., 357 F.3d 1266, 1269 (Fed. Cir. 2004). See also Schmier v. U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Cir., 279 F.3d 817, 824–25 (9th Cir. 2002) (affirming the
district court’s dismissal for lack of Article III standing with prejudice as the plaintiff
“could not have possibly amended his complaint to allege an injury in fact.”); Ashurst Land
& Cattle, LLC v. Rancho Mountain Props., Inc., 609 F. App’x 500, 501 (9th Cir. 2015)
(affirming the district court’s dismissal of the plaintiffs’ claims with prejudice because the
plaintiffs had an opportunity to cure their lack of standing and failed to do so).
Here, it does not appear that any set of facts could cure Plaintiff’s lack of standing.
As evidenced by the Proposed Amended Complaint (“AC”), Plaintiff largely reiterates the
same arguments and conclusory allegations previously dismissed by this Court. (Compare
Doc. 18-1, with Doc. 1-1). For example, Plaintiff again argues that he paid more for the
RSO than he otherwise would have because he relied on Defendants’ representations that
the RSO was lawful. (Doc. 18-1 at 34–35, ¶¶ 97–100). But Plaintiff’s alleged reliance is
again based on his own assumption, not a specific misrepresentation made by Defendants.
(Id. at 33–34, ¶¶ 88, 92–93, 95). The Dismissal Order clearly stated that reliance on an
assumption that turned out to be untrue does not establish Article III standing under an
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overpayment theory. (Doc. 17 at 5 (citing Barrales, 2025 WL 1584424, at *4)). Plaintiff
must allege actual false representations—which he does not.
Likewise, the statutory and regulatory provisions that Plaintiff cites in the AC do
not identify any additional duties to disclose. (Doc. 18-1 at 40, 43–44, 49, ¶¶ 128, 130, 145,
n.28, 169–170). Insofar as Plaintiff’s argument that Defendants have a common law duty
to disclose beyond the statutory requirements outlined in the Arizona Marijuana Acts,
(Doc. 18-1 at 38–39, 55, ¶¶ 119–120, 127, 178; Doc. 22 at 4–6, 9–10), the Court is not
persuaded. Statutory duties are typically broader than common law duties, not vice versa.
See Schmid v. United States, 273 F.2d 172, 176 (7th Cir. 1959) (“The duty [to furnish and
maintain a safe place of employment] imposed by the Wisconsin statute is greater than that
required by the common law.”); see also St. Louis, I.M. & S. Ry. Co. v. Taylor, 210 U.S.
281, 294 (1908) (recognizing that Congress had prescribed and defined a statutory duty to
supplant the common-law duty of care). Plaintiff does not point to any Arizona law that
indicates Defendants’ alleged common law duty of care is broader than the statutorily
prescribed duties.
Plaintiff’s assertion that Defendants’ alleged misrepresentation of the edible oil
products as RSO is a “hidden defect” also fares no better. (Doc. 18-1 at 40–41, ¶¶ 129–
131). First, Plaintiff does not dispute that Defendants’ edible oil products contained the
mandated Arizona Department of Health Services warning disclosing the health risks of
marijuana use. (See Doc. 22 at 9–10; Doc. 1 at 5, ¶ 22; see also Doc. 1 at 17, ¶ 102; Doc.
18-1 at 23, ¶ 57). Second, the Court has already found that Defendants accurately
represented the volume of THC in their edible oil products. (Doc. 17 at 6). Although
Plaintiff alleges the RSO “had no warnings or labels that Plaintiff could see pertaining to
the potency of the product,” (Doc. 18-1 at 33, ¶ 88), Plaintiff’s own admission that
marijuana consumers commonly understand RSO to be an edible marijuana product with
a very high THC content subverts his hidden defect claim, again assuming such a theory is
even viable, (Id. at 15–17, ¶¶ 34–35, 37). See McGee v. S-L Snacks Nat’l, 982 F.3d 700,
707 (9th Cir. 2020) (finding no hidden defect where the plaintiff acknowledged “Pop
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Secret’s nutritional label disclosed the presence of artificial trans fat, and the health risks
of consuming artificial trans fat were firmly established” at the time of purchase).
Thus, for all the reasons stated above, the Court finds dismissal with prejudice is
appropriate. The Motion is therefore denied.
IV. CONCLUSION
Having considered Plaintiff’s Motion to Amend Complaint, or Alternatively,
Motion for Partial Reconsideration (Doc. 18), the Court will deny the Motion. Although
dismissals for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction typically must be without prejudice, the
Court may dismiss with prejudice if no set of facts could cure the deficiency. Plaintiff’s
proposed AC still does not allege an affirmative misrepresentation made by Defendants,
nor does it identify any actionable duty to disclose. Leave to amend is thus futile. See Lopez
v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1130 (9th Cir. 2000) (“[A] district court should grant leave to
amend even if no request to amend the pleading was made, unless it determines that the
pleading could not possibly be cured by the allegation of other facts.” (citation omitted)),
overruled in part on other grounds by Peralta v. Dillard, 744 F.3d 1076 (9th Cir. 2014).
Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion to Amend Complaint, or Alternatively,
Motion for Partial Reconsideration (Doc. 18) is denied.
Dated this 30th day of April, 2026.
Honorable Steven P. Logan
United States District Judge
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