Soale v. eXp Realty LLC

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WO
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA
Rachel Soale,
Plaintiff,
v.
eXp Realty LLC,
Defendant.
No. CV-25-00773-PHX-GMS
ORDER
Pending before the Court is Defendant eXp Realty, LLC’s (“Defendant”) Motion to
Dismiss Plaintiff Rachel Soale’s (“Plaintiff”) Class Action Complaint for failure to state a
claim, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) (Doc. 12). For the reasons
discussed below, Defendant’s motion is granted in part and denied in part.
BACKGROUND1
Plaintiff is an Arizona resident and the owner of phone number (304) 695-XXXX,
a personal residential telephone number, which she registered with the Federal
Communication Commission’s (“FCC”) Do-Not-Call Registry (“DNC Registry”) in 2008.
(Doc. 1 at 2-3). Defendant “is a global real estate brokerage.” (Id. at 2).
In January 2025, Plaintiff received “numerous telephone calls and text messages
from (520) 772-4900,” all relating to her 2024 attempt to sell her house on the Multiple
Listing Service (“MLS”). (Id. at 3). The calls were not made directly by Defendant. (See
1 This recitation of the facts accepts as true any non-conclusory factual allegations made
by Plaintiff in her Complaint, construed in the light most favorable to her.
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Id. at 3-5; Doc. 12 at 2). Rather, the calls, “prerecorded voice[mail] messages,” and texts
came from the Joshua Jackson Realty Group. (Doc. 1 at 3).
In one voicemail, a male voice says: “Hey this is Josh Jackson at eXp Realty.” (Id.
at 5; Doc. 16 at 6). Joshua Jackson is a licensed Arizona real estate agent and an
independent contractor with Defendant, listed on Defendant’s national website “as one of
its licensed real estate agents,” and operates the Jackson Realty Group. (Doc. 1 at 5; Doc.
12 at 1, 3). Jackson’s Arizona licensure lists Defendant as his employer. (Doc. 1 at 5; Doc.
16 at 7).
According to Defendant’s Independent Contractor Agreement (“IAC”), its affiliated
“real estate agents are independent contractors and not employees.” (Doc. 12 at 3).
Defendant’s real estate agents “receive commission, not salaries, . . . are responsible for
their own taxes and benefits[,]” and must “comply with ‘all applicable laws, rules, and
regulations when providing’ services.” (Id.).
The messages from Jackson Realty Group “expressly acknowledge that they are
sent for the purposes of convincing Plaintiff to list her property through [Jackson], and not
to continue any ongoing relationship or transaction.” (Doc. 1 at 6). Nonetheless, the links
provided in the text messages took Plaintiff to a website which “prominently features
Defendant’s logo and branding” and contains “an electronic booklet touting [Defendant’s]
program to ‘guarantee’ that it will sell a consumer’s home within 23 days.” (Id. at 5).
Plaintiff believes that “Defendant obtained [her] telephone number via records
searches or third-party databases that link the suspected telephone numbers of homeowners
. . . , searching for expired listings to thereafter offer real estate services to those
homeowners.” (Id. at 6). Defendant advertises “[p]owerful lead generation platforms” to
potential agents, “along with training and mentorship for lead generation techniques.” (Id.
at 7). “Defendant receives a portion of commission proceeds derived from any
representation of a consumer by its affiliates and employees.” (Id. at 7-8). Indeed,
Defendant’s business relies on the following policy, which defines Defendant’s relationship
with its real estate agents:
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All real estate brokerage relationships established for any real
estate transactions, regardless of agency status, exist solely as
between eXp and the client (or customer), and not as between
Agent and the client (or customer). Agent provides real estate
services to the client (or customer) on eXp’s behalf; all listings
taken by Agent in connection with eXp’s business are and
remain the separate and exclusive property of eXp, and not of
Agent. During the Term of this ICA, Agent shall diligently
carry out Agent’s duties on behalf of eXp with all reasonable
skill, care, and diligence as expected of a licensed real estate
professional in Agent’s state(s) of licensure.
(Id. at 8).
Defendant’s website allows consumer to opt-in to communications from Defendant
“directly or by a third party vendor . . . acting on [Defendant’s] behalf” through phone calls
or text messages, “including marketing and promotional messages, using an automatic
telephone dialing system, related to [Defendant’s] products and services for real estate
transactions, even if [the consumer’s] name appears on the ‘Do Not Call’ list.” (Id.).
Plaintiff “did not give her prior express written consent to Defendant to send solicitation
or telemarketing messages to her cellular telephone.” (Id. at 5, 7). Nor did she “request
real estate services from Defendant, . . . use Defendant’s website or submit any inquiries
on it, [or] . . . otherwise communicate with Defendant prior to receiving these telemarketing
communications.” (Id. at 6).
DISCUSSION
I. Legal Standard: Failure to State a Claim
Under Rule 12(b)(6), a party may move to dismiss a claim for relief by asserting
“failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). “To
survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted
as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.
662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A
claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court
to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”
Id. “The plausibility standard . . . asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant
has acted unlawfully.” Id.
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Indeed, the “[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the
speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 545. In reviewing the complaint and any
appropriately considered documents,2 the Court will “accept factual allegations in the
complaint as true and construe the pleadings in the light most favorable to the nonmoving
party.” Manzarek v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 519 F.3d 1025, 1031 (9th Cir. 2008).
The Court will not, however, accept as true unreasonable inferences or conclusory legal
allegations cast in the form of factual allegations. W. Mining Council v. Watt, 643 F.2d
618, 624 (9th Cir. 1981).
II. Application
Plaintiff’s Class Action Complaint alleges that Defendants have violated the
Telephone Consumer Protection Act (“TCPA”), 47 U.S.C. § 227, and its implementing
regulations. (Doc. 1 at 2). The TCPA provides private causes of action based on violations
of its provisions or the regulations it authorizes. 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3), (c)(5). A plaintiff
may sue under a theory of direct liability or a theory of vicarious liability—under “federal
common-law principles of agency.” Campbell-Ewald Co. v. Gomez, 577 U.S. 153, 168
(2016) (citing In re Joint Petition Filed by Dish Network, LLC, 28 FCC Rcd. 6574 (2013));
Jones v. Royal Admin. Servs., Inc., 887 F.3d 443, 450 (9th Cir. 2018).
In Count I, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant directly or vicariously violated the
TCPA’s autodialer provision “by delivering artificial or prerecorded voice messages to
Plaintiff’s cellular telephone number without prior express consent.” (Doc. 1 at 12-13).
Indeed, the TCPA prohibits any person from making a call3 using an automatic telephone
dialing system (“ATDS”) to “any telephone number assigned to a . . . cellular telephone
service” absent “prior express consent of the called party.” 47 U.S.C. § 277(b)(1)(A)(iii);
2 Though considering evidence outside the pleadings generally requires the Court to
“convert the 12(b)(6) motion into a Rule 56 motion for summary judgment,” the Court can
“consider certain materials—documents attached to the complaint, documents
incorporated by reference . . . —without converting the motion.” United States v. Ritchie,
342 F.3d 903, 907-08 (9th Cir. 2003). Here the parties both rely on Defendant’s IAC,
which was incorporated by reference in the Complaint and in the parties’ briefing on this
Motion to Dismiss.
3 A text message is a “call” for the purposes of the TCPA. Satterfield v. Simon & Schuster,
Inc., 569 F.3d 946, 954 (9th Cir. 2009).
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47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(a)(1)(iii). Regulations promulgated by the FCC further specify that
this prohibits any person, without “prior express written consent of the called party,” from
using an ATDS to “initiate or cause to be initiated, any telephone call [to a cellular
telephone service] that . . . constitutes telemarketing.”4 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(a)(2).
In Count II, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant, either directly or vicariously, violated
the FCC’s DNC Registry Regulations. (Doc. 1 at 13-14). These regulations prohibit any
telephone solicitation5 to “[a] residential telephone subscriber who has registered his or her
telephone number on the national do-not-call registry of persons who do not wish to receive
telephone solicitations.” 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(c)(2); 47 U.S.C. § 227(c)(3)(F). The private
right of action associated with this prohibition only allows a called party to sue if they
“receive[] more than one telephone call within any 12-month period by or on behalf of the
same entity in violation of” FCC regulations. 47 U.S.C. § 227(c)(5).
Plaintiff claims that Defendant is liable for the actions of its alleged agent, Jackson,
through actual or apparent authority, or by ratification. (Doc. 1 at 12-14). Plaintiff further
alleges that she “suffered actual harm as a result of the calls at issue in that she suffered an
invasion of privacy, an intrusion into her life, and a private nuisance.” (Id. at 9).
As discussed below, although Plaintiff fails to state her claims of direct liability or
vicarious liability based on actual authority, she does state her claims of vicarious liability
based on apparent authority and ratification.
A. TCPA Liability
To state a claim as to Count I for use of an autodialer, Plaintiff must plausibly allege
that (1) Defendants called her number, (2) using an ATDS, (3) without her consent. Meyer
v. Portfolio Recovery Assocs., LLC, 707 F.3d 1036, 1043 (9th Cir. 2012); 47 U.S.C.
§ 227(b). As to Count II for DNC Registry violations, Plaintiff must plausibly allege that
(1) Defendants called her number, (2) which was on the DNC Registry, (3) more than once
4 “The term telemarketing means the initiation of a telephone call or message for the
purpose of encouraging the purchase or rental of, or investment in, property, goods, or
services, which is transmitted to any person.” 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(f)(13).
5 “The term telephone solicitation means the initiation of a telephone call or message for
the purpose of encouraging the purchase or rental of, or investment in, property, goods, or
services, which is transmitted to any person . . . .” 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(f)(15).
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in any 12-month period. 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(c)(2); 47 U.S.C. §§ 227(c)(3)(F), (c)(5). The
first element of each claim can be fulfilled by alleging direct liability or by alleging
vicarious liability which, under the TCPA, requires “an agency relationship, as defined by
federal common law, between the defendant and a third-party caller.” Gomez v. Campbell-
Ewald Co., 768 F.3d 871, 879 (9th Cir. 2014), aff’d 577 U.S. 153 (2016). It is only this
first element of Plaintiff’s claims which Defendant here challenges in its motion to dismiss.
(Doc. 12 at 2).
1. Direct Liability
To be directly liable under the TCPA, a defendant must call or text a consumer or
cause a consumer to be called or texted. 47 U.S.C. §§ 227(b)(1)(A)(iii), 227(c)(5); 47
C.F.R. §§ 64.1200(a)(1)(iii), 64.1200(c)(2). In other words, a defendant is not “directly
liable for a violation of the TCPA unless it initiates a call.” Dish Network, 28 FCC Rcd. at
6582. “[A] person or entity ‘initiates’ a telephone call when it takes the steps necessary to
physically place a telephone call, and generally does not include persons or entities . . . that
might merely have some role, however minor, in the causal chain that results in the making
of a telephone call.” Id. at 6583. But a defendant with substantial involvement “in the
placing of a specific telephone call”—such as “giving the [caller] specific and
comprehensive instructions as to timing and the manner of the call” may be directly liable.
Id.
Here, though Plaintiff alleges that Jackson called and texted her on Defendant’s
behalf, she does not allege that Defendant was so involved in the call as to be plausibly
subject to direct liability. She highlights the fact that Jackson identified himself as “Josh
Jackson at eXp Realty” in one of his voice messages to her and that some of the messages
contained links referencing eXp, but without allegations of specific or comprehensive
instructions given by Defendant to Jackson, this fact at most allows an inference that
Jackson was calling on behalf of Defendant. (See Doc. 1 at 4; Doc. 16 at 6). Even accepting
Plaintiff’s interpretation of Arizona law governing real estate licensing and brokerages, the
language she quotes from the statutes only require “reasonable supervision and control,”
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(Doc. 16 at 7-8), not the “specific” and “comprehensive” control that the FCC has
identified as possible basis for direct liability, Dish Network, 28 FCC Rcd. at 6583. She
makes no factual allegations that Defendant controlled the content or manner of the
communications she received. Cf. Hollis v. eXp Realty LLC, No. c25-0822, 2025 WL
2711424, at *3 (W.D. Wash. Sept. 23, 2025) (relying on plaintiff’s allegations that multiple
messages were received which were explicitly made on behalf of Defendant; that
Defendant “controlled the content of the calls”; and that “the language of the questions
asked” indicated that Defendant provided “the same or similar scripts” to callers, to find
that the allegations collectively supported an inference that Defendant could plausibly be
found directly liable).
Accordingly, Plaintiff fails to state a claim on either Count I or Count II on a theory
of direct liability. Because it may be possible, however, for Plaintiff to amend her
Complaint to allege the degree of comprehensive and specific control necessary for
plausible claims of direct liability, she is granted leave to amend. Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2).
2. Vicarious Liability & Agency
“Agency is the fiduciary relationship that arises when one person (a ‘principal’)
manifests assent to another person (an ‘agent’) that the agent shall act on the principal's
behalf and subject to the principal's control, and the agent manifests assent or otherwise
consents so to act.” Henderson v. United Student Aid Funds, Inc., 918 F.3d 1068, 1073
(quoting Restatement (Third) of Agency § 1.01 (Am. L. Inst. 2006)). To establish an
agency relationship for the purposes of liability under the TCPA, a plaintiff may rely on
theories of “actual authority, apparent authority, and ratification.” Jones, 887 F.3d at 449
n.3 (citing Dish Network, 28 FCC Rcd. at 6584); Mavrix Photographs, LLC v. Livejournal,
Inc., 873 F.3d 1045, 1054 (9th Cir. 2017). These relationships are governed by federal
common law agency principles of vicarious liability as defined by the Restatement (Third)
of Agency. Kristensen v. Credit Payment Servs. Inc., 879 F.3d 1010, 1014 (9th Cir. 2018)
(first citing Dish Network, 28 FCC Rcd. at 6586 n.100; and then Gomez, 768 F.3d at 877-
78).
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As an initial matter, “[w]hether an agency relationship exists is for a court to decide
based on an assessment of the facts of the relationship and not based on how the parties
define their relationship.” Henderson, 918 F.3d at 1073 (quoting Restatement (Third) of
Agency § 1.02). Although “independent contractors are not ordinarily agents,” in the
context of vicarious liability, an independent contractor status “does not preclude a finding
that the [independent contractor] is also an agent for some purposes.” United States v.
Bond, 608 F.3d 495, 505 (9th Cir. 2010). Thus, Defendant’s treatment of its real estate
agents as independent contractors and explicit disclaimer of “an agency relationship
between [Defendant] and its real estate agents” in its ICA (Doc. 12 at 7) do not alter the
Court’s analysis of whether Plaintiff plausibly states a claim premised on vicarious
liability.
a. Actual Authority
Actual authority requires the principal to authorize the agent to act on the principal’s
behalf. Restatement (Third) of Agency § 3.01. Such authorization may be express or
implied but will be considered “actual authority” if “at the time of taking action that has
legal consequences for the principal, the agent reasonably believes, in accordance with the
principal’s manifestations to the agent, that the principal wishes the agent so to act.”
Restatement (Third) of Agency § 2.01. Express authority requires explicit oral or written
communication of authorization, NLRB v. Dist. Council of Iron Workers, 124 F.3d 1094,
1098 (9th Cir. 1997) (citing Haw. Paradise Park Corp. v. Friendly Broad. Co., 414 F.2d
750, 755 (9th Cir. 1969)). Implied authority is derived from express authority, where the
agent acts consistently with directions given by the principal. Id. (citing Haw. Paradise
Park, 414 F.2d at 755).
If an agent’s actions are inconsistent with the scope of their actual authority, they
may still have acted with actual authority if the agent reasonably believed that they were
so authorized to act. Restatement (Third) of Agency § 2.01. But actual authorization will
not apply to an agent’s actions if the defendant expressly and specifically prohibits that
action. Jones, 887 F.3d at 450 (finding that a telemarketing agent was not actually
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authorized to use robo-calls in violation of the TCPA despite general authorization to
market on the defendant’s behalf because the defendant “expressly prohibited” the use of
certain “marketing tools,” specifically “robo-calling.”) In such cases, an agent could not
reasonably believe that their act was actually authorized. Id.
Here, Plaintiff has not plausibly alleged that Defendant actually authorized Jackson
to call or text her in violation of the TCPA. The language of the ICA generally provides
that all real estate agents associated with Defendant—such as Jackson—must comply with
“all applicable laws, rules, and regulations” in any activities associated with Defendant.
(Doc. 12 at 3 & n.1, 9). As noted above, the key issue in assessing actual authority is the
agent’s reasonable belief that they were authorized so to act. Restatement (Third) of
Agency § 2.01. Yet Plaintiff makes no allegation, nor does she argue, that Jackson
reasonably believed he was authorized to make calls on behalf of Defendant that violated
the TCPA. (See Doc. 1 at 8, 12-14; Doc. 16 at 8-14). Thus, even assuming that there was
an agency relationship between Jackson and Defendant, Plaintiff has not plausibly alleged
that Jackson had actual authorization to violate the TCPA.
Accordingly, Plaintiff fails to state a claim for vicarious liability based on actual
authority on either Count I or Count II. Because it may be possible, however, for Plaintiff
to amend her Complaint to allege that Jackson reasonably believed that he was authorized
to make calls that violated the TCPA despite the ICA’s language to the contrary, she is
granted leave to amend. Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2).
b. Apparent Authority
Apparent authority arises when the principal manifests to a third party that the agent
has authority to act on the principal’s behalf, and the third party relies on that manifestation,
creating a reasonable belief that the agent is so authorized. Restatement (Third) of Agency
§ 3.03. For apparent authority to apply, the principal must make some manifestation that
the agent is acting on their behalf prior to the agent’s actions with the third-party that seeks
to bind the principal. Id. “[C]laimed authority or purported . . . exercise” of that authority
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by the alleged agent does not suffice; the third-party must reasonably rely on “something
said or done” by the principal. NLRB, 124 F.3d at 1099 (quoting another source).
Though Plaintiff fails to plausibly allege an actual agency relationship under the
general prohibition in the ICA, that agreement is not controlling in an apparent authority
inquiry. Defendant is correct that Jackson’s statements that he was calling on Defendant’s
behalf cannot establish apparent authority. (Doc. 12 at 2, 6). But Defendant is incorrect
in its assertion that it made no manifestations to Plaintiff that Jackson was authorized to
act as its agent. (Id. at 10-11). Plaintiff alleges that Defendant’s website lists Jackson as
one of its licensed real estate agents (Doc. 1 at 5); that Defendant’s website references that
third parties like Jackson may contact consumers on its behalf (Id. at 8); and that Defendant
publicly advertises that it “provides lead generation training and mentorship . . . to its
agents” (Id. at 7; Doc. 16 at 12). In other words, Plaintiff received messages from someone
purporting to work for Defendant and upon visiting Defendant’s website, found that
Defendant displayed Jackson as one of its real estate agents, purported to provide training
for real estate agents like Jackson, and had given Jackson access to its branding and logos.
Taken as true and considered cumulatively, these allegations of Defendant’s manifestations
would plausibly support a reasonable belief that Jackson was an authorized agent of
Defendant.
Accordingly, Plaintiff states a claim as to Counts I and II under a theory of vicarious
liability through apparent authority. Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss is denied to the extent
that Plaintiff’s claims rely on this theory.
c. Ratification
Finally, a plaintiff may seek to impute liability to a defendant for the acts of a
purported agent. Kristensen, 879 F.3d at 1014. A defendant may ratify such acts even in
the absence of an agency relationship or when such acts go beyond the scope of an existing
agency relationship. Henderson, 918 F.3d at 1074 (describing the application of the
Restatement (Third) of Agency in Kristensen, 879 F.3d 1010). Valid ratification has the
same effect as actual authorization such that a principal may be bound to the actions of the
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agent if the principal “affirm[s] . . . a prior act which did not bind him but which was done
or professedly done on his account.” Mavrix Photographs, 873 F.3d at 1055 (quoting
Restatement (Second) of Agency § 82 (Am. L. Inst. 1958)); Restatement (Third) of Agency
§ 4.01. Accordingly, ratification can only apply where the actor was or purported to be an
agent of the defendant. Kristensen, 879 F.3d at 1014-15 (citing Restatement (Third) of
Agency § 4.03 & cmt. b).
Even if “[t]he doctrine of ratification,” id. at 1014, does apply and the principal
manifests their assent—through words or conduct—to be bound by the purported agent’s
acts, the ratification is only valid if the principal assents with knowledge “of the material
facts involved in the original act.” Henderson, 918 F.3d at 1073-74 (citing Restatement
(Third) of Agency §§ 4.01, 4.06). For example, a defendant may manifest asset and ratify
an act “by receiving or retaining benefits it generates if [it] has knowledge of material
facts.” Id. at 1075 (quoting Restatement (Third) of Agency § 4.01 cmt. g). This knowledge
requirement may be fulfilled by actual knowledge, “willful ignorance” or by “knowledge
of facts that would have led a reasonable person to investigate further.” Id. (citing
Restatement (Third) of Agency § 4.06 cmts. b, d); Kristensen, 879 F.3d at 1014 (citing
Restatement (Third) of Agency §§ 4.01 cmt. b, 4.06 cmt. d). Willful ignorance applies
where a defendant does not “know the material facts” but ratifies “with awareness that such
knowledge was lacking. Henderson, 918 F.3d at 1074-75 (quoting Restatement (Third) of
Agency § 4.01 cmt. b).
Here, Plaintiff states a claim under her ratification theory. As an initial matter,
because Jackson did purport to contact Plaintiff on Defendant’s behalf (Doc. 1 at 5), the
doctrine of ratification is applicable. Kristensen, 879 F.3d at 1014. Plaintiff does allege
that Defendant accepted the benefits of Jackson’s conduct by taking “a portion of
commission proceeds derived from any representation of a consumer by its” real estate
agents and by taking “separate and exclusive” ownership of all brokerage relationships and
listings generated by its real estate agents. (Doc. 1 at 7-8). Further, she argues that
Defendant’s business structure is “set up to remain willfully ignorant of the conduct of
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one’s contractor to avoid liability” (Doc. 16 at 15). She bases this willful ignorance on
Defendant’s knowledge that many other associates similarly situated to Jackson have
generated leads using methods that violated the TCPA which are “materially identical” to
Jackson’s methods. (Doc. 1 at 7-8; Doc. 16 at 15-17); see, e.g., Hollis, 2025 WL 2711424,
at *3. Though the extent of Defendant’s knowledge of the red flags permeating its real
estate agents’ activities is unclear at this point, Plaintiff’s allegations, taken as true, are
sufficient allow a reasonable inference that Defendant treats its real estate agents as
independent contractors to give itself distance from their TCPA-violating conduct despite
taking commission from and ownership over clients and listings, and providing lead-
generation training.6
As such, Plaintiff states a claim as to Counts I and II under a theory of vicarious
liability through ratification. Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss is denied to the extent that
Plaintiff’s claims rely on this theory.
CONCLUSION
In sum, though Plaintiff fails to state a claim under a theory of direct liability or of
vicarious liability through actual authority, she does state a claim as to both Count I and
Count II under theories of vicarious liability premised on apparent authority and
ratification. Defendant’s concerns over Plaintiff’s ability to prove the degree of control or
knowledge that it held over Jackson’s conduct cannot be resolved on a motion to dismiss.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 12) is
GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. Should Plaintiff elect to file an amended
complaint pursuant to this order, Plaintiff shall do so within fourteen (14) days of the
filing of this order.
Dated this 9th day of March, 2026.
6Defendant is correct that the fact that it provides training does not itself suggest ratification
or an agency relationship (Doc. 12 at 12); but the existence of trainings coupled with
Defendant’s purported lack of knowledge of its real estate agents’ marketing activities does
lend support to the plausibility of Plaintiff’s claims of willful ignorance.
Case 2:25-cv-00773-GMS Document 21 Filed 03/09/26 Page 12 of 12