Aguilera et al v. Garcia et al

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WO
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA
Gervacio Hernandez Aguilera, et al.,
Plaintiffs,
v.
Angelo Hanael Barrera Garcia, et al.,
Defendants.
No. CV-25-00681-PHX-MTL
ORDER
Before the Court are Defendants Angelo Hanael Barrera Garcia and Atzimba
Catering LLC’s Motion for Leave to Amend Their Answer (Doc. 90) and Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment (Doc. 81). The motions are fully briefed, and the Court finds
a hearing unnecessary because it would not aid the decisional process. Partridge v. Reich,
141 F.3d 920, 926 (9th Cir. 1998); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 78(b); LRCiv 7.2(f). The
parties are familiar with the facts, so the Court does not recite them here.
I.
A.
Because the deadline to amend the pleadings set out in the Court’s Scheduling
Order has passed, the Court evaluates the Motion for Leave to Amend under both Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure (“Rules”) 16(b) and 15(a). See Johnson v. Mammoth
Recreations, Inc., 975 F.2d 604, 608 (9th Cir. 1992) (citing Forstmann v. Culp, 114
F.R.D. 83, 85 (M.D.N.C. 1987) (party seeking to amend pleading after date specified in
scheduling order must first show “good cause” for amendment under Rule 16(b), then, if
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“good cause” be shown, the party must demonstrate that amendment was proper under
Rule 15)).
“The decision to modify a scheduling order is within the broad discretion of the
district court.” FMC Corp. v. Vendo Co., 196 F. Supp. 2d 1023, 1030 (E.D. Cal. 2002).
“A schedule may be modified only for good cause and with the judge’s consent.” Fed. R.
Civ. P. 16(b)(4). The focus of the good cause inquiry under Rule 16(b) is diligence of the
moving party. Johnson, 975 F.2d at 609 (“The district court may modify the pretrial
schedule if it cannot reasonably be met despite the diligence of the party seeking the
extension.”) (citation modified).
Once the movant shows good cause to amend the scheduling order, it must then
show that amendment is proper under Rule 15. Rule 15(a) provides, “[t]he court should
freely give leave [to amend] when justice so requires,” and the Ninth Circuit has
“stressed Rule 15’s policy of favoring amendments.” Ascon Props., Inc. v. Mobil Oil Co.,
866 F.2d 1149, 1160 (9th Cir. 1989). Under Rule 15(a), courts consider, among other
things, undue delay, bad faith, and prejudice to the opposing party. Sisseton-Wahpeton
Sioux Tribe v. United States, 90 F.3d 351, 355-56 (9th Cir. 1996). Of these factors,
prejudice is the primary focus. Eminence Cap., LLC v. Aspeon, Inc., 316 F.3d 1048, 1052
(9th Cir. 2003).
B.
Plaintiffs contend that leave to amend the Scheduling Order should be denied
because Defendants were not diligent in moving to amend their Answer. Plaintiffs argue
that Defendants have been aware of all the relevant facts for over a year and fact
discovery closed in March 2026. (Doc. 94 at 8-11.) Defendants argue that due to the
nature of the car crash, Defendant Garcia’s memory loss, and a “convoluted” witness
statement, it was unclear whether Plaintiff Gervacio Aguilera was wearing his seatbelt, so
Defendants could not determine the extent of their liability. (Doc. 96 at 2-3.) Defendants
only received clarity at their deposition of Plaintiffs’ accident reconstruction expert in
July 2026, and they moved to amend their answer in September 2026. The Court finds
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that moving to amend two months after discovering relevant information is diligent, so
the Court finds good cause to amend the Scheduling Order.
Plaintiffs also argue that amendment is improper under Rule 15(a).
(Doc. 94 at 11-12.) They argue Defendants unduly delayed because they have had the
relevant facts for well over a year. But as Defendants have explained, they moved to
amend their Answer just two months after discovering relevant information about the
crash, so the Court does not find this delay undue. Plaintiffs also argue that Defendants
have a dilatory motive because their motion to amend tracks their litigation needs rather
than any new evidence. But as the Court has explained, Defendants moved for leave to
amend soon after discovering relevant information, so the Court does not attribute the
proposed amendment to a dilatory motive. Lastly Plaintiffs argue that this amendment
prejudices them, but they do not identify, nor is the Court aware of, any authority
suggesting a plaintiff is prejudiced by a defendant seeking to admit liability. Thus, the
Court finds amendment is proper.
Because the Court finds good cause under Rule 16(b) and that amendment is
proper under Rule 15(a), the Court will grant Defendants leave to amend their Answer.
Plaintiffs express concern that the proposed amended answer does not adequately reflect
the concessions Defendants made in their motion and reply brief to amend and in their
motion for partial summary judgment. The Court expects the parties’ joint pretrial
statement and the related pretrial order, which supersede the pleadings, to reflect these
concessions. See Patterson v. Hughes Aircraft Co., 11 F.3d 948, 950 (9th Cir. 1993).
These concessions include that Defendant Garcia owed Plaintiff Gervacio Aguilera a
duty of reasonable care; Garcia breached that duty; Garcia’s breach caused the subject
collision; Gervacio Aguilera was not comparatively negligent; Garcia was solely at fault
for the accident; and Defendant Atzimba Catering is vicariously liable for Garcia’s
negligence. (Doc. 81 at 1; Doc. 96 at 5-6.) Lastly, Plaintiffs ask the Court to make
various evidentiary rulings and preserve Plaintiffs’ right to seek sanctions under Rule
37(c)(2). The Court declines to resolve these issues at this premature stage.
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II.
A.
Summary judgment is appropriate when the evidence, viewed in the light most
favorable to the non-moving party, demonstrates “that there is no genuine dispute as to
any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ.
P. 56(a). A genuine issue of material fact exists when “the evidence is such that a
reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party,” and material facts are
those “that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law.” Anderson v.
Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). At the summary judgment stage, “[t]he
evidence of the non-movant is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be
drawn in his favor.” Id. at 255 (citation omitted); see also Jesinger v. Nev. Fed. Credit
Union, 24 F.3d 1127, 1131 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding that the court determines whether
there is a genuine issue for trial but does not weigh the evidence or determine the truth of
matters asserted).
B.
1.
The parties first dispute whether the record supports punitive damages. Arizona
law is applicable to determine whether Plaintiffs can recover punitive damages. Med.
Lab’y Mgmt. Consultants v. ABC, 306 F.3d 806, 812 (9th Cir. 2002). In a negligence
action, “a plaintiff generally must show that the defendant’s conduct was outrageous,
oppressive or intolerable, and created a substantial risk of tremendous harm, thereby
evidencing a conscious and deliberate disregard of the interests and rights of others.”
Swift Transp. Co. v. Carman, 253 Ariz. 499, 506 (2022) (citation modified) (emphasis in
original). This risk of tremendous harm must be “substantially greater than that necessary
to make [the defendant’s] conduct negligent or even grossly negligent.” Id. at 507. And
the “outrageousness of the defendant’s conduct” must demonstrate that “the defendant
had an ‘evil mind’ when engaging in such conduct.” Id. at 506 (citation modified). A
plaintiff will generally only succeed “in proving the requisite ‘evil mind’ by
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demonstrating that the defendant’s conduct was criminal or that the defendant continued
a course of conduct with knowledge of the past harm caused by that conduct.” Sanchez v.
Lily Transp. Corp., No. CV-23-08117-PCT-JJT, 2025 WL 472584, at *3 (D. Ariz. Feb.
12, 2025) (citing Swift, 253 Ariz. at 506-07 & n.2). As such, “it will be only the rare
negligence case that meets this standard.” Swift, 253 Ariz. at 507.
For example, in Swift, a semitruck driver caused an accident because he used his
jack brake in the rain, which he had been trained was dangerous; employed cruise control
with an empty trailer, which he knew was dangerous; travelled at 62 miles per hour with
limited visibility; and did not slow down as he went downhill and around a curve, despite
being trained to do so. Id. at 502. The Supreme Court of Arizona held that this conduct
did not warrant punitive damages. Id. at 509. And a post-Swift decision in this District
concluded that an employer failing to discipline its driver after receiving 116 alerts for
their traffic violations also did not warrant punitive damages. Sanchez, 2025 WL 472584,
at *3.
Here, Plaintiffs argue that their punitive damages claim should proceed because
Garcia often drove on four hours of sleep, Garcia’s supervisor expressed concern about
his lack of sleep, and Atzimba Catering lacked policies and training on fatigued driving.
(Doc. 95 at 8-11.) But these facts pale in comparison to the egregious conduct described
in Swift, which the Supreme Court of Arizona held did not evince an evil mind. See Swift,
253 Ariz. at 502, 509; see also Bachrach v. Covenant Transp. Inc., Civil No. 10-00315
REJ, 2011 WL 1211767, at *2 (D. Ariz. Mar. 31, 2011) (finding that driving while tired
is generally insufficient to support punitive damages). As to Atzimba Catering’s direct
negligence, awareness of and concern about Garcia not getting enough sleep falls
significantly below the conduct of the employer in Sanchez who knew of its driver’s 116
traffic violations and did nothing. And Atzimba Catering’s lack of policies and training
on fatigued driving does not evince an evil mind because it does not demonstrate that
Atzimba Catering consciously disregarded or actually considered the risk of an accident
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by failing to train him.*
While Defendants’ conduct may very well support a claim of negligence—
Defendants have conceded as much—their conduct does not evince an evil mind. As
such, this is not one of the rare negligence cases where punitive damages are appropriate,
and the Court will grant Defendants summary judgment on this issue.
2.
The parties next dispute whether Plaintiffs’ direct negligence claims against
Atzimba Catering for its allegedly negligent vetting, training, and supervision of Garcia
should proceed. Arizona law recognizes claims for direct negligence separate from claims
of vicarious liability. Roaf v. Stephen S. Rebuck Consulting, LLC, 257 Ariz. 452, 457
(2024). But “where the plaintiff claims no separate or additional damage from the
employer’s conduct, the employer’s separate liability adds nothing to the damages
sought, and any related evidence is similarly irrelevant.” Id.
Here Defendants concede that Garcia was fully at fault for the accident and
Atzimba Catering is vicariously liable for his negligence. (Doc. 81 at 1.) And except for
punitive damages, which the Court has concluded the record does not support, Plaintiffs
seek no additional damages from their direct negligence claims against Atzimba Catering.
Thus, under Roaf, the direct negligence claims add nothing to the case.
Plaintiffs attempt to distinguish Roaf because that employer defendant also
conceded its direct negligence, and, here, Atzimba Catering has not. But, again, whether
Atzimba Catering was directly negligent has no bearing on the claimed damages, so its
concession, or lack thereof, of direct negligence is irrelevant.
While the Supreme Court of Arizona reserved the question of whether direct
negligence claims should proceed in this context, a decision in this District has favorably
cited Roaf’s discussion of McHaffie ex rel. McHaffie v. Bunch, 891 S.W.2d 822, 826
(Mo. 1995), which articulates the majority rule that direct negligence claims should not
* Plaintiffs rely exclusively on Encarnacion v. J.B. Hunt Transportation Inc., CV-24-
01384-PHX-MTL, 2026 WL 83996 (D. Ariz. Jan. 12, 2026), to support their claim of
punitive damages. (See Doc. 95 at 8-11.) But the inquiry of an “evil mind” is inherently
case-specific, and the Court finds Encarnacion to be of limited persuasive value.
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go forward when the employer has conceded vicarious liability. Lewis v. May Trucking
Co., No. 54 CV-25-04419-PHX-SMB, slip op. at 1-2 (D. Ariz. July 30, 2026). Because
Plaintiffs can claim no separate or additional damages from Atzimba Catering’s alleged
direct negligence and Atzimba Catering has conceded it is vicariously liable for the
accident, the Court concludes that summary judgment is appropriate for Defendants on
the direct negligence claims. See Lucero v. STI Trucking Inc., No. 25-668, 2026 WL
1180469, at *2 n.3 (9th Cir. Apr. 30, 2026) (mem.) (noting that a plaintiff suffers no
prejudice from being unable to pursue his direct negligence claim when the employer
defendant’s separate liability added nothing to the damages).
III.
Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED that Defendants’ Motion to Amend Their Answer (Doc. 90) is
GRANTED. Defendants must file and serve their First Amended Answer, attached as
Exhibit 1 to Defendants’ Motion to Amend Their Answer (Doc. 90-1), in accordance
with Local Rule 15.1 no later than seven days from the date of this Order.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendants’ Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment (Doc. 81) is GRANTED. Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on the
issue of punitive damages. Defendants are also entitled to summary judgment on
Plaintiffs’ direct negligence claims.
Dated this 13th day of October, 2026.
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