Sanchez #152030 v. Marion et al

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KAB
WO
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA
Francisco Sanchez,
Plaintiff,
v.
Marion, et al.,
Defendants.
No. CV-25-00564-PHX-JAT (MTM)
ORDER
Plaintiff Francisco Sanchez, who is currently confined in the Arizona State Prison
Complex-Lewis, brought this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Defendants
move for summary judgment. (Doc. 21.) Plaintiff was informed of his rights and
obligations to respond pursuant to Rand v. Rowland, 154 F.3d 952, 962 (9th Cir. 1998) (en
banc) (Doc. 24), and he opposes the Motion. (Doc. 34.)
Plaintiff also seeks reconsideration of the Court’s March 30, 2026 Order denying
him relief pursuant to Rule 56(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. (Doc. 33.)
I. Background
On screening under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a), the Court determined that Plaintiff stated
an excessive force claim against Defendants Marion and Prater in Count One based on
Plaintiff’s allegations that, while incarcerated in the Pinal County Adult Detention Center
(PCADC), Pod Officer Marion “grabbed [Plaintiff], threw [him] against the wall,
kneed[him] on the side, and threw [him] violently to the ground,” causing Plaintiff to injure
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his shoulder and Pod Officer Prater, who was present, did not intervene to stop the assault.
(Docs. 6, 1.) The Court dismissed the remaining claims and Defendants. (Doc. 6.)
II. Plaintiff’s Motion for the Court to Vacate Its Order Dated 3/30/2026 (Doc. 33)
Plaintiff seeks reconsideration of the Court’s March 30, 2026 Order on the basis that
“the Court is rushing this matter [and] did not give plaintiff time to file” his reply in support
of his Motion for Rule 56(d) relief. (Doc. 33.)
The Court has discretion to reconsider and vacate a prior order. Barber v. Hawaii,
42 F.3d 1185, 1198 (9th Cir. 1994); United States v. Nutri-cology, Inc., 982 F.2d 394, 396
(9th Cir. 1992). “The Court will ordinarily deny a motion for reconsideration of an Order
absent a showing of manifest error or a showing of new facts or legal authority that could
not have been brought to its attention earlier with reasonable diligence.” LRCiv 7.2(g)(1).
Any motion for reconsideration must specifically identify the matters that were overlooked
or misapprehended by the Court. Id. If any new matters are being brought to the Court’s
attention for the first time, the movant must identify the reasons they were not presented
earlier, and any specific modifications being sought in the Court’s Order. Id. No motion
for reconsideration of an Order may repeat any oral or written argument made in support
of or in opposition to the motion that resulted in the Order. Id.
In its March 30, 2026, the Court denied Plaintiff’s request for Rule 56(d) relief on
the following basis:
Plaintiff has not met either the procedural or substantive
requirements of Rule 56(d). Plaintiff did not set forth in his
affidavit or declaration any of the requirements of Rule 56(d).
Moreover, Plaintiff seeks to obtain evidence from Defendants
that Defendants do not have in their possession and seeks to
obtain evidence about facts that are in his personal knowledge
and which he can attest to. Additionally, in his response to
Defendants’ interrogatories, Plaintiff claims he exhausted, but
does not assert that he filed a second level appeal, indicating
that he did not fully exhaust his administrative remedies. As
such, even if Plaintiff were able to obtain copies of the
grievances he claims he filed, it is unclear whether such
documents would demonstrate that he exhausted. For all the
foregoing reasons, Plaintiff’s Motion seeking relief pursuant to
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Rule 56(d) will be denied.
(Doc. 31 at 5.) Plaintiff does not set forth any matters that were overlooked or
misapprehended by the Court and does not identify any information he would have put in
a reply that would have changed the Court’s decision. Accordingly, Plaintiff has failed to
make any showing that he is entitled to reconsideration of the Court’s March 30, 2026
Order, and his Motion to Vacate will be denied.
III. Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment
Defendants argue that they are entitled to summary judgment because Plaintiff did
not properly exhaust his available administrative remedies. In Response, Plaintiff asserts
that he exhausted his available administrative remedies via the Inmate Tablet.
A. Summary Judgment Standard
A court must grant summary judgment “if the movant shows that there is no genuine
dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986). The
movant bears the initial responsibility of presenting the basis for its motion and identifying
those portions of the record, together with affidavits, if any, that it believes demonstrate
the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323.
If the movant fails to carry its initial burden of production, the nonmovant need not
produce anything. Nissan Fire & Marine Ins. Co., Ltd. v. Fritz Co., Inc., 210 F.3d 1099,
1102-03 (9th Cir. 2000). But if the movant meets its initial responsibility, the burden shifts
to the nonmovant to demonstrate the existence of a factual dispute and that the fact in
contention is material, i.e., a fact that might affect the outcome of the suit under the
governing law, and that the dispute is genuine, i.e., the evidence is such that a reasonable
jury could return a verdict for the nonmovant. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S.
242, 248, 250 (1986); see Triton Energy Corp. v. Square D. Co., 68 F.3d 1216, 1221 (9th
Cir. 1995). The nonmovant need not establish a material issue of fact conclusively in its
favor, First Nat’l Bank of Ariz. v. Cities Serv. Co., 391 U.S. 253, 288-89 (1968); however,
it must “come forward with specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.”
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Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986) (internal
citation omitted); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1).
At summary judgment, the judge’s function is not to weigh the evidence and
determine the truth but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial. Anderson,
477 U.S. at 249. In its analysis, the court must believe the nonmovant’s evidence and draw
all inferences in the nonmovant’s favor. Id. at 255. The court need consider only the cited
materials, but it may consider any other materials in the record. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(3).
B. Exhaustion
Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act, a prisoner must exhaust “available”
administrative remedies before filing an action in federal court. See 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a);
Vaden v. Summerhill, 449 F.3d 1047, 1050 (9th Cir. 2006); Brown v. Valoff, 422 F.3d 926,
934-35 (9th Cir. 2005). The prisoner must complete the administrative review process in
accordance with the applicable rules. See Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 92 (2006).
Exhaustion is required for all suits about prison life, Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 523
(2002), regardless of the type of relief offered through the administrative process, Booth v.
Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 741 (2001).
The defendant bears the initial burden to show that there was an available
administrative remedy and that the prisoner did not exhaust it. Albino v. Baca, 747 F.3d
1162, 1169, 1172 (9th Cir. 2014); see Brown, 422 F.3d at 936-37 (a defendant must
demonstrate that applicable relief remained available in the grievance process). Once that
showing is made, the burden shifts to the prisoner, who must either demonstrate that he, in
fact, exhausted administrative remedies or “come forward with evidence showing that there
is something in his particular case that made the existing and generally available
administrative remedies effectively unavailable to him.” Albino, 747 F.3d at 1172. The
ultimate burden, however, rests with the defendant. Id. Summary judgment is appropriate
if the undisputed evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the prisoner, shows a
failure to exhaust. Id. at 1166, 1168; see Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).
. . . .
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IV. Facts
Pinal County Sheriff’s Office (PCSO) Standard Operating Procedure 4.3 sets forth
the procedure for detainees incarcerated in PCADC to grieve claims that arise during their
incarceration. (Doc. 22 ¶ 4.) The grievance procedure generally requires a detainee to
complete an Inmate Request Form within 5 days of the incident giving rise to the grievance.
(Id. ¶¶ 16, 19.) The remaining steps in the procedure require the detainee to submit an
Informal Resolution Form, a Formal Grievance Form, an appeal form, and a second-level
appeal form. (Id. ¶¶ 25-45.)
Defendants assert that Plaintiff submitted an Inmate Request Form on December
31, 2024 regarding the October 14, 2024 incident, but it was denied as untimely. (Id. ¶¶
54-55.) Plaintiff asserts that the Inmate Request Form was wrongfully denied as untimely
because he was in the hospital between October 14, 2024 and October 16, 2024. (Doc. 35
¶ 56.)1 Defendants assert they did not receive any other grievance forms from Plaintiff in
relation to the October 14, 2024 incident. (Doc. 22 ¶¶ 59-60, 65-67.)
Defendants issued the following Interrogatory request to Plaintiff:
Describe in detail every effort you made to exhaust your
administrative remedies at Pinal County Adult Detention
Center (“PCADC”) with respect to the allegation pled against
Defendants in your Complaint, including reference to each
Inmate Request Form, Informal Resolution Form, Formal
Resolution and/or Grievance Appeal submitted by you, the
date you submitted each, the date of each response, the name
of the officer providing the response, and the final
determination of each.
(Doc. 22-1 at 28-29.)
Plaintiff responded:
on October 14, 2024, . . . he was abused by Officers Marion
and Officer Prater. On October 21, 2024, Plaintiff received a
1 To the extent Plaintiff’s informal was improperly denied as untimely, Plaintiff does
not assert that he was not given the opportunity to appeal that decision. Rather, in his
interrogatory response, Plaintiff asserts that he was able to submit an informal, formal, and
a grievance appeal.
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[sic] Informal Complaint form from Sgt. S. Carrion and
Plaintiff return [sic] the Informal back later that day his
Complaint [sic] to Sgt. Carrion. On October 31, 2024, Plaintiff
received a response back denying his relief. On November 4,
2024, Plaintiff filed his Formal Grievance form given to him
by Sgt. S. Carrion later that same day. On November 22, 2024,
Plaintiff received a responses [sic] to his Formal Grievance. On
November 27, 2024, Plaintiff filed his Grievance Appeal form
given to him by Sgt. S. Carrion later that same day. On
December 19, 2024 Plaintiff received the response to his
Grievance Appeal denying him relief.
(Id. ¶ 63.)
V. Discussion
There is a disputed issue of fact as to whether Plaintiff could submit the relevant
grievances via inmate tablet at the relevant time. Plaintiff asserts that the inmate tablet
allowed him to submit grievances on it at the relevant time and Defendants assert that
inmate tablet had no such capability at that time. Defendants request that the Court
disregard Plaintiff’s testimony regarding the inmate tablet as self-serving. Statements in
Plaintiff’s personal knowledge must be taken as true, even absent other corroborating
evidence. See Nigro v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 784 F.3d 495, 497 (9th Cir. 2015) (the
district court cannot “disregard a piece of evidence at the summary judgment stage solely
based on its self-serving nature[,]” even if it is uncorroborated).
In Response to the Motion for Summary Judgment, however, Plaintiff asserts new
testimony that directly contradicts his Response to Defendants’ Interrogatory. For
instance, Plaintiff provides new dates that he allegedly submitted the grievances,
inconsistent with the dates provided in response to the interrogatory, and Plaintiff asserts
that he did not turn those grievances in on “forms,” as he repeatedly states in response to
the interrogatory, but instead submitted them via the tablet. Moreover, although the
interrogatory requested “every effort you made to exhaust your administrative remedies at
Pinal County Adult Detention Center,” Plaintiff made no mention of submitting grievances
via the inmate tablet in response to the interrogatory, and Plaintiff now contends that he
completed the grievance process by submitting a Second Level Appeal, in contradiction to
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his interrogatory response.
The Court cannot credit any of Plaintiff’s testimony made in response to the Motion
for Summary Judgment that contradicts his interrogatory response. See Hall v. Eads, No.
CV-16-03855-PHX-JJT, 2018 WL 3575828, at *3 (D. Ariz. July 25, 2018) (“Mrs. Hall’s
deposition plainly contradicts the interrogatory responses offered in Plaintiffs’ Response,
warranting rejection under the “sham-affidavit” rule.”); Nelson v. City of Davis, 571 F.3d
924, 928 (9th Cir. 2009) (“The rationale underlying the sham affidavit rule is that a party
ought not be allowed to manufacture a bogus dispute with himself to defeat summary
judgment.”). Here, Plaintiff has manufactured sham testimony entirely inconsistent with
his previous interrogatory response, and the Court cannot credit that testimony.
Accordingly, the undisputed evidence before the Court shows that Plaintiff did not
submit a second-level appeal to the Deputy Chief as required to properly exhaust his
available administrative remedies. Accordingly, Defendants’ Motion for Summary
Judgment will be granted.
IT IS ORDERED:
(1) The reference to the Magistrate Judge is withdrawn as to Defendants’
Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 21) and Plaintiff’s “Motion for the Court to Vacate
Its Order Dated 03/30/2026 (Dkt. 31)” (Doc. 33).
(2) Plaintiff’s “Motion for the Court to Vacate Its Order Dated 03/30/2026 (Dkt.
31)” is denied.
(3) Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 21) is granted, and the
action is terminated without prejudice for failure to properly exhaust available
administrative remedies. The Clerk of Court must enter judgment accordingly.
Dated this 30th day of June, 2026.
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