United States of America v. Qasim

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WO
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA
United States of America,
Plaintiff,
v.
Sabir Qasim,
Defendant.
No. CV-23-01581-PHX-SHD
ORDER
Defendant Qasim has filed a motion to stay execution of the Court’s judgment
revoking his citizenship. (Doc. 78.) The motion is fully briefed (Docs. 81, 82), no party
has requested oral argument, and the Court does not believe oral argument is necessary.
The Court will deny the motion.
The Supreme Court has established a four-factor test governing a court’s discretion
to issue a stay pending appeal. Courts must consider: “(1) whether the stay applicant has
made a strong showing that he is likely to succeed on the merits; (2) whether the applicant
will be irreparably injured absent a stay; (3) whether issuance of the stay will substantially
injure the other parties interested in the proceeding; and (4) where the public interest lies.”
Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 434 (2009) (quotation marks omitted).
To obtain a stay, a defendant “must show either a probability of success on the
merits and the possibility of irreparable injury, or that serious legal questions are raised and
the balance of hardships tips sharply in [defendant’s] favor.” Leiva-Perez v. Holder, 640
F.3d 962, 964 (9th Cir. 2011) (quotation marks omitted). The “probability of success”
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standard does not “demand a showing that success is more likely than not.” Id. at 968.
Rather, “a [defendant] must show, at a minimum, that [they have] a substantial case for
relief on the merits.” Id.
Qasim alleges that his appeal will raise “serious legal questions” regarding whether
8 U.S.C. § 1101(b)(1)(E) invariably requires the complete legal severance of the biological
parent–child relationship in the context of foreign customary arrangements such as kafala.
(Doc. 78 at 6–8.) The Court concludes that Qasim has not shown the existence of a serious
legal question, let alone a probability of success on the merits.
For reasons explained in detail in the Court’s previous decision (Doc. 65), the Court
found that “the undisputed facts compel the conclusion that Qasim’s LPR status is void
because he is not a child of a refugee. Consequently, Qasim’s naturalization was illegally
procured within the meaning of [8 U.S.C.] § 1451(a) because Qasim did not satisfy all
statutory requirements for citizenship, and his citizenship must be revoked.” (Id. at 29–
30.) Central to that determination was the Court’s conclusion that Qasim’s kafala
arrangement did not constitute an “adoption” under § 1101(b)(1)(E) because it did not
terminate the legal relationship between Qasim and his biological parents. (Id. at 19–20.)
The Ninth Circuit addressed the definition of “adoption” in § 1101(b)(1)(E) in
Young v. Reno, finding that a valid adoption for immigration purposes requires the
termination of the prior parent–child relationship. 114 F.3d 879, 885 (9th Cir. 1997).
Qasim’s briefing admits the kafala arrangement did not severe Qasim’s legal ties with his
parents. (Doc. 44 at 3, 11.)1 Under Young, the absence of such termination is dispositive.
Qasim nevertheless argues that his appeal will raise “serious legal questions”
because, in his view, Young did not resolve whether § 1101(b)(1)(E) “invariably requires
1 At oral argument, Qasim asserted for the first time that his mother had relinquished
her parental rights. For the reasons explained in the Court’s prior order, (Doc. 65 at 19
n.8), the Court relies on Qasim’s briefing, which expressly states that his kafala
arrangement did not sever his ties with his biological parents. (See Doc. 44 at 3, 11.)
Additionally, Qasim’s motion to stay does not contend that parental rights were severed; it
relies solely on the assertion that his appeal will present “serious legal questions” about the
proper interpretation of Young and § 1101(b)(1)(E).
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a legally complete severance of the biological parental relationship in the context of foreign
customary arrangements,” and he seeks to recharacterize this case as presenting a question
of first impression. (Doc. 78 at 8.)
Qasim attempts to avoid Young by contending that it involved a domestic adoption
rather than a cultural arrangement such as kafala. (Id. at 7.) This distinction does not
undermine the binding rule expressed in Young. As Young makes clear, adoption for
immigration purposes under § 1101(b)(1)(E) necessarily requires the extinguishment of the
natural parents’ legal rights. 114 F.3d at 885 (“[U]nder [§ 1101’s] definitions of ‘parent’
and ‘child,’ adoption terminates the legal relationship between a natural parent and an
adopted child,” such that an “adopted child’s only ‘parents’ under the statute are her
adoptive parents.”).
Qasim also relies on Kaho v. Ilchert, which held that “[f]or an adoption to be valid
under section 1101(b)(1)(E), an adoption need not conform to the BIA’s or Anglo-
American notions of adoption; the adoption need only be recognized under the law of the
country where the adoption occurred.” 765 F.2d 877, 885 (9th Cir. 1985). Qasim cites
Kaho to argue that the Ninth Circuit “explicitly rejects imposing Anglo-American notions
of adoption.” (Doc. 82 at 2; Doc. 78 at 7.) But Kaho does not stand for the proposition
that any foreign custodial or guardianship arrangement qualifies as an “adoption” for
immigration purposes. The relationship between the adult and child must still be the
functional equivalent of adoption as Congress used that term in § 1101(b)(1)(E).
Because Qasim’s kafala arrangement did not severe his biological parents’ legal
rights, it cannot qualify as an adoption under the INA, as construed by the Ninth Circuit.
Young interprets § 1101(b)(1)(E) to require termination of the biological parent-child
relationship, and nothing in Kaho suggests otherwise. Qasim cites no authority suggesting
that kafala, without termination of parental rights, constitutes an adoption under the INA.
Binding Ninth Circuit precedent forecloses Qasim’s position, and this Court must adhere
to such authority. Hart v. Massanari, 266 F.3d 1155, 1170–71 (9th Cir. 2001); id. at 1170
(“Binding authority . . . cannot be considered and cast aside; it is not merely evidence of
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what the law is. Rather, caselaw on point is the law.”). Accordingly, Qasim has not shown
a probability of success on the merits or presented any serious legal question.
Because Qasim has not satisfied the threshold requirement under Nken, his motion
fails at the first factor. The Court therefore need not address the remaining factors.
Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED that Qasim’s motion to stay execution of the Court’s judgment
(Doc. 78) is denied.
Dated this 16th day of December, 2025.
Case 2:23-cv-01581-SHD Document 83 Filed 12/16/25 Page 4 of 4