In re Carvana Co Securities Litigation

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WO
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA
United Association National Pension Fund, et
al.,
Plaintiffs,
v.
Carvana Company, et al.,
Respondents.
No. CV-22-02126-PHX-MTL
ORDER
Pending before the Court are Plaintiffs’ motions to compel interrogatory responses
(docs. 775, 777, 780, 782, 784, 786) and motions to compel request for admission
responses (docs. 788, 790), and a Joint Discovery Motion (doc. 794).1 “This case has
produced an unprecedented number of discovery disputes,2 which has expended a
considerable amount of the Court’s limited judicial resources.” Gjovik v. Apple Inc., No.
3:23-cv-04597-EMC (KAW), 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 68340, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 30,
2026). Based upon the briefings, the Court finds oral arguments unnecessary and unhelpful
in resolving the instant discovery disputes.
As a preliminary matter, several of Plaintiffs’ claims throughout these motions are
legally and factually meritless—such as their arguments asserting that they are entitled to
1 Discovery matters in this action have been referred to this Court by the Presiding
United States District Judge. (Doc. 125.)
2 To date, this Court has issued twenty-two substantive discovery orders—not
including the instant order—alone in this action, not to mention numerous orders on
procedural matters and minor discovery disputes this Court has issued. See (docs. 173, 192,
196, 212, 255, 264, 298, 313, 326, 394–95, 432, 467, 471, 513, 532, 568, 600, 633, 656,
734, 807.)
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50 interrogatories and that Defendants, because of a singular Request for Production
(“RFA”), are obligated to authenticate 8,536 documents. Suffice to say, these arguments
have wasted limited judicial resources to address. Nevertheless, the Court has addressed
all issues contained within the motions.
First, the Court finds that Plaintiffs’ Interrogatory Nos. 4 and 9 are impermissibly
compound, resulting in Plaintiffs’ exceeding their interrogatory limit by 12 interrogatories.
The Court will not excuse this failure to comply with Fed. R. Civ. P. 33’s dictates. given
that Plaintiffs have exceeded their interrogatory limit by 12 interrogatories, the Court shall
deny (docs. 777, 780, 782, 784, 786) without prejudice and require Plaintiffs to select 25
of their 37 interrogatories to be addressed by Defendants. Thereafter, the parties shall meet
and confer in good faith on the selection to attempt to resolve this matter without judicial
intervention as is required by the Local Rules of Civil Procedure.
Second, the Court finds that RFA No. 3 is unduly burdensome given that requests
Defendants authenticate 8,536 documents. Consequently, Plaintiffs may select up to 250
documents that they would like to have authenticated. Then, the parties shall meet and
confer in good faith to determine whether authentication may be done via stipulation or
via a singular RFA.
Third, Plaintiffs’ request to compel responses related to RFA Nos. 50, 54, 85, 89,
93, 99, 118, 150–51 is granted in part because several of Defendants’ responses are
noncompliant with Fed. R. Civ. P. 36(a)(4).
Finally, the Court shall deny Plaintiffs’ request for confidential and private
settlement materials and communications between Defendants and an individual state
attorney general related to the non-public State Investigative Matter (the “Investigation”).
Specifically, the Court does not find that Plaintiffs’ proffered reasons for seeking private
settlement negotiations meets their heightened burden here.
The parties may, AS A LAST RESORT, seek future judicial guidance on the
interrogatory and authentication matters. However, the parties are put on notice that (a)
bringing meritless discovery requests and (b) failing to meet and confer in good faith are
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sanctionable conduct that may result in cost shifting of attorneys’ fees. See LRCiv 7.2(j);
see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(5)(A), (B).
I. BACKGROUND.
As the Court previously noted:
This action, in which Plaintiffs aver that Defendants violated the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, is based on an alleged “pumping” and “dumping” of
stock. (Doc. 105 at 2–3.) Part of Defendants’ alleged misdeeds was the sale
of vehicles before Defendants possessed the titles to such vehicles. (Id. at 2–
3, 45.) Such acts, Plaintiffs have alleged, relates to Defendants’ scienter—an
element of a security fraud claim. (Id. at 41–42, 45–48.)
* * *
While the Presiding Judge dismissed portions of Plaintiffs’ Amended
Complaint [(“AC”)], the T&R allegations that Defendants sold cars before
they possessed those cars’ titles remained. (Id. at 69–73.) This decision was
based, at least in part, upon a finding that the CWs’ accounts were “probative
of Defendants’ scienter by suggesting precisely what Plaintiffs allege—that
Carvana’s noncompliance with title and registration requirements was
widespread and persistent, and Defendants were well aware of the issue.” (Id.
at 48.)
(Doc. 394 at 2.)
Since the Presiding Judge’s order on the motions to dismiss Plaintiffs’ AC, the
parties have engaged in a scorched earth campaign to obtain discovery in this action. The
nine currently pending discovery motions are a representation of the parties’ aggressive
discovery campaign—these motions in question were all filed on the same day, October 1,
2026, one day before the written discovery deadline. See (doc. 505 at 2.)
II. LEGAL STANDARDS.
A. Interrogatories.
Rule 33 governs the use of interrogatories. “The purpose of interrogatories is to limit
and clarify the issues for the parties as they prepare for further trial proceedings.” Bragel
Int’l, Inc. v. Kohl’s Dep’t Stores, No. CV 17-7414 RGK (SSx), 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
224955, at *17-18 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 14, 2018) (citing Soria v. Oxnard Sch. Dist. Bd. of Trs.,
488 F.2d 579, 587 (9th Cir. 1973)). “Unless otherwise stipulated or ordered by the court, a
party may serve on any other party no more than 25 written interrogatories, including all
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discrete subparts.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 33(a)(1).
“A responding party must respond to interrogatories under oath to the fullest extent
possible, Fed. R. Civ. P. 33(b)(3), and any objections must be stated with specificity.”
Bragel Int’l, Inc., 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 224955, at *18. “Answers to interrogatories must
be responsive, full, complete and un[-]evasive.” Moore v. Garnand, No. CV-19-00290-
TUC-RM (LAB), 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 51457, at *7 (D. Ariz. Mar. 17, 2021). Courts
generally reject interrogatory answers that are non-specific. See id. “An interrogatory
response is improper if it merely references information contained in declarations,
pleadings, or other discovery responses.” V5 Techs. v. Switch, Ltd., 334 F.R.D. 297, 305
(D. Nev. 2019) (citations omitted). “Similarly, an interrogatory response may not simply
refer to the litigation record in an underlying action.” Id. “The sufficiency of an
interrogatory response must be analyzed on a case-by-case basis in light of the particular
question being asked.” Id.
B. Requests for Admissions.
Under Rule 36, “[a] party may serve on any other party a written request to admit .
. . the truth of any matters within the scope of Rule 26(b)(1) relating to . . . facts, the
application of law to fact, or opinions about either[,] and the genuineness of any described
documents.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 36(a)(1). “The purpose of Rule 36(a) is to expedite trial by
establishing certain material facts as true and thus narrowing the range of issues for trial.”
Asea, Inc. v. S. Pac. Transp. Co., 669 F.2d 1242, 1245 (9th Cir. 1981).
In answering an RFA, a party must be mindful of the following:
If a matter is not admitted, the answer must specifically deny it or state in
detail why the answering party cannot truthfully admit or deny it. A denial
must fairly respond to the substance of the matter; and when good faith
requires that a party qualify an answer or deny only a part of a matter, the
answer must specify the part admitted and qualify or deny the rest. The
answering party may assert lack of knowledge or information as a reason for
failing to admit or deny only if the party states that it has made reasonable
inquiry3 and that the information it knows or can readily obtain is insufficient
3 “‘Reasonable inquiry’ is limited to persons and documents within the responding
party’s control[.] It does not require the responding party to interview or subpoena records
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to enable it to admit or deny.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 36(a)(4).
“Generally, qualification is permitted if the statement, although containing some
truth, standing alone out of context of the whole truth conveys unwarranted and unfair
inferences.” Creative Photographers, Inc. v. Line Fin. Health Network, No. CV 23-5419
JFW (RAOx), 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 75987, at *6 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 24, 2024) (citations
omitted). However, parties should be on notice that “Rule 36(a) provides that a matter may
be deemed admitted if the answer does not comply with the requirements of this rule.”
Asea, Inc., 669 F.2d at 1245.
“A party may not avoid responding based on technicalities.” United States ex rel.
Englund v. Los Angeles, 235 F.R.D. 675, 684 (E.D. Cal. 2006). “[A] party who is unable
to agree with the exact wording of the request for admission should agree to an alternate
wording or stipulation.” Id. “When the purpose and significance of a request are reasonably
clear, courts do not permit denials based on an overly-technical reading of the request.”
C. Motion to Compel.
“The purpose of discovery is to make trial ‘less a game of blind man’s bluff and
more a fair contest with the basic issues and facts disclosed to the fullest extent possible,’
. . . and to narrow and clarify the issues in dispute.” U.S. Equal Emp. Opportunity Comm’n
v. ABM Indus., 261 F.R.D. 503, 506 (E.D. Cal. 2009) (quoting United States v. Procter &
Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677, 682 (1958)). In theory, the discovery process “should be
cooperative and largely unsupervised by the district court.” Sali v. Corona Reg’l Med. Ctr.,
884 F.3d 1218, 1219 (9th Cir. 2018). However, where theory does not reflect realty—such
as when “disclosures aren’t made or cooperation breaks down”—Rule 37 provides the
proper mechanism to compel the disclosure of materials from a party involved in the
litigation. See id.
The court has broad discretion regarding whether to permit or deny discovery via a
motion to compel. See Hallett v. Morgan, 296 F.3d 732, 751 (9th Cir. 2002). Generally,
from independent third parties in order to admit or deny a Request for admission.” United
States ex rel. Englund v. Los Angeles, 235 F.R.D. 675, 685 (E.D. Cal. 2006).
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discoverable evidence is “any nonprivileged matter that is relevant4 to any party’s claim or
defense and proportional to the needs of the case[.]” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1).
While a party’s right to discovery is broad, that does not mean that it is limitless.
See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2). Courts will limit discovery where:
(a) the discovery sought is unreasonably cumulative or duplicative, or can be
obtained from some other source that is more convenient, less burdensome,
or less expensive; (b) the party seeking discovery has had ample opportunity
to obtain the information by discovery in the action; or (iii) the proposed
discovery is outside the scope permitted by Rule 26(b)(1).
Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2)(C)(i)–(iii).
Generally, the party seeking to compel additional discovery bears the burden of
showing that the additional discovery is relevant under Rule 26(b)(1). See Soto v. City of
Concord, 162 F.R.D. 603, 610 (N.D. Cal. 1995). Thereafter, the opposing party carries “a
heavy burden” in showing why such discovery request should be denied. Blankenship v.
Hearst Corp., 519 F.2d 418, 429 (9th Cir. 1975).
III. DISCUSSION.
At the current juncture, the parties dispute every one of Defendants’ responses to
Plaintiffs’ twenty-five propounded interrogatories. (Docs. 775, 777, 780, 782, 784, 786.)
Additionally, the parties dispute ten responses Plaintiffs received in response to their RFAs
propounded upon Carvana Defendants. (Docs. 788, 790.) Furthermore, the parties have
filed a Joint Discovery Motion wherein Plaintiffs request the Court compel Defendants to
produce all communications related to settlement negotiations between Defendants and an
individual state attorney general untethered from the Investigation (Doc. 794.)
These motions boil down to seven arguments, namely: (1) whether Plaintiffs
violated Rule 7.2(j) of the Local Rules of Civil Procedure by failing to sincerely confer
with Defendants regarding (docs. 775, 777, 780, 782, 784, 786, 788, 790); (2) whether
4 Evidence is considered relevant if: “(a) it has any tendency to make a fact more or
less probable than it would be without the evidence; and (b) the fact is of consequence in
determining the action.” Fed. R. Evid. 401. “Irrelevant evidence is not admissible.” Fed.
R. Evid. 402. Further, a court may exclude relevant evidence where its probative value is
substantially outweighed by the danger of confusing the issue in the present case. Fed. R.
Evid. 403.
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Plaintiffs are entitled to fifty interrogatories; (3) whether Plaintiffs’ interrogatories are
impermissible compound interrogatories; (4) the merits of Defendants’ objections—
beyond compound objections—to each interrogatory; (5) whether Plaintiffs’ RFA No. 3
impermissibly seeks authentication of 8,563 documents; (6) whether Defendants’
responses to RFA Nos. 50, 54, 85, 89, 93, 99, 118, 150, and 161 satisfy the dictates of Rule
36; and (7) whether Defendants are entitled to a protective order regarding settlement
negotiations between Defendants and individual state attorneys general involved in the
Investigation, and, if not, whether Defendants must produce documents related to these
negotiations to Plaintiffs. The Court shall address each argument in turn.
A. Meet and Conferral Requirement.
Whether Plaintiffs exhausted their requisite LRCiv 7.2(j) meet-and-confer process
is a close question.
Rule 7.2(j) of the Local Rules of Civil Procedure states that:
[n]o discovery motion will be considered or decided unless a statement of
moving counsel is attached thereto certifying that after personal consultation
and sincere efforts to do so, counsel have been unable to satisfactorily resolve
the matter. Any discovery motion brought before the Court without prior
personal consultation with the other party and a sincere effort to resolve the
matter, may result in sanctions.
LRCiv 7.2(j).
“The requirement to confer contained in LRCiv 7.2(j) is designed to avoid
unnecessary litigation of discovery issues that the parties should be able to resolve
themselves.” Lapin v. Nortonlifelock Inc., No. CV-22-00759-PHX-MTL, 2022 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 188238, at *3 (D. Ariz. Oct. 14, 2022) (citation omitted). “When the court must
resolve a dispute that the parties themselves could have resolved, it must needlessly expend
resources that it could better utilize elsewhere.” Id. at *3 (emphasis added) (Pulsecard,
Inc. v. Discover Card Servs., 168 F.R.D. 295, 302 (D. Kan. 1996)).
The Local Rules of Civil Procedure are not permissive guidelines nor are they idle
threats. No, the Local Rules of Civil Procedure “have the force of law and are binding upon
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the parties and the court.” Rehfeldt v. United States Dep’t of Homeland Sec., No. 23-15240,
2024 U.S. App. LEXIS 7119, at *2 (9th Cir. Mar. 26, 2024) (citation omitted); Weil v.
Neary, 278 U.S. 160, 169 (1929) (“It is clear that a rule of court thus authorized and made
has the force of law.”).
Here, the conferral process between the parties regarding Plaintiffs’ eight discovery
motions, (docs. 775, 777, 780, 782, 784, 786, 788, 790), appears to be as follows. First, the
parties conducted a singular phone call on September 25, 2026, during which it is disputed
whether the parties addressed all of Plaintiffs’ arguments which made their way into the
eight pending discovery disputes. Compare (doc. 776-2) with (doc. 811 at 2–4). Second,
Plaintiffs submitted a sixteen-page letter to Defendants, which was submitted in the waning
hours of September 28, 2026—that is, at 11:30 p.m. MST. (Doc. 776-2); (doc. 811). Again,
Defendants opine that not all arguments contained within the letter were addressed in the
parties’ phone call. Compare (doc. 776-2) with (doc. 811 at 2–4). Thereafter, Plaintiffs
filed the instant discovery disputes on October 1, 2026. See (docs. 775, 777, 780, 782, 784,
786, 788, 790.)
At first glance, it appears that Plaintiffs failed to comply with the dictates of LRCiv
7.2(j) in bringing forth their claims in (docs. 775, 777, 780, 782, 784, 786, 788, 790), which
is sufficient grounds for this Court to disregard these motions. See Bustamante v. Graco,
Inc., No. CV 03-182 TUC JMR, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 49768, at *3 (D. Ariz. Dec. 1,
2005). However, taking this exchange out of isolation, and viewing it in the broader course
of this litigation, it does appear that Plaintiffs rapid press to file the instant motions was
based upon the impending close of written discovery on October 2, 2026. Thus, the Court
will excuse the lack of professional curtesy and compliance with the Local Rules of Civil
Procedure this one time. However, this is not a blank check going forward.5
“The Court advises counsel to do better. The Court’s conferral requirement serves
an important function in ‘encouraging parties to resolve amicably disputes when possible,
preserving judicial resources for those matters that require the court’s intervention.’”
5 The Court, in its discretion, will not strike Plaintiffs’ sixteen-page letter attached as
an exhibit to (doc. 775).
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Bowers v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., No. 6:25-cv-01615-MTK, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
100961, at *6 (D. Or. May 6, 2026) (cleaned up and emphasis added) (quoting Thompson
v. Federico, 324 F. Supp. 2d 1152, 1172 (D. Or. 2004) (noting that for a rule requiring
meeting and conferring in good faith “to mean anything at all, at least the spirit of its
substantive requirements must be met.”)); Edwards v. Sakir, No. 2:25-cv-03135-VBF-SP,
2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 69304, at *5 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 24, 2026 (“Filing discovery motions
in blatant disregard of the Local Rules is a waste of valuable judicial resources.”));
Wunderlich v. Allred, No. 2:24-cv-001847 TLN CKD (PC), 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
156943, at *5 (E.D. Cal. July 14, 2026) (“It is not the court’s job to micromanage the
production of requested documents in the absence of any conversation or cooperation
between the parties. Rather, the moving party in a discovery motion is required to meet and
confer so that such issues can be ironed out without judicial intervention.”). More to the
point, future failures to meet and confer may lead to the issuance of sanctions. See LRCiv
7.2(j) (“Any discovery motion brought before the Court without prior personal consultation
with the other party and a sincere effort to resolve the matter, may result in sanctions.”).
B. Number of Interrogatories Plaintiffs are Entitled.
While the prior issue was a close call, the instant issue is not. Full stop.
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure note that “[u]nless otherwise stipulated or
ordered by the court, a party may serve on any other party no more than 25 written
interrogatories, including all discrete subparts.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 33(a)(1). “Commentary and
caselaw have noted that permitting the maximum number of allowable interrogatories on
each named defendant does not always accord with the purpose of Rule 33’s limitation.”
Gaby’s Bags, LLC v. Mercari, Inc., No. 20-cv-00734-WHA (TSH), 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
45961, at *2–3 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 8, 2021) (citation omitted). Rather, numerous district courts
in the Ninth Circuit have applied a 25-interrogatory-per-side rule “when the parties to an
action are nominally separate.” Fate Therapeutics, Inc. v. Shoreline Biosciences, Inc., No.
22-cv-00676-H-MSB, 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 108433, at *4 (S.D. Cal. June 22, 2023)
(cleaned up) (collecting cases). “Parties may be considered nominally separate when
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represented by a single attorney, when there is unity of action, or when there is a legal
relationship between parties.” 21X Capital Ltd. v. Werra, No. C06-04135 JW (HRL), 2007
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 75487, at *2–3 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 2, 2007) (citation omitted).
This is not a close question. Plaintiffs—i.e., United Association National Pension
Fund (“UANPF”) and Saskatchewan Healthcare Employees’ Pension Plan (“SHEPP”)—
are nominally separated, entitling them to only 25 interrogatories. First, UANPF and
SHEPP are represented by the same counsel. Second, the history of this litigation
establishes that UANPF and SHEPP have always been treated collectively, not
individually. See, e.g., (doc. 71) (treating the parties together as a single unit); Freedom
Found. v. Sacks, No. 3:19-cv-05937-RBL, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 69188, at *9 (W.D.
Wash. Apr. 20, 2020) (treating the defendants as nominally separated because “the
Complaint consistently refers to ‘Defendants’ as a single unit”). Third, there is clear unity
of action here based on the sharing of counsel and interest in the same outcome. Fourth,
there is a legal relationship between UANPF and SHEPP as joint lead Plaintiffs. See (doc.
20 at 4.)
In short, Plaintiffs UANPF and SHEPP’s attempt to backdoor additional
interrogatories is unavailing given that, throughout the discovery process, they have always
been treated collectively. Thus, Plaintiffs are only entitled to 25 interrogatories.
C. Compound Interrogatories.
Unlike the prior question addressed, the instant question does present a close call.
To address this matter, the Court has parsed through all 25 of Plaintiffs’ interrogatories
propounded upon Defendants, and has reached the following conclusion. The Court agrees
with Defendants’ that Plaintiffs have exceeded their 25-interrogatory limit because they
have propounded impermissible compound interrogatories. The Court However, the Court
disagrees with Defendants’ contention that Plaintiffs’ have propounded 70 interrogatories.
Rule 33 provides that “a party may serve on any other party no more than 25 written
interrogatories, including all discrete subparts.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 33(a)(1). “Interrogatories
that contain discrete subparts are compound and not permitted.” Kleovoulos v. Semtech
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Corp., No. 2:25-cv-01474-MCS-AYP, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 172523, at *6 (C.D. Cal.
July 31, 2026). However, “[i]nterrogatory subparts are to be counted as one interrogatory
if they are logically or factually subsumed within and necessarily related to the primary
question.” Safeco Ins. Co. of Am. v. Rawstron, 181 F.R.D. 441, 445 (C.D. Cal. 1998)
(cleaned up) (quoting Kendall v. GES Exposition Servs., 174 F.R.D. 684, 685 (D. Nev.
1997)). In other words, genuine subparts are not counted as individual interrogatories,
whereas discrete or separate questions are. See Safeco Ins. Co., 181 F.R.D. at 445.
“Courts have formulated various tests for determining when subparts are actually a
separate interrogatory.” Warren v. Bastyr Univ., No. 2:11-cv-01800-RSL, 2013 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 50408, at *4 (W.D. Wash. Apr. 8, 2013). “Interrogatory subparts are counted as a
single interrogatory if ‘they are logically or factually subsumed within and necessarily
related to the primary question.’” Id. (quoting Safeco Ins. Co., 181 F.R.D. at 445). “A single
question asking for several bits of information relating to the same topic counts as one
interrogatory. (E.g., ‘State the name, address and telephone number of each person present
at the meeting.’).” Hasan v. Johnson, No. 1:08-cv-00381-GSA-PC, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
21578, at *13 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 21, 2012). “However, questions seeking information about
separate subjects count as several interrogatories. (E.g., ‘Were you ever discharged from
any employment for incompetency or did you ever sue a former employer for any
reason?’).” Id. (citing Kendall, 174 F.R.D. at 686). “For example, Interrogatories
requesting (1) facts (information about a certain event), (2) persons (identify each person
who knew), and (3) documents (identify documents in support) have three discrete
subparts, with different themes.” Hasan, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21578, at *13 (citing
Superior Communs. v. Earhugger, Inc., 257 F.R.D. 215, 218 (C.D. Cal. 2009)
(“Interrogatory no. 1 still has at least three discrete subparts: facts; persons; and
documents.”)).
Here, Defendants argue that several of Plaintiffs’ interrogatories are impermissible
compound interrogatories. (Doc. 811 at 6–7); (doc. 812-1.) Defendants opine that Plaintiffs
exceeded their interrogatory limit by Interrogatory No. 8, pointing to Interrogatory No. 4
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as an example of an interrogatory containing “two separate requests.” (Doc. 811 at 6.)
The Court, upon parsing through all 25 interrogatories, disagrees with Defendants’
impermissible compound interrogatory count as to all interrogatories other than
Interrogatory Nos. 4 and 9. Regarding Plaintiffs’ Interrogatory No. 4, it states the
following:
Identify all CFO monthly financial results meetings during the Relevant
Period (see, e.g., CVNA_CA_00019978, GT_Carvana_00001061,
CVNA_CA_00037866, CVNA_CA_00037674), including:
(a) the date on which each meeting occurred;
(b) the attendees at each such meeting; and
(c) all documents prepared for, used at, distributed at, memorializing, or
otherwise concerning each such meeting.
(Doc. 776 at 5.)
Interrogatory No. 4 is impermissible as it has two discrete subparts. The first subpart
contains subsections (a) and (b), which ask for facts regarding the financial result meetings
held during the relevant period. The second discrete subpart is subsection (c), which asks
for documents prepared for, used at, distributed at, memorializing, or otherwise concerning
those financial result meeting. As past district court precedent establishes, asking for facts
and documents are two discrete subparts with different themes, rendering Interrogatory No.
4 as impermissibly compound. See Hasan, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21578, at *13; see also
Figuerola v. Nationwide Agribusiness Ins. Co., No. 2:19-cv-07491-FMO-MAA, 2020 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 272194, at *23 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 28, 2020) (noting that a interrogatory
requesting all facts, address and contact information for persons with knowledge of these
facts, and all documents that support responses to the prior two categories “must be counted
as three separate interrogatories”); Makaeff v. Trump Univ., LLC, No. 10-CV-0940-GPC
(WVG), 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 94732, at *25–26 (S.D. Cal. July 11, 2014) (“Further, the
discrete subsections in ROG No. 32 would count as individual ROGs.”).
Interrogatory No. 9 is a starker example of an impermissible compound
interrogatory. Interrogatory No. 9, which spans more than two pages, asks for a plethora of
information regarding:
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each formal or informal investigation, inquiry, examination, audit, notice of
violation, complaint, demand, administrative proceeding, disciplinary or
enforcement action, consent order or agreement, settlement, or other matter,
whether resolved or unresolved, by, before, or with any state, territory, the
District of Columbia, or political subdivision thereof, or any agency,
department, commission, board, bureau, regulator, licensing authority, motor
vehicle or dealer-licensing agency, attorney general, consumer protection
authority, administrative body, court, or law-enforcement authority of any
such jurisdiction, relating in whole or in part to Carvana’s T&R Issues that
occurred during the Relevant Period, in which any Sanction against or
applicable to Carvana was proposed, sought, threatened, negotiated,
assessed, levied, imposed, ordered, issued, entered, agreed to, or paid. The
response must include any such matter that began before or after the Relevant
Period, and any Sanction proposed, sought, threatened, negotiated, assessed,
levied, imposed, ordered, issued, entered, agreed to, paid, or resolved before
or after the Relevant Period, if the matter or Sanction relates in whole or in
part to T&R Issues that occurred during the Relevant Period.
(Doc. 780-1 at 8–10.)
Following this paragraph are 11 subsections requiring matters such as the date
Defendants first learned of each matter and participated in or supervised a response or
negotiation to the number of vehicle sales, customer transactions, titles, etc., at issue in
formal or informal investigation, inquiry, examination, audit, etc. (Id.) Suffice to say, this
two-page interrogatory is not, in fact, one singular interrogatory. Rather, each subsection
is its own separate interrogatory given that each request seeks different subject matter based
on with different themes—i.e., subsection (a) requires information based on every state or
jurisdiction involved in an investigation, which is a different theme than subsection (b)
which seeks the date they first learned of the matter and the employee or officer who
received notice of the investigation. Consequently, the Court agrees with Defendants that
Interrogatory No. 9 is an impermissible compound interrogatory that amounts to 12
individual interrogatories.
Based upon the following, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have propounded 37
interrogatories upon Defendants. Thus, Plaintiffs have exceeded their limit by 12
interrogatories. Furthermore, while the Court may grant leave to file additional
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interrogatories, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 33(a)(1), Plaintiffs have neither made a particularized
showing for such a need based on the expansive discovery they have already obtained and
given the fact that the instant motions were filed on the eve of the written discovery
deadline. Thus, the Court does not excuse Plaintiffs’ actions in exceeding Rule 33’s
interrogatory limitations.
D. Merits of Defendants’ Objections in Response to Interrogatories.
Given the immediately prior finding, the Court shall not address the merits of
Plaintiffs’ claims as to Defendants’ objections to their propounded interrogatories. Doing
so would be unproductive and a waste of scarce judicial resources.
Rather, the Court will direct Plaintiffs to select 25 of their interrogatories that they
would like Defendants to respond to. Thereafter, the parties shall meet and confer in good
faith, see supra section III.A., to address Defendants’ objections and whether supplemental
responses are in order. To aid in this endeavor, the Court shall provide three notes. First,
the Court reiterates what it has already stated before, that pure, boilerplate or generalized
objections bereft of any detailed analysis or explanation are insufficient and are
“tantamount to not making any objection at all.” Makaeff v. Trump Univ., LLC, No. 10-
CV-0940-GPC (WVG), 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34974, at *18 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 12, 2013)
(quoting Walker v. Lakewood Condo. Owners Ass’n, 186 F.R.D. 584, 587 (C.D. Cal.
1999)); (doc. 734 at 16.) However, where Defendants have provided explanations
regarding their objections, such as their assertion that Interrogatory No. 24 is unduly
burdensome, see (doc. 782-1 at 48–49), Plaintiffs should truly ponder the fruitfulness of
challenging such an objection. Cf. Becker v. TIG Ins. Co., No. 3:21-cv-05185-JHC, 2022
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 193508, at *7 (W.D. Wash. Oct. 24, 2022) (“Courts confronting
overbroad interrogatories need not impose limiting constructions but may instead deny the
request to compel responses.”); Plata v. Lands’ End, Inc., No. 5:24-cv-00723-MEMF-SP,
2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21421, at *14 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 2, 2026) (“Plaintiff may need
discovery throughout the proposed class period, but that does not mean he needs every
document concerning every sale during that period at this stage.”).
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Second, the Court will not consider any motion where it appears that the parties
have not conferred in good faith to seek resolution outside of the courtroom. See
Bustamante, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 49768, at *3. And third, if this matter cannot be
resolved absent judicial intervention, the parties are forewarned that any side’s arguments
and requests lacking merit may result in cost shifting. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(5)(A), (B);
see also Byzantine Catholic Eparchy of Phx. v. Burri Law PA, No. CV-20-00779-PHX-
ROS, 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 153140, at *4 (D. Ariz. June 17, 2022) (“The losing party to
a discovery motion bears the burden of demonstrating substantial justification or unjust
circumstances.”); cf. Hyde & Drath v. Baker, 24 F.3d 1162, 1171 (9th Cir. 1994) (“We
have not required a finding of bad faith on the part of the attorney before imposing
sanctions under Rule 37.”).
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiffs’ motions to compel interrogatory responses
(docs. 775, 777, 780, 782, 784, 786) are denied without prejudice.
E. RFA No. 3.
The next issue the Court must address is whether it shall compel Defendants to
respond to RFA No. 3. (Doc. 788.) Plaintiffs’ RFA No. 3 requests Defendants “[a]dmit the
genuineness and authenticity, within the meaning of Rule 901 of the Federal Rules of
Evidence, of each document identified in the chart attached hereto as Exhibit A.” (Doc.
789-1 at 9.) The ‘exhibit A’ in question is 194-pages long, containing 8,536 documents
that Plaintiffs request Defendants authenticate via RFA No. 3. See (doc. 78-2 at 39–233.)
Plaintiffs aver that “Rule 36 expressly authorizes requests concerning ‘the
genuineness of any described documents[.]’” (Doc. 788 at 2) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P.
36(a)(1)(b)). Plaintiffs are correct in this assertion. See K.C.R. v. Cnty. of L.A., No. CV 13-
3806 PSG (SSx), 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 98278, at *14 (C.D. Cal. July 14, 2014) (“Rule
36(a) specifically provides that a party may serve a written request on another party to
admit the genuineness of any described documents, not sentences or passages of
documents[.] Once a document is authenticated, all of its contents are necessarily
authenticated, and the purpose of Rule 36(a) of narrowing the range of issues for trial is
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furthered.”) (citations omitted). Plaintiffs also assert that the volume of documents
requested to be authenticated is not an issue either. See (doc. 788 at 2–3.) On this matter,
the Court disagrees.
As an initial matter, the Court finds that Defendants’ undue burden argument
specific enough to render it non-boilerplate. See (doc. 789-1 at 9–10.) Thus, Defendants’
undue burden argument is proper here. See A. Farber & Ptnrs., Inc. v. Garber, 234 F.R.D.
186, 188 (C.D. Cal. 2006) (“[G]eneral or boilerplate objections such as overly burdensome
and harassing are improper—especially when a party fails to submit any evidentiary
declarations supporting such objections.”).
More to the point, the Court agrees that requiring Defendants to authenticate 8,536
documents of varying page lengths—wherein the list containing all the document names
alone is 139-pages long—is unduly burdensome. See, e.g., Thompson v. C&H Sugar Co.,
No. 12-cv-00391 NC, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 42618, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 28, 2014)
(“Plaintiffs ask Defendants, through either a request for admissions or a 30(b)(6) witness,
to authenticate the genuineness of all the documents C&H has produced in this litigation,
which amount to over 14,000 pages. Plaintiffs do not explain the need to authenticate every
document produced in this case, and the Court will not order defendants to undergo that
burden.”); Satchell v. FedEx Express, Nos. C 03-02659 SI, C 03-2878 SI, 2006 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 76246, at *19 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 6, 2006) (“By requesting defendant to make
admissions regarding hundreds of deposition exhibits, or paper personnel files, plaintiffs
inappropriately put the burden on defendant to sift through the voluminous discovery in
this case.”) (cleaned up); Klopman-Baerselman v. Air & Liquid Sys. Corp., No. 3:18-cv-
05536-RJB, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 188349, at *9–10 (W.D. Wash. Oct. 30, 2019)
(“Although portions of the materials referenced in RFA No. 15 may be relevant and
important to Plaintiff's claims, authentication of more than 11,000 pages of various
materials does not appear proportional to the needs of this case.”). The cases in which
Plaintiffs have relied upon to rebut this finding are unavailing given that the number of
documents requested to be authenticated collectively does not exceeds 500 documents. See
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Mirae Asset Sec. Co. v. Ryze Renewables Holdings, LLC, No. 2:23-cv-01492-APG-NJK,
2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 123604, at *4–5 (D. Nev. June 3, 2026) (requesting authentication
for two documents); see also Sanchez Y Martin, S.A. de C.V. v. Dos Amigos, Inc., No.
17CV1943 LAB (JMA), 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 101719, at *3–6 (S.D. Cal. June 15, 2018)
(requesting authentication for three documents); Adobe Sys. v. Christenson, No. 2:10-cv-
00422-LRH-GWF, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16977, at *23–24 (D. Nev. Feb. 7, 2011)
(discussing 20 RFAs that requested authentication for one website posting each, for a total
of 30 website postings); Berry v. Federated Mut. Ins. Co., 110 F.R.D. 441, 442 (N.D. Ind.
1986) (requesting authentication for 244 exhibits); Est. of Manship v. United States, 232
F.R.D. 552, 559 (M.D. La. 2005) (requesting authentication for four documents).
Plaintiffs must select 250 or less documents for authentication that are most likely
to be relevant to any dispositive motion and trial. These documents must not have been
created by non-Carvana sources. See (“An affiant seeking to authenticate a document via
personal knowledge under Federal Rule of Evidence . . . 901(b)(1) must be a witness who
wrote it, signed it, used it, or saw others do so.” Sullivan v. City of Marysville, No. C13-
0803JLR, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14318, at *6 (W.D. Wash. Feb. 5, 2014) (citations
omitted). Once Plaintiffs have selected their subset of document, the parties shall meet and
confer in good faith on whether authentication by stipulation or a request for admissions is
the most efficient manner of authentication. Hence, Plaintiffs’ “Motion to Compel
Responses from Carvana Co. to Request for Admission No. 3” (doc. 788) is granted in part
as to Plaintiffs and granted in part as to Defendants.
F. RFA Nos. 50, 54, 85, 89, 93, 99, 118, 150, and 161.
Because several of Defendants’ responses do not fairly respond to the substance of
Plaintiffs’ RFAs at issue, the Court shall grant the instant Motion in part.
Rule 36 requires the following when a party responds to an RFA:
If a matter is not admitted, the answer must specifically deny it or state in
detail why the answering party cannot truthfully admit or deny it. A denial
must fairly respond to the substance of the matter; and when good faith
requires that a party qualify an answer or deny only a part of a matter, the
answer must specify the part admitted and qualify or deny the rest.
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Fed. R. Civ. P. 36(a)(4).
Here, Defendants’ responses to RFA Nos. 50, 54, and 118 are evasive and fail to
fairly respond to the substance of Plaintiffs’ requests. Specifically, RFA No. 50 requests
Defendants:
[a]dmit that on August 5, 2020, during an earnings call, [Defendant] Jenkins
stated:
[T]here are definitely some exciting trends in retail GPU. I think the
most exciting is that, as I mentioned earlier, in July, we bought more than
100% as many cars from customers as we sold to customers. . . .
I think that’s obviously a positive, that drives wholesale GPU, that
drives incremental retail GPU, because cars that you acquire from customers
are typically more profitable than cars that you acquire at auction.
(Doc. 789-1 at 27.)
Similarly, RFA Nos. 54 and 118 contained edited portions of Form 10-Ks filed by
Defendants with the Security and Exchange Commission. See (id. at 28, 45–46.)
Defendants’ sole response to these RFAs was “denied.” (Id. at 27–28, 45–46.) Given that
these are direct quotes, albeit with modifications, from statements and documents created
by Defendants, the Court finds that a denial without explanation does not fairly respond to
the substance of the matter as required by Rule 36(a)(4). Thus, Defendants must
supplement their responses.
The Court turns next to RFA Nos. 85, 89, and 93. These RFAs request Defendants
to admit several statements made by Defendant Jenkins at an August 11, 2021, J.P. Morgan
Auto Conference. See (id. at 36–39.) Defendants’ response to each includes the following
language:
Defendant incorporates each of the General Objections and Objections to
Definitions and Instructions as if fully set forth in this Response. Subject to
and without waiving the foregoing objections, Defendant states that after a
reasonable inquiry the information he knows or can readily obtain is
insufficient to enable him to admit or deny, due to lack of recollection of
specific statements made at a J.P. Morgan Auto Conference on August 11,
2021, and on that basis denies the Request.
(Id.)
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The Court shall deny Plaintiffs’ request as to RFA Nos. 85, 89, and 93. Defendants’
responses comply with Rule 36(a)(4) as the responses note that Defendants conducted a
reasonable inquiry and that, due to lack of recollection, are unable to admit or deny the
statements. See Bingham v. Marriott Int’l, Inc., No. 8:21-cv-00836-JLS (JDEx), 2022 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 55447, at *5 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 17, 2022) (“If an answering party asserts lack of
knowledge or information as a reason for failing to admit or deny, the party must state ‘that
it has made reasonable inquiry and that the information it knows or can readily obtain is
insufficient to enable it to admit or deny.’”) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 36(a)(4)).
Finally, the Court turns to RFA Nos. 99, 150, and 161. In these RFAs, Plaintiffs
request that Defendants admit or deny that a Wall Street Journal exposé quotes a Carvana
Spokeswoman with a specific quote of that spokeswoman as well as a request to admit or
deny that that Michigan Department of State made a specific announcement on October 7,
2022. (Doc. 789-1 at 40, 55, 58–59.) Defendants file objections to RFA Nos. 99 and 161,
wherein they note that after a reasonable investigation they are unable to admit or deny the
request. (Id. at 58–59.) Defendants, in response to RFA No. 150, solely write “denied.” (Id.
at 55.) Defendants’ response to RFA No. 99 and 161 comply with Rule 36(a)(4), but their
response to RFA No. 150 does not because a denial without explanation in this situation
does not fairly respond to the substance of the matter as required by Rule 36(a)(4). Thus,
Defendants shall be directed to supplement their responses to RFA No. 150.
G. The Parties’ Joint Motion for Discovery.
The final matter the Court shall address is whether Plaintiffs are entitled to private
settlement communications and documents between Defendants and a state attorney
general formerly associated with the Investigation. (Doc. 794.) The Court shall deny
Plaintiffs request because they have failed to meet their heightened burden in this matter.
Pursuant to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, “[p]arties may obtain discovery
regarding any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party’s claim or defense and
proportional to the needs of the case[.]” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). Generally, courts construe
this rule broadly “because wide access to relevant facts serves the integrity and fairness of
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the judicial process by promoting the search for the truth.” Epstein v. MCA, 54 F.3d 1422,
1423 (9th Cir. 1995) (citation omitted). “However, the right of a party to obtain discovery
is not unlimited.” Id. For example, courts in this Circuit “have granted protective orders to
protect confidential settlement agreements” in the context of discovery. Phillips v. GMC,
307 F.3d 1206, 1212 (9th Cir. 2002) (citing Kalinauskas v. Wong, 151 F.R.D. 363, 365–67
(D. Nev. 1993)).
“On a motion to compel discovery, the moving party carries the initial burden of
demonstrating relevance.” Muzi Gao v. Campus 150 Venture II, No. 8:20-01355 DDP
(ADSx), 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 246093, at *6 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 29, 2021). Regarding
whether a confidential settlement agreement is discoverable, courts within the Ninth
Circuit apply a heightened burden upon the party seeking discovery. See Big Baboon Corp.
v. Dell, Inc., No. CV 09-01198 SVW (SSx), 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 108027, at *18 (C.D.
Cal. Oct. 8, 2010) (“Several courts in the Ninth Circuit have recognized that even though
settlement agreements may be discoverable in some circumstances, the public policy
favoring efficient settlements supports heightened scrutiny regarding their production.”);
see also Zucchella v. Olympusat, Inc., No. CV 19-7335-DSF (PLAx), 2020 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 210859, at *26–27 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 2, 2020) (same); cf. Thomasian v. Wells Fargo
Bank, N.A., No. 03:12-cv-01435-HU, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 119554, at *3 (D. Or. Aug.
22, 2013) (“A strong public policy favoring settlement of disputed claims dictates that
confidentiality agreements regarding such settlements not be lightly abrogated.”) (citation
omitted); T1 Payments, LLC v. New U Life Corp., No. 2:19-cv-01816-APG-DJA, 2021
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 222830, at *19 (D. Nev. Nov. 17, 2021) (“Although not amounting to a
recognized privilege, public policy generally favors confidential settlements because they
often assist parties in resolving their disputes by mutual agreement. Accordingly, the
secrecy of a settlement agreement and the contractual rights of the parties thereunder
deserve court protection.”) (cleaned up).
Plaintiffs have not met their heightened burden here. Particularly, the Court finds
that Plaintiffs assertions that “[t]hese communications concern Class Period T&R failures
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and bears on falsity, materiality, and knowledge,” (doc. 794 at 4), insufficient for lack of
any particularized explanation. Moreover, while this Court has construed relevancy
broadly and liberally in this action, it appears too far attenuated to find Defendants’
settlement negotiations with a singular state’s attorney general at all relevant towards
Defendants’ knowledge and scienter during the relevant period. See Big Baboon Corp.,
2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 108027, at *18 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 8, 2010) (“It is axiomatic that [a
party] is not required to produce confidential information that is not relevant to the parties’
claims or defenses in this action.”).
All told, while the Court disagrees with Defendants’ assertion that Plaintiffs are
attempting to interject themselves into private settlement negotiations, the Court
nevertheless finds that Plaintiffs are not entitled to access materials and communications
related to those settlement agreements. Given this, and considering the “broad latitude” the
Court is invested with “to grant protective orders” under Rule 26(c), Phillips, 307 F.3d at
1211, the Court shall grant the Joint Discovery Motion as to Defendants.
IV. CONCLUSION.
For the foregoing reasons, (doc. 775) is granted as to Defendants, (docs. 777, 780,
782, 784, 786) are denied without prejudice, (docs. 788, 790) are granted in part as to each
party, and (doc. 794) is granted as to Defendants. The parties are directed to meet and
confer in good faith within the next 14 days regarding Plaintiffs interrogatories and RFAs
as limited by this order. The parties may seek judicial guidance on these matters AS A
LAST RESORT. However, the parties are put on notice that (a) the presentation of
factually or legally meritless claims and (b) the failure to meet and confer in good faith
may result in sanctions, including shifting some, if not all of the costs for litigating or
defending such motion(s).6
6 As a final matter, the Court shall grant Defendants’ “Motion to Seal and/or Redact
Joint Discovery Motion and Exhibits” (“Motion to Seal”) (doc. 795.) The Court shall do
so because the District Court granted a Protective Order which rationally covers these
documents. See (doc. 136.) Hence, the District Court has, ipso facto, determined that good
cause exists to protect these documents. See, e.g., Phillips ex rel. Ests. of Byrd v. Gen.
Motors Corp., 307 F.3d 1206, 1214 (9th Cir. 2002) (“When a court grants a protective
order for information produced during discovery, it already has determined that “good
cause” exists to protect this information from being disclosed to the public by balancing
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Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED that (doc. 775) is GRANTED as to Defendants for the reasons
stated herein.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that (docs. 777, 780, 782, 784, 786) are DENIED
WITHOUT PREJUDICE for the reasons stated herein. Plaintiffs are directed to select 25
of their 37 interrogatories, and thereafter meet with Defendants within 14 days regarding
the same. The parties shall meet and confer in good faith. The failure to do so may result
in immediate denial of any discovery motion on the matter or sanctions.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that (doc. 788) is GRANTED IN PART as to
Plaintiffs and GRANTED IN PART as to Defendants for the reasons stated herein. The
parties must meet and confer in good faith within 14 days on a subset of 250 or less
documents chosen by Plaintiffs for authentication. These documents must not have been
created by non-Carvana sources.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that (doc. 790) is GRANTED IN PART as to
Plaintiffs and GRANTED IN PART as to Defendants for the reasons stated herein.
Defendants are directed to supplement their responses to RFA Nos. 50, 54, 118, 150 within
14 days.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that (doc. 794) is GRANTED as to Defendants.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendants’ Motion to Seal (doc. 795) is GRANTED.
The Clerk of Court is kindly directed to file (doc. 796) and the enclosed exhibits UNDER
SEAL.
Dated this 9th day of October, 2026.
Honorable John Z. Boyle
United States Magistrate Judge
the needs for discovery against the need for confidentiality.”).
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