Burton v. DeJoy

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WO
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA
Derek L Burton,
Plaintiff,
v.
Louis DeJoy,
Defendant.
No. CV-22-00755-PHX-ROS
ORDER
Plaintiff Derek Burton (“Plaintiff”) brought this employment discrimination action
against his employer, the United States Postal Service (“USPS”). Plaintiff claims he was
discriminated against based on his race when he was placed on administrative leave on
March 24, 2021, and when he was given a Letter of Warning in Lieu of a 14-day
Suspension on July 6, 2021.
The case proceeded to a jury trial on the racial discrimination claim. Pursuant to
Fed. R. Civ. P. 50, Defendant moved for judgment as a matter of law after Plaintiff
presented his case. The motion was denied, and on March 10, 2025, the jury found for
Plaintiff and awarded him $300,000.00 in damages. (Doc. 141). The Clerk of Court then
entered judgment in Plaintiff’s favor consistent with the jury’s verdict. (Doc. 140).
Defendant renewed the Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law and, in the alternative,
moved for a new trial.
For the following reasons, Motions will be denied.
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I. Factual Background1
Plaintiff has worked for USPS for nearly 30 years and has been a supervisor for
nearly 20 years. In 2020, Plaintiff was working as a morning supervisor at the Sunnyslope
station in Phoenix, Arizona. Plaintiff had served as the station’s Stamp Custodian, but in
2020 that role was held by Jeffrey White, another supervisor. Stamp Custodian was a key
role, as the Custodian’s responsibilities included accountability for and management of the
station’s entire inventory of stamps. Other members of the management team at
Sunnyslope included Station Manager Kim Collins and, later, her replacement, Stephanie
Cook. Plaintiff was the only Black member of this group.
Toward the end of 2020, Supervisor White went on medical leave status after a
cancer diagnosis. Supervisor White’s absence left the station without a Stamp Custodian,
and as his leave was extended, the station needed someone to manage stamp transactions.
It is a violation of USPS policy for one employee to use another’s credentials to handle the
stamp inventory. Ordinarily, USPS policy under these circumstances required the Stamp
Custodian’s duties be transferred through a detailed protocol involving an audit and
password reset. At this time, Manager Collins was suffering from her own cancer
treatments. Rather than designate a new Stamp Custodian and transfer the stamp stock,
Manager Colins instructed Plaintiff to use White’s password to handle the stamp
transactions. Plaintiff then began fulfilling the Stamp Custodian’s role using Supervisor
White’s credentials. Shortly thereafter, Manager Collins was transferred to another station
and was replaced by Stephanie Cook.
From January through March 2021, Plaintiff handled many stamp transactions while
Supervisor White remained on medical leave. Plaintiff asserts that when Manager Cook
arrived to replace Manager Collins, she, too, instructed him to continue handling the stamp
transactions using White’s password.
On March 24, 2021, after higher management became aware of Plaintiff’s use of
1 As required in considering a renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law, the facts
are presented in the light most favorable to Plaintiff as the prevailing party. Harper v. City
of Los Angeles, 533 F.3d 1010, 1021 (9th Cir. 2008).
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Supervisor White’s credentials to conduct stamp transactions, there was an audit of the
Sunnyslope Station stamp inventory. This count found the inventory to be short by
$1,499.96 in stamps. That same day, Plaintiff was escorted off site and placed on
Emergency Placement. Although Plaintiff’s Emergency Placement was paid administrative
leave, the first document issued reflected that it would be unpaid. In April, Manager Erica
Ibuado submitted a Proposed Personnel Action seeking to terminate Plaintiff. Plaintiff
remained on Emergency placement until May 20, 2021. The missing stamps were located
shortly after Supervisor White’s return, when he was restored to his Stamp Custodian
duties and performed a count. Manager Ibuado’s Proposed Personnel Action was rejected
and ultimately, Plaintiff received a Letter of Warning in lieu of a 14-day suspension.
II. Legal Standards
A. Renewed Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law
Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 50, district courts may set aside a jury verdict as a matter
of law if a reasonable jury would not have had a legally sufficient evidentiary basis to
support the verdict. Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(a), (b). A “party cannot raise arguments in its post-
trial motion for judgment as a matter of law under Rule 50(b) that it did not raise in its pre-
verdict Rule 50(a) motion.” OTR Wheel Eng’g, Inc. v. W. Worldwide Servs., Inc., 897 F.3d
1008, 1016 (9th Cir. 2018) (quoting Freund v. Nycomed Amersham, 347 F.3d 752, 761
(9th Cir. 2003)). “A renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law should be granted if
the evidence permits only one conclusion and that conclusion is contrary to the jury’s
verdict.” Martin v. California Dep’t of Veterans Affs., 560 F.3d 1042, 1046 (9th Cir. 2009)
(citing Pavao v. Pagay, 307 F.3d 915, 918 (9th Cir. 2002)).
Conversely, a “jury’s verdict must be upheld if it is supported by substantial
evidence that is adequate to support the jury’s findings, even if contrary findings are also
possible.” Escriba v. Foster Poultry Farms, Inc., 743 F.3d 1236, 1242 (9th Cir. 2014)
(citing Harper v. City of Los Angeles, 533 F.3d 1010, 1021 (9th Cir. 2008)). “In making
this determination, the court must not weigh the evidence, but should simply ask whether
the plaintiff has presented sufficient evidence to support the jury’s conclusion.” Harper,
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553 F.3d at 1021 (citing Johnson v. Paradise Valley Unified Sch. Dist., 251 F.3d 1222,
1227-28 (9th Cir. 2001)). The Court must review the evidentiary record “in the light most
favorable to the nonmoving party, draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-
mover, and disregard all evidence favorable to the moving party that the jury is not required
to believe.” Id. While reviewing motions for judgment as a matter of law, the Court always
remains conscious that the “jury is the ‘constitutional tribunal provided for trying facts in
courts of law.’” Id. (quoting Berry v. United States, 312 U.S. 450, 453 (1941)).
B. New Trial
The Court may grant a new trial “after a jury trial, for any reason for which a new
trial has heretofore been granted in an action at law in federal court.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
59(a)(1)(A). Recognized grounds for a new trial “include, but are not limited to, claims
‘that the verdict is against the weight of the evidence, that the damages are excessive, or
that, for other reasons, the trial was not fair to the party moving.’” Molski v. M.J. Cable,
Inc., 481 F.3d 724, 729 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Duncan, 311
U.S. 243, 251 (1940)). The Court “may grant a new trial only if the verdict is contrary to
the clear weight of the evidence, is based upon false or perjurious evidence, or to prevent
a miscarriage of justice.” Passantino v. Johnson & Johnson Consumer Prods., Inc., 212
F.3d 493, 510 n.15 (9th Cir. 2000) (citation omitted). Unlike a Rule 50 motion, a district
court reviewing a motion for a new trial has “the duty, to weigh the evidence as [the Court]
saw it, and to set aside the verdict of the jury, even though supported by substantial
evidence,” where the Court believes “the verdict is contrary to the clear weight of the
evidence, or” to prevent a miscarriage of justice. Murphy v. City of Long Beach, 914 F.2d
183, 187 (9th Cir. 1990) (quoting Moist Cold Refrigerator Co. v. Lou Johnson Co., 249
F.2d 2246, 256 (9th Cir. 1957), cert denied, 356 U.S. 968 (1958)). “[E]rroneous jury
instructions, as well as the failure to give adequate instructions, are also bases for a new
trial.” Id. (citations omitted).
III. Analysis
A. Renewed Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law
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Defendant contends no reasonable jury could have found that Plaintiff had met his
burden of proof because no proffered comparator was similarly situated. Defendant does
not challenge the jury instruction defining similarly situated employees but rather contends
there was insufficient evidence as a matter of law to conclude that similarly situated
employees outside Plaintiff’s race or color were treated more favorably.
“Similarly situated” is broadly defined: other employees are similarly situated to the
plaintiff when they have similar jobs and display similar conduct. Here, there was sufficient
evidence for the jury to conclude that similarly situated employees outside Plaintiff’s race
or color were treated more favorably.
1. Plaintiff provided sufficient evidence for a jury to conclude that there was a
comparator with a similar job
Defendant contends that none of the proffered comparators were similarly situated
because Plaintiff was the only person acting as the Stamp Custodian.2 However,
Defendant’s contention that a comparator must have a job “bordering on identical” to the
plaintiff misstates the requirement for similarly situated comparators: similarly situated
means having a similar job and displaying similar conduct. To accept Defendant’s
definition exceeds the requirements of this standard and would ensure that no employee
who is the only person holding a particular position or fulfilling a particular function can
ever prove discrimination.
Plaintiff’s position was that of a station supervisor. The other proffered comparators,
Manager Cook, Manager Collins, and Supervisor White, were two station managers and
another station supervisor. Supervisor White and Plaintiff both held the position of station
supervisor; it is more than just reasonable to conclude that they had similar jobs. At trial,
Postmaster Tina Sweeney testified that as a station supervisor, Plaintiff “managed retail
delivery operations in his station, managing clerks, carriers, custodians, retail operations,
anything to do with the station” (Trial Day 3 Transcript, page 104) and that making sure
there is a Stamp Custodian within a station is “all EAS’s responsibility, not just the
2 It is uncontested that Plaintiff was not, in fact, the Stamp Custodian.
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manager,” with no “bright line distinction between the manager being responsible for
appointing and ensuring that the stamp custodian takes ownership of the stock and the
supervisors responsibility to do the same thing.” All managers and supervisors were
executive administrative (“EAS”) employees. Plaintiff’s EAS level was 17, and Manager
Collins’ was 22. Manager Cook, in her prior placement, also held an EAS level of 17 before
she was detailed to serve as the Sunnyslope station manager. Based on this evidence, a
reasonable jury could conclude that Plaintiff’s job as a station supervisor was similar to
that of a station manager.
2. Plaintiff provided sufficient evidence for a jury to conclude there was a
comparator who displayed similar conduct
Defendant contends that Plaintiff was the only person to use Supervisor White’s
credentials to perform stamp transactions and, thus, none of the proffered comparators are
similarly situated. However, this argument inappropriately narrows the definition of
“similarly situated.” Comparators are not required to have engaged in the exact alleged
offense; they are only required to display similar conduct. The evidence presented at trial
showed Plaintiff’s conduct that led to his discipline was behavior that violated security
procedures and circumvented appropriate accountability protocols. While there was no
evidence that other comparators personally used another employee’s credentials, Plaintiff
testified that Manager Collins and Manager Cook instructed him to do so, and Supervisor
White testified that he voluntarily gave Manager Collins his password in violation or or at
least outside of regular security protocols.
Defendant argues that this case resembles Vasquez v. City of Los Angeles. In
Vasquez, the plaintiff worked at a youth detention center, and he was disciplined for
disobeying a direct order from his supervisor by playing a game of football with the youth.
The court found no similarly situated comparators because the other employee who
participated in the game did not know it had been prohibited, and the supervisor’s alleged
offenses were entirely different. Therefore, the court reasoned the proffered comparators
“were not involved in the same type of offense” as the plaintiff and did not “engage in
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problematic conduct of comparable seriousness.” Vasquez, 349 F.3d at 641. In contrast,
here all four individuals engaged in forbidden behavior and failed to follow designated
security and accountability procedures regarding the stamp stock. A reasonable juror could
conclude these actions were similar conduct to Plaintiff’s because they were breaches of
security and accountability procedures.
As such, the jury’s verdict is supported by substantial evidence, and the Motion for
Judgment as a Matter of Law will be denied.
B. Motion for a New Trial
Defendant argues in the alternative that a new trial is justified because (1) the verdict
was against the weight of the evidence, (2) the damages award was excessive, (3) the jury
was confused by the instruction on the business judgment rule, and (4) the jury was
confused by the Court’s dead-locked jury instruction. The Court finds none of these
arguments justify granting a new trial and addresses each in turn.
As discussed above, the jury’s verdict was supported by sufficient evidence to find
in favor of Plaintiff. Each party had adequate opportunity to present his case, and the
evidence presented was sufficient to support a reasonable inference of discrimination. As
such, the verdict and was not against the clear weight of the evidence.
The Court “allow[s] substantial deference to a jury’s finding of the appropriate
amount of damages” and will uphold the jury’s damages award “unless the amount is
grossly excessive or monstrous, clearly not supported by the evidence, or based only on
speculation or guesswork.” Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd. V. City of Monterey, 95
F.3d 1422, 1435 (9th Cir. 1996). The jury verdict awarded Plaintiff $300,000 in damages.
Defendant argues that this amount is excessive and justifies a new trial or remitter. The
jury was instructed on damages thus:
The plaintiff has the burden of proving damages by a
preponderance of the evidence. In this case, damages include
the amount of money that will reasonably and fairly
compensate the plaintiff for the mental and/or emotional pain
and suffering experienced by him as a result of the workplace
discrimination that occurred. It is for you to determine what
damages, if any, have been proved. Your award must be based
upon evidence and not upon speculation, guesswork or
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conjecture.
(Doc. 137 at 18). At the time of trial, Defendant did not object to this instruction, nor has
Defendant argued that it is incorrect. Extensive testimony established the nature of the
events at issue and Plaintiff and his wife, Mrs. Burton, testified as to the impact on Plaintiff.
Plaintiff’s experiences caused stress, depression, uncertainty, and fear, and impacted his
relationships with his family, his enjoyment of life, and his reputation. Defendant did not
argue against the requested damages at trial or offer evidence refuting Plaintiff’s pain and
suffering. The Court finds the damages awarded were not grossly excessive and were
sufficiently based upon the evidence presented at trial.
Defendant asserts that the Court’s jury instruction on the business judgment rule
misstated the law. Jury instruction 15 stated as follows:
An employer has discretion in making legitimate, thus lawful
business decisions. This requires however that the decision(s)
at issue is/are not based in whole or part on prohibited criteria,
such as the Race or Color of an employee.
(Doc. 137 at 17). Defendant argues that this instruction “allows jurors to find pretext if the
jurors believed the USPS employees were racist, regardless of whether the USPS’s decision
was based on legitimate non-discriminatory business reasons.” (Doc. 155 at 17). It is not
clear how this instruction is alleged to have created such a “loophole,” Id., when the
instruction explicitly states that a business decision is lawful when “not based in whole or
in part on…the Race or Color of an employee.” From this, it is not reasonable to infer that
a juror would believe that they could find for the Plaintiff if USPS employees harbored
racial animus even if that racial animus played no role in the decision. The Court finds this
instruction was accurate and did not create jury confusion.
Finally, Defendant contends the Court’s unanimity instruction may have confused
the jurors into rendering a plaintiff’s verdict. However, the instruction Defendant
challenges focused on the jury’s responsibility to deliberate, weigh the evidence, and make
an impartial judgment. The Court finds this instruction did not substantially mislead the
jury. Defendant also takes issue with the Court’s statement that “you cannot reach a
unanimous verdict if you violate your judgment and conscience, and only you can decide
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that.” It is unclear how this statement, as Defendant suggests, may have invited jury
nullification when it specifically instructs that jury that they cannot violate their judgment
to reach unanimity.
Defendant has not shown grounds sufficient to justify a new trial and as such, the
Motion for a New Trial will be denied.
IV. Conclusion
For the reasons given above, the Court finds sufficient evidence was presented at
trial for a rational trier of fact to have found the essential elements of Plaintiff’s claim.
IT IS ORDERED the Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law is DENIED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED the Motion for a New Trial is DENIED.
Dated this 17th day of November, 2025.
Honorable Roslyn O. Silver
Senior United States District Judge
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