Denby et al v. Casa Grande, City of et al

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WO
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA
Pending before the Court is Defendants Engstrom, Robinson, Lapre, Gragg, and
Skedel’s (collectively, “Defendants”) Rule 60 and Rule 37 Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff
Elizabeth Torres and for Sanctions against Plaintiff Denby and his Counsel. (Doc. 321). In
accordance with expedited briefing ordered by the Court, Plaintiffs filed a Response (Doc.
325),1 and Defendants filed a Reply (Doc. 326). The Motion is fully briefed, and the Court
now rules as follows.2
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1 The Court ordered Plaintiffs to file their Response by 5:00 P.M. on April 22, 2026.
(Doc. 322). Plaintiffs’ Response was not filed until 5:35 P.M. (See Docs. 326 at 1, 327 at
3). As a result, Defendants moved to strike the Response in their Reply. (Doc. 326 at 1–2).
Plaintiffs then filed a Response to the Reply, which included a declaration from Plaintiffs’
counsel’s paralegal, explaining why the filing was thirty-five minutes late. (Doc. 327). The
Court will decline to strike the Response.
2 Because it would not assist in resolution of the instant issues, the Court finds the
pending motions are suitable for decision without oral argument. See LRCiv. 7.2(f); Fed.
R. Civ. P. 78(b); Partridge v. Reich, 141 F.3d 920, 926 (9th Cir. 1998).
James W. Denby, et al.,
Plaintiffs,
vs.
City of Casa Grande, et al.,
Defendants.
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No. CV-17-00119-PHX-SPL
ORDER
Case 2:17-cv-00119-SPL Document 329 Filed 04/24/26 Page 1 of 27

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I. BACKGROUND
A. Facts and Procedural History
This case has been pending for almost ten years. (See Doc. 1). The procedural
history is complex, and this action has involved three different Plaintiffs, three amended
complaints, and three appeals to the Ninth Circuit. The jury trial in this case was set to
begin on April 28, 2026, four calendar days from the date of this Order. After Plaintiff
Elizabeth Torres was re-added to this case in the Third Amended Complaint, filed October
9, 2025, the parties engaged in highly contested motion practice about the two Plaintiffs’
abilities to claim damages. About one month ago, on March 24, 2026, Defendants informed
the Court that Plaintiff Torres resides in a memory care facility and raised concerns about
her competency. (Docs. 300-1, 302). The questions about Plaintiff Torres’s competency,
and Plaintiffs’ subsequent course of conduct, have led to the filing of the instant Motions.
1. Factual History
The Court has outlined the facts behind this case numerous times but will do so
again in this Order. This case arises from a search warrant executed in the City of Casa
Grande. (Doc. 256). In the afternoon of December 17, 2014, the Casa Grande Police
Department (“CGPD”) responded to a “domestic disturbance” complaint. (Id. at 4, ¶ 24).
The disturbance involved Abram Ochoa (“Ochoa”), who had multiple arrest warrants. (Id.
¶ 27).
The officers learned that Ochoa fled to Plaintiffs’ residence (the “Residence”). (Id.
at 5, ¶ 30). At the time, Plaintiffs James Denby and Elizabeth Torres, who are brother and
sister, as well as their mother Wilma Logston, “resided at” the Residence. (Id. at 3, ¶ 13).
At the time, “Elizabeth Torres and Wilma Logston were the named grantees listed in the
deed of the Residence.” (Id. ¶ 15). However, Plaintiffs allege that Denby, Torres, and
Logston “all understood and intended that James Denby was the sole owner of the
Residence.” (Id. ¶ 16).
The officers believed that Ochoa was inside the Residence. (Id. ¶ 37). Minutes after
arriving, CGPD requested assistance from the Pinal County Regional SWAT (“SWAT”).
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(Id. at 6, ¶ 51). After one hour, Defendant Engstrom, a sergeant in the CGPD, noticed
movement coming from a tarp in the backyard, but no one investigated further. (Id. at 7, ¶
57–63). Meanwhile, two SWAT teams arrived and used a Bearcat armored vehicle to drive
over a fence and into the front of the Residence, breaking down the windows and doors.
(Id. at 8, ¶¶ 65, 67, 73). SWAT attempted to communicate with Ochoa and launched
chemical munitions into the Residence. (Id. ¶¶ 76, 78). A judge signed a search warrant,
permitting officers to enter the Residence and curtilage for the sole purpose of arresting
Ochoa. (Id. at 9, ¶¶ 79–82). Over the next several hours, SWAT deployed robots, fired
twenty-two canisters of pepper spray and tear gas, and deployed Noise Flash Diversionary
Devices into the Residence. (Id. at 9–10, ¶¶ 83, 84, 95, 98, 102, 104). SWAT eventually
entered the home to search for Ochoa, and during that process, destroyed several items
including furniture, cushions, pillows, windows, window coverings, bathroom mirrors,
shower doors, toilets, televisions, artwork, and antiques. (Id. at 11, ¶¶ 103, 109–15). At
approximately 10:03 P.M., Ochoa was found hiding under a tarp in the backyard. (Id. at
12, ¶ 121–23). He had apparently been hiding there during the entire incident. (Id.).
2. Procedural History
Plaintiffs Denby, Torres, and Logston initiated this lawsuit because of the “complete
demolition and destruction of the Plaintiffs’ personal property and Residence.”3 (Id. at 12).
They filed the case in state court (Doc. 1-1 at 2), and Defendants removed it to federal court
on January 13, 2017. (Doc. 1). The original three plaintiffs amended their complaint twice.
(See Docs. 31, 82).
Plaintiffs Torres and Logston were later dismissed as Plaintiffs, leaving Plaintiff
Denby as the only Plaintiff for a portion of this litigation. On March 29, 2019, the Court
3 Plaintiffs filed the lawsuit against Ochoa, who has not been active in this litigation
since default was entered against him (Doc. 67), as well as Defendants Engstrom,
Robinson, Lapre, Gragg, and Skedel, officers employed by the City of Casa Grande Police
Department or the Pinal County Sheriff’s Office. (Doc. 256 at 2–3, ¶¶ 7–11). The operative
complaint includes three claims: violation of Plaintiff’s Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment
rights, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the Officer Defendants (Count I); failure to
intervene with respect to a constitutional violation against the Officer Defendants (Count
II); and Trespass against Defendant Ochoa (Count III). (Id. at 14–18).
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granted Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Elizabeth Torres for lack of standing. (Doc. 106 at
6–7). The Court explained: “The only fact alleged as to Elizabeth Torres in the Second
Amended Complaint is that she is a resident of Maricopa County, Arizona. Without more,
Plaintiffs have failed to satisfy the Article III standing requirements.” (Id. at 7) (citation
omitted). In that Order, the Court granted Plaintiffs leave to amend the complaint as to
Elizabeth Torres’s standing, but Plaintiffs did not do so. (Id.). On July 13, 2022, Plaintiffs
filed a Motion to Dismiss Wilma Logston as Plaintiff, after informing the Court that Ms.
Logston had died. (Doc. 187). The Court granted the Motion and dismissed Ms. Logston
from the action on July 15, 2022. (Doc. 188).
Between 2018 and 2025, Defendants filed four appeals to the Ninth Circuit.4 After
the Ninth Circuit affirmed the Court’s denial of Defendants’ Motion for Summary
Judgment and the Mandate issued on April 15, 2025 (Doc. 229), the Court set a Final
Pretrial Conference. (Doc. 230).
3. Plaintiff Torres’s Re-addition to the Action
On July 8, 2025, the Court held the Final Pretrial Conference (“FPTC”) in this
matter and set a four-week jury trial. (ME 250).5 In advance of the FPTC, Defendants raised
contested issues of fact and law that Plaintiff Denby did not own the Residence at the time
of the incident and, as a result, lacks standing to assert a constitutional violation. (Doc.
237-1 at 4, 12–13). Specifically, Defendants contended that “Plaintiff [Denby] was not the
owner of the home at the time of this event and, as such, he is not a real Plaintiff in interest
having standing to make a Constitutional claim or to obtain damages.” (Id. at 13). Plaintiff
Denby argued that although Logston and Torres’s names were on the deed, he “was
4 The Court’s January 14, 2026 Order contains a more detailed summary of the
appeals. (Doc. 275). In its rulings on the Motion to Dismiss and Motion for Summary
Judgment, the Court found that the Defendant Officers were not entitled to qualified
immunity, and the Court of Appeals affirmed those decisions. (Docs. 136, 142, 216, 229).
5 The jury trial was originally set to begin March 7, 2026. (ME 250). The case was
briefly reassigned to Judge Liburdi (Doc. 258), and the trial date was reset to April 28,
2026. (Doc. 262). That date remained on this Court’s calendar when this case was
reassigned back to Judge Logan. (Doc. 271).
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responsible for all aspects of the house” and the house “was supposed to be recorded in
Mr. Denby’s name prior to the event.” (Id. at 12).
At that time, Plaintiff Denby also filed a Motion in Limine to address the issue,
asking the Court to exclude all argument, discussion, and evidence relating to the
ownership of the Residence. (Doc. 240). Plaintiff asserted that “Ms. Torres will testify that
it was the family’s intent that Plaintiff own the residence and that his omission from the
deed was an oversight.” (Id. at 2). Further, Plaintiff argued that Ms. Torres’s claims were
dismissed without prejudice, and she could “be made an additional named Plaintiff again
by means of simple amendment to the Complaint with no prejudice to any party.” (Id. at
3–4). The Court denied the Motion, explaining that a motion in limine “is not the
appropriate channel to request the addition of a party.” (Doc. 248 at 9).
On August 8, 2025, Plaintiff Denby filed a Motion for Leave to Amend the
Complaint to add his sister, Ms. Torres, back into the action as a Plaintiff. (Doc. 249). Even
though he believed he has standing, Plaintiff Denby sought “to re-add Elizabeth out of an
abundance of caution and in the interests of justice.” (Id. at 4–5). Plaintiff re-emphasized
that “[Ms. Torres] will testify that it was her and their mother’s understanding and intention
at the time that [Plaintiff Denby] was the sole owner . . . and that his omission from the
deed was a mere oversight.” (Id. at 3). Plaintiff continued to explain:
True to this understanding and intention, on December 16,
2015 [Ms. Torres and Ms. Logston] executed a quitclaim deed
to [Plaintiff Denby] as sole owner of the Residence. Though
that deed was later declared to be invalid, [Ms. Torres] and her
mother properly corrected it on July 10, 2017. However, due
to an inadvertent oversight, the corrected deed failed to amend
the date of the change back to December 2014, the time of the
incident.
(Id. at 3–4 (citations omitted)). Plaintiff Denby further argued in support of his Motion that
no prejudice would result from the amendment because “even if some discovery were
necessary . . . trial is still seven and a half months away.” (Id. at 6).
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The Court considered the request under Rules 15 and 16. (Doc. 255). The Court
found that Defendants would not be prejudiced by the amendment because she did not raise
any new claims, and her ownership of the house was her only connection to the case. (Id.
at 6). The Court also agreed that discovery could be accomplished, if need be, before trial.
(Id.). The Court granted the Motion, and Plaintiff Torres was added to the case in the Third
Amended Complaint (“TAC”), filed on October 9, 2025. (Doc. 256).
After Plaintiff Torres was added to the case, Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss.
(Doc. 267). Relevant here, Defendants argued that Plaintiff Torres’s claims are time-
barred, and therefore she should be dismissed. (Id. at 17). The Court rejected that argument,
finding that Plaintiff Torres’s claims in the TAC relate back to the original complaint. (Doc.
275 at 6–9). Therefore, the Court declined to dismiss her from the action. Defendants also
argued that Plaintiff Denby lacked Fourth Amendment standing to sue based on the damage
to the real property because he did not own the Residence at the time of the incident. (Doc.
267 at 18). The Court determined that Plaintiffs had adequately alleged that Plaintiff Denby
had a possessory interest in the Residence, sufficient to establish Fourth Amendment
standing at the pleading stage. (Doc. 275 at 10). The Court denied Defendants’ Motion to
Dismiss (id. at 12–14), and the TAC remains the operative complaint. (See Doc. 256).
4. Recent Litigation and Competency Issues
After the Motion to Dismiss was denied, Defendants requested a Rule 16 Case
Management Conference and additional discovery. (Doc. 276). After hearing argument at
a status conference, the Court granted the parties a short period of limited discovery, from
February 18, 2026–March 2, 2026. (Doc. 282). During that time, Plaintiffs sought a
protective order excusing Plaintiffs Denby and Torres from depositions (Doc. 286), and
Defendants sought to extend the discovery deadline. (Doc. 287). Recognizing that
Defendants propounded extensive discovery requests, the Court denied the request for an
extension of the discovery period and did not require that Plaintiffs be deposed. (Doc. 294).
In light of Plaintiff Torres’s re-addition to the case, the parties were also directed to
resubmit their joint pretrial documents to reflect the addition of Plaintiff Torres before the
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trial, scheduled to begin on April 28, 2026. The parties did so on March 24, 2026. (See
Docs. 297–300). In the Joint Proposed Final Pretrial Order, Defendants informed the Court
that, in an attempt to serve a witness subpoena on Plaintiff Torres at her last known address
on March 18, 2026, they were unable to complete service but made contact with the
resident, Plaintiff Torres’s daughter, who informed them that Plaintiff Torres lives in a
memory care facility. (Doc. 300-1 at 4). Defendants’ investigator interviewed Plaintiff
Torres’s two daughters on March 20 and 22, 2026. (Id.). The daughter holding power of
attorney, Suzanne Jackson, told the investigator that “her first contact with Denby’s
counsel was approximately 3 months ago during which Plaintiffs’ counsel stated he would
like Ms. Torres to testify, and was told about her residency in a memory care facility.”
(Id.). The daughters also informed the investigator of Plaintiff Torres’s diagnoses of
dementia and Alzheimer’s disease. (Id.). Finally, they stated that “depending on the day,
[Plaintiff Torres’s] long-term memory could be good,” but they could not answer whether
she is competent to testify. (Id.).
Shortly after submitting the pretrial documents, Defendants filed a Motion to set a
competency hearing for Plaintiff Torres (Doc. 302), which the Court granted, and set a
hearing for April 22, 2026. (Doc. 310). In granting the Motion, the Court ordered Plaintiffs
to produce Plaintiff Torres to testify in-person at the hearing. (Id.). On April 15, 2026,
Plaintiffs filed a Motion to Vacate the hearing and informed the Court that after obtaining
Plaintiff Torres’s medical records, they conceded she was not competent to testify at trial.
(Doc. 316). The hearing was vacated (Doc. 317), and the Court ordered Plaintiffs to inform
the Court how they would proceed in prosecuting Plaintiff Torres’s claims given her
incompetency. (Doc. 320).
On April 21, 2026, Defendants filed the instant Motion to Dismiss Elizabeth Torres
as a party and impose sanctions. (Doc. 321). Later that same day, Plaintiffs filed a Motion
to appoint Plaintiff Torres’s daughter, Suzanne Jackson, as a representative for Plaintiff
Torres under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 17(c). (Doc. 323).
///
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B. Medical Records
Along with the Motion to Dismiss and Motion for Sanctions (Doc. 321), Defendants
provided a summary of the medical records disclosed by Plaintiffs on April 3, 2026 and
April 14, 2026 from the Terra Pointe memory care facility where Plaintiff Torres resides.
(Doc. 321 at 2). Those records include over 1,180 pages of documents, and Defendants
provided the Court with relevant excerpts. (Id.). Plaintiffs did not provide any additional
medical records or information in their Response or in the Motion to Appoint a
representative. (Docs. 325, 323). Plaintiffs also do not dispute Defendants’ account of
Plaintiff Torres’s medical history. (See id.). The Court will summarize the medical
evidence before it.
On April 23, 2024, Plaintiff had an MRI of her brain based on complaints of memory
loss and frequent falls. (Doc. 321-3 at 2–3). It revealed findings that “would explain the
memory loss.” (Id. at 3). At a medical visit on October 21, 2024, a provider reported that
Plaintiff Torres did not have decision-making capacity, was positive for memory loss, was
confused “Most of the Time,” and had a memory deficit. (Doc. 321-4 at 11). On November
24, 2024, Plaintiff Torres was admitted to the hospital for three days because of “increased
confusion and agitation.” (Id. at 9). She was seeing a “psych provider” and her daughter
reported at a December 4, 2024 doctor’s visit that Plaintiff Torres “continues presenting
behavior changes that is difficult to manage at home” and the provider discussed a “need
for higher level of care or dementia unit.” (Id.).
On December 19, 2024, Plaintiff moved into Terra Pointe Memory Care, an assisted
living facility, for dementia specific care, with the knowledge that she could not self-direct
care. (Doc. 321-4 at 8, 13). In the Terra Pointe Directed Care Evaluation, Plaintiff Torres’s
medical history was reported to include sundown hallucinating, slamming doors, OCD
history, mobility issues, and that she needs assistance with transfers to the bathroom and
to and from bed. (Id. at 13). Plaintiff Torres required assistance and supervision with
medication administration to the effect of placing her medications in a cup, handing them
to her, and observing her take the medication. (Id. at 14). Plaintiff Torres was determined
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to require full support for oral care, which may include support with physically brushing
teeth, as well “constant supervision with bathroom (toileting) care.” (Id. at 17–18). Team
members were to provide “full assistance” with mobility/transfers, dressing, grooming to
include washing hands and face, and bathing, which requires “physical support for the
duration of the shower/bath.” (Id. at 18).
On January 7, 2025, Plaintiff’s medical provider reported that Plaintiff Torres was
“aware that she is in Arizona but unable to recall other specifics” and was “homebound.”
(Id. at 12). On a July 15, 2025 follow-up visit, Plaintiff’s provider noted that she was
“awake and alert, oriented to person and possibly place, forgetful at baseline.” (Id. at 33).
In a July 31, 2025 treatment note, the provider reported that Plaintiff Torres stated she “was
visiting with her brother today.” (Doc. 321-4 at 43). On October 21, 2025, Plaintiff’s
medical provider noted no acute changes in behavior or cognition and recommended that
Plaintiff Torres “continue in calm/structured environment in locked down memory unit.”
(Id. at 35).
On January 6, 2026, the provider reported that Plaintiff Torres was “[a]ble to
respond to some questions with simple yes/no responses.” (Doc. 321-4 at 36). On February
5, 2026, a medical note reports that Plaintiff Torres “could not remember what state we are
in, which is unlike her” and that she was “fixate[d] on wanting to go home because her
house is so close by.” (Id. at 44). On February 17, 2026, the provider reported that Plaintiff
Torres was “able to state her name; however, she did not respond to the provider throughout
the visit.” (Id. at 39). On March 17, 2026, the provider again reported that Plaintiff can
“respond to some questions with simple yes/no responses” and stated that she is not able
to complete day-to-day activities without assistance.” (Id. at 40). On March 19, 2026,
Plaintiff “continue[d] to repeatedly ask when she can go home, stating her house is ‘only
3 minutes away’ from the facility.” (Id. at 45).
On March 31, 2026, the provider entered an office note based on the request for a
court letter regarding Plaintiff Torres. (Doc. 321-4 at 41). The provider wrote that Plaintiff
Torres is a 75 year-old female “who resides at Terra Pointe [memory care] unit on a 24/7
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basis [due to] increased monitoring required. [Plaintiff Torres] does not have the capacity
to travel or care for herself independently [relating to] her advanced alzheimer’s disease
progression.” (Id.).
C. Plaintiffs’ Representations to the Court
As stated above, the question of Plaintiff Torres’s competency was first raised in
the Proposed Joint Pretrial Order by Defendants, who informed the Court that Plaintiff
Torres was living in a memory care facility with diagnosed Alzheimer’s disease. (Doc.
300-1 at 3–4). Prior to Defendants bringing the issue to the Court’s attention, Plaintiffs had
not raised any issues surrounding Plaintiff Torres’s health or memory. Indeed, in the Joint
Proposed Pretrial Order submitted on June 13, 2025, Plaintiff Denby averred that “Ms.
Torres was dismissed without prejudice, is still living, is available to testify, and with
simple amendment can be allowed to be a Plaintiff again.” (Doc. 237-1 at 13). Further, Ms.
Torres was listed on Plaintiff Denby’s List of Witnesses with the explanation that “[s]he
has knowledge of the condition of Mr. Denby’s property before the incident, how Mr.
Denby lived his life prior, the condition of the property following the incident, the issues
that Mr. Denby has dealt with since the incident, and how Mr. Denby has lived following
the incident.” (Id. at 20).
As stated above, Plaintiff Denby made similar representations about Ms. Torres in
the Motion in Limine (Doc. 240) and Motion for Leave to Amend (Doc. 249). Namely,
Plaintiff Denby averred that Ms. Torres would testify to her and her mother’s belief that,
at the time of the incident, Plaintiff Denby owned the Residence. (See id.). In Response to
Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss the TAC, Plaintiffs did not raise any additional information
about Plaintiff Torres and again stated that she “has been added to the Complaint for the
sole reason that she was the record owner of the Residence at the time Defendants
destroyed it.” (Doc. 269 at 17).
The parties also engaged in a period of limited discovery after Plaintiff Torres was
re-added to the case, during which time Plaintiffs did not inform the Court of any concerns
about Plaintiff Torres’s ability to respond to discovery or testify. Plaintiffs assert that
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“counsel actually met with Torres in February 2026 to develop responses to Defendants’
latest discovery requests” and counsel prepared the responses based on that meeting. (Doc.
325 at 10). When Defendants noticed Plaintiff Torres’s deposition, however, counsel did
not provide any information about her residence or condition. (See Doc. 286). In Plaintiffs’
February 26, 2026 Motion for Protective Order, Plaintiffs argued that “Plaintiffs [Denby
and Torres] are unable to sit for the noticed depositions, as both of their counsel have prior
conflicts in other matters on the scheduled dates and times and it would be impossible for
counsel to meet with and prepare Plaintiffs for a deposition on such short notice.” (Id. at
3).
In the Joint Revised Proposed Pretrial Order, submitted on March 24, 2026,
Plaintiffs averred that Plaintiffs’ counsel “has represented Ms. Torres since December
2016” and “has had no reason to question her competency to testify about the issues raised
in this case and still has no reason to question the same.” (Doc. 300-1 at 5). Plaintiffs further
averred, in relevant part:
[Plaintiff Torres] resides in an assisted living facility and has
been diagnosed with early stages of dementia and Alzheimer’s.
Despite this, Plaintiffs’ counsel still has no concerns about her
recall of the events surrounding this case and prior. Plaintiffs’
counsel has met with Ms. Torres in person recently and without
waiving privilege, do not question her fitness to testify about
the events at issue in this case. Potential accommodations may
be necessary.
(Id.) (emphasis added).6 In the Joint Revised Proposed Pretrial Order, Plaintiffs again stated
that “Plaintiff Elisabeth Torres (sic) will testify that James Denby was always considered
the owner of the property. In fact, Ms. Torres was not even living on the property at the
6 Later in the Joint Proposed Revised Pretrial Order, in discussing the issue of
Plaintiff Torres’s competency, Plaintiffs again contend that counsel “[]has[ ]never had any
reason to question her competency to testify as to the issues raised in this case. Plaintiffs’
counsel has met with her in person very recently, and still has no reasons to question her
competency to testify as to the issues raised in this matter.” (Doc. 300-1 at 20).
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time of the Incident.”7 (Doc. 300-1 at 9).
Next, in their Response to Defendants’ Motion for a competency hearing, Plaintiffs
appeared to agree that there was uncertainty about Plaintiff Torres’s competency and
informed the Court that they were in the process of obtaining her medical records. (Doc.
308 at 2). With that information, the Court set a competency hearing for April 22, 2026
and ordered Plaintiffs to produce Plaintiff Torres to testify. (Doc. 310).
On April 15, 2026, Plaintiffs filed a Motion to Vacate the hearing and stated that
they “concede that Ms. Torres is not competent to testify at trial.” (Doc. 316 at 1). Plaintiffs
included a letter from Plaintiff Torres’s medical provider which stated that Plaintiff Torres
has “severe memory loss, impaired judgment, and lacks the capacity to understand or
participate in court proceedings.” (Id. at 2). Plaintiffs also included a declaration of Plaintiff
Torres’s daughter, Suzanne Jackson, who “holds power of attorney over Ms. Torres’[s]
affairs.” (Id.). In the Declaration, Ms. Jackson avowed that she was “aware of the lawsuit
for the last decade” and she knew Plaintiff Torres was originally a party to the lawsuit and
was recently added back. (Doc. 316-2 at 3). However, Ms. Jackson also declared that she
“did not talk to [Plaintiffs’] attorneys prior to adding [Plaintiff Torres] back to the
lawsuit.” (Id.) (emphasis added). Nonetheless, she stated that she agreed with the decision
and the lawsuit. (Id.). The Court vacated the hearing on April 16, 2025. (Doc. 317).
Plaintiffs remained silent on how they would proceed in prosecuting Plaintiff Torres’s
claims given her incompetency. (See Doc. 316). Their inaction left the case in a concerning
posture, wherein an incompetent Plaintiff, unrepresented in the action within the meaning
of Rule 17(c), could not testify at the impending trial and apparently had not been deposed
earlier in the case. Five days after Plaintiffs filed their Motion to Vacate the competency
hearing, the Court ordered them to inform the Court of how they would proceed with
Plaintiff Torres’s claims. (Doc. 320). Only in response to that Order did Plaintiffs file the
instant Motion to Appoint a Representative for Plaintiff Torres on April 21, 2026. (Doc.
7 This contradicts the allegation in the TAC that Plaintiffs Denby, Torres, and their
mother Ms. Logston all “resided at” the Residence. (Doc. 256 at 3, ¶ 13).
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323). That request came over three weeks after Plaintiffs received the letter from Plaintiff
Torres’s medical provider attesting to her incapacity and only one week before trial.
II. LEGAL STANDARDS
A. Inherent Powers of the Court
“It has long been understood that ‘[c]ertain implied powers must necessarily result
to our Courts of justice from the nature of their institution,’ powers ‘which cannot be
dispensed with in a Court, because they are necessary to the exercise of all others.’”
Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 43 (1991) (citing United States v. Hudson, 11 U.S.
(7 Cranch) 32, 34 (1812)). “These powers are ‘governed not by rule or statute but by the
control necessarily vested in courts to manage their own affairs so as to achieve the orderly
and expeditious disposition of cases.’” Id. (citing Link v. Wabash R. Co., 370 U.S. 626,
630–31 (1962)). “A primary aspect of that discretion is the ability to fashion an appropriate
sanction for conduct which abuses the judicial process.” Id. at 44–45.
In Chambers, the Supreme Court discussed the scope of a federal court’s inherent
power, including the power “to vacate its own judgment upon proof that a fraud has been
perpetrated upon the court.” Id. at 44. The Court emphasized that this power is “necessary
to the integrity of the courts, for ‘tampering with the administration of justice in [this]
manner . . . involves far more than an injury to a single litigant. It is a wrong against the
institutions set up to protect and safeguard the public.’” Id. (citing Hazel-Atlas Glass Co.
v. Hartford-Empire Co., 322 U.S. 238, 246 (1944)). To this end, “a court has the power to
conduct an independent investigation in order to determine whether it has been the victim
of fraud.” Id. (citing Universal Oil Prods. Co. v. Root Refining Co., 328 U.S. 575, 580
(1946)). The Supreme Court underscored that “[b]ecause of their very potency, inherent
powers must be exercised with restraint and discretion.” Chambers, 501 U.S. at 44 (citing
Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 764 (1980)).
B. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11
Rule 11 provides that by “presenting to the court a pleading, written motion, or other
paper,” an attorney certifies to the best of their “knowledge, information, and belief, formed
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after an inquiry reasonable under the circumstances” that the filing “is not being presented
for any improper purpose,” and “the factual contentions have evidentiary support or, if
specifically so identified, will likely have evidentiary support after a reasonable
opportunity for further investigation or discovery.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b) (quoted in relevant
part). Conduct that allegedly violates Rule 11(b) may be challenged by a motion for
sanctions, but the Court also may, “[o]n its own,” order a party to “show cause why conduct
specifically described in the order has not violated Rule 11(b). Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(c)(2)–
(3).
Courts must “exercise extreme caution” when imposing Rule 11 sanctions and
should only order sanctions in rare and exceptional circumstances. Larez v. Holcomb, 16
F.3d 1513, 1522 (9th Cir. 1994). Rule 11 sanctions “must be limited to what suffices to
deter repetition of the conduct or comparable conduct by others similarly situated.” Fed.
R. Civ. P. 11(c)(4). The imposition of sanctions is discretionary. See Air Separation, Inc.
v. Underwriters at Lloyd’s of London, 45 F.3d 288, 291 (9th Cir. 1995) (“Although courts
may impose sanctions . . . they are not required to do so.”).
Statutes and Rules, including Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11, have not
“displace[d] the inherent power to impose sanctions.” Chambers, 401 U.S. at 46. However,
“when there is bad-faith conduct in the course of litigation that could be adequately
sanctioned under the Rules, the court ordinarily should rely on the Rules rather than the
inherent power. But if in the informed discretion of the court, neither the statute nor the
Rules are up to the task, the court may safely rely on its inherent power.” Id. at 50. A court’s
power to impose sanctions under Rule 11 differs from its inherent power. “A violation of
[Rule 11] does not require subjective bad faith.” Yagman v. Republic Ins., 987 F.2d 622,
628 (9th Cir. 1993). Conversely, courts may not impose sanctions under their inherent
powers “without a specific finding of bad faith.” Id. (internal quotations and citations
omitted).
C. Dismissal as a Sanction
In Chambers and Roadway Express, the Supreme Court recognized that “outright
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dismissal of a lawsuit . . . is a particularly severe sanction, yet is within the Court’s
discretion.” 501 U.S. at 44; see also Am. Unites for Kids v. Rousseau, 985 F.3d 1075, 1088
(9th Cir. 2021) (“A district court may, among other things, dismiss a case in its entirety,
bar witnesses, exclude other evidence, award attorneys’ fees, or assess fines.”). The Ninth
Circuit has observed that under those cases, courts have “inherent authority to impose
sanctions for bad faith, which includes a broad range of willful improper conduct.” Fink v.
Gomez, 239 F.3d 989, 992 (9th Cir. 2001). Although “recklessness, without more, does not
justify sanctions under a court’s inherent power,” sanctions are justified for “recklessness
when combined with an additional factor such as frivolousness, harassment, or an improper
purpose.” Id. at 993–94. “Knowingly false representations to the court by a party and his
lawyer on an issue that relates to the matters in controversy also constitutes willful abuse.”
Bridgepoint Constr. Servs. Inc. v. Lassetter, No. CV-16-00078-PHX-JJT, 2018 WL
4539972, at *10 (D. Ariz. Sept. 21, 2018) (citing Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Nat. Beverage
Distribs., 69 F.3d 337, 348 (9th Cir. 1995); Wyle v. R.J. Reynolds Indus., Inc., 709 F.2d
585, 589 (9th Cir. 1983)).
If a district court finds that a party “willfully violated its order(s), or acted in bad
faith,” the court “should not dismiss the party’s case unless the case presents ‘extreme
circumstances’ that satisfy certain criteria established by the Ninth Circuit.” Allen v. W.
Governors Univ., No. 2:25-cv-00325-RFB-NJK, 2026 WL 893368, at *4 (D. Nev. Mar.
31, 2026) (citing Hernandez v. City of El Monte, 138 F.3d 393, 399 (9th Cir. Mar. 3, 1998)).
Before dismissing a case pursuant to its inherent powers, a district court must consider the
following factors: “(1) the public’s interest in expeditious resolution of litigation; (2) the
court’s need to manage its docket; (3) the risk of prejudice to the defendants; (4) the public
policy favoring disposition of cases on their merits and (5) the availability of less drastic
sanctions.” Thompson v. Housing Auth. of Los Angeles, 782 F.2d 829, 831 (9th Cir. 1986)
(citing Henderson v. Duncan, 779 F.2d 1421, 1423 (9th Cir. 1986)). In addition, “[d]ue
process concerns further require that there exist a relationship between the sanctioned
party’s misconduct and the matters in controversy such that the transgression ‘threaten[s]
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to interfere with the rightful decision of the case.’” Anheuser-Busch, 69 F.3d at 348 (citing
Wyle, 709 F.2d at 591).
III. DISCUSSION
A. Bad faith
First, the Court will determine whether it can make a finding of specific bad faith
based on Plaintiffs’ course of conduct in this matter. Defendants argue that since the Final
Pretrial Conference, “Plaintiffs have steadfastly, though falsely and through active
concealment, misled the Court and Defendants as to Torres’ true condition.” (Doc. 321 at
6). Defendants assert that based on Plaintiff Torres’s medical records, “it is clear that [she]
was never competent to be a party to this case, or to testify, ever since the filing of the
August 2025 Motion for Leave to Amend Complaint.” (Id. at 10). Saliently, Defendants
highlight Plaintiff James Denby’s visit to his sister in the memory care facility on July 31,
2025, one week before Plaintiffs filed the Motion for Leave to Amend. (Id. at 6).
Defendants also compare Plaintiffs’ contradicting beliefs that Plaintiff Torres was
competent to testify when the parties submitted the pretrial documents on March 24, 2026,
yet determined to be incompetent six days later, the date of her medical provider’s letter to
counsel. (Id. at 10).
Plaintiffs, on the other hand, aver that they relied, in good faith, on Plaintiff Denby’s
“regular[] and consistent[] report[s] to counsel that Torres had capacity and that he had
never observed issues with her memory of the events at issue” in the TAC. (Doc. 325 at 3).
They argue that they maintained an attorney-client relationship with Plaintiff Torres after
her dismissal from the action, though they do not state in what capacity, and throughout
the representation “maintained regular contact with Torres’ family, including her brother.”
(Id.). They do not explain the contact they had with Plaintiff Torres over the years, except
to say they met with her in February 2026 about the discovery responses. (Id.). Plaintiffs
do not describe where or exactly when this meeting took place, except that it was “just
weeks before the incapacity determination.” (Id.). Their argument centers on the contention
that Nurse Practitioner Calucer’s March 30, 2026 letter “was the first formal determination
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of Torres’ incapacity to participate in litigation,” they cooperated in good faith after that
time. (Id. at 4).
1. Plaintiffs’ Failure to Investigate and/or Communicate with
Plaintiff Torres
The Court finds that the conduct here is tantamount to bad faith because, at best,
Plaintiffs acted recklessly with an improper purpose in failing to inform the Court of
Plaintiff’s inability to participate in her case. Fink, 239 F.3d at 994 (Bad faith includes “a
variety of types of willful actions, including recklessness when combined with . . . an
improper purpose.”).
First, Plaintiff Denby and Plaintiffs’ counsel knew or should have known that
Plaintiff Torres was not competent to participate in the case at the time they moved to re-
add her as a Plaintiff. At the time Plaintiff Denby filed the Motion to Amend the Complaint
on August 8, 2025, Plaintiff had already been living in a memory care facility for over
seven months. When Plaintiff Torres was admitted to the secure memory care unit on
December 19, 2024, she was determined to require full assistance with many daily
activities and had already been diagnosed with dementia and Alzheimer’s disease. (See
Doc. 321-4). Plaintiffs did not provide this information to the Court. According to
Plaintiffs, Plaintiff Denby “communicated with Torres regularly,” (Doc. 325 at 3), and a
treatment note indicates that Plaintiff Torres visited with her brother on July 31, 2025.8
(Doc. 321-4 at 43). Indeed, Plaintiffs aver that Plaintiff Denby “consistently reported to
counsel that Torres had capacity.” (Doc. 325 at 3). Thus, Plaintiff Denby was certainly
aware of Plaintiff Torres’s residence in the memory care facility and Plaintiffs’ counsel
should have known the same.
But by all accounts, Plaintiffs’ counsel failed to communicate with Plaintiff Torres
or her daughter and power of attorney before re-adding her to the case. In the Joint
Proposed Revised Pretrial Order submitted on March 24, 2026, Plaintiffs’ counsel averred
8 The Court has not been provided with visitation records from the Terra Pointe
facility.
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that they met with Plaintiff Torres in-person “recently.” (Doc. 300-1 at 5). In response to
the Motion to Dismiss and Motion for Sanctions, Plaintiffs provided a time frame for that
visit for the first time, stating that counsel met with her in “February 2026” to prepare
discovery responses. (Doc. 325 at 2). They provided no other facts about the visit, including
a specific day, time, or place. (See id.). Based on the information from both parties,
February 2026, six months after moving to re-add Plaintiff Torres to the case, is the only
time that Plaintiffs assert that counsel has actually met or spoken with her.
In addition, counsel did not speak to Plaintiff Torres’s daughter, Suzanne Jackson,
who holds power of attorney for Plaintiff Torres, prior to adding Plaintiff Torres back into
the case. In the Declaration attached to Plaintiffs’ Motion to Vacate, Ms. Jackson declared:
“I did not talk to her attorneys prior to adding her back to the lawsuit[.]” (Doc. 316-2 at 3).
Indeed, it appears that Plaintiffs’ counsel did not contact Ms. Jackson until approximately
December 2025, when counsel “stated he would like Ms. Torres to testify, and was told
about her residency in a memory care facility.” (Doc. 300-1 at 4) (explaining that Ms.
Jackson’s “first contact with Denby’s counsel was approximately 3 months ago”).
The information that Plaintiffs have provided to the Court does not support their
contention that the “attorney-client relationship remained intact at all times.” (Doc. 325 at
3). The Court agrees with Defendants that “[i]f counsel was representing Torres in 2019,”
when she was dismissed for failure to allege facts establishing standing, “they failed
miserably.” (Doc. 326 at 4). Plaintiffs make this assertion about the continuation of their
representation in the same breath as they assert that counsel maintained regular contact
with her family, and they relied on Plaintiff Denby’s reports about Plaintiff Torres’s
capacity. (Doc. 325 at 3). Plaintiffs assert that counsel had no concerns about Plaintiff
Torres’s memory or mental condition, yet they apparently did not communicate with her
and relied on others’ statements about her condition. Plaintiffs cannot have it both ways.
Moreover, Plaintiffs aver that they acted with “urgency and transparency” upon
learning of “the first formal determination of Torres’s incapacity to participate in litigation”
on March 30, 2026. (Doc. 325 at 4). But this characterization of the events ignores
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counsel’s ethical duties to their client as well as their common-sense responsibility to
investigate the mental status of a client who was diagnosed with Alzheimer’s disease and
living in a memory care unit in a “homebound” state. Further, it shows that Plaintiff Denby
and Plaintiffs’ counsel were either completely unaware of Plaintiff Torres’s condition, or
they were less-than-candid with the Court. The Court cannot conceive of how Plaintiffs
planned to present their case at trial and prosecute Plaintiff Torres’s claims, given her
reported inability to, at the very least, leave her memory care unit.9
2. Improper Purpose and Fraud on the Court
At the very least, these facts reveal recklessness with an improper purpose. To
further illustrate this finding, the Court will turn to the law of fraud on the court, based on
which a court may may relieve a party from a judgment.10 Rule 60(b) provides that a court
may relieve a party from a final judgment for, among other reasons, “fraud (whether
previously called intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation, or misconduct by an opposing
party.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(3). “In determining whether fraud constitutes fraud on the
court, the relevant inquiry is not whether fraudulent conduct prejudiced the opposing party,
but whether it harm[ed] the integrity of the judicial process.” United States v. Estate of
Stonehill, 660 F.3d 415, 444 (9th Cir. 2011) (internal quotations and citation omitted).
Fraud on the court requires “an intentional, material misrepresentation in support of an
unconscionable plan or scheme which [was] designed to improperly influence the court in
its decision.” Trendsettah USA, Inc. v. Swisher Intern., Inc., 31 F.4th 1124, 1133 (9th Cir.
2022) (internal quotations and citations omitted).
Here, Plaintiff Denby sought to re-add Plaintiff Torres to the Complaint “after
Defendants raised the issue of his standing due to his lack of ownership of the Residence
9 Plaintiffs do not dispute this contention, and do not provide information about where
counsel met with Plaintiff Torres.
10 Defendants argue that the Court should grant relief under Rule 60(b). However,
Rule 60(b) only allows the Court to grant relief from a “Final Judgment, Order, or
Proceeding.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b). The Court will impose sanctions based on other sources
of authority. However, the standard is assessed here because it provides a helpful point of
comparison for Plaintiffs’ conduct.
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at the time of Defendants’ siege of and damage to it.” (Doc. 249 at 7). Now, Plaintiffs argue
that “Denby is a separate plaintiff with his own independent claims. His claims do not
depend on Torres’ capacity and are not affected by her medical condition. Any dispute
regarding Torres’ capacity has absolutely no bearing on the merits of Denby’s claims, his
conduct, or his right to pursue his case.” (Doc. 325 at 11). This is not true. Plaintiff Denby
has repeatedly argued that Plaintiff Torres will testify as to Plaintiff Denby’s possessory
interest in the Residence. Their mother, the other owner of the Residence at the time, is
deceased. Plaintiff Torres was the only person who could testify to her own belief that
Plaintiff Denby owned the house and her intention to have deeded it to him at the time.11
This testimony is central to his argument that he was the true owner of the house and could
therefore receive damages based on the destruction of the property. (See also Doc. 325 at
11–12 (Plaintiff Torres’s “incompetency potentially hurts both Denby and Torres’ claims
as no testimony is able to be given by Torres.”)).
Plaintiff Denby sought to add Plaintiff Torres to the case to streamline the issue of
Fourth Amendment standing. (See Doc. 249). This in and of itself was not improper, and
the Court granted the Motion with the belief that it would streamline the issues for trial
without prejudicing Defendants. (Doc. 255). But given the revelation of Plaintiff Torres’s
incompetency, along with the apparent fact that Plaintiffs’ counsel did not consult with her
or her daughter, the re-addition of Plaintiff Torres looks like it was part of “a plan . . . to
improperly influence the court.” See Trendsettah, 31 F.4th at 1133. The failure to
investigate and inform the Court of her competency or mental condition harmed the
11 Plaintiffs’ counsel has averred that they had no concerns about Plaintiff Torres’s
ability to testify. But Plaintiff Torres’s purported testimony surrounding the ownership of
the house and the attempts to deed it to Plaintiff Denby is not a simple subject. Plaintiffs’
theory is that Plaintiff Denby was the intended owner in 2014, and that in 2015, Plaintiff
Torres and her mother executed a quitclaim deed to him, but it was later declared invalid.
(Doc. 249 at 3–4). Plaintiff Torres and her mother then corrected it in 2017, but “due to an
inadvertent oversight,” the corrected deed did not amend the date of the change back to
2014. (Id. at 4).
Even for someone who is only in the early stages of dementia or Alzheimer’s
disease, the scope of this testimony, dating back over ten years and involving several
attempts to convey property, should have rung alarm bells.
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integrity of the judicial process.
Although the Court will not make a determination under Rule 60, the fraud on the
court standard shows the improper purpose with which Plaintiffs acted. Seeking to claim
damages for the destruction of the property and to avoid litigation on the scope of his
possessory interest, Plaintiff Denby and counsel re-added Plaintiff Torres to the Complaint.
In doing so, they either completely failed to communicate with Plaintiff Torres and learn
of her incompetency, or they failed to provide the Court with this information. Even more,
this course of conduct continued through discovery, when Plaintiff Torres’s deposition was
noticed. Since Defendants raised the competency issue, there has been a continued lack of
candor to the Court. These actions combined show a reckless ignorance of obvious facts
and an intentional failure to disclose important information to the Court, coupled with the
intent to “influence or manipulate the proceedings” by bringing Plaintiff Torres back into
the case for the purpose of damages. For these reasons, the Court finds that Plaintiffs’
course of conduct reflects bad faith.
B. Imposition of Sanctions
Having found that Plaintiffs acted with bad faith, the Court will impose sanctions
on Plaintiffs. First, the Court will discuss under what authority it imposes sanctions, and
then will turn to the sanction of dismissal.
1. The Court’s Authority
Defendants sought relief under Rule 60 and Rule 37. (See Doc. 321). As discussed
above, the Court will not make a determination based on Rule 60(b) as Defendants do not
seek relief from a final judgment. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b). However, there are several
other applicable sources of authority to draw upon.
For instance, Plaintiffs’ many failures to disclose information about Plaintiff
Torres’s condition throughout the discovery process in response to written discovery
requests and a noticed deposition certainly empowers the Court to issue sanctions under
Rule 37(b). But Plaintiffs’ continuous course of conduct, which has extended far further
than the discovery stage and impacts the merits of the parties’ claims, also provides grounds
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for the Court to exercise authority pursuant to Rule 11 or its inherent powers. As discussed
supra Section II.B, the imposition of sanctions under Rule 11 “does not require subjective
bad faith,” but doing so pursuant to the Court’s inherent powers does. Yagman, 987 F.2d
at 628. Having made a specific finding of bad faith, sanctions would be appropriate under
either source of authority.
First, under Rule 11, an attorney must certify, “after an inquiry reasonable under the
circumstances,” that, among other requirements, the filing is not being presented for an
improper purpose and the factual contentions have evidentiary support. Fed. R. Civ. P.
11(b). Plaintiffs’ counsel repeatedly certified that Plaintiff Torres would testify about
Plaintiff Denby’s intended ownership of the Residence. After Defendants discovered
Plaintiff Torres’s residence at Terra Pointe memory care facility, Plaintiffs’ counsel stated
they met with her and “[did] not question her fitness to testify about the events at issue in
this case. Potential accommodations may be necessary.” (Doc. 300-1 at 5). Again, in
response to Defendants’ Motion for a Competency Hearing, Plaintiffs stated: “Both
Elizabeth and Jim believe, and will testify, that at all relevant times they considered, and
intended for, Jim to be the true owner thereof.” (Doc. 308 at 3).
An inquiry reasonable under the circumstances would have revealed that these facts
were not true. Medical records from the time reflect Plaintiff Torres’s baseline
forgetfulness, lack of orientation, and diminished ability to communicate, sometimes only
answering questions with yes or no responses. (See Doc. 321-4). Even acknowledging that
those with dementia and Alzheimer’s disease may have good and bad days, Plaintiffs’
statements misrepresented Plaintiff Torres’s ability to participate in her own case,
misleading the Court. Plaintiffs’ course of conduct amounts to a violation of Rule 11.12
12 In addition, “[t]hough FRCP 11 does not mention misleading a court in its reference
to improper purpose, the language of the rule makes clear that it contemplates a range of
possible improper purposes . . . and applicable law makes clear that misleading a court is
an improper purpose. Thus, having found as part of the bad faith analysis that [the relevant
party] acted with an improper purpose, sanctions are permissible under FRCP 11(b).”
Disability Rights Or. v. Hathi, No. 3:02-cv-00339-AN (lead), 3:21-cv-01637-AN
(consolidated), 2025 WL 868656, at *8 (D. Or. Mar. 20, 2025).
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Even though the conduct here violates Rule 11, the Court will impose sanctions
under its inherent powers due to the continued course of bad faith conduct at issue. See
Chambers, 401 U.S. at 50 (“[T]he court ordinarily should rely on the Rules rather than the
inherent power. But if in the informed discretion of the court, neither the statute nor the
Rules are up to the task, the court may safely rely on its inherent power.”). The Court has
already found that the conduct at issue here is the kind of “willful improper conduct” that
is tantamount to bad faith. Fink, 239 F.3d at 992. Having authority under its inherent
powers, the Court will determine what sanction to impose.
2. Sanction of Dismissal
Defendants seek the dismissal of not only Plaintiff Torres’s claims, but Plaintiff
Denby’s claims as well. (Doc. 321 at 14–15). Defendants write that “[i]n the end,” they
“will never have the opportunity to hear from Torres about Denby’s assertions, or whether
Torres has any real-party interest in the case or its outcome.” (Id. at 15). Defendants further
explain that Plaintiff Denby’s standing claim “is based, on large part, to Torres’ testimony
over the intent for Denby to be considered the owner, despite the plain language of the deed
operative in 2014.” (Id.). Despite Plaintiffs’ attempts to distinguish Plaintiff Denby’s
claims from Plaintiff Torres’s, which contradicts the stance they took in re-adding her to
the case, Plaintiffs also acknowledge that Plaintiff Torres’s unavailability hurts Plaintiff
Denby’s claims. (Doc. 325 at 11–12). The Court will consider dismissing both Plaintiffs’
claims.
Dismissal is a severe sanction, but the Court has detailed at length the false
representations Plaintiffs submitted to the Court about Plaintiff Torres’s ability to testify
and the continued less-than-candid conduct that followed the revelation that she was living
in a memory care facility. “It is well settled that dismissal is warranted where, as here, a
party has engaged deliberately in deceptive practices that undermine the integrity of
judicial proceedings: ‘courts have inherent power to dismiss an action when a party has
willfully deceived the court and engaged in conduct utterly inconsistent with the orderly
administration of justice.’” Anheuser-Busch, 69 F.3d at 348 (citing Wyle, 709 F.2d at 589)).
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The Court cannot interpret the conduct here in any way that does not amount to deception.
By failing to proactively provide any information about Plaintiff Torres’s ability to
participate in the case—even down to the fact that she lives in a memory care facility and
would not be able to appear in person at trial—Plaintiffs willfully deceived the Court. Even
the failure to offer this information until the eve of trial is a deception that impacts the
parties’ ability to litigate their claims. This deception has certainly undermined the judicial
proceedings and administration of justice.
In addition, dismissal as a sanction comports with due process. This requires the
Court to find that “there exist a relationship between the sanctioned party’s misconduct and
the matters in controversy such that the transgression threatens to interfere with the rightful
decision of the case.” Anheuser-Busch, 69 F.3d at 348. As described above, Plaintiff
Torres’s claims and testimony go to the heart of Plaintiff Denby’s Fourth Amendment
standing and ability to recover damages. Thus, the deception is closely related to the merits
of the case.
Before dismissing a case pursuant to its inherent powers, a district court must
consider the following factors: “(1) the public’s interest in expeditious resolution of
litigation; (2) the court’s need to manage its docket; (3) the risk of prejudice to the
defendants; (4) the public policy favoring disposition of cases on their merits and (5) the
availability of less drastic sanctions.” Thompson v. Housing Auth. of Los Angeles, 782 F.2d
829, 831 (9th Cir. 1986) (citing Henderson v. Duncan, 779 F.2d 1421, 1423 (9th Cir.
1986)). As to the first factor, “the public’s interest in expeditious resolution of litigation
always favors dismissal.” Yourish v. California Amplifier, 191 F.3d 983, 990 (9th Cir.
1999). Conversely, the fourth factor, public policy favoring resolution on the merits,
“clearly counsels against dismissal, especially because [this case] is a § 1983 civil rights
action.” Hernandez v. City of El Monte, 138 F.3d 393, 401 (9th Cir. 1998).
The second factor, the Court’s need to manage its docket, favors dismissal.
Plaintiffs’ addition of Plaintiff Torres to the action at a late stage in the case, as well as the
competency issues, have led to extensive motion practice that has, at times, monopolized
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the Court’s resources. The competency issues were raised to the Court less than one month
before a four-week jury trial, in which issues relating to Plaintiff Torres’s testimony or lack
there-of and Plaintiff Denby’s standing, would be highly contested. For those reasons, this
factor weighs toward dismissal. The third factor, risk of prejudice to Defendants, also
weighs toward dismissal. “In determining whether a defendant has been prejudiced, we
examine whether the plaintiff’s actions impair the defendant’s ability to go to trial or
threaten to interfere with the rightful decision of the case.” Malone v. United States Postal
Serv., 833 F.2d 128, 131 (9th Cir. 1987). There is no doubt that the last-minute discovery
of Plaintiff Torres’s incompetency prejudices Defendants’ ability to defend Plaintiffs’
claims, which have been premised on Plaintiff Torres’s recollection of past events. To
require Defendants to defend these claims at trial next week would be highly prejudicial.
As to the fifth and final factor, the availability of less drastic sanctions, the Court
also finds that this factor weighs toward dismissal. Less drastic sanctions are not available
in this case. Defendants propose that as an alternative to dismissal, the Court could deny
Plaintiff Torres’s claims and award monetary sanctions of their attorneys’ fees incurred in
opposing Plaintiff Torres’s addition to the case and litigating competency. (Doc. 321 at
15). This sanction would eliminate Plaintiff Denby’s ability to rely on Plaintiff Torres’s
ownership of the property to collect damages. However, it would not address the fact that
Plaintiff Denby and Plaintiffs’ counsel failed to inform the Court of Plaintiff Torres’s
condition, and as far as the Court is aware, planned to proceed to trial without disclosing
this information.
Further, the misrepresentations to the Court continued for such a long period of time
that “the Court can only anticipate that, if this action were to proceed, Plaintiff’s and
counsel[’s] deceptive misconduct would continue.” Bridgepoint, 2018 WL 4539972, at
*11. Those credibility issues would compromise the effective administration of the
imminent jury trial. The Court is also concerned that a less drastic sanction would send the
message that a party and their counsel might intentionally fail to disclose facts, continue to
remain silent when an issue arises, and move forward with their claims nonetheless. It is
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especially important because the facts here involve a vulnerable person whose addition into
the litigation, unbeknownst to her, conferred a benefit upon the other Plaintiff. This
decision is not made lightly, but lesser sanctions are not sufficient based on these facts. See
also Henderson, 779 F.2d at 1424 (“The district court need not exhaust every sanction short
of dismissal before finally dismissing a case, but must explore possible and meaningful
alternatives.”). The Court will dismiss this action in its entirety.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, the Court has found that Plaintiffs acted in bad faith
and deceived the Court as to Plaintiff Torres’s ability to testify and participate in this action.
The Court has considered the appropriate sanctions pursuant to its inherent authority and
determined that dismissal of the case in its entirety, though drastic, is the only appropriate
sanction. Therefore, Defendants’ Rule 60 and Rule 37 Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff
Elizabeth Torres and For Sanctions Against Plaintiff Denby and His Counsel (Doc. 321) is
granted to the extent that this Order grants the request for the sanction of dismissal.13
Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED that Defendants’ Rule 60 and Rule 37 Motion to Dismiss
Plaintiff Elizabeth Torres and For Sanctions Against Plaintiff Denby and His Counsel
(Doc. 321) is granted, consistent with this Order.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendants’ Motion to Strike contained in
Defendants’ Reply in Support of their Motion (Doc. 326) is denied.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED dismissing this case in its entirety.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that all other pending Motions are denied as moot.
///
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13 Because this action will be dismissed, all other pending Motions will be denied as
moot.
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IT IS FINALLY ORDERED directing the Clerk of Court to enter final judgment
accordingly and terminate this action accordingly.
Dated this 24th day of April, 2026.
Honorable Steven P. Logan
United States District Judge
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