McCoy v. Chapmond et al

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS
HOT SPRINGS DIVISION
TANA McCOY 	PLAINTIFF
v. 	Civil No. 6:24-cv-06125
HOT SPRINGS POLICE
DEPARTMENT, et al 	DEFENDANTS
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
OF THE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Before the Court is Defendant Bill Bryant’s in his official capacity as Director of Arkansas
State Police (“Bryant), and Ron Casey’s, in his official capacity as Corporal of the Arkansas State
Police (“Casey”) Motion to Dismiss. 	ECF No. 9. 	Plaintiff has not responded to the Motion.
Pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. §§ 636(b)(1) and (3), the Honorable Susan O. Hickey,
Chief United States District Judge, referred this case to the undersigned for the purpose of making
this Report and Recommendation.
I. 	Background:
This is a civil rights action filed by Plaintiff, Tana McCoy, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Plaintiff proceeds pro se and in forma pauperis. 	Plaintiff maintains her rights under the Fourth,
Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments have been violated by the Defendants. 	Plaintiff has named as
Defendants the Hot Springs Police Department and the Arkansas State Police, along with Chief
Chris Chapmond (“Chapmond”), Detective Matthew Cheatham (“Cheatham”), Director Bill
Bryant (“Bryant”), and Corporal Ron Casey (“Casey”) all in their Official Capacities. 	ECF No.
1. 	Plaintiff also named the Office of the Prosecutor of Garland County and Prosecuting Attorney
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Michelle Lawrence in her “Personal” and Official Capacity.0F
1 	Id. 	Plaintiff’s lawsuit seeks
damages as a result of an incident wherein Plaintiff was arrested for operating a stolen vehicle.
Plaintiff claims she was the actual owner of the vehicle. 	Id.
II. 	Applicable Law:
A party may move to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). 	To survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), a pleading must
provide “a short and plain statement of the claim that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ.
P. 8(a)(2). 	The purpose of this requirement is to “give the defendant fair notice of what the . . .
claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007) (quoting
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twonbly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). 	The complaint’s factual allegations are
assumed true and all reasonable inferences are drawn in Plaintiff’s favor, “even if it strikes a savvy
judge that actual proof of those facts is improbable.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555-56. 	The Court,
however, need not “blindly accept the legal conclusions drawn by the pleader from the facts.”
Westcott v. City of Omaha, 901 F.2d 14486, 1488 (8th Cir. 1990).
The complaint “must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to
relief that is plausible on its face.’” 	Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting
Twombly, 550 U.S.). 	“A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that
allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged.” Id. 	“Though pro se complaints are to be construed liberally, see Estelle v. Gamble, 429
U.S. 97, 106, 97 S.Ct. 285 (1976), they still must allege sufficient facts to support the claims
advanced.” Stone v. Harry, 364 F.3d 912, 914 (8th Cir.2004).
1 The Court has dismissed all claims against Defendants Lawrence, Office of the Prosecutor of Garland County, the
Hot Springs Police Department, and the Arkansas State Police. ECF No. 16.
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III. 	Discussion:
Section 1983 provides a federal cause of action for the deprivation, under color of law, of
a citizen’s “rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws” of the United
States. 	To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that (1) each defendant
acted under color of state law and that (2) he or she violated a right secured by the constitution.
West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42 (1988); Dunham v. Wadley, 195 F.3d 1007, 1009 (8th Cir.1999).
Defendants Bryant and Casey contend (1) sovereign immunity bars Plaintiff's official capacity
claims against them and (2) Plaintiff’s claims should be dismissed for failure to state a claim as a
matter of law. 	ECF No. 9.
A. Sovereign Immunity
Plaintiff only sued Bryant and Casey in their official capacities. 	ECF No. 1, pg. 6. 	“A
suit against a government official in his or her official capacity is another way of pleading an action
against an entity of which an officer is an agent.” Baker v. Chisom, 501 F.3d 920, 925 (8th Cir.
2007) (citing Monell v. Dep't of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 690 n.55, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d
611 (1978)). 	In this case, Bryant and Casey, as employees of the Arkansas State Police, are agents
of the State of Arkansas. 	However, “[n]either a state nor its officials acting in their official
capacities are ‘persons’ under § 1983” when sued for money damages. 	Will v. Mich. Dep't of State
Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71, 109 S.Ct. 2304, 105 L.Ed.2d 45 (1989). 	Thus, state officials may only
be sued in their official capacities for prospective injunctive relief. 	Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123,
157-60, 28 S.Ct. 441, 52 L.Ed. 714 (1908); Fond du Lac Band of Chippewa Indians v. Carlson,
68 F.3d 253, 255 (8th Cir. 1995) (“Ex parte Young recognized that suits may be brought in federal
court against state officials in their official capacities for prospective injunctive relief to prevent
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future violations of federal law.”). 	Here, Plaintiff requests money damages for relief. 	Because
money damages are not available against Bryant and Casey in their official capacities as employees
of the Arkansas State Police, Plaintiff's official capacity claims against Bryant and Casey fail as a
matter of law.
Exceptions to the reach of the Eleventh Amendment exist only when the state has
unequivocally waived its immunity or Congress has abrogated the immunity. 	Hutto v. Finney,
437 U.S. 678, 693 (1978). 	The State of Arkansas has not waived its sovereign immunity. 	See
e.g., Hadley v. North Ark. Cmty. Tech. Coll., 76 F.3d 1437, 1438 (8th Cir. 1996). 	Nor did
Congress abrogate sovereign immunity when enacting § 1983. Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332,
345 (1979).
B. Failure to State a Claim1F
2
Defendants also argue Plaintiff’s complaint does not allege any personal involvement by
either Bryant or Casey and therefore must be dismissed under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) for failure
to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. 	In determining whether an action fails to state
a claim upon which relief can be granted, the Court must engage in a two-step inquiry. 	First, the
Court must identify the allegations in the complaint that are not entitled to the assumption of
truth. 	Ashcroft, 566 U.S. 678. 	These include “legal conclusions” and “[t]hreadbare recitals of
the elements of a cause of action [that are] supported by mere conclusory statements.” Id. Second,
the Court must determine whether the complaint states a plausible claim for relief. Id. at 679. A
plaintiff is required to plead facts that show more than the “mere possibility of misconduct.” Id.
2 Although Plaintiff specifically named these Defendants in their official capacity only, the court will
address this argument as if Plaintiff also named the Defendants also in their Individual capacity.
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Plaintiff’s Complaint stems from a traffic stop in which it was discovered her vehicle was
reported stolen. 	ECF No. 1. 	Plaintiff alleges her vehicle was wrongly impounded and then
delivered to another individual who forged a title transferring ownership of the vehicle to himself.
Id. 	Plaintiff seeks damages for replacement of her vehicle, lost wages, punitive damages, and
pain and suffering. 	Id. 	According to the Complaint, Plaintiff sent multiple emails to Defendant
Casey expressing her concern about the quality of the investigation of this matter. 	ECF No. 1,
pg. 15. 	Plaintiff’s allegation against Casey is that Casey told her that Arkansas State Police would
“not get involved in a local investigation regardless of the level of incompetence, unfairness, or
violations of Constitutional rights of arrestees.” 	Id. 	Plaintiff’s only allegation against Defendant
Bryant is that he “is charged with supervising employees, ensuring adequate training and effecting
policies and customs that directly lead to the violation of Plaintiff’s Constitutional right to due
process.” 	ECF No. 1-1.
To establish a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, “a plaintiff must allege a violation of a
constitutional right committed by a person acting under color of state law.” Andrews v. City of
West 	Branch, 	Iowa, 	454 	F.3d 	914, 	918 	(8th 	Cir. 	2006). 	“Suits 	against 	officials 	in
their individual capacity seek to impose personal liability upon a government official for actions
he 	takes 	under 	color 	of 	state 	law.” 	Handt 	v. 	Lynch, 	681 	F.3d 	939, 	943 	(8th 	Cir.
2012) (quoting Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165 (1985)). 	To establish liability against
officials in their individual capacity, “the plaintiff must show that the official, acting under color
of state law caused the deprivation of a federal right.” Id. at 943 (citing Graham, 473 U.S. at 166)
(emphasis 	added); see 	also Mayorga 	v. 	Missouri, 	442 	F.3d 	1128, 	1132 	(8th 	Cir.
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2006) (“Liability under § 1983 requires 	a 	causal 	link 	to, 	and 	direct 	responsibility 	for, 	the
deprivation of rights.”).
In reviewing the Complaint, Plaintiff fails to allege that either Bryant or Casey had any
direct involvement in the incident giving rise to her alleged claims. 	At best her claims against
these Defendants are limited to an allegation of failing to control or supervise the post-incident
investigation. 	A claim of deprivation of a constitutional right cannot be based on a respondeat
superior theory of liability. 	See Monell v. New York City Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694
(1978). “[A] supervisor is not vicariously liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for an employee's
unconstitutional activity.” White v. Holmes, 21 F.3d 277, 280 (8th Cir. 1994). 	Supervisors can
“incur liability ... for their personal involvement in a constitutional violation, or when their
corrective inaction amounts to deliberate indifference or tacit authorization of the violative
practices.” Langford v. Norris, 614 F.3d 445, 460 (8th Cir. 2010).
Here, Plaintiff did not allege Defendants Bryant or Casey were present or involved in this
incident when it occurred. Nor does she allege that the Defendants had notice that any training
procedures and supervision were inadequate and likely to result in a constitutional violation.
IV. 	Conclusion:
Accordingly, I recommend Defendants Bryant and Casey’s Motion to Dismiss (ECF No.
9) be GRANTED and Plaintiff's case be DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE against them.
The parties have fourteen (14) days from receipt of the Report and Recommendation
in which to file written objections pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). 	The failure to file
timely objections may result in waiver of the right to appeal questions of fact. 	The parties
are reminded that objections must be both timely and specific to trigger de novo review by
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the district court.
DATED this 21st day of November 2024.
/s/ Barry A. Bryant
HON. BARRY A. BRYANT
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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