McCoy v. Chapmond et al

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS
HOT SPRINGS DIVISION
TANA McCOY 	PLAINTIFF
v. 	Civil No. 6:24-cv-06125
HOT SPRINGS POLICE
DEPARTMENT, et al 	DEFENDANTS
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
OF THE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
This is a civil rights action filed by Plaintiff, Tana McCoy, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Plaintiff proceeds pro se and in forma pauperis. 	Plaintiff maintains her rights under the Fourth,
Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments have been violated by the Defendants.
Plaintiff filed a Complaint on September 16, 2024. 	ECF No. 1. 	The case is before the
Court for preservice screening under the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). 	Pursuant to the
provisions of 28 U.S.C. §§ 636(b)(1) and (3), the Honorable Susan O. Hickey, Chief United States
District Judge, referred this case to the undersigned for the purpose of making this Report and
Recommendation.
I. 	Background:
Plaintiff has named as Defendants the Hot Springs Police Department and the Arkansas
State Police, along with Chief Chris Chapmond (“Chapmond”), Detective Matthew Cheatham
(“Cheatham”), Director Bill Bryant (“Bryant”), and Corporal Ron Casey (“Casey”) all in their
Official Capacities. 	ECF No. 1. 	Plaintiff also named the Office of the Prosecutor of Garland
County and Prosecuting Attorney Michelle Lawrence in her “Personal” and Official Capacity. 	Id.
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Plaintiff’s lawsuit seeks damages as a result of an incident wherein Plaintiff was arrested for
operating a stolen vehicle. 	Plaintiff claims she was the actual owner of the vehicle. 	Id.
II. 	Applicable Law:
Under the § 1915(e)(2)(B), the Court is obligated to screen the case prior to service of
process being issued. 	The Court must dismiss a complaint, or any portion of it, if it contains
claims that: (1) are frivolous, malicious, or fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted;
or, (2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 	28 U.S.C. §
1915(e)(2)(B).
A claim is frivolous if “it lacks an arguable basis either in law or fact.” 	Neitzke v.
Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). 	A claim fails to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted if it does not allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). 	“In evaluating whether a pro se plaintiff
has asserted sufficient facts to state a claim, we hold ‘a pro se complaint, however inartfully
pleaded . . . to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.’” 	Jackson v.
Nixon, 747 F.3d 537, 541 (8th Cir. 2014) (quoting Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007)).
However, even a pro se plaintiff must allege specific facts sufficient to support a claim. 	Martin
v. Sargent, 780 F.2d 1334, 1337 (8th Cir. 1985).
III. 	Discussion:
Section 1983 provides a federal cause of action for the deprivation, under color of law, of
a citizen’s “rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws” of the United
States. 	To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that (1) each defendant
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acted under color of state law and that (2) he or she violated a right secured by the constitution.
West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42 (1988); Dunham v. Wadley, 195 F.3d 1007, 1009 (8th Cir.1999).
A. Prosecutorial Immunity
Plaintiff's claims against Office of the Prosecutor of Garland County and Prosecuting
Attorney Michelle Lawrence must be dismissed because prosecutors are immune from suit when
acting within the scope of their job as a prosecutor. The United States Supreme Court in Imbler v.
Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 431 (1976), established the absolute immunity of a prosecutor from a
civil suit for damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 “in initiating a prosecution and in presenting the
State's case.” Id. at 427. This immunity extends to all acts that are “intimately associated with the
judicial phase of the criminal process.” Id. at 430; see also Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259
(1993) (Prosecutor acting as an advocate for the state in a criminal prosecution is entitled to
absolute immunity). Here, Plaintiff's factual allegations against the prosecutors are for their
actions in acting as an advocate for the state. Thus, Plaintiff's claims against them must be
dismissed.
Furthermore, the Prosecutors’ Office is not a person or legal entity subject to suit
under § 1983. 	See Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989) (“neither a State
nor its officials acting in their official capacity are persons under § 1983”); Ketchum v. City of
West Memphis, Ark., 974 F.2d 81, 82 (8th Cir. 1992) (stating that “departments or subdivisions”
of local government are not “entities suable as such”); Zapata v. Public Defenders Office, 252 Fed.
Appx. 237, 239 (10th Cir. 2007) (public defenders’ office is not a person subject to suit
under § 1983); Dingman v. Barron, Case No. 5:13-cv-05117, 2014 WL 584757, * (W.D. Ark. Feb.
13, 2014).
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B. Sovereign Immunity
The Court turns to consideration of the official capacity claims against Defendant Michelle
Lawrence. 	In Arkansas, prosecuting attorneys are officers of the state. Ark. Const. amend. 80, §
20. 	“[A] suit against a state official in his or her official capacity is not a suit against the official
but rather is a suit against the official's office. 	As such, it is no different from a suit against the
state itself.” Will v. Michigan Dep't. of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989) (citation omitted).
The Eleventh Amendment provides that “[t]he Judicial power of the United States shall not
be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against any one of
the United States.” U.S. Const. amend XI. 	“The Eleventh Amendment confirms the sovereign
status of the States by shielding them from suits by individuals absent their consent.” Frew ex
re. Frew v. Hawkins, 540 U.S. 431, 437 (2004). 	“Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence is well-
settled: ‘a suit by private parties seeking to impose a liability which must be paid from public funds
in the state treasury is barred by the Eleventh Amendment.’ ” Burk v. Beene, 948 F.2d 489, 492
(8th Cir. 1991) (quoting Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 663 (1974)).
This bar exists whether the relief sought is legal or equitable. Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S.
265, 276 (1986). 	Furthermore, “neither a State nor its officials acting in their official capacity are
‘persons’ under § 1983.” Will, 491 U.S. at 71.
Exceptions to the reach of the Eleventh Amendment exist only when the state has
unequivocally waived its immunity or Congress has abrogated the immunity. 	Hutto v. Finney,
437 U.S. 678, 693 (1978). 	The State of Arkansas has not waived its sovereign immunity. 	See
e.g., Hadley v. North Ark. Cmty. Tech. Coll., 76 F.3d 1437, 1438 (8th Cir. 1996). 	Nor did
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Congress abrogate sovereign immunity when enacting § 1983. Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332,
345 (1979). 	The official capacity claims against Defendant Michelle Lawrence are barred by the
Eleventh Amendment.
C. Claims Against the Hot Springs Police Department and Arkansas State Police
The Hot Springs Police Department and Arkansas State Police are not considered to be
persons or legal entities subject to suit. 	See e.g., Ketchum v. City of West Memphis, 974 F.2d 81,
82 (8th Cir. 1992) (police department not a juridical entity suable as such); In re Scott County
Master Docket, 672 F. Supp. 1152, 1163 n. 1 (D. Minn. 1987) (sheriff's department is not a legal
entity subject to suit), aff'd, Myers v. Scott County, 868 F.2d 1017 (8th Cir. 1989). Plaintiff’s
claims against the Hot Springs Police Department and Arkansas State Police are subject to
dismissal.
D. Officer Claims
At this stage of the case, the Court need only determine whether Plaintiff has alleged
sufficient factual matter to assert “plausible” claims against Defendants Chapmond, Cheatham,
Bryant, and Casey all in their Official Capacities. 	The Court believes that plausible claims have
been stated against these Defendants.
IV. 	Conclusion:
For the reasons stated above, I recommend the following:
(1) That the individual capacity claims against Defendant Lawrence be dismissed on the
grounds she is immune from suit.
(2) That the official capacity claims against Defendant Lawrence, be dismissed as they are
barred by the Eleventh Amendment. And,
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(3) That the claims against Defendants Office of the Prosecutor of Garland County, the Hot
Springs Police Department, and the Arkansas State Police, be dismissed as they are not legal
entities subject to suit.
Adoption of these recommendations would result in the dismissal of all claims against
Defendants Lawrence, Office of the Prosecutor of Garland County, the Hot Springs Police
Department, and the Arkansas State Police. 	Only the claims against Defendants Chapmond,
Cheatham, Bryant, and Casey remain for further resolution. 	By separate order, the Complaint
will be served upon them.
The parties have fourteen (14) days from receipt of the Report and Recommendation
in which to file written objections pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). 	The failure to file
timely objections may result in waiver of the right to appeal questions of fact. 	The parties
are reminded that objections must be both timely and specific to trigger de novo review by
the district court.
DATED this 3rd day of October 2024.
/s/ Barry A. Bryant
HON. BARRY A. BRYANT
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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